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Abstract 
 
Autism is a global epidemic. An estimated 1 in 40 children in Australia, 1 in 64 children 
in the U.K., and 1 in 36 children in the U.S. have an autism spectrum disorder (ASD). 
This is an enormous increase from the first known autism prevalence study in the U.S. 
in 1970, that established an autism prevalence rate of less than 1 per 10,000. Several 
studies have shown that changes in diagnostic criteria account for only a small fraction 
of the increased prevalence. Families of children on the spectrum face extraordinary 
additional expenses and decreased earnings as one parent often becomes a caregiver. 
Autism cost the U.S. $268 billion (1.5% of GDP) in 2015; if autism continues to 
increase at its current rate, autism will cost the U.S. over $1 trillion (3.6% of GDP) in 
2025 (as a point of comparison, U.S. Defense Department spending is 3.1% of GDP). 
Over the last decade, several groups of leading epidemiologists, doctors, and public 
health experts have published consensus statements declaring that toxicants in the 
environment are contributing to the rising prevalence of neurodevelopmental disorders 
including autism. Beyond the consensus statements, a range of independent researchers 
have identified many additional factors that appear to increase autism risk. Given rising 
prevalence rates and the extraordinary impacts of ASD on individuals, families, and 
communities, what explains why public health authorities, thus far, have failed to ban or 
restrict toxicants that have been shown to increase autism risk? I argue that autism is not 
only a public health issue, it also represents a crisis of political economy. In this thesis I 
will show that: capitalism has transformed science and medicine from a focus on use 
values to a focus on exchange values; regulation is largely a reflection of political power 
not scientific evidence; and cultural and financial capture are blocking the sorts of 
regulatory responses that are necessary to stop the autism epidemic.  
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Glossary 
 
allostatic load: ‘The sum total of stressors and burdens on the body’ (Herbert & Sage, 
2013a).  
 
astroturf: ‘2. fig. orig. Politics. Simulated or artificially created public or grass-roots 
support for a policy, product, movement, etc., generated by an organized campaign; cf. 
astroturfing n. 2. Frequently attributive, as Astroturf lobbying, Astroturf movement, etc.’ 
(OED). 
 
bioaccumulation: ‘Progressive increase in the concentration of a chemical compound 
in an organism, organ, or tissue when the rate of uptake exceeds the rate of excretion or 
metabolism.... Bioaccumulation occurs within a trophic (food chain) level’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
biomagnification: ‘Sequence of processes in an ecosystem by which higher 
concentrations (e.g., of a persistent toxic substance) are attained in organisms at higher 
levels in the food chain... Biomagnification occurs across trophic (food chain) levels’ 
(Porta, 2014). 
 
black box warning: ‘A type of advisory notice printed (usually within a heavy black 
border) on the packaging of or insert accompanying certain prescription drugs, warning 
of potentially dangerous or fatal side effects. A black box warning is the strongest 
advisory issued by the American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on medications. 
A similar type of warning is issued by the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration 
(TGA)’ (OED). 
 
case series: ‘A collection of subjects (usually, patients) with common characteristics 
used to describe some clinical, pathophysiological, or operational aspect of a disease, 
treatment, exposure, or diagnostic procedure’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
carcinogen: ‘A physical, chemical, or biological agent that may induce or otherwise 
participate in the causation of cancer’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
 xiii 
cohort study: ‘The analytic epidemiological study in which subsets of a defined 
population can be identified who are, have been, or in the future may be exposed or not 
exposed — or exposed in different degrees — to a factor or factors hypothesized to 
influence the occurrence of a given outcome. A common feature of a cohort study is 
comparison of incidences in groups that differ in exposure levels’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
confidence interval: ‘The conventional form of an interval estimate in frequentist 
statistics. If the underlying statistical model is correct and there is no bias, a confidence 
interval derived from a valid analysis will, over unlimited repetitions of the study, 
contain the true parameter with a frequency no less than its confidence level (often 95% 
is the stated level, but other levels are also used)’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
contextual empiricism: An approach to the philosophy of science developed by 
Longino (1990) that treats ‘experience as the basis of knowledge claims in the sciences’ 
while also insisting on ‘the relevance of context’ including ‘the context of assumptions’ 
and ‘the social and cultural context’ surrounding any scientific inquiry.   
 
de novo mutation: ‘A mutation that occurs in one member of a family as a result of a 
mutation in a germ cell of a parent or in a fertilized egg’ (King, Mulligan, & Stansfield, 
2013). 
 
endocrine disrupter: ‘A chemical compound or mixture of compounds that interferes 
with the normal functioning of the endocrine system and the physiological, 
developmental, and (especially) the reproductive processes regulated by it’ (OED). 
 
genetics: ‘The study of genes and their roles in inheritance’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
genomics: ‘The study of all of a person’s genes (the genome), including interactions of 
those genes with each other and with the person’s environment’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
genotoxin: ‘A substance, setting, or process that is toxic or harmful to the genetic 
material’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
 xiv 
hazard ratio: ‘A measure of how often a particular event happens in one group 
compared to how often it happens in another group, over time’ (National Cancer 
Institute, n.d.) 
 
immunotoxin: ‘Any substance that produces an adverse or inappropriate change in the 
structure or function of the immune system’ (Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, p. 
3). 
 
incidence rate ratio (IRR): ‘The incidence rate in the exposed group divided by the 
incidence rate in the unexposed group’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
Mertonian: ‘Of or relating to Robert K. Merton (1910–2003), American sociologist’ of 
science (YourDictionary, n.d.).  
 
mutagen: ‘A microbiological, physical, or chemical agent that raises the frequency of 
mutations above the spontaneous rate. Any substance that can cause genetic mutations’ 
(Porta, 2014). 
  
meta-analysis: ‘A statistical analysis of results from separate studies, examining 
sources of differences in results among studies, and leading to a quantitative summary 
of the results if the results are judged sufficiently similar or consistent to support such 
synthesis’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
neurotoxin: ‘Any substance that is toxic to neurons or to the nervous system’ (OED).  
 
odds ratio: ‘An odds ratio (OR) is a measure of association between an exposure and an 
outcome. The OR represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular 
exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that 
exposure. OR=1 Exposure does not affect odds of outcome, OR>1 Exposure associated 
with higher odds of outcome, OR<1 Exposure associated with lower odds of outcome’ 
(Szumilas, 2010).  
 
Pearson’s r: ‘Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (usually denoted by r) 
is a measure of the degree to which a set of paired observations in a scatter diagram 
 xv 
approaches the situation in which every point falls exactly on a straight line. The 
possible range of values of r is from –1 (when there is a perfect negative correlation 
between the two observations) to +1 (when there is a perfect positive correlation)’ 
(Szklo & Nieto, 2018). 
 
positivism: ‘The philosophy of Comte, holding that the highest or only form of 
knowledge is the description of sensory phenomena. Comte held that there were three 
stages of human belief: the theological, the metaphysical, and finally the positive, so-
called because it confined itself to what is positively given, avoiding all speculation’ 
(Blackburn, 2016).  
 
poststructuralism: A ‘...critique of structuralism, especially as used in critical textual 
analysis, which rejects structuralist claims to objectivity and comprehensiveness, 
typically emphasizing instead the instability and plurality of meaning...’ (OED).  
 
randomised controlled trials (RCT): ‘A clinical-epidemiological experiment in which 
subjects are randomly allocated into groups, usually called test and control groups, to 
receive or not to receive a preventive or a therapeutic procedure or intervention. The 
results are assessed by comparison of rates of disease, death, recovery, or other 
appropriate outcome in the study groups’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
reproductive toxin: ‘Any substance that produces adverse effects on sexual function 
and fertility in adults as well as developmental toxicity in offspring’ (United Nations, 
2011).  
 
risk ratio: ‘The ratio of two risks, usually of exposed and not exposed’ (Porta, 2014). 
 
systematic review: ‘The application of strategies that limit bias in the assembly, critical 
appraisal, and synthesis of all relevant studies on a specific topic. Systematic reviews 
focus on peer-reviewed publications about a specific health problem and use rigorous, 
standardized methods for selecting and assessing articles’ (Porta, 2014).  
 
teratogen: ‘A substance that produces abnormalities in the embryo or fetus by 
disturbing maternal homeostasis or acting directly on the fetus in utero’ (Porta, 2014). 
 xvi 
 
toxic: ‘Poison or poisonous. Any agent capable of producing a deleterious response in a 
biological system’ (Green, n.d.).  
 
toxicant: ‘A poison that is made by humans or that is put into the environment by 
human activities’ (National Cancer Institute, n.d.).  
 
toxin: ‘A toxic substance produced by biological systems such as plants, animals, fungi, 
and bacteria’ (Green, n.d.). 
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Chapter 1 
History, prevalence, cost, and theories of causation of ASD 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
In July of 2015, my then partner’s son was diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum. 
Growing up my mom had been a special education teacher who specialised in working 
with non-verbal children, so I had a passing familiarity with autism. But I had never 
studied it in depth. At first, I was in denial and thought that this must have been a 
misdiagnosis. But over the course of several weeks of talking with my partner and 
others I came to understand that this diagnosis was likely correct. 
 
In addition to the wave of different emotions that arise following the diagnosis of a 
loved one there were troubling signs that this might be part of a larger trend. 
Newspapers seemed to report higher autism prevalence numbers every few years. High 
school friends who had become teachers reported rising numbers of students on the 
spectrum in their classrooms. Friends in my peer group often had children on the 
spectrum. As a graduate student instructor at the University of California, Berkeley, I 
often wrote letters of recommendation for my students. One student who had been 
placed with Teach for America, reported three to four students on the autism spectrum 
in every one of her classes in a middle school in Southern California. She was not a 
special education teacher, these were regular education classes and that was the norm at 
her school. But these were all just isolated reports, I had never seen anyone put together 
the larger picture of what was happening with autism on the macro level.  
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One Saturday, I decided to spend eight hours researching autism. I reasoned that 
political economy has a set of tools for helping to understand the world and perhaps 
those tools could be applied to this situation as well. I was curious as to whether anyone 
had done cost estimates on the impact of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) on families 
and governments. Furthermore, I knew that there was a standard narrative about autism 
in the popular media that has four or five pillars — “it is likely genetic”, “it is not an 
epidemic”, “rising prevalence numbers are the result of better diagnosis”, “we do not 
know exactly what causes it”, but “we know for sure that vaccines are not involved”. 
With access to one of the best libraries in the world and electronic access to almost all 
current scientific and medical journals, I simply wanted to find the study or studies that 
supported each of the pillars of the standard narrative. I wanted to make sure that 
someone (public health officials) had it figured out and that we were in good hands so 
that I could return to my thesis on Adam Smith.  
 
I quickly discovered two very good estimates, one from the London School of 
Economics and one from the University of California, Davis, that showed that costs 
associated with autism are massive and pose an existential threat to budgets in the U.K. 
and the U.S. respectively (I will provide more details on those studies below). And then 
to my astonishment, I discovered that each of the pillars of the standard narrative is, at 
best, incomplete, and in many cases, demonstrably untrue. One day of reading, turned 
into two, turned into three, turned into six weeks of reading about autism twelve hours a 
day seven days a week. I have been researching autism ever since and this thesis is the 
story of what I have discovered.  
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Researching autism, one quickly discovers that every facet of the autism debate is 
fiercely contested. The differing views do not merely represent differences of opinion 
but rather completely different ontologies and epistemologies for understanding the 
world. In this thesis I will endeavour to present the range of views on each facet of the 
debate. But as I will show in the theoretical framework in chapter 2, I think contextual 
empiricism is the best way to approach this material. So within a very noisy debate, I 
think some data and some arguments are more valid than others and I will devote the 
bulk of the narrative to lines of inquiry that I think are more promising, while showing 
why I think they are more promising.  
 
In this chapter I will provide a history of autism (1.1); define autism spectrum disorders 
(1.2); examine autism prevalence in the U.S. (1.3), Australia (1.4), and worldwide (1.5); 
examine the fiscal implications of ASD (1.6); discuss problems with the genetic 
explanations for autism (1.7); explain why rising autism rates are not explained by 
diagnostic expansion and substitution (1.8); review environmental factors associated 
with autism (1.9); explore issues of correlation and causation (1.10); compare how the 
U.S. government has responded to environmental factors associated with autism versus 
other products shown to cause harm (1.11); state my research question (1.12); explain 
the boundaries of my thesis (1.13); and then provide a summary of my argument (1.14).  
 
1.1 A brief history of autism 
 
Spikins (2017) argues that autism is genetic, that some ‘autism genes’ date back to ‘our 
shared ape heritage’ and that other autism genes are over 100,000 years old. 
Furthermore she argues that cave paintings in southern France are so detailed that they 
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could only have been made by people with autistic traits and that autism is likely 
responsible for much of human evolution since then (Spikins, 2017). Donvan and 
Zucker (2016a) point to stories like the Wild Boy of Avignon discovered in 1799 as 
possible early cases of autism; they argue that the first case in the United States was 
discovered by noted doctor and social reformer Samuel Howe in 1846. These sorts of 
narratives are influential in shaping perceptions of autism but they are not necessarily 
helpful in responding to the autism epidemic. While there may have been isolated ASD 
cases in the historical record, these accounts likely overstate the historical prevalence of 
ASD while minimising or ignoring large scale studies from reputable researchers (that I 
will discuss below) that show that prevalence rates started to grow dramatically in the 
20th century, particularly since the early 1970s.  
 
Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler first coined the term autism in 1910 ‘to describe the 
social withdrawal and detachment from reality often seen in children with schizophrenia’ 
(Zeldovich, 2018). A Russian neurologist named Grunya Sukhareva1 provides the first 
documented medical record of a cluster of cases that resemble our present day 
understanding of autism (Wolff, 1996; Manouilenko & Bejerot, 2015). ‘In 1921, 
Sukhareva founded a therapeutic school for children with psychiatric problems at the 
Psychoneurological Department for Children in Moscow’ (Manouilenko and Bejerot, 
2015). In 1925 in Russian and then in 1926 in German, Sukhareva published a case 
series of six boys with a new disorder that closely matches the present day definition of 
an ASD as contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th 
Edition (DSM-5) (Wolff, 1996; Manouilenko & Bejerot, 2015). The article would have 
                                                
1 Груня Ефимовна Сухарева, is transliterated as Ssucharewa by Wolff (1996, 2004). 
Manouilenko and Bejerot (2015) argue that Ssucharewa is a misspelling by the original German 
publisher and that the proper transliteration is Sukhareva. Shorter and Wachtel (2013) also find 
the transliterations Sucharewa and Soukhareva.  
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been noteworthy — a Soviet, Jewish, woman, neurologist discovers a cluster of cases of 
a novel psychiatric condition in children; yet it went largely unnoticed, or perhaps 
simply uncredited, until rediscovered in 1996 by British psychiatrist Sula Wolff. 
 
Most histories of autism begin with Austrian-American physician, Leo Kanner. In 1935, 
Miriam Partridge brought her three and a half year old son David Speck in to Dr. 
Kanner for an examination (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, p. 171). He presented an unusual 
set of symptoms: lack of affective contact, delayed language development, a rigid 
insistence on sameness, a resistance to any change in routine, and an apparent 
preference for playing alone (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, p. 171). Soon Kanner started 
seeing other children with a similar set of symptoms and he wrote that he was seeing a 
‘unique and as yet unreported condition’ (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, pp. 172–174). By 
1943, Kanner had seen eleven children who seemed to fit the same pattern and he 
published ‘Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact’ in the journal The Nervous Child 
which became the first published case series on autism in the English language 
(Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010).   
 
A continent away, Austrian paediatrician Hans Asperger, who had no previous contact 
with Kanner, began noticing children in his practice with a severe lack of affective 
contact (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, p. 193). In 1944, Asperger published ‘Autistic 
Psychopathy in Childhood’ to document this case series of four children who seemed to 
represent a new and novel psychiatric condition (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, p. 193). 
Today, Asperger is generally associated with higher functioning cases of autism — 
where the person has speech but may lack other social skills. Recent scholarship 
(Donvan & Zucker, 2016b; Sheffer, 2018) has revealed that this was not a coincidence. 
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During the Nazi occupation of Austria, Asperger participated in a euthanasia program 
that killed the more severely disabled children in Vienna; the higher functioning cases 
that he documented were from the children who were spared execution based on the 
belief that they could still serve as soldiers for the Reich (Donvan & Zucker, 2016b, pp. 
327–341; Sheffer, 2018).  
 
By 1957, Kanner had seen 120 cases of autism in his practice (Olmstead & Blaxill, 
2010). By training and practice he was inclined more toward psychobiology than 
psychoanalysis but in an article in 1957, he offered up this speculation as to the causes 
of autism, ‘The emotional frigidity in the typical autistic family suggests a dynamic 
experiential factor in the genesis of the disorder of the child’ (Olmstead and Blaxill, 
2010, p. 204). This theory of the case is now completely discredited but it was dominant 
for decades. 
 
In 1967, another Austrian-American, Bruno Bettelheim, made headlines for his theories 
on autism (Pollack, 1997). A survivor of the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration 
camps, Bettelheim emigrated to the U.S. in 1939 and became a professor of psychology 
at the University of Chicago in spite of the fact that his educational background was 
primarily in art history (Pollack, 1997). Bettelheim, amplified Kanner’s theory that 
‘refrigerator mothers’ were to blame for their autistic children; then he took the concept 
one step further to argue that the cause of autism was the homicidal urges of mothers 
towards their children (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, pp. 212–213). Bettelheim was prolific 
and media savvy: he published articles in Scientific American and Ladies Home Journal; 
he appeared on NBC’s Today Show and The Dick Cavett Show to talk about his work; 
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and he received glowing reviews and endorsements by the New Yorker, Time Magazine, 
The Atlantic, and The New Republic (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010).  
 
In 1956, a Navy psychologist in San Diego, Bernard Rimland and his wife Gloria, had 
their first child, a son named Mark; early on Mark displayed signs of autism and was 
soon formally diagnosed (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, p. 202). Rimland began a 
correspondence with Kanner (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, p. 202). Rimland did not think 
that poor parenting was to blame and he began treating Mark with vitamin supplements, 
dietary changes, and other interventions and he argued that they led to improvements in 
Mark’s behaviour (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010). Rimland soon dedicated his life to 
researching the biological factors that might be involved with autism and in 1964 he 
published, Infantile Autism: The Syndrome and Its Implications for a Neural Theory of 
Behavior that explored the physiological factors that might be involved with autism 
(Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010). Rimland’s approach is now called the biomedical model and 
it is based on the idea that autism is caused by a child’s metabolic and immune 
processes and susceptibility to toxicants (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010). 
 
Rimland and Bettelheim battled each other throughout their lives: Rimland built a 
powerful base of parents of autistic children, through founding the National Society for 
Autistic Children (now the Autism Society of America with 50,000 members and 200 
chapters); but Bettelheim, for a time, was more effective at shaping conventional 
wisdom about autism because of his more aggressive self promotion and the receptive 
welcome he received from mainstream media (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010). At the time, 
autism was still considered a rare disorder affecting a very small number of children. 
Solomon (2012) writes that the director of the National Institute of Mental Health, 
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Thomas Insel, ‘recounted a time during the 1970s when an autistic child was admitted 
to Boston Children’s Hospital; the chief of service called the residents together to 
observe him, reasoning that they might never see an autistic child again’ (p. 261).  
 
Sometime between 1987–1990, autism prevalence rates began to increase sharply in the 
U.S. and other industrialised countries (McDonald & Paul, 2010). (I will discuss the 
history of prevalence estimates below.) Clearly there had not suddenly been an 
explosion in bad parenting and the psychoanalytic theories of Kanner and Bettelheim 
quickly fell out of favour. The Human Genome Project launched in 1990 and soon 
autism was socially reconstructed as a genetic condition. One can imagine that the 
genetic explanation must have had a certain emotional appeal — if autism is genetic, 
and the U.S. government is on the case, perhaps soon even rare genetic disorders like 
autism would be treatable. The extraordinary claims coming out of the Human Genome 
Project fed those hopes. However, the genetic explanation for autism has always been 
problematic because, as is often repeated by critical voices in the autism debate, ‘there 
is no such thing as a genetic epidemic’ (Kirby, 2005; see variations on this argument 
from Newschaffer in Barclay, 2005, and Hertz-Picciotto in Cone, 2009). So even as 
public health authorities promoted a genetic narrative that fit existing research programs, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) own sharply rising prevalence 
numbers showed that this could not possibly be the whole story. 
 
Concurrent with genetic explanations for autism, officials at the CDC also promote the 
notion that rising autism rates are the result of ‘diagnostic expansion’ and ‘diagnostic 
substitution’. The idea is that the sharp increases in prevalence rates do not reflect a real 
underlying change in the number of children with the disorder. Rather, children with 
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milder conditions, that in previous years would have been considered just misbehavior, 
are now being classified as autistic (‘diagnostic expansion’) and children who were 
formerly classified with other disorders (e.g. mental retardation) are now being 
classified as autistic (‘diagnostic substitution’). As I will show below, this theory of the 
case has been tested by large scale epidemiological studies and shown to only explain a 
small fraction of the increased prevalence rates; and yet this narrative persists.  
 
In the past few years, autism appears to be going through yet another discursive shift. 
Stephen Silberman, author of NeuroTribes: The Legacy of Autism and the Future of 
Neurodiversity (2015), claims that autism has always been with us, is not an epidemic, 
does not need to be solved, and represents yet another form of difference that should be 
celebrated like homosexuality or left-handedness. The book is popular in both the 
medical community and certain segments of the autism community. In 2015, 
NeuroTribes was awarded the Samuel Johnson Prize, a British honour for the best non-
fiction writing in the English language. In spite of the acclaim for the book, Silberman’s 
argument is not supported by the empirical data that shows sharply rising prevalence 
rates that are only partly explained by increased awareness.   
 
1.2 Present day definitions of autism 
 
As yet there are no biomarkers for autism so diagnosis is made based on observation of 
behaviors. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) provides the definitions and the billing codes 
that are used by health insurers and government when paying for mental health care 
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services in the United States. Autism spectrum disorders are defined in the DSM-5 
according to the following criteria:     
 
A. Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction 
across multiple contexts. 
B. Restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities, as 
manifested by at least two of the following... 
1. Stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, use of objects, or 
speech. 
2. Insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, or 
ritualized patterns or verbal nonverbal behavior. 
3. Highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity 
or focus. 
4. Hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input or unusual interests in 
sensory aspects of the environment (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). 
 
The definition also states that ‘symptoms must be present in the early developmental 
period’, that ‘symptoms must cause clinically significant impairment’, and that one 
should make sure to rule out other possible explanations such as ‘intellectual 
developmental disorder or global developmental delay’ (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  
 
Ozonoff et al. (2018) explain that ASD is usually characterised in one of two ways: ‘an 
early onset pattern, in which children demonstrate social-communication delays early in 
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life, and a regressive pattern, in which children develop typically for some period and 
then experience a substantial decline in or loss of previously developed skills’ (p. 788). 
Early onset (‘from birth’) was assumed to be the dominant mode of presentation but 
more recent scholarship suggests that regression may be ‘more the rule than the 
exception’ (see Ozonoff et al., 2018, p. 788, for a review of the recent literature). A 
third pattern of onset is described in some studies as well, ‘that of developmental 
stagnation or plateau [Shumway et al., 2011], that is characterized by intact early skills 
that fail to progress or transform into more advanced developmental achievements’ 
(Ozonoff et al., 2018, p. 788). 
 
1.3 Autism prevalence in the U.S. 
 
One in 36 American children has been identified with ASD according to estimates from 
the CDC’s Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network 
(Zablotsky, Black, & Blumberg, 2017). This is a 27,000% increase from the first autism 
prevalence estimate in the U.S. that established an autism prevalence rate of less than 
one per 10,000 people in the population (Treffert, 1970). ASD is almost 5 times more 
common among boys than among girls (Baio, 2014). Buescher, Cidav, Knapp, and 
Mandell (2014) estimate that more than 3.5 million Americans live with an autism 
spectrum disorder. 
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Figure 1.1: Increase in Autism Prevalence in the U.S. 1970 to 2017 
 
Source: Handley (2018). 
 
1.4 Autism prevalence in Australia 
 
Three studies show that autism prevalence rates appear to be increasing in Australia. 
MacDermott et. al. (2007) reported a prevalence estimate of 1 in 160 (0.6%) children 
with ASD in Australia. In a prospective surveillance study, Barbaro and Dissanayake 
(2010) reported that 1 in 119 (0.8%) to 1 in 233 (0.4%) Victorian two-year-olds met 
criteria for ASD. Randall et al. (2016) estimated that 1 in 40 (2.5%) of all Australian 
children age four to five have an autism spectrum disorder. The different prevalence 
estimates may reflect different study designs. However, these three studies were 
conducted over an eight year period and given the rate of increase that we are seeing in 
other countries it is also possible that the different estimates may all be correct and 
simply reflect the increased prevalence over time. 
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1.5 Autism prevalence worldwide 
 
The CDC (2018) reports that studies in Asia, Europe, and North America show that 1–2% 
of the global population have an autism spectrum disorder. Prevalence rates vary widely 
by country. Hinkka-Yli-Salomäki et al. (2014) estimate 1 in 189 (0.53%) in Finland; 
Ouellette-Kuntz (2010) estimate 1 in 94 (1.06%) in Canada; Baron-Cohen et al. (2009) 
estimate 1 in 64 (1.6%) in the U.K.; and Kim (2011) estimates 1 in 38 (2.6%) children 
with an autism spectrum disorder in South Korea.  
 
1.6 Fiscal implications 
 
Cidav, Marcus, and Mandell (2012) found that ‘mothers of children with ASD earned, 
$20,479 annual on average’; that was ‘35% ($7,189) less than the mothers of children 
with another health limitation and 56% ($14,755) less than the mothers of children with 
no health limitations’ (p. 617).  
 
A metastudy by researchers at the University of Pennsylvania and the London School of 
Economics found that in the U.S. on average, ‘the cost of supporting an individual with 
an ASD and intellectual disability during his or her lifespan was $2.4 million... The cost 
of supporting an individual with an ASD without intellectual disability was $1.4 million’ 
(Buescher, Cidav, Knapp, & Mandell, 2014, p. 721). Knapp (2014), on behalf of the 
study team, wrote that ‘autism is the most costly medical condition in the UK’; ASD 
‘costs the UK more than heart disease, cancer, and stroke combined’; and ‘it costs the 
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country at least £32 billion per year in treatment, lost earnings, and care and support for 
children and adults with autism’.  
 
Leigh and Du (2015) estimate that autism cost the U.S. $268 billion (1.5% of GDP) in 
2015 in ‘direct medical, direct non-medical, and productivity costs’. They project that 
autism will cost the U.S. $461 billion annually by 2025; but that estimate assumes an 
autism prevalence rate of 1.1%; if autism continues to increase at its current rate, ceteris 
paribus, autism will cost the U.S. over $1 trillion per year (3.6% of GDP) by 2025 
(Leigh & Du, 2015). To put these numbers in perspective, U.S. defense spending in 
2016 was 3.1% of GDP (World Bank, n.d.).  
 
The estimated 70 million people worldwide with autism understates the true impact 
because caregivers are impacted as well. As a point of reference, there are currently 65 
million refugees worldwide from war, famine, and persecution (Edwards, 2016). Given 
current trends, it seems reasonable to conclude that autism could easily reach two per 
cent of global population by 2025 (as shown above, the U.S., South Korea, and 
Australia are already at close to three per cent autism prevalence rates). In the face of 
this crisis, governments have responded by providing medical, psychological, and 
educational support services — which are vital and necessary. But no government has 
yet engaged in lawmaking or regulation to try to ban or restrict toxic chemicals that 
might be associated with autism.  
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1.7 Problems with the genetic explanations for autism 
 
Studies of twins and autism beginning with Folstein and Rutter (1977) suggested a 
strong genetic component to autism. But nearly all of the early twin studies suffered 
from small sample size and flaws in study design. With twins it is extremely difficult to 
isolate the effect of genes versus environment.  
 
Francis Collins (2006), Director, National Institutes of Health, wrote, ‘Genes alone do 
not tell the whole story. Recent increases in chronic disease like diabetes, childhood 
asthma, obesity or autism cannot be due to major shifts in the human gene pool as those 
changes take much more time to occur’. And yet, genetic research continues to receive 
the bulk of federal funding in connection with autism (Wright, 2012; Interagency 
Autism Coordinating Committee [IACC], 2012, p. 16; IACC, 2017, p. 59). 
 
The State of California contracted with 16 of the best geneticists in the U.S. and gave 
them total access to all birth records in the state. The study that resulted is Hallmayer et 
al. (2011) which is the most comprehensive study of twins and autism to date. They 
found that genetic heritability explains at most 38% of ASD cases; in two places they 
explain that this is likely an overestimate (Hallmayer et al., 2011). So at least 62% of 
ASD cases are caused by something other than genes.  
 
1.8 Are rising autism rates the result of diagnostic expansion and substitution? 
 
Many people have looked at the skyrocketing prevalence rates and wondered if perhaps 
they merely reflect increased awareness or changes in diagnostic criteria (e.g. did the 
 17 
change from the DSM-III to the DSM-IV to the DSM-5 result in vastly higher 
estimates?). Others wondered whether the higher rates in states like California and New 
Jersey reflected families moving to those states to take advantage of better autism 
support services. But the evidence suggests that diagnostic changes only explain a 
relatively small proportion of the overall increase in prevalence.  
 
In 1999, the California Department of Developmental Services produced a report 
showing that autism increased in the state by 273% over the period 1987 to 1998 (Byrd 
et. al, 2002, p. 2). In response, the California legislature contracted with the Medical 
Investigation of Neurodevelopmental Disorders (MIND) Institute at the University of 
California, Davis to investigate whether this increase was real or the result of a change 
in diagnostic criteria or people moving to the state to take advantage of better social 
services (Byrd et al., 2002). The principal investigator was paediatric epidemiologist 
Robert S. Byrd at UC Davis and he led a team of investigators at UC Davis and UCLA 
(Byrd et al., 2002). Among the major findings of the study, the investigators concluded 
that, ‘The observed increase in autism cases cannot be explained by a loosening in the 
criteria used to make the diagnosis’ and ‘children served by the State’s Regional 
Centers are largely native born and there has been no major migration of children into 
California that would explain the increase in autism’ (Byrd et al., 2002, p. 5).  
 
Hertz-Picciotto and Delwiche (2009), also at UC Davis, conducted a study to determine 
the extent to which ‘changes in diagnostic criteria, the inclusion of milder cases of 
autism, and an earlier age at diagnosis’ might have contributed to the 600% to 700% 
increase in autism cases in California over the period 1990 to 2006 (p. 89). They found 
that changes in diagnostic criteria explained 120%, the inclusion of milder cases 
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explains 56%, and earlier age at diagnosis explains 12% of the increase — for a total of 
188% (Hertz-Picciotto and Delwiche, 2009, p. 89).2 But remember, Hertz-Picciotto and 
Delwiche (2009) are trying to identify the factors responsible for a 600% to 700% 
increase in autism over that 16 year time period. So these three factors (diagnostic 
criteria, milder cases, and earlier age) combined explain just 26.9% (188/700) to 31.3% 
(188/600) of the total increase in autism over that time period. In a subsequent interview 
about the study with Scientific American, Hertz-Picciotto explained that these three 
factors ‘do not get us close’ to the 600% to 700% increase in autism over that time 
period and she urged the scientific community to take a closer look at environmental 
factors (Cone, 2009, para. 13).  
 
Autism was first included in the DSM-III that was published in 1980. The DSM-IV that 
came out in 1994 added Asperger’s Disorder but it was separate from autism (Autism 
Society, n.d.). The DSM-5 that came out in 2013 merged autism, Asperger’s, and 
pervasive developmental disorders under the umbrella diagnosis ‘autism spectrum 
disorders’ (Autism Society, n.d.). There are sometimes also smaller changes in 
definition between the different editions. A number of studies have looked at whether 
changes in definitions of autism might account for the rising prevalence numbers. 
Croen, Grether, Hoogstrate, and Selvin (2002) concluded that the increase in autism 
prevalence in California from 1987–1994 may have been the result of changes in 
diagnostic criteria. Blaxill, Baskin, Spitzer (2003) identified several problems in the 
Croen et al. (2002) analysis. Croen and Grether (2003) then reversed course and agreed 
                                                
2 There appears to be a typo in the Hertz-Picciotto and Delwiche (2009) article published in 
Epidemiology. On page 89, the earlier age at diagnosis is listed as explaining a 24% increase in 
autism prevalence even though in two separate places earlier in the article (p. 84 and p. 88) 
earlier age at diagnosis is listed as explaining a 12% increase. The author manuscript available 
at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4113600/ shows a 12% increase attributable 
to earlier age at diagnosis (p. 8) so that is the figure that I used. I have written to Epidemiology 
to request clarification or a correction.  
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with Blaxill et al. (2003) that ‘diagnostic substitution does not appear to account for the 
increased trend in autism prevalence’.  
 
Barton, Robins, Jashar, Brennan, and Fein (2013) and Mazefsky, McPartland, Gastgeb, 
and Minshew (2013) concluded that the more precise definition of autism in the DSM-5 
will result in fewer numbers of children diagnosed with autism. Maenner et al. (2014) 
conducted a retrospective analysis of 6,577 children who had been diagnosed with 
autism according to the DSM-IV-TR [text revision between editions] and found that the 
DSM-5 definition would lead to an 11.5% decrease in the number of children diagnosed 
with autism.  
 
There are also questions about how the slightly different definition used by the 
Individuals with Disabilities Educational Act might impact prevalence estimates. 
Although the IDEA was last updated in 2004, it is remarkably consistent with the DSM-
5 (Harker & Stone, 2014). The American Psychiatric Association (that publishes the 
DSM) also works in concert with the World Health Organization and designed the 
DSM-5 to be consistent with the forthcoming International Classification of Disease, 
11th edition (ICD-11) (Regier, Kuhl, & Kupfer, 2013). 
 
1.9.0 Introduction to environmental factors associated with autism 
 
There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that the autism epidemic is being 
driven by toxicants in the environment. There are four overlapping groups of 
environmental factors associated with autism that one can study — known (widely 
agreed upon) environmental triggers (1.9.1), consensus statements about environmental 
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factors linked with neurodevelopmental disabilities including but not limited to autism 
(1.9.2), individual studies of particular toxicants (1.9.3); and studies initiated via activist 
initiated participatory science (1.9.4). There are strengths and weaknesses associated 
with each group of studies that I will explain below.  
 
1.9.1. Known environmental causes of autism 
 
There are four known and widely agreed upon environmental causes of autism — 
‘thalidomide, misoprostol, valproic acid, and first-trimester rubella [also known as 
German measles] infection’ (Landrigan, Lambertini, & Birnbaum, 2012). While these 
factors provide ‘proof of the principle’ that autism can be caused by environmental 
triggers (Landrigan et al., 2012), thalidomide and misoprostol have been withdrawn 
from the market, valproic acid is contraindicated for pregnant women, and rubella 
infections are now rare because of widespread vaccination — so these factors cannot 
explain the sharp rise in autism rates starting in the late 1980s.  
 
Furthermore, Olmsted and Blaxill (2010) provide an important caveat about the 
relationship between rubella infection during pregnancy and autism. They explain that 
congenital rubella syndrome (CRS, the condition that sometimes produces autism and 
other harms in fetuses) was first identified in the 1950s and the standard treatment for 
pregnant women who contracted rubella was injection with gamma globulin (Olmsted 
& Blaxill, 2010). The preservative used in gamma globulin was thimerosal which is 
49.6% ethylmercury, a known neurotoxin (Grandjean & Landrigan, 2014). Olmsted and 
Blaxill (2010) argue that a toxicant plus a virus is sometimes more dangerous than 
either of those factors by themselves; they point to a study by Lock, Gatling, Mauzy, 
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and Wells [1961] that showed that 16% of pregnancies with rubella infection had 
abnormal outcomes, 6% of pregnancies with gamma globulin treatment by itself in the 
absence of rubella infection had abnormal outcomes, and 25% of pregnancies 
characterised by rubella infection plus gamma globulin treatment had abnormal 
outcomes. Recent studies of CRS in Brazil [Lanzieri et al., 2004] and Oman [Al-
Awaidy et al., 2006] did not report any cases of autism which lends further support to 
the theory that autism cases linked to rubella infection in the U.S. in the 1960s may have 
been driven by some additional factor (Olmsted & Blaxill, 2010, p. 223).  
 
1.9.2 Consensus Statements 
 
Over the last decade, several consensus statements have been published by groups of 
leading epidemiologists and public health experts who have concluded that 
neurodevelopmental disabilities (NDD) including autism are caused by toxicants in the 
environment. The consensus statements tend to list well known toxicants and they do 
not break out the causes of autism separately from other NDDs. The consensus 
statements are important because they tell us that autism and other NDDs are potentially 
preventable through stricter regulation of toxicants.  
 
In 2008, the Collaborative on Health and the Environment’s Learning and 
Developmental Disabilities Initiative published a ‘Scientific Consensus Statement on 
Environmental Agents Associated with Neurodevelopmental Disorders’ (Gilbert, 2008). 
It was signed by 57 scientists, researchers, and health professionals including some of 
the biggest names in environmental epidemiology. The statement focused on 11 ‘high 
confidence conclusions’ (‘alcohol, lead, mercury, PCBs, PBDEs, manganese, arsenic, 
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solvents, PAHs, pesticides, and tobacco smoke’) and three ‘emerging concerns’ 
(‘endocrine disruptors, fluoride, and food additives’) (Gilbert, 2008).  
 
In 2010, the Mount Sinai Children’s Environmental Health Center in partnership with 
Autism Speaks organised a workshop on ‘Environmental Causes of Autism and 
Learning Disabilities’ that brought together researchers from around the world 
(Landrigan et al., 2012). A similar meeting organised by Mount Sinai Hospital in 1964 
was pivotal in establishing the link between asbestos and cancer (Michaels, 2008a, p. 
29). The 2010 workshop ‘generated a list of 10 chemicals and mixtures widely 
distributed in the environment that are already suspected of causing developmental 
neurotoxicity’ including ‘lead, methylmercury, polychlorinated biphenyls, 
organophosphate pesticides, organochlorine pesticides, endocrine disruptors, 
automotive exhaust, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, brominated flame retardants, 
and perfluorinated compounds’ (Landrigan et al., 2012, p. A259).  
 
In 2016, a group of 47 of the top epidemiologists, doctors, and public health experts in 
the U.S. came together under the banner of ‘Project TENDR: Targeting Environmental 
Neuro-Development Risks’ and published a consensus statement that toxic chemicals in 
the environment contribute to neurodevelopmental disorders including autism (Bennett 
et al., 2016). The consensus statement focused on six ‘prime examples of 
neurodevelopmentally toxic chemicals’ including ‘organophosphate pesticides, PBDE 
flame retardants, combustion related air pollutants, lead, mercury, and PCBs’ (p. 118–
119). Arthur Lavin (2015), a member of Project TENDR wrote, ‘if we reduce the 
exposure from the top neuro-toxic chemicals by as little as 20%, the country could 
experience drops in the chances of our children developing autism, ADHD, and/or 
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learning disabilities by 15–40%’. The conflict of interest statement at the end of the 
statement lists the John Merck Fund as a sponsor of Project TENDR. Given the ongoing 
debate over a possible association between vaccines and autism (that will be discussed 
below), the fact that Merck & Company is a large vaccine producer, and the abundant 
evidence on the funding effect (that will be discussed in chapter 5) it is problematic that 
this group accepted funds derived from the Merck family fortune.  
 
On the one hand, these consensus statements are an important step forward in 
addressing rising levels of neurodevelopmental disorders including autism. On the other 
hand, it is striking how politically safe the consensus statements are in their lists of 
environmental triggers. The dangers of lead have been well-established for fifty years, 
the dangers of mercury have been known for 100 years, organophosphates were 
developed as chemical weapons in World War II, problems with organochlorine 
pesticides like DDT have been known since before Rachel Carson wrote Silent Spring, 
and the manufacture of PCBs was banned in the U.S. in 1979. With a few exceptions, 
the uses of many of these chemicals have been flat or declining in the U.S. (Nevison, 
2014). While there could be low-dose, non-linear, cumulative, or synergistic effects or 
biomagnification as these toxicants move up the food chain, as a first step (consistent 
with Hill, 1965) it would make sense to explore toxicants that are increasing in use in 
line with the increases in autism prevalence. So again, even though these consensus 
statements help to establish that toxicants cause autism, they do not necessarily explain 
why autism rates started to increase sharply in the late 1980s.  
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1.9.3.0 Individual studies of individual toxicants 
 
Next there are specific studies that look at individual toxicants and associated risks of 
developing autism in those exposed to that toxicant. These studies are important 
because they suggest where one might apply regulatory efforts to prevent autism. In this 
section I will review individual studies on six possible autism triggers: mercury from 
coal fired power plants and other industrial sources (1.9.3.1); vehicle emissions 
(particularly diesel trucks) (1.9.3.2); endocrine disruptors including phthalates, BPA, 
and flame retardants (1.9.3.3); Roundup (1.9.3.4); pesticides (1.9.3.5); and selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (1.9.3.6). 
 
1.9.3.1 Mercury from coal fired power plants and other industrial sources 
 
Palmer, Blanchard, Stein, Mandell, and Miller (2006) used ‘data from the Texas 
Education Department and the United States Environmental Protection Agency’ to 
‘examine the association between environmentally released mercury, special education, 
and autism rates in Texas’. They found that ‘on average, for each 1,000 pounds [453 
kilo] of environmentally released mercury, there was a 43% increase in the rate of 
special education services and a 61% increase in the rate of autism’ (Palmer et al., 2006). 
Palmer, Blanchard, and Wood conducted a second study in (2009) to refine their initial 
analysis. They found that for every ten miles (16 kilometers) further a family lives from 
an industrial mercury source, a child’s risk of autism goes down 2% and for every ten 
miles further a family lives from a coal fired power plant the autism risk declines 1.4% 
(Palmer et al., 2009).   
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Windham, Zhang, Gunier, Croen, and Grether (2006) examined autism and air pollution 
in the San Francisco Bay Area. Their analysis focused on nineteen compounds with 
known developmental, neurologic, or endocrine-disrupting toxicity (Windham et al., 
2006). They found statistically significant increased risks of autism for those exposed to 
higher levels of several hazardous air pollutants including methylene chloride, 
trichloroethylene, vinyl chloride, cadmium, mercury, and nickel (Windham et al., 2006). 
Specifically with reference to mercury, they found nearly double the autism risk in the 
areas with the highest concentrations of airborne mercury pollution (adjusted odds ratio 
= 1.92; confidence interval: 1.36, 2.71) (Windham et al., 2006, p. 1441). All statistical 
terms used in this thesis are defined in the glossary.  
 
1.9.3.2 Vehicle emissions (particularly diesel trucks) 
 
In 2002, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the University of 
Michigan Air Quality Laboratory (UMAQL) conducted a pilot program ‘to investigate 
mercury emissions from motor vehicles’. The subsequent report, Hoyer, Baldauf1, 
Scarbro, Barres, and Keeler (2004) found that vehicle emissions contain mercury and 
that diesel trucks emitted much higher levels of mercury than cars — emissions for 
‘vapor-phase mercury plus particulate mercury for light-duty gasoline vehicles ranged 
from 0.31 to 1.4 nanograms per mile [1.6 km] while diesel vehicles ranged from 6.3 to 
11.0 ng/mi’ (Hoyer et al., 2004).  
 
Volk, Hertz-Picciotto, Delwiche, Lurmann, and McConnell (2011) found that children 
living within 1,000 feet (300 meters) from a freeway at birth had nearly a two-fold 
increase in autism risk (OR = 1.86; CI: 1.04, 3.45). The link held up even after 
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researchers controlled for other factors that may influence development, such as 
parental education, maternal age, and exposure to tobacco smoke (Volk et al., 2011). A 
similar correlation did not appear in connection with living within 1,000 feet of a road 
(Volk et al. 2011). The authors speculated that the higher risk of autism as a result of 
living near a freeway could be a result of diesel emissions from trucks which are found 
more often on freeways (Volk et al., 2011). Volk, Lurmann, Penfold, Hertz-Picciotto, 
and McConnell (2013) found that ‘exposure to traffic-related air pollution, nitrogen 
dioxide, [particulate matter] PM2.5, and PM10 during pregnancy and during the first year 
of life was associated with autism’ (p. 71).  
 
1.9.3.3 Endocrine disruptors: Phthalates, BPA, and flame retardants 
 
Endocrine disruptors are chemicals that interfere with the hormone (endocrine) system 
in mammals. Consensus statements from Gilbert (2008), Landrigan, Lambertini, and 
Birnbaum (2012), and Bennett et al. (2016) expressed concern and called for more 
research regarding possible links between endocrine disrupting chemicals and adverse 
neurodevelopmental outcomes including autism in children. Endocrine disruptors are 
abundant in our environment and in our bodies. Common endocrine disruptors include 
phthalates which ‘are a group of chemicals used to soften and increase the flexibility of 
plastic and vinyl’ (ToxTown, n.d.); bisphenol A (BPA) which is a chemical used to 
harden plastics and is often found in food and beverage packaging; and polybrominated 
diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) which are sold as flame retardants and found in furniture, 
clothing, and plastics used in electronics (CDC, 2009). It is important to point out that 
phthalates, BPA, and flame retardants are not the only endocrine disruptors — just the 
most well known examples (but there is concern about this entire class of chemicals). 
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Furthermore, endocrine disruption is not the only mechanism of action associated with 
phthalates, BPA, and flame retardants. There are also concerns about their toxic effects 
on other systems in the body including the brain, central nervous system, and 
reproductive system (so endocrine disruption is just one way of thinking about the 
dangers of these chemicals). 
 
Sjodin et al. (2004) show that PBDE (flame retardant) concentrations in human tissues 
have been increasing over the last few decades. Lang et al. (2008) using data from the 
U.S. National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 2003–2004 found that 92% of 
participants had detectable levels of BPA. Woodruff, Zota, and Schwartz (2011) in a 
study of 268 pregnant women in the U.S. found that 99–100% had detectable levels of 
‘polychlorinated biphenyls, organochlorine pesticides, PFCs, phenols, PBDEs, 
phthalates, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and perchlorate’ (p. 878). 
 
Larsson, Weiss, Janson, Sundell, and Bornehag (2009), in a study (initially designed to 
look at allergies) of 4,779 children between ages 6 to 8 in Sweden found that vinyl 
flooring in the parents’ bedroom was associated with an increased risk of ASD by 140% 
(OR = 2.4; CI: 1.31, 4.40). Engel et al. (2010) as part of the Mount Sinai Children’s 
Environmental Health Study compared measurements of third trimester phthalate 
metabolites (in the urine of pregnant women) with later cognitive and behavioral 
development when those children were between 4 and 9 years old. Low molecular 
weight phthalate metabolites were associated with a range of subsequent behavioral 
problems in children including aggression, attention, conduct, and depression (Engel et 
al., 2010, p. 568). Messer (2010) notes that multiple animal and human studies have 
found that PBDE interferes with the thyroid and theorises a possible link between 
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PDBE exposure and autism. Testa et al. (2012) in a study in Italy of 48 children with 
ASD and a control group of 45 neurotypical controls found a statistically significant 
association between ASD and two metabolites of the phthalate DEHP in urine samples. 
Stein, Schluter, Streer, and Ming (2013) found that many children with ASD seemed to 
have a defect that limited their ability to detoxify DEHP (p. 2677). Degroote, Hunting, 
Sébire, and Takser (2014) in animal experiments found that prenatal exposure to even 
low doses of phthalates and flame retardants produced autistic-like traits in offspring. 
Ejaredar, Nyanza, Eycke, and Dewey (2015) in a systematic review of 11 studies found 
that ‘prenatal exposure to phthalates is associated with adverse cognitive and behavioral 
outcomes in children, including lower IQ, and problems with attention, hyperactivity, 
and poorer social communication’ (p. 51). Stein, Schluter, Steer, Guo, and Ming (2015) 
in a study of 46 children with ASD and 52 neurotypical controls, found that children 
with ASD had three times more BPA metabolites in their urine than the children in the 
control group. Kardas et al. (2016) in blood samples of 48 children with ASD as 
compared with 41 neurotypical controls found elevated levels of three endocrine 
disruptors (two phthalates — MEHP and DEHP, as well as BPA) in the children with 
ASD. The political economy of the regulation of phthalates, BPA, and flame retardants 
is the subject of chapter 6.  
 
1.9.3.4 Roundup (glyphosate+ adjuvants)  
 
In 1974, Monsanto began selling Roundup to farmers. Roundup is a combination of the 
chemical glyphosate plus various adjuvants. Monsanto’s patent expired in 2000 but 
glyphosate-based herbicides have become the most widely used herbicides in the United 
States agricultural sector; ‘since the late 1970s the volume of glyphosate-based 
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herbicides applied has increased approximately 100-fold’ and now 240 million pounds 
(~108.8 million kilograms) are applied to U.S. crops every year (Myers et al., 2016).  
 
Swanson, Leu, Abrahamson, and Wallet (2014) found highly significant correlations 
between glyphosate applications and a wide range of chronic health conditions 
including autism (Pearson’s r = 0.989). There are many reasons to take this study with a 
grain of salt. The authors are not academics, the Journal of Organic Systems that it was 
published in is not well regarded, and anything that experienced a sharp increase during 
the past three decades is likely to be highly correlated with autism even if there is no 
plausible causal connection (e.g. single parent families or video game sales).  
 
Monsanto has long claimed that Roundup is safe because it interferes with the shikimate 
pathway (that plants use for biosynthesis) and animals do not have a shikimate pathway. 
But Samsel and Seneff (2013a, 2013b) point out that gut bacteria have a shikimate 
pathway and the majority of children with autism also suffer from gastrointestinal issues. 
Scientists are finding that gut bacteria plays an important role in mental health (Dietert, 
2016). While autism was once considered exclusively a neuropsychiatric disorder, 
increasingly doctors and research scientists are coming to understand it as affecting a 
range of systems including the gut, central nervous system, and the immune system.  
 
1.9.3.5 Pesticides 
 
Roberts et al. (2007) for the California Department of Public Health found that maternal 
residence during pregnancy within 500 meters of a field sprayed with the 
organochlorine pesticides endosulfan and dicofol increased incidence of autism by 
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600%. In 2010, the EPA reached an agreement with manufacturers to phase out all 
endosulfan uses within two years. Dicofol is still used on cotton, apples, and citrus. 
Many other organochlorine pesticides are still in use — particularly in developing 
countries (Jayaraj, Megha, & Sreedev, 2016).   
 
Project TENDR (Bennett et al., 2016) lists five studies that show an association between 
organophosphate pesticides and developmental disabilities [Rauh et al., 2006; Eskenazi 
et al., 2007; Marks et al., 2010; Fortenberry et al., 2014, and Furlong et al., 2014]. 
Shelton et. al. (2014) found that living within 1.25 km of fields sprayed with 
organophosphates at any point during pregnancy was associated with a 60% increased 
risk for ASD (aOR = 1.6; CI: 1.02, 2.51); there was a 99% increased risk for ASD if 
organophosphate pesticides were applied during the third trimester (aOR = 1.99; CI: 
1.11, 3.56). Living within 1.75 km of a field sprayed with chlorpyrifos was associated 
with a 78% increased risk for ASD (aOR = 1.78; CI: 1.05, 3.02); there was a 163% 
increased risk if the chlorpyrifos pesticide is applied during second trimester (aOR = 
2.63; CI: 1.28, 5.41) (Shelton et. al., 2014). Furthermore, ‘each 100-lb (45.4 kg) 
increase in the amount of chlorpyrifos applied over the course of pregnancy (within 1.5 
km of the home) was associated with a 14% higher prevalence of ASD (aOR = 1.14; CI: 
1.0, 1.32)’ (Shelton et. al., 2014). Ten million pounds [4,535,923 kilo] of chlorpyrifos 
pesticides are applied to U.S. crops every year (EPA, 2002). Pregnant women who lived 
within 1.5 km of a field sprayed with pyrethroids during the third trimester faced an 87% 
increased risk of having a child with autism (aOR = 1.87; CI: 1.02, 3.43). Proximity to 
fields sprayed with carbamates was associated with a 148% increased risk for 
developmental disabilities (aOR = 2.48; CI: 1.04, 5.91) and a 37% increased risk for 
ASD (aOR = 1.37; CI: 0.66, 2.84) — although the ASD risk was not statistically 
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significant. Shelton, Hertz-Picciotto, and Pessah (2012) explore the potential 
mechanisms of action by which pesticides may lead to autism.  
 
Indoor use of pesticides to kill fleas and ticks on pets has also been found to increase the 
risk of autism. Keil, Daniels, and Hertz-Picciotto (2014) compared 262 neurotypical 
children with 407 children with ASD and found that women who were pregnant who 
applied imidacloprid, a common flea and tick treatment, to their pets had a two-fold 
higher risk of having children with autism than those who did not use imidacloprid (p. 
1). Imidacloprid is part of a class of chemicals called neonicotinoids that interfere with 
the central nervous system in insects leading to paralysis and death (Keil et al., 2014). 
Schmidt et al. (2017) looked at the association between folic acid intake during 
pregnancy, which is thought to protect against developmental harms from certain 
toxicants, and pesticide exposure (including indoor exposures from flea and tick 
treatments for pets). Low folic acid intake (<800 µg) was associated with a 20% 
increased risk for autism (OR = 1.2; CI: 0.7, 2.2), but that result was not statistically 
significant. Exposure to any indoor pesticide was associated with a 70% increased risk 
for autism (OR = 1.7; CI: 1.1, 2.8), and the combination of low folic acid and any 
indoor pesticide exposure was associated with a 150% increased risk of autism (OR = 
2.5; CI: 1.3, 4.7) (Schmidt et al., 2017, p. 097007-1). Low folic acid and regular 
pregnancy exposure (≥6 months) to pet pesticides increased the risk of autism by 290% 
(OR = 3.9; CI: 1.4, 11.5); low folic acid and regular pregnancy exposure (≥6 months) to 
outdoor sprays and foggers increased autism risk by 310% (OR = 4.1; CI: 1.7, 10.1) 
(Schmidt et al., 2017, p. 097007-1). The political economy of the regulation of 
herbicides and pesticides is the topic of chapter 7. 
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1.9.3.6 Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and other antidepressants 
 
Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are designed to cross the blood brain 
barrier and they cross the placental barrier at a high rate (Hendrick et al., 2003; 
Rampono et al., 2009). Eight studies have found a statistically significant association 
between selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) use in mothers and subsequent 
autism in their children (Croen, Grether, Yoshida, Odouli, & Hendrick, 2011; Eriksson, 
Westerlund, Anderlid, Gillberg, & Fernell, 2012; Rai et al., 2013; Sørensen et al., 2013; 
Gidaya et al., 2014; Harrington, Lee, Crum, Zimmerman, & Hertz-Picciotto, 2014; El 
Marroun et al., 2014; Boukhris, Sheehy, Mottron, & Bérard, 2016). Two other studies 
found an association but some of their results were not statistically significant (Hviid, 
Melbye, & Pasternak, 2013; Clements et al., 2015). Taking each of these studies in turn: 
 
Croen et al. (2011) ‘found a two-fold increased risk of ASD associated with treatment 
with SSRIs by the mother during the year before delivery (adjusted odds ratio = 2.2; CI: 
1.2, 4.3)’ (p. 1104). They also found a more than three-fold increased risk of ASD with 
treatment with SSRIs during the first trimester (aOR = 3.8; CI: 1.8, 7.8) (Croen et al., 
2011, p. 1104). ‘No increase in risk was found for mothers with a history of mental 
health treatment in the absence of prenatal exposure to SSRIs’ (Croen et al., 2011, p. 
1104). 
 
Eriksson et al. (2012) compared the family histories of 208 children with autism against 
119,183 controls (the entire birth cohort in Sweden during the years 2002–2006). They 
found that mothers of children with autism were 4.4 times more likely to have taken 
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SSRIs during pregnancy than controls (OR = 4.4; CI: 2.5, 8.0) (Eriksson et al., 2012, p. 
1645).  
 
Rai et al. (2013) in a study of 4,429 cases of ASD and 43,277 controls found that 
maternal antidepressant (both SSRIs and tricyclic antidepressant) use during pregnancy 
more than tripled the risk of having a child with autism (aOR = 3.34; CI: 1.50, 7.47). 
The increased risk was entirely associated with children on the spectrum without an 
intellectual disability (n = 2601) and there was no observed association between 
maternal antidepressant use and rates of autism with an intellectual disability (n = 1828) 
(Rai et al., 2013). They estimated that if their calculations are correct, ‘antidepressant 
use during pregnancy explained 0.6% of the cases of autism spectrum disorder’ in their 
sample (Rai et al., 2013, p. 1).  
 
Sørensen et al. (2013) found that children exposed prenatally to any antidepressant 
(which included SSRIs, serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors, and tricyclic 
antidepressants) had a 50% increased risk of autism (adjusted hazard ratio = 1.5; CI: 1.2, 
1.9). But then Sørensen et al. (2013) decided to restrict the analysis only to women with 
a diagnosis of affective disorder (which eliminated 80.1% of the sample) and then 
further discounted the hazard ratio if unexposed siblings also had an ASD diagnosis 
which moved the hazard ratio to 1.1 (CI: 0.5, 2.3) and below the level of statistical 
significance.  
 
Gidaya et al. (2014) found any SSRI exposure during pregnancy doubled the risk of 
having a child with autism (aOR = 2.0; CI: 1.6, 2.6); exposure to SSRIs during the third 
trimester tripled autism risk (aOR = 3.1; CI: 2.1, 4.5). Harrington et al. (2014) found 
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that SSRI use during pregnancy nearly triples the risk of developing autism if the fetus 
is male (aOR = 2.92; CI: 1.07, 7.93); the strongest association occurred with first-
trimester exposure (aOR = 3.22; CI: 1.17, 8.84). El Marroun et al. (2014) in a study of 
376 children prenatally exposed to maternal depression, 69 children prenatally exposed 
to SSRIs, and 5,531 controls found that SSRI exposure nearly doubled the risk for 
autistic traits as compared with mothers who experienced depression but were not 
treated with SSRIs (β = 0.17; CI: 0.1, 0.24). In linear regression models, ‘the beta 
coefficient, β, is the degree of change in the outcome variable for every 1-unit of change 
in the predictor variable’ (Lani, n.d.). Boukhris et al. (2016) in a study of all ‘singleton 
full-term infants born alive [in Québec] between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 
2009’ (n = 145,456) found that exposure to SSRIs during the second and/or third 
trimester more than doubled the risk of autism (aHR = 2.17; CI: 1.20, 3.93).  
 
Two other studies had mixed results. Hviid, Melbey, and Pasternak (2013) in ‘a cohort 
study of all singleton live births in Denmark from 1996 through 2005’ found an 
association between SSRI use during pregnancy and autism but it was not statistically 
significant (adjusted rate ratio = 1.20; CI: 0.90, 1.61). However, SSRI use 2 years to 6 
months before pregnancy showed a statistically significant increased risk of autism 
(aRR = 1.46; CI: 1.17, 1.81) (Hviid, Melbey, & Pasternak, 2013). Clements et al. (2015) 
compared 1,377 children diagnosed with ASD matched 1:3 with neurotypical controls. 
In gathering the history of the parents and children in the study they found that 
caesarean section delivery increased autism risk 28% (aOR = 1.28; CI: 1.11, 1.47) 
(Clements et al., 2015). They also found a statistically significant association between 
antidepressant use and autism if the exposure occurred during prepregnancy (‘anytime 
before the last menstrual period’, read: ever), preconception (‘3 months before 
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conception’), the first trimester, or second trimester — adjusting for ‘gender, race, birth 
year, insurance type, maternal age, and median income’ (Clements et al., 2015, p. 728). 
But then they built a second model that controlled for past history of maternal 
depression claiming that they wanted to ‘address the possibility of confounding by 
indication’ (Clements et al., 2015). As described above, Croen et al. (2011) did not find 
an association between maternal depression in the absence of antidepressant use and 
autism so it is not clear that confounding by indication is actually a problem in this case. 
Clements et al. (2015) seem to assume that maternal depression itself can cause autism 
but they make no effort to suggest a mechanism of action nor do they provide empirical 
evidence to support this assumption. Their second model showed a statistically 
significant association between antidepressant use and autism if the exposure occurred 
during prepregnancy (aOR = 1.62; CI: 1.17–2.23) and an elevated but not statistically 
significant risk if antidepressant exposure occurred during preconception and pregnancy 
(Clements et al., 2015). One of the co-authors of Clements et al. (2015) reported ties to 
each of the five largest antidepressant manufacturers in the world and two other co-
authors also reported financial conflicts of interest. I will show in chapter 5 that the 
funding effect consistently distorts research outcomes. The political economy of the 
regulation of SSRIs is the subject of chapter 8.  
 
1.9.4 Activist initiated participatory science 
 
Next, there are studies produced as a result of ‘Activist-Initiated Participatory Science’ 
(Moore, 2006). In the wake of rising autism prevalence, parents’ groups have often 
funded their own research into possible environmental triggers associated with autism. 
It would be easy to dismiss these studies because they are often underfunded and 
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undersized, usually conducted by outsiders and those on the fringe of the scientific 
community, and published in obscure journals if at all. But to dismiss these studies out 
of hand would be to misunderstand the political economy of science and medicine in 
general (which I will discuss more fully in chapter 5) and autism in particular.  
 
Activist-Initiated Participatory Science has a long history going back to the social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s that were alarmed by the role of scientists in the 
chemical and weapons industries (Moore, 2006, p. 301). Scientists were both targets of 
and sometimes participants in these activist social movements (Moore, 2006, p. 301). 
Activist-Initiated Participatory Science has often been a key feature of anti-toxics/anti-
pollution campaigns [Brown, 1992; Bullard, 1994; Lichterman, 1996; and Allen, 2003] 
and health-related social movement groups [Morello-Frosch, 2006] (Moore, 2006, p. 
305). Many of these studies could also be considered examples of ‘popular 
epidemiology’ which is defined as ‘the process by which laypersons gather scientific 
data and other information, and also direct and marshal the knowledge of other experts 
in order to understand the epidemiology of a disease’ (Brown, [1992], p. 269, in Moore, 
2006, p. 305). In this section I will review studies on EMF/RFR (1.9.4.1), 
acetaminophen (1.9.4.2), and vaccines (1.9.4.3).  
 
1.9.4.1 EMF/RFR  
 
Herbert and Sage (2013a, 2013b) argue that electromagnetic frequency and 
radiofrequency exposures (EMF/RFR) may be associated with autism. In 1993, only 6% 
of American adults owned a cell phone; in 2018 that number was 95% (Hertsgaard & 
Dowie, 2018). Exposure to EMF/RFR comes from cell phones, microwave towers that 
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now dot the landscape, and wireless routers that have become standard appliances in 
homes and offices (Herbert & Sage, 2013b, pp. 222–223). Herbert and Sage (2013a) 
show that there are ‘a series of parallels between the pathophysiological and genotoxic 
impacts of EMF/RFR and the pathophysiological underpinnings of’ ASD including 
‘DNA damage; immune and blood-brain barrier disruption; cellular and oxidative stress; 
[altered] calcium channel [signaling]; disturbed circadian rhythms; hormone 
dysregulation; and degraded cognition, sleep, autonomic regulation and brainwave 
activity’ (p. 200). They argue that increased EMF/RFR exposure contributes to total 
‘allostatic load — the sum total of stressors and burdens on the body’ and that even 
small increases in allostatic load can produce significant impacts on health (Herbert & 
Sage, 2013a). Further, they cite, Juutilainen, Kumlin, and Naarala [2006] who show that 
EMF/RFR can increase the harms caused by other toxicants ‘when both exposures occur 
together’ (Herbert & Sage, 2013a, p. 193). An excellent political economy of the lack of 
regulation of EMF/RFR is provided by Hertsgaard and Dowie (2018).   
 
1.9.4.2 Acetaminophen (Tylenol, Panadol, Paracetamol)   
 
Acetaminophen (sold under the brand names Tylenol, Panadol, Paracetamol) is used by 
up to 65% of pregnant women in the U.S. (Werler, Mitchell, Hernandez-Diaz, & Honein, 
2005). Acetaminophen is one of three analgesics derived from aniline dye (which 
initially was derived from benzene, a component of coal tar); the other two, acetanilide 
and phenacetin, were withdrawn from the market because of their toxicity (Bertolini et 
al., [2006], in Schultz & Gould, 2016). Torres (2003) first proposed that antipyretics 
(drugs used to reduce fevers) during pregnancy might cause neurodevelopmental 
disorders such as ASD. This theory was later developed by Schultz (2008, 2010, 2016), 
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a successful dentist who returned to university and got a Ph.D. in public health 
epidemiology after his son regressed into autism. The temporal association between 
acetaminophen and autism is intriguing. For decades, aspirin was the dominant pain 
reliever and antipyretic in the U.S. However, in 1980, aspirin was found to cause Reye’s 
Syndrome in some children so doctors recommended that parents use acetaminophen 
instead (Bauer & Kriebel, 2013). Sales of acetaminophen in the U.S. increased from 
$400 million in 1982 to $2.6 billion in 2008 (Bauer & Kriebel, 2013). A systematic 
review by Bauer, Kriebel, Herbert, Bornehag, and Swan (2018) identified nine studies 
conducted since 2013 that show an association between acetaminophen use and adverse 
neurodevelopmental outcomes. Two of those studies looked at the association between 
Tylenol during pregnancy and ASD in offspring. Avella-Garcia et al. (2016) found that 
males exposed to acetaminophen for all three trimesters have significantly elevated risk 
of autism (β = 1.91; CI: 0.44, 3.38). Liew, Ritz, Virk, and Olsen (2016) found that 
persistent exposure to acetaminophen in utero (>20 weeks) increased the risk of autism 
with hyperkinetic disorder (ADHD) by 77% (HR = 1.77; CI: 1.24, 2.53). Bauer and 
Kriebel (2013) and Frisch and Simonsen (2015) found an association between male 
circumcision and autism and that raises the question as to whether acetaminophen 
sometimes administered before and/or after the procedure may be the trigger. Clearly 
more research is needed. However, it is very difficult to rule out confounding factors; in 
the case of acetaminophen and pregnancy the confounding factor could be the 
underlying illness or inflammation and with acetaminophen and circumcision the 
confounding factors could pain/trauma associated with the procedure itself or vaccines 
administered around the same time.   
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1.9.4.3 Vaccines  
 
The CDC, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
American Medical Association, and the American Academy of Pediatrics all argue that 
vaccines do not cause autism. They point to more than 20 scientific studies that have 
concluded that there does not appear to be an association between vaccines and autism 
(Fombonne & Chakrabarti, 2001; Madsen et al., 2002; Mäkelä, Nuorti, & Peltola, 2002; 
Pichichero, Cernichiari, Lopreiato, & Treanor, 2002; Hviid, Stellfeld, Wohlfahrt, & 
Melbye, 2003; Madsen et al., 2003; Nelson & Bauman, 2003; Stehr-Green, Tull, 
Stellfeld, Mortenson, & Simpson, 2003; Verstraeten et al., 2003; Wilson, Mills, Ross, 
McGowan, & Jadad, 2003; Andrews et al., 2004; Heron & Golding, 2004; Smeeth et al., 
2004; Honda, Shimizu, & Rutter, 2005; Fombonne et al., 2006; Miles & Takahashi, 
2007; Thompson et al., 2007; Baird et al., 2008; Hornig et al. 2008; Schechter & 
Grether, 2008; and Tozzi et al., 2009). Critics contend that there are problems of study 
design and conflict of interest with each of these studies (Handley, n.d.). Furthermore, 
they point out that even though randomised double blind controlled trials are the gold 
standard of biomedicine, none of these studies has a proper control group of 
unvaccinated children.  
 
The case to answer in connection with vaccines and autism is surprisingly 
straightforward. Vaccines often contain toxic ingredients. The U.S. vaccine schedule 
increased sharply starting in 1987 which coincides with the inflection point in the 
autism epidemic. The vaccine schedule now starts earlier which puts it in key 
developmental windows. There are at least 10,000 parental eyewitnesses who claim that 
vaccines caused autism in their children. There are 83 instances where the vaccine court 
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awarded compensation to families whose children developed autism following 
vaccination. The flu shot during pregnancy appears to increase the risk of autism, 
several studies have shown an elevated risk of autism associated with the hepatitis B 
vaccine, and there are concerns about the safety of other vaccines. Five studies funded 
by parents’ groups or interested doctors comparing the health outcomes between 
vaccinated and unvaccinated children show that unvaccinated children have fewer 
chronic illnesses including autism. Three CDC researchers appear to have violated 
accepted scientific practices or committed outright fraud in connection with key vaccine 
safety studies. I will briefly cover each of these points below.  
  
Vaccines often contain a number of additives including ethylmercury, aluminum 
hydroxide, aluminum phosphate, and neomycin and streptomycin (antibiotics). 
Thimerosal is still in three different brands of multidose flu vaccines (Fluvirin, Flulaval, 
Fluzone), one meningococcal vaccine, and three tetanus-diphtheria vaccines (Thomas & 
Margulis, 2016, p. 14). Thimerosal is 49.6% ethylmercury which is a known neurotoxin 
(Grandjean & Landrigan, 2014). Aluminium is a known neurotoxin (Finberg et al., 1986; 
Joshi, 1990; Wisniewski, Moretz, Sturman, Wen, & Shek, 1990; Bishop, Morley, Day, 
& Lucas, 1997; Petrik, Wong, Tabata, Garry, & Shaw, 2007; Tomljenovic & Shaw, 
2011a; and Shaw et al., 2014). Even as it was phasing thimerosal out of some vaccines, 
the U.S. Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) added to the schedule 
as much as 25 µg of thimerosal and 625 µg of aluminium for pregnant women (which 
exposes the fetus to these metals during a vulnerable developmental window) along 
with up to 50 µg of thimerosal and 1,000 additional µg of aluminium for children in the 
first two years of life (Miller, 2016b). Furthermore, some people are allergic to 
neomycin and streptomycin. Using in vitro experiments, Haley (2005) showed that the 
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synergistic effect of thimerosal, plus aluminum, plus neomycin, plus testosterone is one 
hundred times more toxic than thimerosal alone — which he argues might explain why 
autism rates are so much higher in boys than in girls.  
 
The vaccine schedule in most developed countries increased dramatically in the last 65 
years. In the 1950s, children in the U.S. received seven vaccinations before age six. In 
1983, the U.S. vaccination schedule mandated ten vaccinations. From 1983 to 2013, the 
number of recommended vaccinations more than tripled to thirty-six and the U.S. now 
gives more doses of more vaccines at earlier ages than any other country in the world 
(Miller & Goldman, 2011). If vaccines work as advertised, they should reduce infant 
mortality. But Miller and Goldman (2011) found the opposite — in developed countries 
the more vaccines on the schedule the higher the infant mortality rate (r = 0.992, p = 
0.0009). That does not establish a causal connection with autism per se. But critics 
argue that the total allostatic load on children (from the ingredients listed above and 
from other environmental factors described in this chapter) may have increased in the 
last three decades.  
 
A growing body of literature from toxicologists and environmental epidemiologists 
shows that there are ‘windows of vulnerability’ (Miodovnik, 2011) where the human 
body is uniquely susceptible to toxicants. Critics point out that not only has the vaccine 
schedule tripled, but it has also moved earlier — starting now in pregnancy — so the 
bulk of the vaccine schedule is administered when the human body is uniquely 
vulnerable to toxic insults. Johanson (1980) and Adinolfi (1985) showed that the blood-
brain barrier is not fully developed in infants. Zheng (2001) writes, ‘chemical exposure 
at a young age may have profound neurotoxic consequences’. During early development 
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the blood-brain barrier is porous to allow blood-borne nutrients to reach the growing 
brain; ‘however, this relative openness of the barriers in early life renders the brain 
highly susceptible to insults from exposure to toxic substances’ (Zheng, 2001, p. 7). 
Grandjean and Landrigan (2014) write that ‘in utero and during infancy and early 
childhood... chemicals can cause permanent brain injury at low levels of exposure that 
would have little or no adverse effect in an adult’ (p. 330). The FDA takes no account of 
these windows of vulnerability and allows safety studies conducted with healthy adults 
to be the basis for licensing vaccines that are added to the schedule for pregnant women, 
neonates, and infants.  
 
In 1986 the U.S. Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) 
that provided legal liability protection to vaccine makers. It set up a separate vaccine 
court under the United States Court of Federal Claims to administer compensation to 
people injured by vaccines. As autism rates grew in the United States, 5,600 families 
filed suit arguing that vaccines caused autism in their children. These claims were 
eventually consolidated in what was called the Omnibus Autism Proceedings. Another 
3,000 families who wished to file suit were denied standing because they did not file the 
required paperwork within four years of the injury as required by the national Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program (VICP). In the U.K., 1,500 families filed suit alleging a 
connection between vaccines and autism in their children. By 2012 all of these claims 
had been denied by the courts. Of course, not all class action lawsuits have merit. But 
these cases highlight an unusual and uncomfortable conflict at the heart of the autism 
epidemic — the overwhelming majority of doctors say there is no association between 
vaccines and autism, but many parents of children on the spectrum say that they saw 
with their own eyes that vaccines caused their children to regress.  
 43 
 
Holland, Conte, Krakow, and Colin (2011) discovered 83 instances where the Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program in the U.S. awarded compensation to families of children 
who developed autism as a result of vaccines. Holland et al. (2011) point out that the 
table of injuries that can be compensated by the VICP includes encephalopathy and the 
VICP’s definition of encephalopathy is very similar to the DSM-IV definition of autism 
(p. 495). In a cruel twist of administrative law, sometimes the Special Masters of the 
Vaccine Court are willing to grant compensation for vaccine injuries that produce 
symptoms characteristic of autism so long as the petitioners describe these symptoms as 
‘autism-like’ (rather than autism per se) and/or include other co-morbid conditions 
(Holland et al., 2011). The 83 cases establish that there is some connection between 
vaccines and autism, it is just not clear how large the connection may be because the 
necessary research to solve that question has never been done (i.e. the CDC has never 
funded a study with an unvaccinated control group).  
 
Because there are many vaccines on the schedule, many combined vaccines (MMR, 
DTaP), and many vaccines given at a single ‘well-baby’ visit it is difficult to measure 
the safety in the population of any one vaccine. Clinical trials as part of the licensure 
process should provide assurances that each individual vaccine is safe but as I will show 
in chapter 9, the licensure process at the FDA is often too short, studies are too small, 
the contents of placebos are not regulated, and the population in the clinical trials is 
usually healthier and older than the target population. But the effect of the flu shot 
during pregnancy and the hepatitis B vaccine given on the first day of life can be studied 
in isolation because they are not necessarily given with other vaccines. Zerbo et al. 
(2017) in a cohort study using in-house data from Kaiser Permanente (private health 
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maintenance organisation) of 196,929 children, of whom 3,103 had autism spectrum 
disorder, found that maternal vaccination with the flu shot during the first trimester was 
associated with a 20% increased risk of autism (Zerbo et al. 2017, p. 1). They later 
applied a Bonferroni adjust to make the association disappear but I explain in chapter 9 
why this statistical manoeuvre rests on a weak theoretical foundation. Gallagher and 
Goodman (2008) using data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey 1999–2000 found that boys who received all three doses of the hepatitis B 
vaccine (n = 46) were 8.63 times more likely (CI: 3.24, 22.98) to have a developmental 
disability including autism than boys who did not receive all three doses (n = 7). 
Gallagher and Goodman (2010) using data from the National Health Interview Survey 
1997-2002 found that boys ‘who received the first dose of hepatitis B vaccine during the 
first month of life had 3-fold greater odds for autism diagnosis (n = 30 with autism 
diagnosis and 7,044 without autism diagnosis; OR = 3.002; CI: 1.109, 8.126)’ as 
compared with ‘boys either vaccinated later or not at all’ (p. 1669). The Gallagher and 
Goodman (2008, 2010) studies are unusual because they are among the few in the 
vaccine safety literature that do not have a financial conflict of interest.  
 
There are no safety studies that prove the safety of the entire vaccines schedule. 
Defenders of the current vaccine schedule argue that since vaccines are so obviously 
beneficial it would be unethical to deny this life saving medical intervention to those 
assigned to a control group. But this assumes away the question (‘are vaccines safe and 
effective?’). In the absence of double blind randomised control trials (RCTs) from 
established public health agencies, parents’ groups and interested doctors have funded 
their own research comparing the health outcomes between vaccinated and 
unvaccinated populations. Studies conducted by the Dutch Association of Critical 
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Diseases (NVKP) in 2004, Generation Rescue in 2007, Dr. Paul Thomas in 2016, and 
(two studies led by) Anthony Mawson in 2017 (funded by Generation Rescue and the 
Children’s Medical Safety Research Institute) found that autism rates were significantly 
lower in the unvaccinated population. All of these studies would be subject to the 
funding effect (that will be discussed in chapter 5) but the mainstream scientific 
community has no studies to counter them because the CDC has never funded a study 
with an unvaccinated control group. 
 
On three separate occasions, officials acting on behalf of the CDC appear to have 
engaged in manipulation of data and/or outright fraud in connection with vaccine safety 
studies. Using the Freedom of Information Act, e-mails were turned over that showed 
that Verstraeten et al. (2003) intentionally manipulated the data to cover up a 
statistically significant association between thimerosal and autism (Kirby, 2005). Poul 
Thorsen was the data manager on Madsen et al. (2002, 2003) and he was indicted by a 
federal grand jury and charged with ‘13 counts of wire fraud and 9 counts of money 
laundering’ in April 2011 (Crosby, 2011). More recently, CDC research scientist 
William Thompson confessed (in recorded phone conversations, in documents turned 
over to Congress, and in a statement issued by his attorney) that DeStefano, Bhasin, 
Thompson, Yeargin-Allsopp, and Boyle (2004) intentionally omitted data that showed a 
statistically significant association between administration of the MMR vaccine before 
age 3 and autism in African American boys (Ferris, 2015). The political economy of the 
regulation of vaccines is the topic of chapter 9.  
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1.9.5.0 Additional risk factors 
 
Finally there are a couple of risk factors that do not fit neatly into the categories 
described above — the age of parents at conception and diabetes in pregnant women.  
 
1.9.5.1 Age of the parents at conception 
 
Durkin et al. (2008) found that if the father is over 40 years old at the time of 
conception, the risk of autism increases by 40% (OR = 1.4; CI: 1.1, 1.8). If the mother is 
over 35 at conception, the risk of autism increases by 30% (OR = 1.3; CI: 1.1, 1.6). 
Having both a father over 40 and a mother over 35 at conception increases the risk 
threefold that the child will develop autism (OR = 3.1; CI: 2.0, 4.7). Four other studies 
found a statistically significant association between maternal age and autism (Croen, 
Grether, & Selvin, 2002; Glasson, 2002; Bhasin & Schendel, 2007) and four additional 
studies found a statistically significant relationship between advanced paternal age after 
controlling for maternal age (Glasson, 2002; Lauritsen, Pedersen, & Mortensen, 2005; 
Reichman & Teitler, 2006; Croen, Najjar, Fireman, & Grether, 2007). One study found 
neither parent’s age to be predictive of autism spectrum outcomes (Larsson et. al., 2005).  
 
1.9.5.2 Diabetes 
 
Li et al. (2016) in a cohort study of 2,734 children found that ‘mothers with obesity and 
pregestational diabetes (hazard ratio = 3.91; CI: 1.76, 8.68) and those with obesity and 
gestational diabetes (HR = 3.04; CI: 1.21, 7.63) had a significantly higher risk of 
offspring ASD’ (p. 1). It is common to blame ‘lifestyle factors’ (diet, lack of exercise) 
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for these adverse health outcomes, however, there is growing evidence that endocrine 
disrupting chemicals (pesticides, plastics) may be contributing to both obesity and 
diabetes (Gore et al., 2015). So even the association between obesity plus diabetes and 
autism may be a story of environmental triggers.  
 
1.10 Correlation is not causation 
 
Figure 1.2: Rise in U.S. Autism Rates and Rise in Organic Food Sales 1998 to 2007.  
 
Source: Doctorow (2013). 
 
After presenting all of the above data, there is still the issue that correlation does not 
equal causation. In a debate about vaccine safety, tech writer Cory Doctorow (2013) 
cited the above chart on the correlation between the rise of autism and the rise of 
organic food sales to point out the perils of confusing correlation and causation (and it 
was soon picked up by a range of science blogs). As any statistician will point out, 
correlation is only the start of the conversation, one also needs to establish the causal 
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mechanism(s) that may be driving the effect on the dependent variable. But in all of the 
cases described above, the causal pathway seems plausible.   
 
What is interesting about the autism and organic food chart is that there may be 
causation here too — it is just that people usually get the arrow of time wrong. Organic 
foods sales are not likely causing the rise in autism. But it seems possible that fears over 
the rise of autism (and possible links between autism and pesticides) may be driving 
people to buy organic food.   
 
Furthermore, public policy decisions are often made on the basis of weaker correlations 
than those described in this chapter. A reduction in prison recidivism by 10% is 
probably enough to keep a counseling program funded even though it may have had 
nothing to do with the outcome. Given the stakes, it would be odd to completely dismiss 
correlation in each of the examples listed above, especially given that there is a 
plausible physiological explanation that goes along with each factor. In the midst of this 
epidemic, the phrase ‘correlation is not causation’ has become an agnotological device 
that diverts attention from possible environmental factors.  
 
Epidemiologists point out that one study is never determinative. Rather one should take 
the preponderance of all of the studies on a particular topic in order to establish 
causation. But the possible environmental triggers listed in this chapter are made by 
some of the largest and most politically powerful firms in the world. As I will show in 
this thesis, these firms are able to shape the public research agenda to prevent many 
studies from ever being funded in the first place. In the event that a large number of 
studies somehow are conducted over time, for example in the case of asbestos, lead, or 
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tobacco, even if the preponderance of evidence points to a likely causal association, that 
does not necessarily lead to increased regulation, victims’ compensation, or cleanup.   
 
1.11 A different standard? 
 
Products are often pulled from the market that have smaller effect sizes than those listed 
above. Vioxx (Rofecoxib) was pulled from the market in 2004 (Rubin, 2004). It 
increased heart attack risk from 0.1 to 0.4 (Bombardier et. al, 2000). But the results 
were statistically significant only for those patients who already had a history of 
myocardial infarction or other existing heart problem (Bombardier et. al, 2000). In 2002, 
NIH stopped the trial of hormone replacement therapy in connection with the Women’s 
Health Initiative (WHI) because of finding: breast cancer 26% increase, colorectal 
cancer 37% decrease, heart attack & cardiac death 29% increase, hip fracture 34% 
decrease, pulmonary embolism 113% increase, stroke 41% increase (Writing Group for 
the Women’s Health Initiative Investigators, 2002). All of these are below the 200% 
increase often required to establish causation in tort cases (Cranor, 2016, p. 228). Zicam 
Cold Remedy was pulled from the market in 2009 because 130 people complained of 
loss of sense of smell over the course of a decade (Harris, 2009). But a loss of sense of 
smell is also an effect of the common cold; there was no evidence that it was a 
statistically significant effect of Zicam (Harris, 2009). In these cases, various parties 
(corporations, the FDA, and NIH) made decisions based on an abundance of caution to 
protect public health.  
 
Much of the data shown above, linking environmental insults to autism, have bigger 
effects sizes than what is usually necessary to establish legal liability and trigger a recall. 
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And yet, with these environmental triggers that may be linked to autism, the CDC, FDA, 
EPA, and NIH have not shown the same abundance of caution in protecting the health 
of children. These asymmetrical responses by public health officials appear to be a 
result of political power, not good science.  
 
1.12 Research question  
 
Autism is an epidemic and a pandemic by any reasonable definition of those words. The 
inflection point in rising autism prevalence rates is around 1987 (McDonald & Paul, 
2010). It is worldwide and it seems to affect every income group, race, and ethnicity but 
prevalence rates are particularly high in liberal capitalist developed countries. It appears 
to be driven by environmental sources. Yet it is happening even as many sources of 
pollution (e.g. smog, DDT, smoking, etc.) are going down in many developed countries. 
There are a finite number of factors with sufficient global scale during that time period 
that could be responsible.  
 
Solving the riddle of autism would seem to require figuring out patterns, understanding 
correlations, identifying risk, and using massive amounts of data to select likely targets 
for regulatory action. In an earlier era, that might have been beyond the capacity of 
government agencies. But in the age of terrorism, governments in the U.S., the U.K., 
and Australia are actually extremely good at using big data to figure out patterns, 
correlations, risk, and likely targets. It is just that most of those resources are devoted to 
(military) defense rather than public health. The point is, solving a problem this 
complex is no longer beyond the technical capacity of government. It appears to be a 
problem of political will, not institutional ability.  
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What is strange about autism is that none of the government institutions in a position to 
respond to the epidemic seem to have a sense of urgency in finding the cause. This is a 
crisis that demands a massive coordinated policy response. And yet, thus far, there is no 
policy response aimed at autism prevention at all. So my research question is: given 
rising prevalence rates and the extraordinary impacts of ASD on individuals, families, 
and communities, what explains why public health authorities, thus far, have failed to 
ban or restrict toxicants that have been shown to increase autism risk? The evidence 
presented over the next nine chapters will make the case that one possible reason why 
public health authorities have failed to ban or restrict toxicants that have been shown to 
increase autism risk is because of extraordinary levels of cultural and financial capture 
of almost all levels of science, medicine, and government.  
 
1.13 What the thesis does not cover 
 
I focus entirely on the political economy of research in connection with autism 
causation and prevention. I do not focus on education, treatment, or services for those 
who already have autism; nor do I focus on the psychological, sociological, or 
anthropological experience of autism for individuals, families, or communities — as 
those topics are already covered well by others.  
 
1.14 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I showed that the history of autism is contested and winding; provided 
definitions of autism; documented rising autism prevalence in the U.S., Australia, and 
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worldwide; showed that the fiscal implications are already dire and projected to get 
worse; explained the problems with genetic theories of causation; showed that neither 
diagnostic expansion and substitution nor changing definitions of autism entirely 
account for the sharp rise in prevalence; explored environmental factors associated with 
autism; discussed issues of correlation and causation; compared the lack of response to 
possible environmental triggers with the more aggressive U.S. federal response to other 
products with lower relative risks; stated my research question; and also explained what 
facets of the debate will not be covered. In the next chapter I will discuss the theoretical 
framework that I use to approach this material.   
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Chapter 2  
Theoretical framework 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Interpretation is what gives meaning to empirical evidence. Interpretation is a subjective 
process so it is important to be clear about how one approaches the data. My aim in this 
chapter is to explain the theoretical lenses I use to understand the evidence in 
connection with autism. My epistemology is informed by the contextual empiricism of 
Helen Longino (2.1). This thesis is a work of synthesis with some important differences 
from the usual approaches of systematic review and meta-analysis (2.2). My 
methodology is informed by both descriptive epidemiology and political epidemiology 
(2.3). I use Steven Lukes’ study of power (2.4) to understand how power shapes science 
and medicine. I conclude this section with a discussion on the social construction of 
disability (2.5).  
 
2.1 Contextual Empiricism 
 
By most accounts positivism is dead. Ever since Kuhn (1962) there has been a growing 
recognition that science is social. But it is not entirely clear what replaces positivism. 
While poststructuralism has become dominant in the social sciences, it does not offer a 
solid foundation for making science-based policy decisions. At the end of the day, 
scientists, doctors, policy makers, and citizens are either going to take some action or 
not (and not taking an action is itself a form of action). And so society needs some sort 
of basis, however imperfect, for weighing conflicting evidence. American philosopher 
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of science Helen Longino’s (1990) solution to this problem is ‘contextual empiricism’ 
that attempts to blend the best elements of the empiricist approach with the best insights 
from its critics. She writes, ‘It is empiricist in treating experience as the basis of 
knowledge claims in the sciences. It is contextual in its insistence on the relevance of 
context — both the context of assumptions that supports reasoning and the social and 
cultural context that supports scientific inquiry — to the construction of knowledge’ 
(Longino, 1990, p. 219). She concludes, ‘A consequence of embracing the social 
character of knowledge is the abandonment of the ideals of certainty and of the 
permanence of knowledge. Since no epistemological theory has been able to guarantee 
the attainment of those ideals, this seems a minor loss’ (Longino, 1990, p. 232).  
 
There are aspects of contextual empiricism that make me uncomfortable. It feels like a 
straddling of two different epistemologies, trying to have it both ways, a hybrid that will 
do justice to neither contextualism nor empiricism. And yet the notion that a system of 
thought should be just one thing is itself a socially constructed value judgment. One can 
make the case that the both/and nature of contextual empiricism is a strength that 
overcomes Cartesian and other dualisms and allows room for paradox, dissonance, and 
an on-going unfolding of knowing.  
 
Following Longino, in this thesis I will closely examine the available data from a wide 
range of scientific studies as well as the social context in which this knowledge is 
produced. Consistent with contextual empiricism I believe that within the range of what 
is ‘known’ now, there are relatively better and worse choices available to policymakers. 
But also following Levins and Lewontin (1985) and Longino, I hold all conclusions as 
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permanently tentative because they are subject to change as new data and context 
become available.  
 
Longino (1990) argues that objectivity is ‘a matter of degree’ (p. 76). She proposes a 
method for increasing objectivity even while recognising that this is a socially 
embedded idea. She writes:  
 
Scientific communities will be objective to the degree that they satisfy 
four criteria necessary for achieving the transformative dimension of 
critical discourse: (1) there must be recognized avenues for the criticism 
of evidence, of methods, and of assumptions and reasoning; (2) there 
must exist shared standards critics can invoke; (3) the community as a 
whole must be responsive to such criticism; (4) intellectual authority 
must be shared equally among qualified practitioners (Longino, 1990, p. 
76). 
 
Longino (2001) argues that these discursive methods are not ‘offered as a criterion of 
truth, but a criterion distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate consensus’ (p. 131). 
Longino (2001) also renames her theory critical contextual empiricism (CCE) to reflect 
the critical nature of the approach.  
 
Solomon and Richardson (2005) point out that there is not a lot of empirical evidence 
that the methods of CCE, if properly followed, necessarily produce more reliable 
scientific outputs. The history of science suggests that closed systems also produce 
scientific breakthroughs (Solomon & Richardson, 2005). So while CCE is ‘intuitively 
 56 
reasonable’ it is normative and marries epistemology to liberal democratic politics (M. 
Solomon & Richardson, 2005, p. 216). But one might reply, how does one measure 
‘good science’? If there can be no God’s eye perspective on one’s findings (because one 
is always part of the world one is studying) then the process of reaching consensus 
necessarily leads one back to the sort of methodological process of criticism and debate 
that CCE recommends. In order for science to be legitimate it must go through some 
sort of political process and so urging science to apply an open and dialogical process 
seems healthy for both science and society.  
 
2.2.1 A brief note on the epistemology of alternative sources 
 
In addition to journal articles in peer reviewed publications I sometimes use first person 
accounts from families, investigative reports from muckraking journalists, internal 
government documents obtained by parents using the U.S. Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), the accounts of whistleblowers, and documents turned over via discovery in 
legal proceedings. In an ideal world, one would only rely on peer reviewed studies from 
academics who have no conflict of interest published in academic journals with no 
conflict of interest. But that ideal world does not exist in the study of toxicants. 
Academia has been slow to study this crisis so the pool of academic studies is somewhat 
limited (with the exception of the UC Davis MIND Institute and a handful of other 
environmental epidemiologists whom I rely on). As I will show throughout this thesis, 
public health authorities have often acted in ways that are counterproductive, so the pool 
of useful government public health studies is limited as well. If one wants to study the 
impact of toxicants, alternative sources can provide essential new data and insights.  
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But it is not just necessity; epistemologically, I think these sources are more reliable 
than they are often given credit for. First person accounts are an integral part of legal 
proceedings (Broun et al., 2014) and our construction of understanding in everyday life 
(Longino, 2001, p. 2; McMyler, 2011). Poststructuralism in the social sciences has 
affirmed the importance of first person perspectives and flattened prior epistemological 
hierarchies (I am not saying that one needs to become a poststructuralist, only that first 
person perspectives are valued in many spheres). Muckraking journalism has been an 
essential part of uncovering information that is vital to public health for over a century. 
FOIA requests, the accounts of whistleblowers, and documents turned over via 
discovery can provide an unvarnished look inside an institution at a time when no one 
thinks anyone is watching. Furthermore, I will show in chapter 5 that peer review and 
publication in academic journals do not necessarily protect against bias nor ensure 
quality to the extent that many believe.  
 
2.3 Synthesis 
 
This thesis is a work of synthesis. I weave together data and insights from political 
economy, political science, sociology, history, epidemiology, and toxicology to build a 
case to answer in connection with possible environmental triggers of autism. As a 
methodology, synthesis is often overshadowed by its more popular quantitative and 
qualitative cousins (particularly in the U.S.). I believe that synthesis is the proper 
method for answering my research question because autism sits at the nexus of these 
different fields of knowledge.  
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Over the past forty years research synthesis has become increasingly sophisticated 
(Cooper & Hedges, 2009). Traditional methods of synthesis include systematic reviews 
and meta-analysis. While I use both systematic reviews and meta-analysis in the thesis, 
neither approach is exactly the right fit for my research question. That is because the 
bulk of the research in connection with autism is characterised by financial conflicts of 
interest. In chapter 5, I show that the funding effect consistently distorts research 
outcomes. Combining conflicted studies with unconflicted studies in a systematic 
review or meta-analysis (as is standard practice at the CDC, EPA, FDA, and NIH) 
combines biased studies with unbiased studies leaving the ultimate findings muddled 
and meaningless. Industry knows this and so it contracts with science-for-hire firms to 
produce favourable studies that it can use to stymie the regulatory process (Michaels, 
2008a). If I were to exclude all studies with a financial conflict of interest (which would 
be warranted), then in many cases I would be excluding the majority of the research on 
a particular environmental trigger.  
 
Instead, I draw upon the ideas of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973; Gibson-Graham, 
2014) in reviewing the relevant literature. With each of the toxicants listed as a possible 
environmental trigger for autism I ask what is the relevant data, who are the interested 
parties, what is the regulatory history, what are the financial conflicts of interest, and 
how have financial conflicts of interest come to bear on the process? Thick description 
is rarely used and not well regarded in political economy because it is seen as side-
stepping some of the hard choices and critical debates in theory and practice that are the 
coin of the realm in the field. But in this case, I believe thick description is the proper 
approach. As I showed in chapter 1, the gap between what public health officials say 
about autism and what is actually on the page of scientific journals is enormous. By 
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zooming in on both the empirical data and its social context I can analyse and question 
consensus in ways that will hopefully produce a new and more multifaceted 
understanding of autism.  
 
2.4 Descriptive epidemiology and political epidemiology 
 
Consistent with the thick description described above, my thesis is informed by both 
descriptive epidemiology and political epidemiology. The CDC’s (2012) Principles of 
Epidemiology describes descriptive epidemiology as follows:  
 
Clusters or outbreaks of disease frequently are investigated initially with 
descriptive epidemiology. The descriptive approach involves the study of 
disease incidence and distribution by time, place, and person. It includes 
the calculation of rates and identification of parts of the population at 
higher risk than others. Occasionally, when the association between 
exposure and disease is quite strong, the investigation may stop when 
descriptive epidemiology is complete and control measures may be 
implemented immediately. John Snow’s 1854 investigation of cholera is 
an example (p. 1–17).  
 
I write more about John Snow and the 1854 London cholera outbreak in the next 
chapter. While is it common to think of labs and test tubes as tools for responding to an 
epidemic, descriptive epidemiology shows that maps, patterns, logic, and reason can be 
powerful tools as well. The Boston University School of Public Health (n.d.) notes that 
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even though descriptive epidemiology began with the study of infectious diseases, now 
it is also used to study chronic diseases (‘Hypothesis Formulation’, para. 1).  
 
Some descriptive epidemiology has already been done in connection with autism (most 
notably Croen, Grether, & Selvin, 2002). But given the size of the epidemic, it is 
remarkable how little descriptive epidemiology is available. Furthermore, the few 
studies that are conducted are often circumscribed in their approach. Perhaps the lack of 
descriptive epidemiology stems from the fact that any comprehensive overview of 
autism must include a discussion about vaccines and including a variable about vaccines 
in the current political climate is seen by many as a career-limiting decision (Martin, 
2018). So for example, Croen, Grether, and Selvin (2002) do not include a variable for 
vaccination status even though that information might be relevant and would be easy to 
collect — the lead author works for Kaiser Permanente (a fully enclosed health 
maintenance organisation) so that data is readily available in-house.  
 
What is striking about the autism epidemic is how universal it is in developed countries 
and how it does not fit traditional patterns of an epidemic. It is increasing rapidly in all 
developed countries (where there is good data on autism prevalence), autism is 
diagnosed at similar rates across all income groups (with slightly higher rates in higher 
income families that may be because of greater access to diagnostic services); and there 
does not appear to be a distinction between urban, suburban, and rural areas. This is 
unusual. Higher income groups usually have better health outcomes and poor people 
have higher rates of diabetes, heart disease, and all sorts of other chronic health 
problems. Urban areas and rural areas have different exposures to pesticides and 
pollution. And a wide range of variables in different countries including weather, diet, 
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pollution, and healthcare systems usually produces different health outcomes. But not 
with autism.  
 
But there is an additional step to my work in that I am examining the interaction 
between the patterns in the autism epidemic and the political factors that may have 
contributed to these patterns. So my methodology is also informed by political 
epidemiology (Muntaner et al., 2010, 2011). Pega, Kawachi, Rasanathan, and Lundberg 
(2013) define political epidemiology as ‘the study of the impact of welfare regimes, 
political institutions, and specific policies on health and health equity’ (p. 1). My unique 
contribution is that I examine the relationship between regulatory capture and autism. 
My methodology looks at the three descriptive epidemiology factors (time, place, and 
person), as well as the sorts of factors discussed in political epidemiology (toxicants, 
law, and regulatory institutions).  
 
To be clear, this thesis is a work of political economy not epidemiology. But issues of 
politics, economics, and health intersect. The field of political epidemiology draws from 
a wide range of sources including the health sciences and the social and behavioural 
sciences (Pega et al., 2013) — so a contribution from a political economist is not 
necessarily outside the norm. Furthermore, even if it were outside the norm for a 
political economist to participate in these debates, the evidence I present in this thesis 
suggests that the level of cultural and regulatory capture is so extensive in science and 
medicine that an outsider perspective on the autism epidemic would be warranted.  
 
Navarro (2008) notes that there is a large literature on the ‘social and cultural 
determinants of health’, but relatively little research on the ‘political determinants of 
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health’ (p. 354). He offers at least three reasons why this might be so. First, ‘the public-
health field is dominated by professionals trained in medicine and biology rather than in 
the social sciences. Epidemiologists and statisticians tend to dominate the field of 
public-health research. To them, politics seems to be very shaky and risky ground, 
something to be avoided’ (Navarro, 2008, p. 354). Second, most public health research 
is funded by government and government is ‘unlikely to fund any type of research that 
may please some political forces but displease others that have a voice in the funding of 
research institutions’ (Navarro, 2008, p. 354). This is not just hypothetical, Navarro 
(2008) notes that even in democratic societies, when research is displeasing to the 
establishment, the response is often the ‘discontinuation of one’s research funding’ (p. 
354). Third, Navarro (2008) observes that international bodies like the World Health 
Organization tend to avoid discussing the political determinants of health because they 
are trying to reach consensus and do not want to ‘antagonize’ powerful members. So 
Navarro (2008) highlights ‘the need to undertake studies on politics and health’ (p. 
354). The traditional Marxian/progressive response to such a call usually focuses on 
more equal distribution of power and resources, reductions in poverty, and expanded 
access to (existing capitalist) healthcare. My approach is somewhat different in that I 
argue that capitalist healthcare itself is part of the problem and that more access would 
not necessarily improve the situation. Instead one must grapple with the problem of 
political capture and how it distorts scientific research, medicine, law, and policy in 
ways that are catastrophic for the health of the public.  
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2.5 Sociology of Power  
 
Understanding theories of power is important for the study of any disease or complex 
health condition because power shapes what is studied, what is not studied, and how 
matters are studied. Science and society are intertwined in epidemics and the response 
to an epidemic is a reflection of power operating on many dimensions. What follows in 
this section comes from Steven Lukes’ seminal (1974) study Power: A radical view. 
 
Lukes’ (1974) first dimension of power considers the work of Dahl (1961), Polsby 
(1963), Wolfinger (1971), and others who developed what is known as the pluralist 
approach. Lukes (1974) summarising the pluralist view of power writes that it ‘involves 
a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an 
observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed 
by political participation’ (italics in the original, Lukes, 1974, p. 15). In the pluralists’ 
view, individuals come together to form groups to maximise their interests. Groups 
compete with each other for power and influence. While it would appear that 
corporations would dominate that process given their financial superiority, pluralists 
like Polsby argue that other groups (such as unions, civil rights activists, and 
environmentalists) can offset corporate power through numerical advantage (turning out 
more people to vote, lobby, or protest). Like classical economics, pluralism is an 
equilibrium model that posits that, over time, advantages tend to balance out and that 
resources from the political process tend to be divided equitably throughout society.  
 
Lukes’ (1974) second dimension of power considers the work of Bachrach and Baratz 
(1970) who argue that real power is also about the ability to control the agenda and the 
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ability to keep issues off the table. In a critique and elaboration on the pluralists’ view, 
they write: ‘to the extent that a person or groups — consciously or unconsciously — 
create or reinforce barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group 
has power’ (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970, p. 8).   
 
So for example, the U.S. Congress almost never debates royalty rates for oil exploration 
because oil companies have enough political power that they can keep that issue off the 
agenda. As Schattschneider (1960) wrote, ‘Some issues are organised into politics while 
others are organised out’. Lukes (1974) writes that the second dimension of power 
‘allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken 
on potential issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests...’ 
(p. 20). Wagner’s (1995, 1997) work on ‘the science charade in toxic risk regulation’, 
Proctor’s (1996, 2008) work on ‘agnotology’, McGoey’s (2007) research ‘on the will to 
ignorance in bureaucracy’, and the considerable literature on ‘undone science’ (Gross, 
2007; Hess, 2007, 2009; Frickel at al. 2010; Frickel 2014; and Wilyman, 2015) are all 
interesting applications of and elaborations upon how topics are organized out of 
science and medicine.  
 
But then Lukes goes one step further in developing what he calls a three-dimensional 
view of power. Echoing Gramsci’s (1971) views on the construction of hegemony and 
Fanon’s (1963) views on internal colonisation, Lukes (1974) argues that power also 
influences the interests, preferences, and ideation of disadvantaged groups. Power may 
or may not involve observable conflicts. Power is also about latent conflicts where there 
is ‘a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests 
of those they exclude’ (Lukes, 1974). Perhaps most controversially, Lukes argues that 
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those who are excluded from power ‘may not express or even be conscious of their 
interests’, but, ‘the identification of those interests always rests on empirically 
supportable and refutable hypotheses’ (Lukes, 1974, pp. 24–25). Michael Reich (1991) 
in Toxic politics: Responding to chemical disasters applies Lukes’ three-dimensional 
view of power to three cases of toxic contamination (see chapter 4).   
 
Benton (1981), Clegg (1989), and Hay (2002) all take issue with Power: A radical view 
for slightly different reasons. Benton (1981) contends that Lukes’ third dimension of 
power suffers from the ‘paradox of emancipation’ — one cannot simultaneously support 
self-emancipation while also arguing that people are unaware of their real interests as a 
result of the distorting influence of power (p. 162). Clegg (1989) is troubled by the 
‘moral relativism’ of Lukes’ third dimension of power. He notes that by Lukes’ own 
admission, what one’s real interests are ‘will differ according to whether one is a liberal, 
a reformist, or a radical’ (Clegg, 1989, p. 87). If that is the case then real interests are 
both a priori and beyond analytical critique (Clegg, 1989, p. 87). Hay (2002) argues that 
Lukes’ distinction between perceived and real interests is normative and nonfalsifiable 
in spite of Lukes’ claims that real interests are empirically knowable (p. 181). He also 
worries that the paternalism inherent in Lukes’ distinction between perceived and real 
interests may create a ‘paternalist license for tyranny’ (Hay, 2002, p. 182).  
 
None of these critiques appears insurmountable. The problem of ‘false consciousness’ 
that runs through all of these critiques is a recurring debate within Marxism. But many 
streams of Marxism have come to accept the need for a vanguard to act as a catalyst for 
the transformation of consciousness (to shift awareness from perceived to real interests). 
The enduring success of cigarettes, soft drinks, and trans fats suggests that there clearly 
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is a distinction between preferences and real interests even if those are difficult to 
quantify. Furthermore, I think one should welcome normative discussion of interests. 
That does not render the theory invalid, nor does it necessarily lead to tyranny; robust 
normative debates are also constitutive of healthy thriving democratic communities.  
 
Lukes’ (1974) three dimensional view of power has enormous implications for the study 
of autism. Autism at first appears to fit the pluralist view of power — a battle between 
competing groups over resources. But autism also fits the second dimension of power as 
autism prevention has, thus far, been kept completely off the political agenda. And 
power also shapes the way that families and autism groups conceive of what is possible 
politically in the midst of this crisis — focusing for example on insurance reform rather 
than banning of certain toxic chemicals.  
 
2.5 Social construction of disability 
 
When I present my research on the political economy of autism I often get critical 
questions on the social construction of disability so I want to briefly explain my 
approach to that debate.  
 
Wendell (1996) argues that there are two distinct but interrelated aspects to the social 
construction of disability. First, there are the social, economic, and political conditions 
which create illness and injuries and impair physical functioning. These include things 
like war, crime, domestic violence; lack of access to water, food, shelter, or quality 
health care; working conditions, toxicants in the environment, stress, and poverty. 
Second, there are the social and cultural factors that determine standards of normality 
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and how people are included or excluded from full participation in society. These are 
issues of access; expectations around work and family; rights; and policy issues in 
connection with the way cities, corporations, buildings, institutions, and laws are set up. 
 
My thesis focuses almost entirely on Wendell’s first aspect of the social construction of 
disability — the social, economic, and political conditions which create illness and 
injuries and impair physical functioning. I believe that this aspect is under-examined 
and under-theorised at the moment. These are political economy factors and it seems to 
me that this is where I can add the most value to the discussion.  
 
There is lots of very good work being done in anthropology, sociology, and cultural 
studies around Wendell’s second aspect of the social construction of disability (see, e.g., 
Maclean, 2013).  
 
Over the last twenty years, as poststructuralism has become mainstream in the social 
sciences, many people such as Donna Haraway (1991) argue that disability is entirely 
constructed in the second sense described here. The notion is that there is no disability 
but for our construction of it socially. In this view, disability is entirely constituted by 
our actions and beliefs around it. 
 
I disagree with Haraway’s (1991) view and I think that Wendell (1996) is correct when 
she argues that there is a material reality to disabilities such as autism, that this material 
reality is often caused by our political and economic institutions, and that this material 
reality is made more or less disabling by psychological and cultural factors and how we 
set up our society. 
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If one believes that disability is entirely constituted by our discourses around it, one will 
likely be displeased by my work (but that is a decision from first principles, so no 
amount of evidence from me is going to change that view). By the same token if one 
believes, as I do, that disability is constructed through these two sets of factors (the 
material and the social), then one sees the poststructural-only approach as an 
impediment to vitally need political and environmental reforms. It seems to me that the 
material and poststructural approaches could be complimentary (as a society we should 
stop the factors that lead to additional physical limitations and do everything we can to 
create conditions for complete access and accommodation for those with such 
limitations). But that is not how most people see it, most people see these two different 
approaches as incommensurable. Furthermore, the poststructural approach is dominant 
in the social sciences right now so I am swimming against the tide in this thesis.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In a post-positivist world it is difficult to know how to proceed in weighing evidence so 
the best one can do is to use contextual empiricism — assemble the most unbiased 
evidence one can and examine it in its context, knowing that all conclusions are 
tentative and subject to change. In studying toxicants, one often has to rely on 
alternative sources and the epistemological validity of these sources is often stronger 
than one might imagine. My thesis is a work of synthesis but rather than systematic 
review or meta-analysis I tend to engage in thick description to study how financial 
conflicts of interest may have shaped research findings. My research is influenced by 
descriptive epidemiology and political epidemiology while breaking somewhat with the 
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traditional Marxian literature on the political determinants of health. My research will 
also be an examination of power and will look at how various interest groups compete 
for influence, how powerful interests shape the issue agenda through keeping certain 
issues off the table, and how power shapes the ideation and preferences of the powerful 
and the powerless. Finally, there are strong disagreements about the social construction 
of disability; I tend to agree with Wendell (1996) that disability is socially constructed 
through political economy factors and sociological factors and this thesis will focus on 
the political economy factors associated with autism. In the next chapter I will explore 
the histories of science and medicine to better understand the factors that shape the path 
of scientific research.  
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Chapter 3 
What can the histories of science and medicine teach us about 
governments’ failure to engage in autism prevention? 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
In chapter 1, I showed that we have a fairly good understanding of the ‘time, place, and 
person’ (to use the language of descriptive epidemiology) associated with autism. In 
1925, Sukhareva published the first case series of a disorder that today we would call 
autism based on her work with children in Moscow. In 1943, Kanner published the first 
case series in the English language based on his practice in Baltimore, and Asperger 
soon followed with a case series from Vienna. But autism was still a relatively rare 
condition for several decades. Then in the late 1980s, autism rates started to skyrocket 
in the U.S. and other developed countries and they have continued to rise ever since 
(McDonald & Paul, 2010). Autism appears in all industrialised countries (with some 
important variation) and cuts across all income groups, ethnicities, regions, and is much 
higher in males than in females.  
 
This is exactly the sort of crisis that a century of progressive reforms were designed to 
address. Industrialised countries have a range of public health agencies for the purposes 
of addressing epidemics, regulating toxic substances, and advancing a range of health 
objectives in the population. In the U.S., the Department of Health and Human Services 
(that includes the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, the National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities, and 
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry), the Environmental Protection 
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Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Agriculture, plus state 
public health agencies, and a network of hospitals and research universities are 
seemingly well situated to address an epidemic like this. But it has been thirty years 
since the start of the autism epidemic and the response from the U.S. government has 
not matched the scale of the crisis. Resources devoted to autism research are still 
minimal, most government agencies do not even use the word ‘epidemic’, no 
biomarkers have been identified, and most of the research money is directed towards 
proving genetic causation even though ‘there is no such thing as a genetic epidemic’ 
(Kirby, 2005, p. xiii) and the Director of the NIH acknowledges that ‘genes alone do not 
tell the whole story’ (Collins, 2006). In spite of a wealth of information about known 
environmental risk factors there is almost no public discussion about autism prevention. 
The AIDS epidemic in the U.S. peaked in 1995, just 14 years after the first published 
case series on the disorder (Osmond, 2003) in response to a range of preventative 
measures and pharmaceutical interventions. Autism is still on square one even though it 
has been 90 years since the first case series and 30 years since the start of the epidemic. 
Science, medicine, and government in the U.S. appear stuck in paradigms and 
approaches that are not working and yet they seem unable to shift gears toward more 
promising avenues of inquiry. What explains the failure, thus far, of established public 
health agencies in the U.S. to respond effectively to this epidemic?  
 
Histories of science and medicine can help us to understand how and why the 
government response to the autism epidemic has been inadequate thus far. What I will 
show in this chapter is that this is not the first time that medicine in general and public 
health agencies in particular have failed in response to a crisis. Historically, science and 
medicine have been characterised by long periods of failed practices, missed 
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opportunities, and resistance to new methods driven by financial, religious, and cultural 
interests. I start with a discussion of Kuhn’s seminal 1962 book, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (3.1). I argue that Kuhn developed an idealised model that is not 
as helpful as it might appear because he left out important external factors. Then I look 
at the history of medicine using the work of Wootton (2006) who argues that science 
and medicine are shaped by power in ways that often delay, by decades or even 
centuries, important advances (3.2). Next I examine the political economy of the 1854 
London cholera epidemic and the work of John Snow because it represents an important 
breakthrough that might offer important lessons for the autism epidemic (3.2.1). I 
conclude by reviewing the more recent history of science and medicine in the U.S. using 
the work of Mirowski (2011) who argues that the Bayh Dole Act of 1980 ushered in an 
era of privatised science that has been very profitable for some elite actors but has 
hindered scientific development overall (3.3).  
 
3.1 Thomas Kuhn: How science changes its mind 
 
Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was a watershed 
moment in the study of the history of science. Kuhn argues that in the early stages of the 
development of a science, there are a range of competing theories and approaches (p. 
15). Eventually the discipline coalesces around various ‘paradigms’ which Kuhn (1962) 
defines as ‘universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model 
problems and solutions to a community of practitioners’ (p. x). He goes on to note that 
paradigms share ‘two essential characteristics’: ‘their achievement was sufficiently 
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of 
scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of 
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problems for the defined group of practitioners to resolve’ (Kuhn, 1962, p. 10). What 
follows is a period of ‘normal science’ where scientists articulate, prove, and apply 
facets of the theory already supplied by the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962, p. 24). Kuhn (1962) 
refers to these as ‘mopping up operations’ (p. 24) but they are vitally important and can 
go on for decades. Eventually however, new discoveries create anomalies that cannot be 
explained satisfactorily by existing paradigms. This leads to new conflicts and 
competition between different theories and eventually the adoption of a new paradigm 
with greater explanatory power (Kuhn, 1962, p. 75).   
 
Sociologist Steve Fuller (1995, 2000, 2004, 2005) is critical of Kuhn’s failure to address 
the external influences that can distort the scientific process.3 Indeed, Kuhn (1962) 
admits, ‘except in occasional brief asides, I have said nothing about the role of 
technological advance or of external social, economic, and intellectual conditions in the 
development of the sciences’ (p. xi). Kuhn was aware of the extraordinary power of 
outside influences and yet he made a conscious choice not to explore them. Fuller 
(2000, p. 37) argues that ‘paradigms should be seen, not as the ideal form of scientific 
inquiry, but rather an arrested social movement in which the natural spread of 
knowledge is captured by a community that gains relative advantage by forcing other 
communities to rely on its expertise’.  
 
As I showed in chapter 1, the aetiology of autism has already gone through at least five 
paradigm shifts since 1925 (bad parenting, biomedical, genetics, diagnostic expansion 
and substitution, and neurodiversity). The transition from Kanner (bad parenting) to 
Rimland (biomedical) fits the model supplied by Kuhn. But since then, the process of 
                                                
3 I am grateful to Costa (forthcoming) for drawing my attention to Fuller’s work.  
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scientific discovery in connection with autism has not followed Kuhn’s model. Since 
the 1980s autism research has been characterised by dead ends, misdirection, and a 
willful indifference to promising leads. The genetic theory coincided with an existing 
multibillion-dollar research program. Thus far, $2 billion has been spent on genetic 
research and no ‘autism gene’ has yet been found that might explain the current 
epidemic and the entire genetic theory of the case has come into question. Diagnostic 
expansion and substitution appears to be an ad hoc response to public anger over rising 
prevalence rates — the empirical basis was always weak at best. Autism as natural 
neurodiversity does not have an empirical basis either. So the three most recent 
paradigm shifts did not offer a better fit for the data nor greater explanatory power and 
were driven by something other than scientific reason. It seems that autism should be on 
the verge of yet another paradigm shift (or a reversion to Rimland) because existing 
theories are not able to explain the anomalies of rising prevalence rates and eyewitness 
accounts of autistic regression. And yet, the self correcting scientific process described 
by Kuhn has not (yet?) happened.  
 
3.2 History of Western Medicine: How doctors change their minds 
  
David Wootton in Bad Medicine: Doctors Doing Harm Since Hippocrates (2006) 
shows that the history of medicine is very different from the history of the physical 
sciences presented by Kuhn. Wootton (2006) begins with a critique of Galenic medicine 
that was based on the idea that an excess or deficiency of any of four bodily humours 
(‘blood’, ‘phlegm’, ‘yellow bile’, and ‘black bile’) was responsible for disease. Four 
forms of treatment were then recommended: emetics, purgatives, bloodletting, and 
cautery (Wootton, 2006, p. 31). More recent scholarship has revealed that the only gains 
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from going to see a doctor who practiced this form of medicine were from the placebo 
effect and in many cases the standard treatments actually decreased one’s odds of 
survival (Wootton, 2006, p. 8). While many histories of medicine focus on Galenic 
medicine, Collyer (2010) points out that for most of human history (certainly up until 
the 19th century) there was no dominant paradigm in medicine, instead there were lots of 
different competing ideas, methods, and types of practitioners.  
 
Wootton (2006) then works through several additional historical examples and shows 
that issues of power and prestige often get in the way of scientific advancement. The 
telescope and microscope were invented in the early seventeenth century (Van Helden, 
Dupre, & Van Gent, 2011). The telescope launched a revolution in astronomy. It 
appeared that there would soon be revolution at the microscopic level too as Malpighi, 
Hooke, Swammerdam, Grew, and Leeuwenhoek all published the results of their 
microscopic investigations in the 1660s and 1670s (Wootton, 2006, pp. 110–111). 
Everything was in place to discover the germ theory of disease (Winslow, [1943], in 
Wootton, 2006). But by 1690, work in microscopy had largely stopped and the next 
generation did not pick up where the great early microscopists left off (Wootton, 2006, 
pp. 110–111). It was not until the 1830s that microscopy resumed its central role in 
science and medicine (Wootton, 2006, p. 110).  
 
English natural philosopher and chemist Joseph Priestley first synthesised nitrous oxide 
in 1775 (Wootton, 2006, p. 95). The anesthetic effects of nitrous oxide were soon 
apparent as it was used as a ‘fairground amusement’ (Wootton, 2006, p. 21) and as a 
recreational drug at ‘laughing gas parties’ among British elites (Zuck, Ellis, & 
Dronsfield, 2012). But nitrous oxide was not used as an anesthetic in a medical setting 
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until 1846, and it was a dentist, Horace Wells, not a doctor who first used it to relieve 
the pain of surgery (Wootton, 2006, pp. 21–22).  
 
The cure for scurvy was known for centuries before it was implemented as policy in the 
British navy — the Dutch knew about the critical role of dietary citrus by the late 1500s 
(Stephen & Utecht, 2001); Captain James Lancaster carried lemon juice on his ship 
sailing to the East Indies in 1601 (Wootton, 2006, p. 161); and the Dutch and English 
East India Companies used it too in the early seventeenth century as did the Portuguese, 
the Spanish, and the first American colonists (Wootton, 2006, p. 161).  
 
Yet this treatment [lemons] made no sense to doctors with a university 
education, who were convinced that this disease, like every other, must be 
cause by bad air or an imbalance of the humours, and it was under their 
influence (there can be no other explanation) that ships stopped carrying 
lemons. (Wootton, 2006, p. 161).  
 
It was not until 1795, that daily rations in the British navy included lemon juice on the 
advice of Gilbert Blane, the physician to the West Indies Fleet (Wootton, 2006, p. 165). 
In the interim, nearly 100,000 sailors died of scurvy (Wootton, 2006, 161).   
 
Penicillin was discovered in 1871 by Sir John Burdon-Sanderson who ‘reported that 
moulds of the Penicillium group would prevent the development of bacteria in the broth 
exposed to air. In 1872, Lister confirmed that Penicillium glaucum would kill off 
bacteria in a liquid culture’ (Wootton, 2006, p. 247). But it was not until 1940 when the 
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first penicillin-based antibiotic was developed by Howard Florey and Ernst Chain 
(Wootton, 2006, p. 245).  
 
What explains the delay between early discoveries and widespread implementation of 
effective therapies? Wootton (2006) writes that up until the 1820s, Galenic medicine 
was akin to religion and not subject to practical testing (p. 144). He argues: 
 
The primary obstacle to progress, was not practical (Leeuwenhoek’s 
microscopes worked well), nor theoretical (the germ theory of putrefaction 
was not difficult to formulate), but psychological and cultural. It lay in 
doctors’ sense of themselves, their awareness of their own traditions, their 
habit of conferring authority upon an established canon and upon 
established therapies (Wootton, 2006, p. 286).  
 
Often the early innovators who first discovered the revolutionary insight were driven to 
financial ruin, death, or insanity by the resistance of their colleagues. Horace Wells, the 
first practitioner of painless dentistry ‘was driven to suicide by the hostility of the 
medical profession’ (Wootton, 2006, p. 22). Alexander Gordon who discovered the 
cause of puerperal fever in 1795 and published his findings was driven from his practice 
and died at 46 (Wootton, 2006, p. 212). So too, Ignaz Semmelweis who dramatically 
reduced incidence of puerperal fever in a hospital in Vienna (by requiring doctors to 
wash their hands with chloride of lime), was shunned by his colleagues and died in an 
insane asylum in 1865 (Wootton, 2006, p. 217). In every one of these instances, the 
doctors were shunned by their colleagues because these medical breakthroughs also 
revealed the primitive state of existing practices.  
 78 
 
So how did scientists finally figure out the germ theory of disease and subsequent 
treatments? Wootton (2006) argues that the creation of teaching hospitals in the middle 
of the 19th century led medicine to start counting in earnest for the first time. To the 
extent that they measured their results, they found that all of their therapies were 
completely ineffective (Wootton, 2006). ‘“Therapeutic nihilism”, the belief that most 
conventional medical therapies did not work, became the norm amongst sophisticated 
(particularly Parisian) doctors in the 1840s as a result of a new interest in statistics’ 
(Wootton, 2006, p. 141).  
 
One of the most interesting uses of counting occurred during the 1854 London cholera 
outbreak and it led to a turning point in the history of medicine. A pioneering local 
doctor named John Snow, took it upon himself, without pay, to try to figure out the 
cause of the outbreak. ‘Snow and an associate set out to visit every house in which there 
had been a cholera fatality and establish which company supplied its water’ (Wootton, 
pp. 202–203). Snow recorded the cholera cases and fatalities on a decidedly low tech 
device — a map of the neighborhood. Through looking at patterns and anomalies in the 
data displayed on the map, Snow and a local minister named Henry Whitehead were 
able to establish the source of the outbreak. The lessons from the 1854 London cholera 
outbreak are potentially important to the study of autism so I discuss them in detail in 
section 3.2.1 below.   
 
Later, British surgeon, Joseph Lister, broke with tradition when he applied Louis 
Pasteur’s research in microbiology by testing various methods for chemically killing 
microorganisms prior to and during surgery (Wootton, 2006). In the process, Lister 
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developed the first antiseptics and the first antiseptic surgery — thus dramatically 
lowering the fatality rate in his practice (Wootton, 2006).  
 
Wootton (2006) writes: 
 
Individuals and institutions are naturally conservative and risk averse. 
Unless circumstances are very unfavourable, they prefer the known to 
the unknown, continuity to change. Major change requires a crisis of the 
sort that hospitals were undergoing in the 1860s: adaptation comes late, 
not early. Even then change is likely to be easier to bring about in low-
status institutions than in high-status institutions, on the periphery than in 
the centre. Listerism triumphed first in Glasgow, then in Edinburgh, it 
established itself quickly in Scotland, but slowly in England (p. 259).  
 
Elite institutions are often the last to adopt the new methods because they are the ones 
who profit most (in terms of both prestige and financial benefit) from established 
practices.   
 
What is strange about Bad Medicine is that it concludes with the invention of antibiotics 
and the first randomised controlled trials (RCTs) in the late 1940s. Wootton’s view is 
that for most of its history, medicine did not make sufficient use of statistics. But first 
with the work of Lister and later with RCTs, medicine finally became a proper science. 
But then how does one explain the medical failures that have continued even after the 
adoption of RCTs in 1947?  
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Starting in 1957 (ten years after the first RCTs), 14 pharmaceutical companies marketed 
thalidomide in 46 countries under 37 different trade names (Gøtzche, 2013). An 
estimated ten thousand babies were born with birth defects (including phocomelia, the 
malformation of limbs) and only fifty percent of them survived (Strickson, 2014). But it 
still took four years to pull it from the market. A single regulator, Frances Oldham 
Kelsey, prevented its approval in the U.S. (Mintz, 1962). Regulators, medical 
associations, and the pharmaceutical industry all failed to catch their own error. Instead, 
a small number of individual medical professionals (Widukind Lenz in Germany and 
Sister Sparrow and William McBride in Australia) eventually connected the dots and 
figured out that the babies born with phocomelia were the result of thalidomide 
(Stephens & Brynner, 2001; Daemmrich, 2002; Swan, 2018).   
 
The current situation with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which came 
onto the market in 1987, forty years after the first RCTs, is similarly troubling. More 
than ten percent of the population are on these drugs in the United States and yet they 
are toxic, increase suicide risk for many, and do not outperform a placebo for everyone 
except the very most depressed people (Angell, 2011). As I showed in chapter 1, if 
taken during pregnancy, SSRIs increase the risk of autism. Yet 6.5% of all women 
enrolled in private health insurance and 8.1% of women on public health insurance in 
the U.S. use these drugs during pregnancy (Dawson et al., 2016).  
 
RCTs are not the panacea that Wootton would have us believe. RCTs are an important 
method but the outcome of that method depends on the sociopolitical context in which 
this research takes place. As I will show in chapter 5, corporate interests have figured 
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out how to manipulate the RCT process to serve their profit interests. More layers of 
analysis are needed in order to understand the history of medicine in our current era.  
 
3.2.1 The Political Economy of the 1854 and 1866 London Cholera Epidemics 
 
Wootton (2006) observes that the 1854 London Cholera Epidemic is one of the most 
pivotal moments in the history of medicine. A closer examination of the details of the 
outbreak and how it was stopped provides an interesting model of how paradigms shift 
in medicine.  
 
Cholera was brought to London in 1831 as a result of empire. Cholera does not naturally 
live in London, the bacteria thrives in warmer climates like India (Johnson, 2006, p. 33). 
The British colonisation of India resulted in British soldiers and merchants bringing the 
bacteria back home with them (Johnson, 2006, pp. 33–34). 
 
Miasma theory, the belief that disease was caused by bad smells, was popular in that era 
(Johnson, 2006). So health authorities, led by Edwin Chadwick, worked to build a sewer 
system to carry the bad smells out of town (Johnson, 2006). The problem is that the 
sewage was then directed into the Thames River — which was where private water 
companies drew the drinking water that they sold back to the residents (Johnson, 2006, 
pp. 33–34). Johnson (2006) comments, ‘The first defining act of a modern centralized 
public-health authority was to [accidentally] poison an entire urban population’ (p. 120).  
 
When a cholera outbreak hit London in 1854, a respected anaesthesiologist, John Snow, 
set out to determine the cause. Snow’s initial theory of the case was that cholera was 
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transmitted through contaminated water and that some private water companies 
supplying the region would have higher fatality rates than others (Johnson, 2006). 
Wootton (2006) reports that Snow was likely most influenced by John Frank Newton’s 
The Return to Nature: A Defence of the Vegetable Regime [1811] that claimed that 
London drinking water was polluted with ‘septic matter’ (p. 198). So Snow set out to 
map the Soho neighborhood, identifying illnesses and fatalities and the water company 
supplying each house (Johnson, 2006, pp. 105–106). Snow’s focus on corporate 
misconduct seems unusual for a doctor of that era. Indeed, one of the things that 
separated Snow from his contemporaries is that Snow was from a working class 
background and displayed remarkable class consciousness (Johnson, 2006, p. 148).   
 
Snow did not rely on clinical lab work and he never saw the cholera bacteria (Johnson, 
2006, p. 99). Instead he relied on the simple technology of a map that enabled him to 
pinpoint the source of the outbreak. Snow worked in partnership with a local Anglican 
minister, Henry Whitehead, who had no formal medical training (Johnson, 2006).  
 
...Whitehead’s investigations in 1855 were ultimately as decisive as 
Snow’s in solving the Broad Street mystery. His ‘conversion experience’ 
reading Snow’s monograph set him off in search of the index case, 
eventually leading him to baby Lewis. The discovery of baby Lewis led to 
York’s excavation of the pump, which confirmed a direct connection 
between the pump and the cesspool at 40 Broad (Johnson, 2006, p. 199).   
 
Once the Broad Street pump was identified as the source of the water connected with 
most of the fatalities, it was just a matter of removing the pump handle, and the cholera 
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deaths stopped within a week (Johnson, 2006, p. 160). Newspapers ignored the removal 
of the pump handle and credited a change in the weather (based on the miasma theory) 
as ending the epidemic (Johnson, 2006, p. 160).  
 
Throughout the crisis, the medical establishment was an impediment to solving the 
problem (Johnson, 2006). Indeed, even once Snow and Whitehead had definitely proved 
the source of the outbreak, public health authorities remained unconvinced (Johnson, 
2006). Reviewing Snow’s report on the cholera outbreak, Benjamin Hall, who led the 
Board of Health Committee tasked with investigating the outbreak, concluded:  
 
After careful inquiry, we see no reason to adopt this belief. We do not 
find it established that the water was contaminated in the manner 
alleged; nor is there before us any sufficient evidence to show, whether 
inhabitants of the district, drinking from that well, suffered in proportion 
more than other inhabitants of the district who drank from other sources 
(Johnson, 2006, p. 183).   
 
In 1866, a cholera epidemic broke out in East London (Johnson, 2006, p. 209). Snow 
had died in 1858, but William Farr, the registrar-general of London, had worked with 
Snow and Whitehead on the 1854 cholera investigation (Johnson, 2006). Farr brought in 
Whitehead and together they pursued Snow’s original theory, that one of the water 
companies supplying the region might be to blame (Johnson, 2006, p. 210). Indeed, they 
discovered that 93% of the fatalities were customers of the East London Water 
Company (Johnson, 2006, p. 211). Further investigation revealed that a key section of 
the sewer line had not been completed and so sewage was overflowing into the reservoir 
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used by the East London Water Company (Johnson, 2006, p. 211). The 1866 epidemic 
confirmed Snow’s initial theory of the case; miasma theory was official dead; and 
London has not had a cholera outbreak since (Johnson, 2006, p. 214). 
 
Imagine, for a moment, if the lessons of the 1854 and 1866 cholera epidemics were 
applied to the autism epidemic. One might start with the observation that the medical 
establishment can be sclerotic and a barrier to progress. Then one would see that it is 
important to engage directly with those impacted by the epidemic and enlist a diversity 
of viewpoints in searching for evidence. Furthermore, a proper understanding of the 
1854 and 1866 cholera epidemics would lead one to be on alert for the possibility of a 
disease of the remedy — that somehow unwittingly, some step towards scientific 
progress might have unleashed unintended consequences. Finally, the 1854 and 1866 
cholera epidemics teach one to examine autism in its political, economic, cultural, and 
historical context while specifically examining the possible role of corporations and 
capitalism in the rise of the disorder. And yet, generally speaking those are not the 
lessons that public health authorities take from John Snow, Henry Whitehead, and the 
removal of the Broad Street pump handle. More often than not the story is made to fit 
existing cognitive biases — “visionary scientist working alone and science as a system 
that is self-correcting and always improving”.  
 
3.3 Three American regimes of science in the 20th century.   
 
Krimsky (2004), Angell (2005), Hess (2007), Michaels (2008a), Mirowski (2011), and 
Gøtzsche (2013) examine more recent trends in science and medicine and find that 
every step in the scientific process (in the U.S.) is now shaped by corporate influence. I 
devote chapter 5 to exploring the details of the current mode of production in science.  
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For the purposes in this chapter, I want to focus on the work of Philip Mirowski in 
Science-Mart (2011) because he takes a longer historical view than some of these other 
critical authors, his periodisation is better, and he looks at science and medicine in their 
economic and political context.  
 
Mirowski is Professor of Economics and Policy Studies and the History and Philosophy 
of Science at the University of Notre Dame. In Science-Mart (2011) he gives a political 
economic history of corporate influence on science starting in 1890. To begin with he 
notes that ‘history of science’ is a misnomer. The proper term is ‘histories of sciences’ 
plural in each instance because neither history nor science are monolithic (Mirowski, 
2011, p. 88).  
 
Mirowski (2011) argues that there were three radically different phases (what he calls 
‘regimes’) of American scientific research: 1890 to WWII, the ‘Captains of Erudition’ 
regime; WWII to 1980, the Cold War regime; and from 1980 to the present, the 
‘Globalized Privatization’ regime. For each regime he tracks changes in the approach to 
science across six domains: the evolution of the corporate form, government policy 
towards corporations, government science policy, who are the science managers, 
changes in higher education, and the pivotal disciplinary science of that era. Taking 
each regime in turn:4 
 
The ‘Captains of Erudition’ regime from 1890 to WWII was characterised by scientific 
innovation inside large corporate R&D labs; the expansion of corporate prerogatives 
                                                
4 All of the material in the next three paragraphs comes from a table in Mirowski (2011) pp. 94–
95.  
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from patents to giving employers ownership over the research performed by employees; 
very little government science policy; science driven by the charismatic directors of 
corporate labs; universities focused mainly on teaching; and chemistry and electrical 
engineering as the pivotal scientific disciplines of the era (Mirowski, 2011, p. 94).  
 
By contrast, during the Cold War Regime from World War II to 1980, Mirowski (2011) 
argues that large firms diversified; military contracts formed a sort of de facto national 
industrial policy; there was a huge expansion of federal military funding and control of 
science; the military were the primary managers driving innovation in universities, 
corporate labs, and at think tanks; higher education expanded (particularly after the war) 
with an eye toward turning out democratic citizens; and physics, operations research, 
and formal logic were the pivotal scientific disciplines of this era (p. 94).   
 
According to Mirowski (2011), starting around 1980, the scientific paradigm changed 
again in the United States. Mirowski characterises the era from 1980 to the present as 
the ‘Globalized Privatization Regime.’ During this period, corporations have outsourced 
R&D and spun off in-house labs; antitrust laws have been weakened and intellectual 
property rights vastly expanded; publicly funded research has been privatised; global 
corporations control research at universities, contract research organisations, and start-
ups; universities and professors have neglected teaching in favour of research and 
developing patentable intellectual property in partnership with private firms; and 
biomedicine, genetics, computer science, and economics are the pivotal disciplinary 
sciences (Mirowski, 2011, p. 95).   
 
 87 
The catalyst for this shift to the new Globalized Privatization Regime in science was the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the U.S. which ‘allowed universities and small businesses to 
own patents on discoveries made with government R&D funding’ (Mirowski, 2011, p. 
21). Other countries soon adopted similar legislation (Mirowski, 2011, p. 21).  
 
Prior to Bayh-Dole, government funded research, to the extent that it was not classified, 
became part of the commons, free to be used by anyone (Mirowski, 2011). Under Bayh-
Dole, knowledge and discovery could now be privately owned, so individual professors, 
departments, and universities rushed to patent their discoveries and find ways to 
commercially profit from their inventions (Mirowski, 2011). Thus (I note that) several 
hundred years after the British parliament enclosed public lands through various 
legislative acts, the U.S. Congress similarly enclosed public scientific knowledge and 
awarded it to private intellectual property holders to profit from as they wish.   
 
As knowledge is increasingly privatised, collaboration becomes much more difficult 
because now one must obtain a license for everything from certain cell lines to a wide 
range of research methods (Mirowski, 2011). As a result, so called Material Transfer 
Agreements (MTAs) have proliferated in universities (Mirowski, 2011). MTAs are 
contracts that stipulate royalty rates for the use of research tools and specify who will 
own the outputs of scientific research (Mirowski, 2011). Professors, universities, and 
corporations all demand MTAs from each other in order to work together (Mirowski, 
2011). Mirowski (2011) writes, ‘MTAs were essentially absent in most university 
setting before 1980’ (p. 142). He continues, ‘...MTAs can contain a forbidding array of 
controls and restrictions over prospective research still to be carried out by anyone who 
signs them’ (p. 155). These controls and restrictions include ‘reach through’ clauses 
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whereby the patent holder of the research tool is given ownership rights to any 
discoveries resulting from the use of said tool; confidentiality rules whereby the original 
patent holder can forbid publication of unfavourable results of research processes 
involving the patented material; and prohibitions on disclosure of any discoveries 
related to the safety or efficacy of the research tools (Mirowski, 2011, p. 155). 
 
Similarly troubling developments have happened in privatised corporate research. 
Mirowski (2011) shows that many of the same trends that we have seen in traditional 
manufacturing over the last 30 years have also occurred in the manufacturing of 
knowledge — contracting out (p. 137), offshoring (p. 223), and deskilling (p. 228). 
Pharmaceutical companies had long been frustrated by the fact that academic research 
scientists were too slow and sometimes published results that hurt profits. So starting in 
the 1980s and then accelerating in the 1990s, pharmaceutical companies started to work 
with so-called ‘contract research organizations’ (CROs) (Mirowski, 2011).   
 
CROs are private science labs-for-hire that specialise in clinical trials (Mirowski, 2011). 
CROs emphasise speed and give pharmaceutical companies control over the research 
process (Mirowski, 2011). Unfavourable studies are killed and unfavourable data are 
never published (Mirowski, 2011). CROs have radically shifted the biomedical 
landscape from ‘figuring out what was specifically wrong with the patient to the 
efficient and timely production of standardized data for FDA protocols’ (Mirowski, 
2011, p. 231).  
 
The use of CROs raises ethical and safety issues that have thus far been ignored by 
regulators. ‘Foreign trials offer the freedom to adjust the protocols to achieve the 
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preconceived answer one seeks’ (Mirowski, 2011, p. 375). In an interview with Petryna 
[2007] a CRO scientific officer stated:  
 
‘In my recruitment strategy, I can use subject inclusion criteria that are so 
selective I can “engineer out” the possibility of adverse events being seen. 
Or, I can demonstrate that my new drug is better by “engineering up” a 
side effect in another drug. That is the big game of clinical trials’ 
(Mirowski, 2011, p. 375).  
 
As much as 80% of all clinical trials are now conducted in CROs in foreign countries 
with China as the CRO industry leader (OIG [2010] in Mirowski 2011, p. 232).   
 
One result of the privatisation of scientific research is that the pipeline of truly novel 
therapies, drugs, and innovations in science has begun to dry up (Mirowski, 2011). 
Mirowski (2011) notes, ‘the initiation of a serious decline in the number of [New Drug 
Applications] NDAs in the United States dates from roughly 1983’ (p. 211). From 1989 
to 2000, the FDA reports only 15 percent of all approved drugs were real innovations 
(what are called ‘new molecular entities’ NMEs) (Mirowski, 2011, p. 214).   
 
The privatisation of the scientific commons also increases the tendency toward 
Cartesian reductionism. Mirowski (2011) observes: 
 
In order to assert control over biological innovation and research tools, it 
becomes necessary for theory to stabilize discrete objects of ownership 
in accordance with the reigning rules of the property regime. Under the 
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sign of commercialized science, those combinations of theory + 
empiricism that conform to the arbitrary definitions of the commodity 
will clearly be preferred to those that stress complexity and 
interrelatedness of phenomena (p. 206).  
 
Mirowski (2011) suggests that the production of ignorance may be the goal, not the 
unfortunate byproduct of this shift towards a globalised privatisation regime in science 
(p. 343). He writes, ‘The current modern regime of science organization in many 
respects is not a new knowledge economy as much as it is an engine of agnogenesis’ 
(Mirowski, 2011, p. 318). The slowing down and freezing up of scientific discovery is 
not accidental (even if some of the participants are unwitting or unaware of the larger 
dynamics at work). Rather, the legislative enclosure that has produced this result has 
been extremely profitable for a handful of well-positioned professors, universities, and 
corporations. 
 
In the concluding chapter to Science-Mart Mirowski (2011) writes: ‘It will probably 
take a system crash before the leaders of today’s universities will admit [that] the 
current wave of commercialized knowledge production has proven unsustainable on its 
own terms’ (p. 316). A strong case can be made that the autism epidemic is that system 
crash. By analogy, the surge in autism cases is akin to New Orleans following Hurricane 
Katrina: an emergency hits and the system has no capacity to respond because it has 
been hollowed out by corporate interests. Professors, universities, medical journals, and 
regulators have often turned their attention from doing good science to doing profitable 
science. And preventing autism is not profitable. Few of the people in a position to 
respond can respond appropriately because they have committed themselves to a 
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different purpose. Even if they wanted to respond they could not because the research 
tools that they need have been encumbered by the privatisation of scientific knowledge.  
 
3.3.1 A different view of the Bayh-Dole Act 
 
In contrast to Mirowski’s dim view of the Bayh-Dole Act, many in the scientific 
community see it as a great catalyst for progress. The argument is that scientific 
discoveries do no good if locked away in a university — their only value comes from 
commercial applications in the world that make life better for people. Said differently, 
the Bayh-Dole Act properly aligns incentives between scientific research and the needs 
of the public; corporations and academic researchers are compensated according to the 
value that they produce for society. 
 
The Economist in 2002 wrote that the Bayh-Dole Act is ‘possibly the most inspired 
piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century... More than 
anything, this single policy measure helped to reverse America’s precipitous slide into 
industrial irrelevance’ (‘Innovation’s Golden Goose’, para. 2). Schacht (2012) writing 
for the Congressional Research Service points out that research funding only accounts 
for about ‘one-quarter of the costs associated with bringing a new product to market’ (p. 
i). Patents awarded to universities soared following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act: 
‘in 1980, 390 patents were awarded to universities, by 2009, the number increased to 
3,088’ (Schacht, 2012, p. 9). In-house reports prepared for the Biotechnology 
Innovation Organization and the Association of University Technology Managers 
(AUTM) claim that over the twenty years span of 1996–2015 (inclusive) the Bayh-Dole 
Act led to the creation of up to 12,000 new companies, 4.3 million jobs, $1.3 trillion in 
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economic activity, and the development of over 200 new FDA approved vaccines and 
drugs (AUTM, 2016; Pressman, Yuskavage, & Okubo, 2017). 
 
Others are less sanguine. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) in a widely cited article in 
Science argue that the Bayh-Dole Act led to the creation of an ‘anticommons’. They 
write, ‘A proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be stifling life-
saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and product 
development’ (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998, p. 698). Heller and Eisenberg (1998) spurred 
a growing field of anticommons studies including economic modeling (Buchanan & 
Yoon, 2000), books (Heller, 2008; Burk & Lemley, 2009; Heller, 2010), and the 
creation of the Commons Strategies Group to support the development of commons 
research around the world. Others point out that the data with respect to Bayh-Dole is 
decidedly mixed. With the academic landscape transformed into a series of monopolies 
over each part of the scientific process, the federal courts have been tied up with patent 
suits and university spending on litigation increased 5-fold from 1991 to 2002 (Leaf, 
2005). Furthermore, the cost of prescription drugs skyrocketed — 13% a year for two 
decades (Leaf, 2005).  
 
The champions of Bayh-Dole do not focus on autism, the rise in chronic illness, nor the 
inability of government, universities, or the market to prevent and cure such diseases. 
In-house estimates of economic impacts are notoriously unreliable. Touting new FDA 
approvals, which are overwhelmingly ‘me-too’ drugs, does not provide much 
information on impact (there is no way to know how many new molecular entities 
would have been created in the absence of Bayh-Dole). If one focuses on patents and 
profits, then Bayh-Dole is an overwhelming success. But it is more than a little 
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incongruous to celebrate the revenues that have flowed to academic researchers even as 
the number of new molecular entities has slowed and epidemics like autism have 
stumped science and medicine for three decades.  
 
But this conflict over Bayh-Dole is instructive because like the debate over autism itself, 
it is not about data and evidence per se. Rather the conflict reflects prior decisions about 
first principles — the philosophy of science that one uses to approach the material and 
the political economy preferences that one brings to the debate. Bayh-Dole is an ideal fit 
for those who think that private property, profits, and markets are the key to innovation 
and economic success. By contrast Bayh-Dole is seen as problematic to those who 
believe that the commons, free exchange of information, and widescale cooperation are 
the best ways to promote innovation and the best health outcomes for society.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I argued that Kuhn’s (1962) Structure of Scientific Revolutions is an 
idealised model that is not applicable to the biological sciences. I reviewed Wootton’s 
(2006) history of medicine and showed that many important breakthroughs and 
innovations languished for decades or even centuries because they threatened 
established interests and many early innovators were ostracised by their peers and 
driven to an early death. I argued that the 1854 and 1866 London cholera epidemics 
offers important lessons for the autism epidemic, namely: the medical establishment 
might be a barrier to progress; enlist a diversity of viewpoints; look out for a disease of 
the remedy; and examine autism in its political, economic, cultural, and historical 
context (including the possible role of corporations and capitalism in the rise of the 
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disorder). Finally I reviewed Mirowski (2011) who argues that the Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980 led to a privatisation of the scientific commons and radically reshaped nearly 
every step of the scientific process. This has enriched corporations (particularly in 
biotech) and a small number of academic researchers and institutions while impeding 
scientific progress. Furthermore, I argued that this privatisation of the commons has left 
the scientific and medical community ill-prepared to respond to the autism epidemic 
because profit motives may undermine a focus on public health. In the next chapter I 
examine the sociological literature on toxic chemical disasters and long-term toxic 
chemical exposures to glean further lessons for understanding the autism epidemic.  
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Chapter 4 
Case studies in toxic chemical disasters and  
long term toxic chemical exposures 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
Over the last fifty years, social scientists have developed a large literature on patterns 
associated with toxic chemical disasters and long term toxic chemical exposures. This 
literature can help us to think about the political economy of the autism epidemic. In 
this chapter, I start with a focus on the work of Michael Reich (1991) who shows that 
toxic chemical disasters tend to follow a similar pattern as the shockwaves from the 
initial disaster ripple through society (4.1). Then I focus on three case studies of long 
term toxic chemical exposure over the last century: asbestos (4.2.1), lead (4.2.2), and 
tobacco (4.2.3). I show that the public health system is often extremely slow to respond 
to well known threats to human health when powerful economic actors are involved. I 
conclude with a section on Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring and the lessons that the 
campaign against DDT might offer to those interested in autism prevention (4.3).   
 
4.1 The sociology of toxic chemical disasters 
 
There is a large literature on the sociology of toxic chemical disasters including 
Erickson (1977), Levine (1982), Edelstein (1988), Clark (1989), Picou (1990), Brown 
(1990), Reich (1991), Lerner (2006, 2010), and Kroll-Smith and Couch (2009). Reich 
(1991), in a study of three major chemical disasters on three separate continents, found 
that in spite of differences in cultures and contexts, all three societies experienced a 
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similar dynamic following the catastrophe. At first the toxic disaster was treated as a 
nonissue: a private trouble for individuals and their families (Reich, 1991). Later as 
victims connected disparate pieces of information about the cause and then organised 
and struggled for redress, the disaster became a public issue (Reich, 1991). Finally, the 
disaster became a political issue when politicians and various institutions were forced to 
respond (Reich, 1991). Reich (1991) is building on the work of Lukes (1974) who is 
building on the work of C. Wright Mills [1956, 1959], amongst others, in developing 
this analysis.  
 
Reich (1991) writes, ‘four key factors determine the nature of contamination: the 
invisibility of the toxic agent, the nonspecificity of toxic symptoms, the geographical 
distribution of victims, and the difficulties of identifying the causative substances’ (p. 
145). In every case, the particular features of autism make mobilisation difficult. There 
are no biomarkers for autism; it is determined solely by behavioral characteristics. So 
unlike a toxic cloud or an oil spill, in the case of autism the causative substances are 
mostly invisible. Autism is a spectrum rather than a single disorder, so the toxic 
symptoms are nonspecific. People on the autism spectrum represent one to two percent 
of the global population but they are distributed all over the world and in all races, 
ethnicities, and classes which makes organising more difficult. And there are likely not 
just one but many different causative substances which makes it more difficult to 
establish the aetiology of the disorder.  
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4.2 Case studies in long term toxic chemical exposures 
 
While there is fairly good evidence that autism is caused by chemical exposures, the 
autism epidemic is not the result of a one-time spill or accident. Rather it appears to be 
the result of business as usual under a regulatory framework that claims to balance 
corporate profits and human health, but in fact invariably gives preference to corporate 
interests. Closer analogies to the autism epidemic come from the study of asbestos, lead, 
and tobacco. With accidents at chemical plants, one can sometimes make the case that 
no one could have predicted this outcome. But with asbestos, lead, and tobacco, doctors 
and scientists have known for decades that these products were deadly. And yet 
production and use continue anyway.  
 
4.2.1 Asbestos 
 
Over the last thirty years, a number of investigative reporters, doctors, and social 
scientists have studied the history of asbestos including Brodeur (1985); Castleman and 
Berger (1996); Schneider and McCumber (2004); McCulloch and Tweedale (2008); and 
Miyamoto, Morinaga, and Mori (2011). A number of interesting patterns emerge across 
these various studies including the fact that: 1.) the vast majority of people in positions 
of authority, whether in politics or medicine, overlook, downplay, or ignore death and 
disease in their midst rather than confronting toxic polluters; 2.) early whistleblowers 
invariably suffer repression and loss of economic livelihood; and 3.) public health 
institutions can sometimes slow the pace of the catastrophe or provide some 
amelioration but are generally unable to stop a public health crisis caused by a corporate 
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polluter in spite of a century of progressive reforms and the growth of public health 
institutions in this era.  
 
Schneider and McCumber (2004) provide an overview of the last 100 years of asbestos 
research (and all of the sources and quotes in this paragraph come from their text, pp. 
80–82). Castleman [1996] notes that in 1897, a physician in Vienna wrote that 
pulmonary problems in asbestos weavers and their families were the result of dust 
inhalation. In 1918, the Commerce Department published a study called, ‘Mortality 
from Respiratory Disease in Dusty Trades’. The author Frederick Hoffman, an 
employee of Prudential Insurance on loan to the government for the project, made it 
clear that the dangers of asbestos were widely known. Hoffman [1918] wrote, ‘In the 
practice of American and Canadian life insurance companies, asbestos workers are 
generally declined on account of the assumed health-injurious conditions of the 
industry’. Brodeur [1985] cites a 1932 letter from the U.S. Bureau of Mines to asbestos 
manufacturer Eagle-Picher that states: ‘It is now known that asbestos dust is one of the 
most dangerous dusts to which man is exposed’. Furthermore, ‘according to the U.S. 
military’s own estimation, almost as many military personnel were killed from exposure 
to asbestos in World War II than by the enemy’ (Schneider & McCumber, 2004, p. 82).  
 
Many people in positions of authority knew about the dangers of asbestos and did 
nothing about it. Companies that mined asbestos knew that their workers were dying 
from various lung ailments; companies that used asbestos in their products knew that 
dust in the factory was injuring and killing workers; and doctors for these companies, 
insurers, and community leaders knew as well (Schneider & McCumber, 2004). But 
almost invariably, those who speak out in the early days of widespread toxic 
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contamination are vilified and suffer enormous economic harm. In Libby, Montana, site 
of one of the world’s largest vermiculite mines, a local doctor, Richard Irons, figured 
out in the mid-1970s that workers in the mine were developing lung diseases from 
asbestos (Schneider & McCumber, 2004). But the mine owner, W.R. Grace ‘exerted 
tremendous influence on Libby’s medical community. It donated heavily to St. Joseph’s 
Hospital and always kept an executive on the hospital board’ (Schneider & McCumber, 
2004, p. 122). After seeing evidence of lung problems in chest x-rays of eleven mine 
worker patients in a row, Irons contacted W.R. Grace executives to alert them to what 
he was finding (Schneider & McCumber, 2004, p. 123). Grace subsequently stopped 
sending mine workers to his practice and shortly thereafter St. Joseph’s Hospital 
accused Irons of drug use and revoked his hospital privileges thereby ending his 
medical practice in Libby (Schneider & McCumber, 2004, p. 124). It took another 
twenty-two years before an investigative reporter from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer 
stumbled upon the story and wrote the articles that led to an investigation that resulted 
in compensation for some asbestos victims and the partial cleanup of the town 
(Schneider & McCumber, 2004, p. 183).  
 
By the 1930s, it was known that asbestos causes asbestosis, by the 1940s it was 
established that asbestos causes lung cancer, and by the 1960s it was shown that 
asbestos causes mesothelioma (McCulloch & Tweedale, 2008, p. 9). The impact of all 
of these illnesses has been catastrophic worldwide:  
 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) have recently stated that asbestos kills at least 
90,000 workers worldwide each year at present. According to one report, 
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the asbestos cancer epidemic could take at least five million (and possibly 
as many as ten million) lives before asbestos is banned worldwide and 
exposures cease (McCulloch & Tweedale, 2008, p. 11).  
 
In spite of these catastrophic health impacts, asbestos has not been banned in the United 
States and production levels continue to be as high today as they were in the 1960s 
when the direct link between asbestos and mesothelioma was established (McCulloch & 
Tweedale, 2008). They note that: 
 
Between 1900 and 2004, world asbestos production was approximately 
182 million tonnes. Of this total, 143 million tonnes were produced after 
1960 [Virta, 2006]. Put another way, nearly 80 percent of world asbestos 
production in the twentieth century was produced after the world learned 
that asbestos could cause mesothelioma! (McCulloch & Tweedale, 2008, 
p. 14).  
 
McCulloch and Tweedale (2008) explain that continuing production in spite of known 
catastrophic effects is simply a matter of power: ‘…asbestos has proved to be so 
enduring, because the industry was able to mount a successful defence strategy for the 
mineral — that still operates in some parts of the world’ (p. 15). The strategy consisted 
of ‘concealment and, at times, misinformation that often amounted to a conspiracy to 
continue selling asbestos fibre irrespective of the health risks’ (McCulloch & Tweedale, 
2008, p. 15). McCulloch and Tweedale’s (2008) analysis suggests that in some ways we 
live under a sort of modern feudalism, where a handful of powerful actors can engage in 
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long term toxic trespass, as long as they have enough resources to hire skilled product 
defence attorneys and a good public relations team.  
 
4.2.2 Lead Poisoning 
 
Like asbestos there is an extensive literature on the history of lead poisoning including 
Needleman (1991), Warren (2000), Denworth (2009), and Markowitz and Rosner 
(2013). An interesting picture emerges from the study of more than one hundred years 
of lead poisoning.  Specifically, the evidence shows that toxicology has evolved 
considerably over the last century. Yet, in spite of improved science, public health as an 
institution is in retreat, seemingly unable to address the root causes that caused the 
problem in the first place.   
 
The level of lead (in the blood) considered ‘safe’ has changed dramatically over the 
course of the last fifty years. Markowitz and Rosner (2013) write:  
 
From the 1960s through the early 1990s, blood lead levels considered 
dangerous to children declined from 60 to 10 µg/dl. And more recent 
research indicates that even the lower blood lead level considered safe in 
the 1990s offers children inadequate protection. In fact, the CDC in mid-
2012 lowered its level of concern—the level at which children should be 
considered at risk—to 5µg/dl, thereby increasing the estimated number 
of endangered children from 250,000 to 450,000. Even this may not be a 
safe level. The CDC’s Advisory Committee on Lead Poisoning 
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Prevention itself acknowledged that there may not be any ‘safe’ level of 
lead exposure for children (p. 218).  
 
The study of lead poisoning upends many of the long-standing theories in toxicology 
and epidemiology. Markowitz and Rosner (2013) point out that:  
 
Our common-sense assumptions, long held by toxicologists as well as 
the general public, that the higher the level of a poison, the more damage 
it causes, may not always be true. New research shows that the most 
serious damage from lead occurs at some of the lowest levels of 
exposure, often in utero or in the first years of life, when the neurological 
structures of the brain are forming. For example, compared to children 
with virtually no evidence of lead in their blood, the greatest effect of 
lead on IQ occurs in children with blood lead levels below 5 µg/dl.... 
Similarly, endocrine disruptors such as bisphenol A have their greatest 
impact on physiological structures at the lowest levels of 
bioaccumulation if exposure occurs at critical moments in fetal 
development. This raises troubling issues for toxicology and for society, 
because these data imply that other toxins may also defy the traditional 
dogma that the ‘dose makes the poison’ and that ‘lowering exposures 
lowers the risk’ (p. 218).  
 
Markowitz and Rosner’s (2013) account is about more than lead poisoning, it is about 
the failures more broadly of public health as a discipline. They write, ‘More than thirty-
five studies were done during the 1980s and 1990s about various lead-abatement 
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strategies’ (Markowitz & Rosner, 2013, p. 229). In spite of the evidence, ‘policy makers 
were unwilling to commit the needed resources to finally remove lead from children’s 
homes, and the courts were unwilling to hold accountable the companies responsible for 
this ecological and human tragedy’ (Markowitz & Rosner, 2013, p. 229). Figert and 
Bell (2014) lament that global clinical trials have reduced ‘public health strategies from 
a broad array of disease prevention efforts to one seeking to improve the health of 
populations with pharmaceuticals’ (p. 456). 
 
Corporate interests, not human health, continue to be the overriding force determining 
regulatory outcomes. Scientists have known for at least 100 years that lead is toxic; lead 
poisoning is a preventable disease; and yet both policymakers and the courts refuse to 
hold industry responsible for the harms they have caused thereby ensuring ‘that future 
generations of children will be sacrificed as well’ (Markowitz & Rosner, 2013, p. 231). 
Bruce Lanphear underscores this point when he writes, ‘unless it serves the needs of 
private enterprise, public health is incapable of controlling the causes of chronic disease 
and disability’ (in Markowitz & Rosner, 2013, p. i).  
 
4.2.3 Tobacco 
 
The literature on the centuries-long battle against tobacco includes Kluger (1996), 
Kessler (2001), Brandt (2007), McGarity and Wagner (2008), Michaels (2008a), and 
Oreskes and Conway (2010). Like asbestos and lead, many people have known for a 
long time that tobacco was carcinogenic and deadly. Michaels (2008a) notes that ‘by the 
eighteenth century, doctors were writing about the oral tumors of the mouth and throat 
that seemed to afflict smokers’ (p. 4). Early campaigns against smoking encountered 
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widespread media capture by cigarette makers.  Furthermore, the medical establishment 
was both part of the problem and part of the (as yet still incomplete) solution.   
 
In 1938, a study by Pearl at Johns Hopkins University suggested that smoking increased 
mortality (Michaels, 2008a, p. 4). But newspapers at the time were heavily dependent 
on advertising from cigarette makers and so other than the Associated Press, most 
newspapers ignored the story (Michaels, 2008a, p. 4). One muckraking journalist, 
George Seldes, became so enraged by what he saw as media self-censorship that he 
started his own newsletter in 1941 called ‘In Fact’ to publicise stories ‘linking tobacco 
to disease and premature death’ (Michaels, 2008a, p. 5). 
 
Five studies came out in 1950 showing that smoking caused lung cancer, but 
statisticians and the medical establishment remained unconvinced (Michaels, 2008a, p. 
5). They asked,  
 
What was the mechanism by which the tobacco smoke caused cancer? 
Were there other factors associated with both lung cancer and tobacco 
that might be responsible? Was there something in one’s constitution 
(which today we would explain as genetic) that increased both lung 
cancer risk and propensity to smoke? If so, then smoking would not 
cause lung cancer; a third factor would cause them both. Smoking 
apparently increased risk not just of lung cancer but of a host of other 
diseases as well. To some researchers steeped in infectious disease 
epidemiology, it seemed implausible that many different diseases could 
be associated with a single cause (Michaels, 2008a, p. 5).  
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Looking back, the degree to which the tobacco industry was able to co-opt doctors to 
promote their product is astonishing (Kluger, 1996). Both doctors and (later) favourable 
studies could be bought for a price, much like any other commodity (Kluger, 1996). Far 
from the image that science and medicine would like to project of rationality and 
objectivity, for the most part, in the midst of a massive public health crisis, the scientific 
and medical communities showed that they were susceptible to outside pressure and a 
desire for personal financial enrichment (Kluger, 1996).  
 
4.2.4 Patterns that cut across asbestos, lead, and tobacco 
 
There are also patterns that cut across all three of these toxic products. The first is that, 
in the early phase of the crisis, which can sometimes stretch on for decades, there is a 
strong tendency to blame the victim. With asbestos, when mine workers showed signs 
of lung problems, they were blamed for smoking and generally having an unhealthy 
lifestyle (Schneider & McCumber, 2004). With lead, children suffering from lead 
poisoning were blamed for bad behaviour and their parents were blamed for everything 
from being single parents, to lack of discipline, to lack of proper moral values (Warren, 
2000). And with tobacco, as the science connecting smoking with lung cancer became 
crystal clear, cigarette makers crafted a clever legal maneuver to put warning labels on 
cigarette packages — which shifts the blame onto smokers (for choosing to ignore the 
warnings) and thereby gave cigarette makers some form of liability protection for about 
thirty years (Michaels, 2008a, p. 10).  
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The second pattern that shows up in all three of these cases is the essential role of legal 
discovery. Case after case involving asbestos, lead, and tobacco shows that discovery in 
preparation for a trial unearthed the documents that showed the extent of the problem 
and the corporate attempt to cover it up. In writing about lead poisoning, Markowitz and 
Rosner (2013) explain that their account of ‘industry’s role in the development of a 
public-health tragedy would not have been possible without litigation, which brought to 
light literally hundreds of thousands of pages of company documents’ (p. xiii). In the 
absence of discovery we might very well still have asbestos in home insulation, lead in 
paint and gasoline, and the tobacco industry never would have settled with the states for 
$265 billion in related health care costs. An industry that could avoid discovery could 
potentially pollute for an indefinite period of time.   
 
Also in the case of asbestos, lead, and tobacco, some new technology came along that 
enabled better detection. Initially, in every case it was assumed that only those exposed 
to high doses, usually at the factory, with a genetic predisposition were susceptible to 
illness or death from the product. But better detection methods showed that even minute 
doses were toxic, even to otherwise healthy people exposed anywhere. So for example 
in the case of asbestos, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency previously conducted 
all of their tests of asbestos content in ore and dust using polarized-light microscopy 
(PLM); but by the late 1990s a more sophisticated testing method had been developed, 
transmission electron microscopy (TEM) (Schneider & McCumber, 2004). When dust 
and ore from the Libby vermiculite mine were tested using PLM they usually came back 
with no readings for asbestos; when the same samples were tested with TEM, nearly 
100% came back positive for asbestos (Schneider & McCumber, 2004, p. 16). In the 
case of lead, by the mid 1990s, ‘technological advances had led to routine tests that 
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were capable of inexpensively identifying much lower levels of lead in children’s 
blood’ (Markowitz & Rosner, 2013). It is not clear what the breakthrough technology 
will be for detecting the causes of autism. But the fact that the U.S. federal government 
is primarily funding research on the genetic causes of autism, even though this theory is 
increasingly discredited, surely does not help.  
 
4.3 The Lessons from Silent Spring 
 
By most accounts, Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring produced a profound shift in how 
people around the world think about environmental issues. In this section I will discuss 
the lessons from Silent Spring because I think they may offer some important insights 
for how society should respond to the autism epidemic.  
 
When Silent Spring came out in 1962, chronicling the harmful effects of DDT and other 
insecticides, it faced a large, powerful, and profitable industry, and a sceptical court 
system. In the ten years prior to the publication of Silent Spring, four other books had 
come out on the dangers of pesticides and yet none of them made a dent in public 
opinion nor an impact on regulation (Paull, 2013, p. 7). Yet Silent Spring was a catalyst 
for a sea change in public opinion and a dramatic shift in the regulation of chemicals in 
the U.S. (Griswold, 2012). Following the publication of the book and Senate testimony 
by Carson, President Kennedy directed his Science Advisory Committee to follow up 
on Carson’s claims (Stoll, 2012). By 1963, the committee had largely validated 
Carson’s work (Lear, 1997; Stoll, 2012). Support for greater regulation of toxicants was 
bipartisan. President Nixon created the Environmental Protection agency in 1970, and 
by 1972, the EPA had phased out most uses of DDT. Today Silent Spring is credited by 
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many with igniting the modern environmental movement (Griswold, 2012). Three 
lessons emerge from the publication of Silent Spring that may be useful as we think 
about the autism epidemic.   
 
First, Carson (1962) presents not just an alternative account of DDT, she presents an 
alternative ontology of how the world works. Carson (1962) points out the reductionist 
thinking of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in targeting specific insects, 
while missing the impact of pesticides on ecosystems. What she shows is that the 
USDA and state aerial spraying programs killed thousands of larger animals including 
fish, birds, and raccoons and they were often ineffective at eradicating the targeted 
insects. Carson (1962) overcomes Cartesian reductionism by looking at every level of 
an ecosystem and the interactions between them. She starts with living systems in water 
and moves up through soil to the role of worms and their interaction with decomposing 
leaves and plants before discussing birds and then larger animals including humans. 
And she shows how introducing a toxicant at any level of that system impacts every 
other layer in the system. In the book, Carson (1962) does not push for new regulation 
(although she did later in Senate testimony). Rather she advocates for a complete 
change in worldview — from chemical pest management targeted toward killing 
individual species to biological pest management focused on healthy ecosystems.   
 
Second, Carson’s work was reviled by the U.S. Department of Agriculture when it came 
out (Lear, 2007). Contrary to the smooth shifting of gears between different paradigms 
implied by Kuhn (1962) in actual practice those who challenge existing paradigms face 
ostracism, bullying, intimidation, and economic coercion. The important point here is 
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that the USDA saw their mandate as protecting corporate interests rather than public 
health.  
 
Finally, when President Kennedy’s Science Advisory Committee urged comprehensive 
reforms in the regulation of pesticides, they had not clearly established causation. They 
proceeded out of an abundance of caution. What this shows is that waiting for proof of 
causation is a political choice. The responses to the 1854 London cholera epidemic and 
the bird and fish die-offs associated with DDT show that one can stop an epidemic even 
in the absence of establishing causation. It is only the hegemony of a certain sort of 
corporate ideology in our current era (and laws that emerge from that sort of ideology) 
that makes one think that one has to establish causality first.  
 
There is an interesting footnote in connection with Rachel Carson’s legacy. A small but 
vocal faction of the scientific community maintains that Carson is one of the great 
villains in history. Guided by a mix of a positivist philosophy of science, political 
libertarianism, and a belief that big chemical companies rarely do harm, they maintain 
that the banning of DDT led to millions of unnecessary human deaths from malaria, 
particularly in the developing world (Ames & Krovoza, 1992; Trewavas et al., 2012; 
Offit, 2017). This view overlooks the fact that a large body of evidence suggests that 
DDT and its metabolites are associated with a range of adverse health effects including 
breast cancer, diabetes, and neurodevelopmental disorders in children (Eskenazi et al., 
2009). Furthermore, mosquitos had already developed resistance to DDT by the time of 
the ban, a number of suitable substitutes now exist, and interventions like mosquito nets 
offer effective protection against malaria without the toxic trade offs (Stone, 2006). But 
the notion persists because, as I showed in chapter 2, ideology shapes how one sees the 
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evidence. Some of the same actors who see Carson as a villain also defend the 
producers of toxic triggers associated with autism.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I reviewed the work of Reich (1991) who showed that toxic chemical 
disasters tend to follow similar patterns — at first they are a private trouble; as victims 
begin to organise and gain publicity, the disaster becomes a public issue; and as the 
crisis grows and politicians are forced to respond it becomes a political issue. I also 
pointed out that the particular facets of the autism epidemic make organising more 
difficult. Then I reviewed three case studies in long term toxic chemical exposures — 
asbestos, lead, and tobacco. I showed that there are similarities between the dynamics in 
connection with each of these cases and the autism epidemic. And I showed that there 
are patterns that cut across all three case studies — initially there is a strong tendency to 
blame the victims, legal discovery is key to paradigm shifts, and technological 
innovation eventually enables better detection of harms at lower doses. I concluded with 
an analysis of Silent Spring. I argued that Carson presented an alternative ontology of 
how the world works (and that this contributed to her lasting impact), that she was 
reviled by the USDA and many in the science community who worked to protect 
corporate interests, and that establishing causation is a political choice but not essential 
for stopping an epidemic.  
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Chapter 5  
The capitalist conquest of science and medicine 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
Editors from several of the top science journals in the world have recently published 
withering critiques of the current state of scientific research and the practice of medicine. 
Published over the course of a decade, they highlight a series of troublesome patterns 
that appear to be growing worse.  
 
Richard Smith (2005) ‘was an editor for the BMJ for 25 years’ and served for 13 years  
as ‘the editor and chief executive of the BMJ Publishing Group... which published some 
25 other journals’ (p. 364). In 2005, Smith published an essay, in PLoS Medicine, titled, 
‘Medical Journals are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical 
Companies’. In the essay he cites data [from Lexchin, Bero, Djulbegovic, & Clark, 2003] 
showing that ‘studies funded by a pharmaceutical company are four times more likely to 
have results favourable to the company than studies funded from other sources’ (Smith, 
2005, p. 365). He argues that peer review is ‘ineffective’ and ‘prone to bias and abuse’ 
(Smith, 2005, p. 365). He concludes by suggesting that ‘journals should perhaps stop 
publishing [clinical] trials’ altogether and instead ‘concentrate on critically describing 
them’ (Smith, 2005, pp. 365–366). 
 
Drummond Rennie (2007), who served for thirty years as deputy editor of first The New 
England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) and then the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA), writes, ‘The pharmaceutical companies, by their arrogant 
 112 
behaviour and their naked disregard for the well-being of the public, have lost our trust. 
The FDA, by spinelessly knuckling under to every whim of the drug companies, has 
thrown away its high reputation, and in so doing, forfeited our trust’ (pp. 1011–1012).  
 
DeAngelis and Fontanarosa (2008) editor in chief and executive deputy editor 
respectively of JAMA write, ‘The profession of medicine in every aspect — clinical, 
education, and research — has been inundated with profound influence from the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industries. This has occurred because physicians 
have allowed it to happen, and it is time to stop’ (p. 1833).  
 
Marcia Angell (2009) writes:  
 
It is simply no longer possible to believe much of the clinical research that 
is published, or to rely on the judgment of trusted physicians or 
authoritative medical guidelines. I take no pleasure in this conclusion, 
which I reached slowly and reluctantly over my two decades as an editor 
of The New England Journal of Medicine (para. 29).  
 
Richard Horton (2015) editor-in-chief of The Lancet writes: 
 
The case against science is straightforward: much of the scientific 
literature, perhaps half, may simply be untrue. Afflicted by studies with 
small sample sizes, tiny effects, invalid exploratory analyses, and flagrant 
conflicts of interest, together with an obsession for pursuing fashionable 
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trends of dubious importance, science has taken a turn towards darkness (p. 
1380).   
 
These are not the opinions of some Luddite fringe. These are the editors of the most 
influential medical journals in the world. In their capacity as editors they have a bird’s 
eye view of the scientific and medical professions and they are alarmed by what they 
see. Science and medicine have reached unprecedented levels of power and influence in 
society. And yet many of those who know the industry best, report that science as an 
institution is facing multiple internal crises that raise serious doubts about the validity of 
much of the scientific literature.  
 
It is doubtful that there was ever an era when the scientific process was pure, 
disinterested, and untainted by outside influence (Mirowski & Van Horn, 2005, p. 523). 
But the scientific community has changed considerably since the consolidation of 
medicine around biosciences in the 1920s (Collyer, 2010). The development of 
randomised controlled trials that proved the effectiveness of antibiotics in the 1940s 
gave the scientific community a unique claim upon epistemological superiority over and 
against other schools of thought (Wootton, 2006). However, Krimsky (2004), Angell 
(2008), Mirowski (2011), and Gøtzsche (2013) argue that corporate influence over 
science and medicine has intensified since 1980 and led to structural changes that have 
diminished the quality of scientific output. My aim in this chapter is to show how 
conflicts of interest have come to shape every step in the scientific and medical research 
process in the U.S. and I will argue that this is foundational to understanding what is 
happening with autism today.  
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Sociologist of science Robert C. Merton, in his 1942 journal article ‘Science and 
Technology as a Democratic Order’, describes a set of four norms that he argues 
represent the ‘goals and methods’ of science and are described as ‘binding’ upon 
scientists (p. 269). Today they are ‘known by the acronym CUDOS’ which stands for 
‘communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organised scepticism’ (Turner & 
Mccreery, 2015). Communism is the ‘common ownership of goods’ with goods in this 
case defined as the ‘substantive findings of science’ (Merton, [1942], 1973, p. 273). 
Universalism is the idea that truth-claims ‘are subjected to pre-established impersonal 
criteria: consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge’ (Merton, 
1973, p. 270). Disinterestedness is ‘a distinctive pattern of institutional control of a wide 
range of motives’ (Merton, 1973, p. 276). Organised scepticism is ‘the temporary 
suspension of judgment and the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of empirical and 
logical criteria’ (Merton, 1973, p. 277). As I will show below, actually existing 
scientific practices often violate some or all of these Mertonian norms of science.   
 
In attempting to describe an entire system it is difficult to know where to begin. I aim to 
describe a system in constant flux and look at it in its historical, economic, and political 
context. As a way of organising the material, I will examine the problems by sector 
looking at financial conflicts of interest (COI)5 in university scientific research, 
corporate scientific research, scientific journals, government agencies, and the medical 
profession — while recognising that many of these trends, patterns, and crises overlap. 
The distinction between different sectors of the economy that I make in this chapter is 
somewhat artificial. The profit motive and its distorting effects run throughout all of 
                                                
5 I will often shorten ‘conflicts of interest’ to COI in this chapter. COI should be understood to 
be plural and to represent financial conflicts of interest unless otherwise noted. Some scholars 
abbreviate it as COIs but unless it is in a direct quote I prefer to use COI.  
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these different sectors. The real distinction is between discovery oriented science (which 
may or may not have use values) and profit oriented science (searching for exchange 
values). And there is less and less discovery oriented science in our current era 
(Mirowski, 2011).  
 
In this chapter I mostly rely on studies in biomedicine because biomedicine is connected 
with three of the possible environmental triggers described in chapter 1 (acetaminophen, 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and vaccines). But there is plenty of evidence 
that the mode of production in connection with the other possible autism triggers — 
especially plastics, flame retardants, and pesticides — is similar to the mode of 
production in biomedicine. Historically, large pharmaceutical companies often had a 
pesticide and chemical division organised under the same corporate parent and that 
structure continues today at Bayer. Novartis and Zeneca spun off their agrichemical 
divisions to create Syngenta in 2000. Furthermore, the producers of the seemingly 
disparate chemicals that I review in this thesis see themselves as all operating in the 
same industry as evidenced by the fact that energy, plastics, pesticides, and 
pharmaceutical companies all contribute and serve together as trustees of lobbying 
groups such as the American Council on Science and Health (Kroll & Schulman, 2013). 
Finally, regulatory agencies that have purview over these different sectors and products 
seem to operate in a similar manner (and have similar sets of problems).  
 
In this chapter I will show that science and medicine are especially vulnerable to the 
distorting influence of capitalism. Even though this point is obvious to social scientists 
like Mirowski, Navarro, or Michaels, it runs counter to the popular perception of 
science as disinterested and somehow separate from the rest of the economy. Science 
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and medicine have a unique epistemic position that gives them extraordinary power and 
the science and medical communities, particularly in the autism debate, often attempt to 
use their power to shield themselves from popular, political, or media scrutiny. 
Furthermore, the science and medical communities have failed to construct adequate 
ethical safeguards to prevent COI and correct problems as they occur. The result is that 
science and medicine are increasingly beholden to and work in service of capital in 
ways that violate scientific norms and jeopardise the well-being of society. 
 
In this chapter I will show that COI pervade university research (5.1), private research 
(5.2), scientific journals (5.3), government agencies (5.4), and the medical profession 
(5.5). This leads to studies that are not replicable and high levels of iatrogenic injury 
and death from treatments that are not safe (5.6). Far from its popular image and self-
image as objective, science and medicine today have weaker COI rules than the 
financial system and the courts (5.7). The thread that runs through this chapter is that 
COI are fatal to good science. I will argue that the influence of capitalism on science 
and medicine makes it much more difficult to respond to the autism epidemic because 
the institutions that should be focused on prevention and cures are often focused on 
profit instead. The evidence presented in this chapter will show once again that there are 
political economy issues that must be solved prior to or simultaneously with public 
health efforts to respond to the autism epidemic.  
 
5.0.1 Definitions of conflict of interest 
 
There are several competing definitions of conflict of interest in the literature. 
Thompson (1993) defines a conflict of interest as ‘a set of conditions in which 
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professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such as a patient’s welfare or the 
validity of research) tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as 
financial gain)’ (p. 573). Resnik (2007) defines a conflict of interest as ‘a situation in 
which the individual has financial, personal, professional, or political interests that are 
likely to compromise his or her judgment or decision-making related to the performance 
of his or her ethical, legal, or professional obligations’ (p. 112). Schafer (2004) 
emphasises the primacy of the physician’s duty to the patient when he writes:  
 
A person is in a conflict of interest situation if she is in a relationship 
with another in which she has a moral obligation to exercise her 
judgment in that other’s service and, at the same time, she has an interest 
tending to interfere with the proper exercise of judgment in that 
relationship (p. 19).  
 
I find that the word ‘unduly’ in Thompson (1993) and ‘likely’ in Resnik (2007) are 
equivocal and unhelpful. I prefer Schafer’s (2004) definition because it establishes a 
hierarchy between moral duty to the patient and individual (usually financial) interests.  
 
Elliott (2008) notes that ‘Some of the major sources of financial COIs for contemporary 
academic and government researchers include consulting fees with private companies, 
grants or contracts to fund university research projects, honorariums, gifts, equity 
holdings, managements positions with start-up companies, and revenue streams from 
intellectual property’ (p. 4).  
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5.1 Financial conflicts of interest in university scientific research 
 
As I showed in the chapter 3, Mirowski (2011) argues that the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act in 1980, which allows government-funded researchers to patent their discoveries, 
led to the increasing privatisation of university research science. One of the results is 
that financial conflicts of interest have become endemic to medical schools and 
academic scientific research. Angell (2009) writes, ‘A few decades ago, medical schools 
did not have extensive financial dealings with industry, and faculty investigators who 
carried out industry-sponsored research generally did not have other ties to their 
sponsors. But schools now have their own manifold deals with industry and are hardly 
in a moral position to object to their faculty behaving in the same way’ (para. 15).  
 
Campbell et al. (2007) found that 60% of medical school department chairs had a 
personal relationship with industry (from serving on a board to serving as a consultant) 
and 67% of medical schools received financial support from drug companies. In an odd 
bit of mental compartmentalisation, ‘more than two-thirds of department chairs 
perceived that having a relationship with industry had no effect on their professional 
activities, but 72% view a chair’s engaging in more than one industry related activity as 
having a negative impact on a department’s ability to conduct independent unbiased 
research’ (Campbell et al., 2007, p. 1779). Tereskerz, Hamric, Guterbock, & Moreno 
(2009) surveyed the faculty at the 33 U.S. universities that receive the most research 
funding (p. 79). At those institutions, 66% of researchers received financial support 
from industry (Tereskerz et al. 2009). Male researchers were more than three times 
more likely to receive financial support from industry than female researchers — 79% 
vs. 23% respectively; ‘full professors (51%)... were significantly more likely to receive 
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overall industry support than associate professors (25%) or assistant professors (23%)’ 
(Tereskerz et al., 2009, p. 4). 
 
Even prestigious schools of public health have become entangled with financial 
conflicts of interest. The tobacco, asbestos, vinyl, and other toxic industries have a long 
history of hiring professors of public health from esteemed universities to produce 
research favourable to the industry (Michaels, 2008a; Heath, 2016). For example, when 
Patricia Buffler, former dean of the UC Berkeley School of Public Health and world 
renowned researcher into childhood leukemia, died suddenly of a stroke at age 75, it 
was discovered that she had long held lucrative consulting deals with some of the very 
industries she was tasked with evaluating (Heath, 2013b). She made $360,000 serving 
as an expert witness on behalf of lead-based paint manufacturers and she made more 
than $2 million for her seventeen years on the board of pesticide giant FMC Corp 
(Heath, 2013b). Buffler never disclosed her work with FMC nor her ownership of FMC 
stock in her published journal articles (Heath, 2013b). Buffler also consulted for ‘Dow 
Chemical, DuPont, Union Carbide, Shell Oil, Goodyear, and Atlantic Richfield’ (Heath, 
2013b). In addition, the American Industrial Health Council, an industry-funded group 
that lobbied against ‘excessive’ regulation of carcinogens, hired Buffler to critique a 
public health study conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health in connection 
with the leukemia cluster in Woburn, Massachusetts (depicted in the book and movie A 
Civil Action) (Heath, 2013b). She called the study ‘sophisticated but biased’ because of 
its use of volunteers to help collect survey data in spite of the fact that they had all 
received training in the appropriate research techniques (Heath, 2013b).  
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The UC Berkeley School of Public Health is not unique in having staff with COI. The 
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (HCRA) is housed within Harvard’s T. H. Chan 
School of Public Health and since its inception in 1989 it has been funded by many of 
the largest producers of toxic chemicals in the world including the American Chemistry 
Council, the Business Roundtable, ExxonMobil, Dow Chemical Company, Dupont, 
General Electric, Phillip Morris, and the Society of the Plastics Industry (Vogel, 2009, p. 
562). The grants from these companies are usually listed as ‘unrestricted’ but when 
these companies face regulatory or legal hurdles they often commission HCRA to 
produce a report or study, that comes with the imprimatur of one of the nation’s most 
prestigious universities, that portrays their product or industry in a favourable light 
(Vogel, 2009).  
 
Corporations that produce toxic chemicals that need an expert to testify on their behalf 
or need a study to defend their product in regulatory proceedings or in court can also 
hire environmental consulting firms including Gradient, Exponent, Ramboll Environ, or 
ChemRisk that are often staffed with current and former professors of public health 
from prestigious universities (Heath, 2016). These firms are pejoratively referred to as 
‘rented white coats’ by environmental groups because regardless of the issue, they 
consistently produce scientific results favourable to industry. Gradient Corporation staff 
sometimes include former and/or present day faculty at the Harvard School of Public 
Health (Heath, 2016). Heath (2016) writes,  
 
Gradient belongs to a breed of scientific consulting firms that defends 
the products of its corporate clients beyond credulity, even exhaustively 
studied substances whose dangers are not in doubt, such as asbestos, lead, 
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and arsenic. Gradient’s scientists rarely acknowledge that a chemical 
poses a serious public health risk. The Center for Public Integrity 
analyzed 149 scientific articles and letters published by the firm’s most 
prolific scientists. Ninety-eight percent of the time, they found that the 
substance in question was harmless at levels to which people are 
typically exposed (para. 13).  
 
In response to criticism of such close ties to industry, many universities have moved to 
develop guidelines to manage conflicts of interest. Angell (2009) notes that such 
guidelines are ‘highly variable, generally quite permissive, and loosely enforced’ (p. 3). 
Indeed there is often no sanction for failing to disclose a conflict of interest and no 
evidence that such policies have reduced corporate influence on campus or improved 
the quality of scientific research output (Mirowski, 2011, p. 236).  
 
Zinner, Bolcic-Jankovic, Clarridge, Blumenthal, and Campbell (2009) note that ‘life 
science faculty with industry research support were more productive than faculty 
without such support on virtually every measure [number of publications, publication 
trends score, journal impact factor, number of service activities]’ (p. 1814). Yet, saying 
that industry funded scientists are more productive is a circular argument — it is not 
surprising that those who receive more corporate support are able to be more productive 
in a system shaped by corporations to reward those who participate on their terms.  
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5.2. Changes in Corporate Science 
 
In Morbid Symptoms, Panitch and Leys (2009) write, ‘Any serious political economy of 
health under capitalism must be centred on the fundamental contradiction involved: 
health and health care are use values par excellence, of limited interest to capital unless 
it can convert them into exchange values’ (p. 3). Preventing autism provides use value 
to individuals, families, communities, and nations. But preventing autism has almost no 
exchange value (indeed following the recommendations of Project TENDR to ban or 
severely restrict a range of toxicants would cost industry money). Yet science and 
medicine under capitalism are dedicated to exchange values.   
 
George W. Merck, the President of Merck and Co. from 1925 to 1950, once said,  
 
‘We try to remember that medicine is for the patient. We try never to 
forget that medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits. The profits 
follow, and if we have remembered that, they have never failed to appear. 
The better we have remembered it, the larger they have been’ (in Kessel, 
2014, p. 988).  
 
Even if the statement was mostly for public relations purposes, it echoed the rhetoric of 
the Fordist era bargain — that some concessions that benefit the larger community 
(usually in connection with higher worker pay or health and retirement benefits) would 
be rewarded with higher long-run profits (Jessop, 1992). Kessel (2014) argues that the 
culture inside pharmaceutical companies has changed radically in our current era. He 
writes:  
 123 
Over time, however, there has been a shift in ideology of corporations 
[such] that the only social responsibility is to increase profits and 
enhance investor returns, and pharma has followed this mantra. As 
Jurgen Drews, the former head of Roche research, candidly stated in 
2003, in the pharmaceutical business today ‘the ethics of successful 
business have replaced those of medicine. The supreme loyalty of 
today’s companies is not primarily directed at patients and their 
physicians but at shareholders. Consequently, the most influential figures 
in today’s pharmaceutical companies are no longer the heads of R&D but 
the heads of marketing and finance’ (Kessel, 2014, p. 984).   
 
The pharmaceutical industry has long been more profitable than the Fortune 500 
average but pharmaceutical industry profitability further increased in the twenty years 
after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 (Public Citizen, 2000).  
 
Figure 5.1: Profitability of Fortune 500 Drug Industry and All Fortune 500 
Industries; Profits as a % of Revenue (1970–1999) 
 
Source: Public Citizen (2000). 
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But it all seems unsustainable. A 2013 Harris Poll found that only 10% of people 
surveyed have a favourable view of pharmaceutical companies. Legislative manoeuvres 
to extend patents and a focus on ‘me-too drugs’ have produced fat profits in the short 
and medium term but few truly novel new inventions that could sustain the industry 
over the long term (Mirowski, 2011). Regulatory capture leads to soaring prices for 
prescription drugs that consume a growing proportion of American incomes. At the 
same time, the outsourcing, deskilling, and offshoring of production have led to quality 
concerns (Harris, 2008b; ‘FDA says Chinese Pfizer plant hid failures’, 2015) and a 
number of high profile disasters such as when the FDA pulled the blood thinner heparin 
following reports of 785 serious injuries and 81 deaths linked to counterfeit ingredients 
sourced from China (Harris, 2008a, para. 1). 
 
It would seem that the only way that high profit margins can last amidst rising public 
anger and declining quality and effectiveness of one’s products is through ever-
increasing advertising (to try to change public sentiment) and aggressive capture of 
regulatory agencies and politicians (to head off regulation) — which, as I will show 
below, is essentially what is happening now. But that seems unsustainable as well. As 
the gap grows between what one sees and hears in the media and from the political class 
versus one’s actual lived experience of the world I imagine that would set off a whole 
host of destabilising tendencies (for individuals and entire societies) — from pessimism 
to cynicism to nihilism. 
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5.3 The crises in scientific journals 
 
Smith (2003) acknowledged, ‘All journals are bought — or at least cleverly used — by 
the pharmaceutical industry’ (p. 1205). There is growing awareness that the practices of 
actually existing scientific journals violate the Mertonian norms of science: COI are 
widespread (5.3.1); COI shape study design and skew research results (5.3.2); the 
practice of ghost, gift, guest, and honorary authorship is widespread (5.3.3); peer review 
offers little quality control and introduces bias (5.3.4); most studies are not reproducible 
(5.3.5); and even when problems are identified scientific journals seldom issue 
corrections or retractions (5.3.6). Scientific publishing is very profitable, but it appears 
to be increasingly unable to produce reliable scientific results.  
 
5.3.1 Financial conflicts of interest in scientific journals: advertising, reprints, 
special issues 
 
Krimsky, Rothenberg, Stott, and Kyle (1996) studied 1,105 authors, who appeared in 
789 articles, published in 14 major medical journals in 1992 (p. 395). They found that at 
least one lead author had at least one conflict of interest in connection with 34% of the 
articles examined (Krimsky et al. 1996, p. 395). Krimsky and Rothenberg (2001) 
revisited this issue and reviewed the 1,396 highest ranked science and medical journals. 
Of these, over 200 had conflict of interest policies. But when the authors reviewed 
61,134 of the articles in these publications, only 327 (0.5%) had any statements listing a 
financial interest of the authors related to the subject matter of the publication (Krimsky 
& Rothenberg, 2001). Krimsky (2004) writes that, ‘journals neither police nor evaluate 
author compliance with their guidelines’ (p. 171).  
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Drug companies advertise heavily in medical journals and that advertising works: print 
advertising in medical journals has been shown to increase sales [O’Connell, 2001]; 
advertising in medical journals is seen as just as effective as the work of pharmaceutical 
sales representatives for ‘announcing a new product’ or a new use of an existing product 
[Association of Medical Publishers, 2000]; one study showed a return on investment of 
$2.22 to $6.86 (U.S.D.) per dollar spent on journal advertising [Neslin, 2001]; ‘another 
industry study of 45 advertising campaigns found that journal advertising returned U.S. 
$3.05 for unique products and U.S. $2.46’ for products competing with a rival [Liebman, 
2000] (Fugh-Berman, Alladin, & Chow, 2006). Drug companies spent $326 million on 
advertising in medical journals in 2010 (Kornfield, Donohue, Berndt, & Alexander, 
2013, p. 2). 
 
Glassman, Hunter-Hayes, and Nakamura (1999) found that the Annals of Internal 
Medicine (AIM), the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), and the New 
England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) had almost as many advertising pages as text 
pages. Lexchin and Light (2006) found that advertising in AIM supplies 12.9 per cent of 
the budget of the America College of Physicians, advertising in JAMA supplies 10.4 per 
cent of the budget of American Medical Association, and advertising in NEJM supplies 
21.3 per cent of the budget of the Massachusetts Medical Society. In all three cases, 
corporate advertising exceeded the contributions from membership fees and 
assessments for these professional medical associations (Lexchin & Light, 2006, p. 
1445). Special issues and inserts in academic journals have lower editorial standards 
and bring in additional advertising revenue (Sismondo, 2009, p. 183). 
 
 127 
Lundh, Barbateskovic, Hróbjartsson, and Gøtzsche (2010) found that in 2005-2006, the 
sale of reprints generated 41% of The Lancet’s income. Richard Horton, editor of The 
Lancet explains how it happens:  
 
Then the conversation might go: ‘It is likely that the company will want 
to buy several hundred thousand reprints’ and of course several hundred 
thousand reprints might translate into half a million pounds, a million 
pounds revenue to the journal. There is an implicit connection between 
the submission of a paper and the revenue that comes into a journal (UK, 
House of Commons, Health Committee, 2005, pp. 243–244).   
 
Armstrong (2006) shows that Merck bought, from NEJM, 900,000 reprints of an 
article on a favourable Vioxx trial. Smith (2006b) estimates the profit from this 
purchase at $450,000. The editors of NEJM have since come under sharp 
criticism for their failure to issue an immediate correction when it was revealed 
that Merck omitted key information about heart attack risk from the article 
(Armstrong, 2006). Merck withdrew the drug from the market in 2004 and 
NEJM only issued an expression of concern in an editorial in 2005 — four years 
after editors were first made aware of problems with the data (Armstrong, 2006).  
 
Under editors Kassirer and Angell, NEJM had some of the most stringent conflict of 
interest guidelines of any medical journal. For a time they even banned conflicts of 
interest for all review articles and editorials. In 2000, the Massachusetts Medical 
Society that owns the NEJM appointed Jeffrey Drazen as editor. Drazen received 
financial consideration from 21 drug companies between 1994 and 2000 (Smith, 2006b, 
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p. 380) and was censured by the FDA for touting a new asthma drug over and above its 
proven effects (Gottlieb, 2000). In 2002, Drazen along with executive editor Gregory 
Curfman bemoaned the fact that, as a result of the strict COI rules they inherited from 
previous editors, from 2000 to 2002 the NEJM was only able to publish one drug 
therapy article (Drazen & Curfman, 2002, p. 1901). So Drazen and Curfman announced 
that the NEJM would relax their COI guidelines. Henceforth, authors would be 
permitted up to $10,000 a year from a single source (doubling the previous limit; 
multiple COI are permitted but they each have to be below $10,000), and stated that 
these were ‘guidelines, not rigid rules’ (Drazen & Curfman, 2002, p. 1902).  
 
5.3.2 Conflicts of interest shape study design and skew results 
 
Sismondo (2008b) reports that ‘pharmaceutical company funding of clinical trials is 
strongly associated with published results favoring those companies’. The phenomenon 
is called the ‘funding effect’ and there is a vast literature that documents the extent of 
the practice.  
 
Stelfox, Chua, O’Rourke, and Detsky (1998) examined 70 articles in the medical 
literature published between March 1995 and September 1996 on the safety of calcium-
channel antagonists. They found that ‘authors who supported the use of calcium-channel 
antagonists were significantly more likely than neutral or critical authors to have 
financial relationships with manufacturers of calcium-channel antagonists. (96 percent 
vs. 60 percent and 37 percent, respectively)’ (Stelfox et al., 1998, p. 101). ‘Supportive 
authors were also more likely than neutral or critical authors to have financial 
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relationships with any pharmaceutical manufacturer, irrespective of the product (100 
percent vs. 67 percent and 43 percent, respectively)’ (Stelfox et al., 1998, p. 101).  
 
Djulbegovic et al. (2000) examined 136 RCTs in connection with multiple myeloma 
published from 1996 to 1998. Seventy-four per cent of the RCTs sponsored by for-profit 
entities supported the new therapies versus just 53% when the study was sponsored by a 
nonprofit organisation (Djulbegovic et al., 2000).  
 
Yaphe, Edman, Knishkowy, and Herman (2001) analyzed 314 randomised controlled 
trials published between 1992 and 1994 in five top medical journals (Annals of Internal 
Medicine, BMJ, JAMA, Lancet, and NEJM). Industry funded 209 RCTs and of those, 
181 (87%) had positive findings and 28 (13%) had negative findings (Yaphe et al., 
2001). By contrast, 96 RCTs did not have industry funding and of those, 62 (65%) had 
positive findings and 34 (35%) had negative findings; nine studies were categorised as 
uncertain; and the differences between the outcomes by funding source were 
statistically significant (Yaphe et al., 2001). The increased positive outcomes appeared 
whether the support was in the form of money, staff time, or free therapeutic agents (so 
the amount or type of the contribution did not matter — just whether there was any 
support at all) (Yaphe et al., 2001). And there was no difference between the five 
different journals (i.e. no journal was better at weeding out positivity bias than another) 
(Yaphe et al., 2001).  
 
Als-Nielsen, Chen, Gluud, and Kjaergard (2003) studied 370 drug trials included in 
Cochrane Collaboration meta-analyses (studies of studies) and found that ‘conclusions 
were significantly more likely to recommend the experimental drug as treatment of 
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choice in trials funded by for-profit organizations alone compared with trials funded by 
non-profit organizations’ (p. 925). Once again the size of the contribution did not matter 
— both small contributions (such as simply providing the drug) and large contributions 
(funding the whole study) increased the likelihood that the drug would be recommended 
(Als-Nielsen et al., 2003).  
 
Friedman and Richer (2004) examined 193 articles published in NEJM and 205 articles 
published in JAMA in 2001 and found that ‘depending on the COI criteria used, 16.6% 
to 32.6% of manuscripts had one or more author with COI’ (p. 51). They ‘observed a 
strong association between those studies whose authors had COI and reported positive 
findings’ (Friedman & Richer, 2004). When measured against the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors [2001] COI criteria, ‘authors with COI were 10 
to 20 times less likely to present negative findings than those without COI’ (Friedman & 
Richer, 2004, p. 51). 
 
Bekelman, Li, and Gross (2003) aggregated the results of eight meta-analyses that 
evaluated 1,140 original studies. They found that studies with industry sponsorship were 
more than three times more likely (OR = 3.6) to reach pro-industry conclusions than 
studies that were not sponsored by industry (Bekelman et al., 2003). Lexchin, Bero, 
Djulbegovic, and Clark (2003) examined 16 studies that looked at ‘the relationship 
between funding source and the outcomes of clinical trials’; 13 of those ‘found that 
clinical trials and meta-analyses sponsored by drug companies favored the product 
produced by the funder’ (p. 5). Yank, Rennie, and Bero (2007) in a study of 124 meta-
analyses found that meta-analyses that had ties to a drug company were more than five 
times more likely to report favourable conclusions (OR = 5.11; CI: 1.54, 16.92). 
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Sismondo (2008a) reviewed 19 articles on the relationship between industry funding 
and research outcomes and found that 17 articles reported a strong positive correlation. 
Lundh, Sismondo, Lexchin, Busuioc, and Bero (2012) examined the data in 48 papers 
published between 1948 and 2010 on the funding effect and found a statistically 
significant association between industry sponsorship and ‘favorable efficacy results (RR 
= 1.32; CI: 1.21, 1.44), harms results (RR = 1.87; CI: 1.54, 2.27), and conclusions (RR 
= 1.31; CI: 1.20 to 1.44)’ (p. 1). Lundh, Lexchin, Mintzes, Schroll, and Bero (2017) 
reviewed the literature from 2010 through February 2015 and added 27 new studies (to 
the 48 examined previously) on the funding effect and found that ‘industry sponsored 
studies more often had favorable efficacy results, (RR = 1.27; CI: 1.17, 1.37) (25 papers) 
(moderate quality evidence), similar harms results (RR = 1.37; CI: 0.64, 2.93) (four 
papers) (very low quality evidence), and more often favorable conclusions (RR = 1.34, 
CI: 1.19, 1.51) (29 papers) (low quality evidence)’ (p. 2). Moreover, ‘in industry 
sponsored studies, there was less agreement between the results and the conclusions 
than in non-industry sponsored studies (RR = 0.83; CI: 0.70, 0.98) (six papers)’ (Lundh 
et al., 2017, p. 2). 
 
Resnik and Elliott (2013) argue that financial conflicts of interest can influence the 
selection of research problems or questions, study design, data collection, data analysis, 
the interpretation of data (overstating the significance of data or understating risks), and 
publication (favourable results are much more likely to be sent out for publication) (pp. 
188–190). Michaels (2008b) writes, ‘Within the scientific community, there is little 
debate about the existence of the funding effect, but the mechanism through which it 
plays out has been a surprise’ (para. 6). Many people initially assumed that the funding 
effect was the result of outright fraud and data manipulation (Michaels, 2008b). Clearly 
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fraud is a part of the story — McGoey (2007) documented how the makers of Seroxat 
hid the increased risk of suicide from British drug regulators. Later in this chapter I will 
show how the makers of Vioxx hid the increased heart attack risk from studies 
submitted to the FDA. But as Smith (2005) notes, fraud is crude and often detectable. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that research methods in industry funded studies are 
as good or better than independently funded studies (Djulbegovic et al., 2000; Als-
Nielsen et al., 2003; Lexchin et al., 2003). There are many ways to set up a research 
study to produce a desired outcome (it is not clear whether this manipulation is 
conscious or unconscious but it is bias all the same). Smith (2005) argues that the most 
effective way to influence a study is through asking research questions in a certain way 
that privileges one approach over another. Other common techniques include:  
 
...testing one’s drug against a treatment that either does not work or does 
not work very well; testing one’s drug against too low or too high a dose 
of the comparison drug because this will make one’s drug appear more 
effective or less toxic; publishing results of a single trial many times in 
different forms to make it appear that multiple studies reached the same 
conclusion; and publishing only those studies or even parts of studies 
that are favourable to one’s drug, and burying the rest (Michaels, 2008b, 
para. 10).  
 
But that creates an untenable situation. For example, over 100 independent studies of 
bisphenol A (BPA) found harms from even low dose exposures while none of the nearly 
two dozen studies funded by the chemical industry identified such harms (vom Saal & 
Welshons, 2006, p. 61). As I will show below, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
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regulators in the U.S. are required by Congress to weigh all of the available evidence. 
So biased studies are mixed in with unbiased studies which muddies the pool of 
evidence and makes regulation more difficult.   
 
Bias also shows up in metastudies, where decisions about what to include and what to 
exclude as well as how to weight different factors and which endpoints to examine all 
make an enormous difference on the study outcome (Michaels, 2008b, para. 11). So for 
example, the National Toxicology Program sponsored two metastudies of the health 
effects of BPA and they reached two different conclusions because of differences in 
sampling and weighting of different studies (Michaels, 2008b, para. 11).  
 
5.3.3 Ghost, gift, guest, and honorary authorship 
 
As pharmaceutical companies shifted much of their research funding to CROs over the 
last twenty years, it created a problem because the managers of the CROs rarely have 
the necessary academic degrees nor social standing to get published in top science and 
medical journals. And yet articles in top science and medical journals are a key 
marketing tool in outreach to doctors and the public. So pharmaceutical companies 
began asking academics to affix their names to studies written by pharmaceutical 
company ghost-writers. ‘Honorary’ (also sometimes called ‘guest’ or ‘gift’) authorship 
is defined as ‘naming, as an author, an individual who does not meet authorship criteria’ 
(Rennie & Flanagin, 1994). Ghost authorship is defined as ‘failure to name, as an author, 
an individual who has made substantial contributions to the research or writing of the 
article’ (Rennie & Flanagin, 1994). The full extent of ghost writing in the scientific and 
medical literature is unknown because it is secret by design (Ngai, Gold, Gill, & 
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Rochon, 2005). ‘Most of the articles that have been identified as ghost written were 
revealed as such only after investigative work by lawyers, journalists, or scientists’ 
(Ngai et al., 2005, p.106). Sismondo (2007) estimates that ‘approximately 40% of 
journal reports of clinical trials of new drugs’ are written by ghost writers employed by 
pharmaceutical companies, not the listed author. Other studies described below have 
lower estimates. ‘Ghost authorship is often employed to mask conflicts of interest’ 
(Ngai et al., 2005). Yet this practice is commonplace throughout academic publishing 
and rarely policed by most universities (Mirowski, 2011). Honorary and ghost 
authorship are two facets of a vast restructuring in the mode of production in science 
over the last few decades. In this section I will review the literature on how marketing 
concerns largely drive the scientific process from study design through execution and 
dissemination of the results.  
 
In a previous era, research came first and then marketing. Now, the evidence suggests, 
marketing starts the process — either in-house at pharmaceutical companies and/or 
through a range of contractors including advertising agencies, medical education and 
communications companies (MECCs), and/or publication planners — who guide a 
research study from conception, through publication, regulatory approval, and 
marketing (Sismondo, 2009). These firms aim to produce results that get published in 
the best journals in the shortest amount of time and then they broadly share these results 
with regulators, doctors, and the public in order to boost sales and profits for their 
sponsors (Sismondo, 2009).  
 
Publication planning has evolved beyond the ghost writing of the earlier era — it is now 
a vertically integrated information manufacturing machine that guides every step of the 
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process. ‘Publication planning can and should start even before the research does, 
contributing to research design, mapping out key messages, and identifying papers for 
different audiences and journals, and potential authors on those papers. The focus is 
communication, and the research is created with communication in view’ (Sismondo, 
2009, p. 175).  
 
There are more than 50 publication planning firms, some with hundreds of employees, 
and even two international associations of publication planning professionals (Sismondo, 
2009, pp. 172–174). Some publication planning firms are independent, some are owned 
by CROs, and some are divisions of major publishing houses (Sismondo, 2009, p. 182). 
Petersen (2002) writing in the New York Times discovered that three of the world’s 
largest advertising agencies (Omnicom, Interpublic, and WPP) have bought or invested 
in CROs directly (para. 5).  
 
An essential step in this new mode of knowledge production is to find a Key Opinion 
Leader (KOL) who will agree to attach his or her name to the study in order to get it 
published in a high impact factor journal (Sismondo, 2009). ‘A KOL is a well-known 
specialist, highly regarded by peers, who... can influence other physicians and who has 
experience with the product’ (Sismondo, 2009, p. 185). Ideally, the KOL has an existing 
relationship of some kind with the pharmaceutical company (Sismondo, 2009, p. 186). 
KOLs can include doctors, editors at medical journals, and academics (Sismondo, 2009).  
 
Why would leaders in the field agree to attach their names to studies that they did not 
write? The evidence suggests such honorary, gift, or guest authorship is relatively easy, 
somewhat lucrative, and there is almost never any sanction even if caught (which, given 
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the secret nature of the arrangement, rarely happens). Petersen (2002) finds evidence 
that some academics sign on for as little as $1,000 to $1,500 per article. Sismondo 
(2009) estimates the going rate at around $2,500 per article.  
 
It appears that the dynamic here is about more than just the money. In the competition 
to improve university, department, and individual rankings, those who play the 
honorary/gift/guest writing game earn publishing credits for ‘authoring’ articles which 
can ‘then translate into promotion, tenure, grants, and so on’ (Moffatt & Elliott, 2007, p. 
29). Such success presumably also impacts social capital including standing, respect, 
and esteem in the eyes of colleagues. And those who do not play along in a system in 
which pharmaceutical industry funding is influential in every step of the process, may 
find themselves falling further and further behind.  
 
Flanagin et al. (1998); Yank and Rennie (1999); Mowatt et al. (2002); Healy and Cattell 
(2003); Gøtzsche et al. (2007); Ross, Hill, Egilman, and Krumholz (2008); and Wislar, 
Flanagin, Fontanarosa, and DeAngelis (2011) all conducted original research that 
showed widespread evidence of honorary, guest, gift, and ghost authorship. Melander, 
Ahlqvist-Rastad, Meijer, and Beermann (2003) found widespread evidence of multiple 
publication (publishing the same article, worded slightly differently, in several journals), 
selective publication (only publishing studies that are favourable to one’s product), and 
selective reporting (omitting key data from a study) in connection with studies of five 
SSRIs.  
 
Defenders of the status quo tend to describe the trend towards honorary, guest, gift, and 
ghost authorship as ‘new styles of authorship’ which reflect the decentralised nature of 
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modern scientific research. By contrast, Moffatt and Elliott (2007) argue that honorary, 
guest, gift, and ghost authorship are designed to conceal conflicts of interest for the 
purpose of marketing and profit. 
 
5.3.4 Problems with peer review 
 
Peer review is one of the gold standards of academic publishing. Yet leading figures in 
science and medicine are sharply critical of the process and raise doubts as to its 
effectiveness and scientific validity. Smith (2006a) writes:  
 
Peer review is impossible to define in operational terms (an operational 
definition is one whereby if 50 of us looked at the same process we 
could all agree most of the time whether or not it was peer review). Peer 
review is thus like poetry, love, or justice.... [W]e have little evidence on 
the effectiveness of peer review, but we have considerable evidence on 
its defects. In addition to being poor at detecting gross defects and 
almost useless for detecting fraud, it is slow, expensive, profligate of 
academic time, highly subjective, something of a lottery, prone to bias, 
and easily abused (p. 178).  
 
Peters and Ceci (1982) selected 12 papers published in prestigious journals, changed the 
names and institutions listed for the authors, and ‘resubmitted [them] to the same 
journals that had originally refereed and published them’ (p. 187). ‘Sixteen of the 18 
referees (89%) recommended against publication and the editors concurred’ (Peters & 
Ceci, 1982, p. 187). In the scientific community, favourable treatment toward well-
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established names in the field is referred to as the ‘Matthew Effect’ (Merton, 1968) 
based on the Biblical passage, Matthew 13:12:  ‘For to those who have, more will be 
given, and they will have an abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what 
they have will be taken away’ (New Revised Standard Version).   
 
Schroter et al. (2008) reviewed three studies on the ability of reviewers to detect errors 
(Nylenna, Riis, & Karlsson, [1994]; Baxt et al., [1998]; and Godlee et al., [1998]) and 
found that the majority of reviewers missed most of the major errors that were 
deliberately inserted. Schroter et al. (2008) then inserted nine major errors into three test 
papers and sent them to 607 peer reviewers at the BMJ. After marking up the first paper, 
reviewers then underwent a short training in how to detect methodological errors. ‘At 
baseline (Paper 1) reviewers found an average of 2.58 of the nine major errors’ 
(Schroter et al. 2008, p. 507). Following the short training course, ‘the mean number of 
errors reported was similar for the second and third papers, 2.71 and 3.0, respectively’ 
(Schroter et al. 2008, p. 507).  
 
Jefferson, Alderson, Wager, and Davidoff (2002) in a metastudy on peer review 
concluded that, ‘The practice of peer review is based on faith in its effects, rather than 
on facts’. Lee, Sugimoto, Zhang, and Cronin (2013) in a more recent metastudy of 
papers on peer review found bias in connection with institutional prestige, affiliation, 
nationality, as well as confirmation bias, conservatism, bias against interdisciplinary 
research, and positivity bias (pp. 7–10).  
 
Ioannidis (2005b) writes, ‘Prestigious investigators may suppress via the peer review 
process the appearance and dissemination of findings that refute their findings, thus 
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condemning their field to perpetuate false dogma’ (p. 698). Wilson (2016) writes, ‘If 
peer review is good at anything, it appears to be keeping unpopular ideas from being 
published’ (para. 19).  
 
Smith (2006a) provides a list of recommended reforms to improve peer review, but, like 
so many policy prescriptions, he is doubtful that they will be implemented. He writes,  
 
So peer review is a flawed process, full of easily identified defects with 
little evidence that it works. Nevertheless, it is likely to remain central to 
science and journals because there is no obvious alternative, and 
scientists and editors have a continuing belief in peer review. How odd 
that science should be rooted in belief (Smith, 2006a, p. 182).  
 
Reform proposals that are quickly forgotten and a tendency to stick with traditional 
systems even when they have been shown to be inadequate or error-prone have become 
troublesome hallmarks of the modern scientific era. Peer review, that starts out looking 
like the very essence of objective science, is in fact social, and prone to abuse, distortion, 
and bias; its gatekeeping role can be used to improve quality but it can also serve to 
protect existing power structures in science and medicine.  
 
5.3.5 The crisis of reproducibility 
 
Widespread problems in the quality of scientific research have led to what is called the 
‘crisis of reproducibility’.  
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C. G. Begley is the former global head of Hematology and Oncology Research at 
Amgen. Over the course of a decade, Begley and other researchers at Amgen attempted 
to reproduce 53 landmark studies in the field (‘landmark’ is not defined in the paper) 
(Begley & Ellis, 2012). Extraordinary efforts were taken to reproduce the exact 
conditions of the initial study — in some cases the studies were even reproduced in the 
original lab under the direction of the original investigators (Begley & Ellis, 2012). 
However, scientific findings were confirmed in only six (11%) out of 53 cases (Begley 
& Ellis, 2012, p. 532).  
 
Sharon Begley (2012) of Reuters followed up with C. G. Begley (no relation) and 
discovered that many of the original study authors, as a condition of participating in the 
replication study, required the Amgen scientists to ‘sign a confidentiality agreement 
barring them from disclosing data at odds with the original findings’. C. G. Begley 
explained that as a result, ‘the world will never know’ the 47 studies that are not 
replicable (S. Begley, 2012).  
 
How does this happen? It appears to be a combination of permissive standards as well 
as a tendency for science journals to seek out sensational stories. C. G. Begley recounts 
that he met with the principal investigator of one of the non-reproducible studies (S. 
Begley, 2012).  
 
‘We went through the paper line by line, figure by figure’, said [C. G.] 
Begley. ‘I explained that we re-did their experiment 50 times and never 
got their result. He said they’d done it six times and got this result once, 
but put it in the paper because it made the best story’ (S. Begley, 2012).  
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Cosgrove, Vannoy, Mintzes, and Shaughnessy (2016) point out that the FDA regulatory 
process allows this sort of cherry-picking of positive data and omission of failed trials. 
The same drug that receives FDA approval as safe and effective via this cherry-picking 
approach could also fail a systematic review that looks at all of the evidence (Cosgrove 
et al., 2016, p. 261).  
 
In a similar set of experiments, three scientists from Bayer Healthcare compared 
published data against the results from 67 in-house projects (Prinz, Schlange, & 
Asadullah, 2011). Forty-seven of the 67 projects were from the field of oncology. They 
found that: 
 
...only in ~20–25% of the projects were the relevant published data 
completely in line with our in-house findings.... Surprisingly, even 
publications in prestigious journals or from several independent groups 
did not ensure reproducibility. Indeed our analysis revealed that the 
reproducibility of published data did not significantly correlate with 
journal impact factors, the number of publications on the respective 
target or the number of independent groups that authored the publications 
(Prinz et al. 2011, p. 713). 
 
Prinz et al. (2011) argue that the non-reproducibility of much of the published research 
is widely known in scientific circles. They write: 
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 Our findings are mirrored by ‘gut feelings’ expressed in personal 
communications with scientists from academia or other companies, as 
well as published observations. An unspoken rule among early-stage 
venture capital firms that ‘at least 50% of published studies, even those 
in top-tier academic journals, can’t be repeated with the same 
conclusions by an industrial lab’ (Prinz et al. 2011, p. 713). 
 
The problem of lack of reproducibility sets off a cascade of harmful effects. Begley and 
Ellis (2012) write, ‘Some non-reproducible preclinical papers had spawned an entire 
field, with hundreds of secondary publications that expanded on elements of the original 
observation, but did not actually seek to confirm or falsify its fundamental basis’ (p. 
532). Many of these non-reproducible studies also lead to clinical trials which means 
that people are subjected to medicines that do not work (Begley & Ellis, 2012, p. 532). 
 
In 2005, John Ioannidis published two ground-breaking articles on the crisis of 
reproducibility. Ioannidis (2005a) focused on 49 of the mostly highly cited (over 1,000 
citations) original clinical research findings during the period 1990–2003. Forty-five 
studies in the sample reported effective interventions (Ioannidis, 2005a, p. 218). ‘Of 
these, 7 (16%) were contradicted by subsequent studies, 7 others (16%) had a larger 
effect size than in the subsequent study, 20 (44%) were replicated, and 11 (24%) were 
not subject to replication studies’ (Ioannidis, 2005a, p. 218). In the study, five out of six 
non-RCTs were problematic (contradicted or reported larger effects than were replicable) 
versus just 9 out of 38 RCTs (Ioannidis, 2005a, p. 218). 
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Ioannidis (2005b) ‘Why Most Published Research Findings are False’ created a 
mathematical model to estimate the likelihood that any given research study will be 
true.6 His model factored in estimates of power, bias, and pre-study odds to create a 
range of estimates. His model predicts that 85% of ‘adequately powered RCTs with 
little bias and 1:1 pre-study odds’ are correct; 23% of ‘underpowered but well-
performed phase I/II RCTs’ are correct; 20% of ‘adequately powered exploratory 
epidemiological studies’ are correct; and about 1/10th of 1% of ‘discovery oriented 
exploratory research with massive testing’ (nutrition and genetic studies with large 
numbers of variables) are correct (Ioannidis, 2005b, p. 700). It is important to point out 
that Ioannidis is presenting a theoretical model here. Actual real world results, including 
the efforts of Begley and Ellis (2012) and Prinz, Schlange, and Asadullah, (2011) show 
that even widely respected RCTs in the real world are not replicable at much higher 
rates than suggested by Ioannidis’ (2005b) model. What this tells us is that lots of low 
quality evidence is routinely passed off as legitimate in ways that are profitable for 
corporations but harmful for the public.  
 
5.3.6 Even when massive problems are identified, scientific journals seldom issue 
corrections or retractions 
 
In the 1950s, a poor African American tobacco farmer named Henrietta Lacks 
developed cervical cancer (Skloot, 2017). Samples of her cancerous cells were cultured 
and turned into a popular and profitable cell line called HeLa that is still used in 
scientific research today (Skloot, 2017). But it turns out her cell line was too successful 
and combined with inadequate lab practices, HeLa has contaminated a wide variety of 
                                                
6 It has since become the most downloaded article in the history of PLoS Medicine (Freedman, 
2010).  
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cell lines and raised questions about the validity of an enormous range of subsequent 
scientific research (Oransky & Marcus, 2016). HeLa contamination is just the tip of the 
iceberg as far as contamination of popular cell lines:  
 
Recent estimates suggest that between 20 percent and 36 percent of cell 
lines scientists use are contaminated or misidentified — passing off as 
human tissue cells that in fact come from pigs, rats, or mice, or in which 
the desired human cell is tainted with unknown others. But despite 
knowing about the issue for at least 35 years, the vast majority of 
journals have yet to put any kind of disclaimer on the thousands of 
studies affected (Oransky & Marcus, 2016, para. 2).  
 
The conclusions of thousands of studies are potentially invalid as a result of this 
contamination.  
 
Nearly 5,800 articles in 1,182 journals may have confused HeLa for 
HEp-2; another 1,336 articles in 271 journals may have mixed up HeLa 
with INT 407. Together, the 7,000-plus papers have been cited roughly 
214,000 times, Science reported last year. And that’s just two cell lines. 
All told, more than 400 cell lines either lack evidence of origin or have 
become cross-contaminated with human or other animal cells at some 
point in their laboratory lineage (Oransky & Marcus, 2016, para. 4).  
 
Casadevall, Steen, and Fang (2014) conducted a study of 2,047 articles in the PubMed 
database that had been retracted as of May 3, 2012. Casadevall et al. (2014) found that 
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the vast majority of retractions, 1,624 (79%), were the result of scientific misconduct 
defined as ‘data fabrication, data falsification, plagiarism, and duplicate publication’ (p. 
3848). They analysed the remaining 423 (21%) articles that had been retracted due to 
error. To their surprise, they only found 6 (1.4% of the papers retracted due to error) 
attributed to contamination of cell lines or use of inappropriate cells (Casadevall et al., 
2014, p. 3849). They noted that this low number was in spite of the fact that the problem 
of cell line contamination is widespread and well known. They conclude, ‘the paucity of 
retractions attributed to contaminated cell lines suggests that the literature contains 
many unretracted but potentially erroneous studies’ (Casadevall et al., 2014, p. 3849). 
Indeed if Oranksy and Marcus (2016) are correct, the number of articles that should be 
retracted numbers in the tens of thousands.  
 
It does not take a lot of imagination to figure out why scientific journals might be 
reluctant to retract the thousands of papers tied to contaminated cell lines. Millions of 
dollars, jobs, and status are on the line for the academic and corporate researchers and 
the journals themselves. Yet the unwillingness of journals to issue retractions for 
articles they know are based on false premises, suggests that economic, social, and 
personal factors sometimes outweigh objectivity at even the best scientific journals.  
 
5.4 Capture of regulatory agencies 
 
Laffont and Tirole (1991) argue that the theory of regulatory capture begins with Marx. 
While they do not elaborate on Marx’s particular contribution, it seems clear that Marx 
and Engels’ ([1848], 2004) argument in the Communist Manifesto that ‘The executive 
of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
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bourgeoisie’ and many themes in their larger oeuvre presaged more recent theories of 
regulatory capture. Following the growth of the regulatory state in the U.S. as part of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal and with the end of World War II a number of political scientists 
and economists developed theories of regulation including Huntington (1952), Bernstein 
(1955), and Downs (1957). Progressives often view regulation as a tool for reining in 
corporate excesses and harms. Chicago school theorists including Stigler (1971) and 
Peltzman (1976) counter that regulation and regulatory agencies are often designed by 
corporate lawyers, lobbyists, and executives to favour corporate interests (which is more 
in line with Marx’s view as well).  
 
Carpenter and Moss (2013) define regulatory capture as ‘the result or process by which 
regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the 
public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action 
of the industry itself’ (p. 13). Below I will present evidence that the key regulatory 
agencies in the Federal government that have purview over some aspect of the autism 
epidemic (CDC, FDA, NIH, and EPA) are all captured pursuant to the definition from 
Carpenter and Moss (2013). In spite of their differences, each institution is characterised 
by unresolvable contradictions that are built into the design of the institution and/or are 
added over time. Evidence of regulatory capture in these institutions includes corporate 
influence over the decisions of advisory committees, front line scientists, and senior 
managers. Corporate donations to elected officials also result in pressure from above on 
regulators to bow to corporate interests.  
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5.4.1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
 
The U.S. Communicable Disease Center was founded July 1, 1946 as a branch of the 
U.S. Public Health Service with a mission to control malaria (Parascandola, 1996). In 
the early years the key staff were entomologists (scientists who study insects) and 
engineers and the agency focused on the application of DDT and other pesticides to 
more than 6 million homes (CDC, 2016a). Over the years the CDC expanded to take on 
the Epidemic Intelligence Service (to deal with Cold War concerns over biological 
warfare), veterinary diseases, and sexually transmitted diseases (CDC, 2016a). It was 
renamed the National Communicable Disease Center effective July 1, 1967, the Center 
for Disease Control on June 24, 1970, the Centers for Disease Control effective October 
14, 1980, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) effective October 
27, 1992 (National Archives, n.d.). Like the FDA, the CDC has made an enormous 
contribution to public health over the years. But there are concerns that it has become 
captured by corporate interests in recent years. Importantly, autism falls within the 
CDC’s ambit. As of yet, the agency does not use the word ‘epidemic’ in connection 
with autism in spite of the rising prevalence numbers and does not acknowledge that 
autism is preventable in spite of the consensus statements (described in chapter 1) by 
leading epidemiologists that argue that autism is likely caused by environmental triggers.  
 
COI are endemic to the CDC. Levinson (2009) in a report for the Office of the Inspector 
General wrote, ‘We found that CDC had a systemic lack of oversight of the ethics 
program for SGEs [special government employees — the official designation for 
advisory committee members]’ (p. iii). Ninety-seven per cent of disclosure forms filed 
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by SGEs were incomplete and 13 per cent of SGEs did not even have a disclosure form 
on file (Levinson, 2009). 
 
COI are by design at the CDC. According to Lenzer (2015) in 1983, ‘the CDC was 
authorised to accept “gifts” from industry and other private parties’ (p. 1). In 1992, 
Congress introduced more possibilities for conflict of interest by creating the non-profit 
CDC Foundation which opened its doors in 1995 (Lenzer, 2015). The legislation that 
created the CDC Foundation allows private donors to create and fund programs at the 
CDC, ‘endow positions at the CDC, and even place individuals to work at the CDC, 
paid through “private funding”’ (Informed Consent Action Network, 2017a, p. 27). 
Overall the CDC accepted $42,433,855 in gifts in 2016 and $662,785,857 since its 
inception in 1995 (CDC Foundation, 2016a). Bayer, Merck, the Pfizer Foundation, and 
the Sanofi Foundation all give to the CDC Foundation (CDC Foundation, 2016b).  
 
In 2016, the CDC’s budget was about $7 billion, so outside funding is just a small 
fraction of the total. So then why allow outside funding of the CDC at all? From a 
corporate perspective, the CDC Foundation represents an extraordinary opportunity. For 
a relatively small investment of money, they can get a foot in the door and integrate 
themselves into the government bureaucracy and produce outputs that have the 
imprimatur of an ostensibly neutral government body. But from a scientific perspective 
such donations violate Mertonian norms of universalism, disinterestedness, and 
organised scepticism. The moment the CDC accepts any outside funding it becomes a 
conflicted party subject to the funding effect and such funding raises doubts as to the 
scientific integrity of their work. 
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Lenzer (2015) highlights three case studies of COI at CDC. Between 2010 and 2015 the 
CDC Foundation accepted over $26 million from corporations that make products that 
‘test for or treat hepatitis C infection’ (Lenzer, 2015, p. 2). In August 2012, the CDC 
issued guidelines ‘recommending expanded (cohort) screening of everyone born 
between 1945 and 1965 for hepatitis C virus’ (Lenzer, 2015, p. 2). But Koretz, Lin, 
Ioannidis, and Lenzer (2014) argue that the expanded screenings are not scientifically 
justified. Nine of the 34 members of the working group that wrote the guidelines had a 
financial relationship with the manufacturers of hepatitis C tests or treatments (Lenzer, 
2015, p. 2).  
 
A similar pattern emerged in connection with an antiviral drug called oseltamivir, 
produced for Roche, for treatment of symptoms associated with the flu: Roche funded 
the CDC’s ‘Take 3’ flu campaign; the third step in the Take 3 campaign is ‘take 
antiviral medicine if your doctor prescribes it’; the CDC then posted a study sponsored 
by Roche to its website recommending antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir for flu 
(Lenzer, 2015, p. 2). The CDC failed to include the Cochrane Collaboration review on 
its website that showed that oseltamivir does not reduce pneumonia nor fatalities from 
the flu (Lenzer, 2015, p. 2). Indeed the FDA warned Roche that it could not promote 
oseltamivir as reducing pneumonia and death because it had never provided evidence to 
support such claims yet the CDC’s Take 3 campaign was seen as promoting off label 
use of oseltamivir for flu (Lenzer, 2015, p. 2). 
 
The third case study from Lenzer (2015) is the most troubling. Twenty thousand young 
men who worked in sugar cane fields in Central America have died in an ‘epidemic of 
chronic kidney disease’ (Ramirez-Rubio, McClean, Amador, & Brooks, 2013). The 
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most likely causes according to Ordunez et al. (2014) are agrochemicals (including 
glyphosate-based herbicides like Roundup) used in the fields and the horrendous 
working conditions. In 2014, the sugarcane industry gave $1.7 million to the CDC 
(Lenzer, 2015). And the CDC is now conducting a longitudinal study, for an as yet 
undetermined period of time, to examine genetics and biomarkers in children that might 
predispose them to later kidney failure (Lenzer, 2015, pp. 2–3). Researching long-shot 
genetic explanations over and against investigating environmental causes that might 
threaten corporate interests has become standard practice at the CDC — particularly in 
connection with autism.  
 
5.4.2 Food and Drug Administration  
 
Throughout the Progressive Era (1890s to 1920s) in the United States, muckraking 
journalists like Samuel Hopkins Adams and Upton Sinclair brought the nation’s 
attention to problematic corporate conduct in connection with the nation’s medical and 
food supplies (Buenker, Burnham, & Crunden, 1986; FDA, 2009a). In 1902, following 
the deaths of thirteen children in St. Louis who received diphtheria antitoxin 
contaminated with tetanus spores, Congress passed the Biologics Control Act to 
regulate vaccines (HHS, n.d.). In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, 
that banned the interstate transport of food or drugs that had been adulterated (FDA, 
2009a). Drugs now required labels that listed the ingredients and purity standards were 
also established (FDA, 2009a). Enforcement of the act was the responsibility of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Chemistry which later became the Food, Drug, 
and Insecticide Administration and this name was eventually shortened to the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in 1930 (FDA, 2014a). Today the FDA regulates ‘food, 
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drugs, biologics, medical devices, electronic products that give off radiation, cosmetics, 
veterinary products, and tobacco products’ (FDA, 2018). Harris (2008b) estimates that 
the FDA regulates the products in connection with twenty-five per cent of all consumer 
spending in the U.S. There is no question that the FDA has saved millions of lives and 
improved health and safety for U.S. citizens. But there are growing concerns that the 
FDA has become captured by corporate interests (Gøtzsche, 2013, p. 109). If it is 
ultimately determined that autism is the result of iatrogenic injury it would represent an 
extraordinary regulatory failure by the FDA. For the sake of brevity, I will limit my 
analysis here to studies on regulatory capture of the FDA published beginning in 2000.    
 
A study by USA Today found that the FDA is riddled with financial conflicts of interest 
(Cauchon, 2000). They found that, ‘more than half of the experts hired to advise the 
[U.S.] government on the safety and effectiveness of medicine have financial 
relationships with the pharmaceutical companies that will be helped or hurt by their 
decisions’ (Cauchon, 2000, p.1). The financial conflicts of interest ‘include stock 
ownership, consulting fees, research grants, a spouse’s employment, and payments for 
speeches and travel’ (Cauchon, 2000, ‘Types of Conflicts’, para. 1). The USA Today 
analysis examined conflicts of interest at 159 FDA advisory committee meetings from 
January 1, 1998 to June 30, 2000. They found that:  
 
• at 92% of meetings, at least one member had a financial conflict of 
interest.  
• At 55% of meetings, half or more of the FDA advisers had conflicts 
of interest....  
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• At 102 meetings dealing with the fate of a specific drug, 33% of the 
experts had a financial conflict (Cauchon, 2000, para. 8).  
 
Adding a ‘consumer representative’, a frequent reform proposed by those worried about 
the influence of commercial interests on drug regulation, was of no help. USA Today 
showed that ‘even consumers’ and patients’ representatives on the committees often 
receive drug company money’ (Cauchon, 2000, ‘Number of Drug Experts Available is 
Unlimited’, para. 6). The FDA is prohibited from using experts with COI if they do not 
have a waiver; but waivers are routine — during this period, the FDA granted 803 COI 
waivers (Cauchon, 2000). Advisory committees are extremely powerful. During the two 
year period under review, the FDA followed the advisory committees’ 
recommendations in every instance except one — ‘the FDA approved the flu drug 
Relenza in July 1999 despite an advisory committee voting 13–4 against approval’ 
(Cauchon, 2000, ‘Powerful Panels’, para. 1).  
 
In December 2000, the Los Angeles Times published an investigation by David Willman 
(who was later awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his work on this series) into seven drugs 
that had been approved by the FDA that were later withdrawn after a combined 1,002 
fatalities. Willman (2000) notes that for decades the FDA had been known for a 
cautious and slow approach to approving new drugs; but pharmaceutical companies 
took advantage of the AIDS crisis to push for faster drug reviews. The 1992 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) requires pharmaceutical companies to pay 
$309,647 to the FDA for each new drug application (the fee represents about half of the 
actual cost of a review) (Willman, 2000). But in return, the PDUFA called on the FDA 
to review drugs within six months to a year — more than twice as fast as before 
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(Willman, 2000). The result was a dramatic speed up in new drug reviews and a 
massive increase in the percentage of drugs approved (Willman, 2000). The agency 
hired more medical officers to help with the workload but they did not hire more 
investigators to monitor safety once those drugs were on the market (Willman, 2000). 
Wood, Stein, and Woosley (1998) note that the 1992 PDUFA and its reauthorisation in 
1997 prohibited the FDA from spending user fees ‘on post-marketing surveillance or 
other drug-safety programs’ (p. 1852). Following the PDUFA, FDA staff (who 
subsequently left the agency) described a ‘sweatshop environment’ where scientists 
were pressured to approve drugs and were reprimanded by senior administrators if they 
raised safety concerns in connection with the data submitted by the companies (Willman, 
2000, ‘Lost Faith in the System’, para. 20). Willman (2000) writes,  
 
In 1988, only 4% of new drugs introduced into the world market were 
approved first by the FDA. In 1998, the FDA’s first-in-the-world 
approvals spiked to 66%. The drug companies’ batting average in getting 
new drugs approved also climbed. By the end of the 1990s, the FDA was 
approving more than 80% of the industry’s applications for new products, 
compared with about 60% at the beginning of the decade (para. 9). 
 
If the new drug works, rapid approval means patients can enjoy the health benefits 
sooner than under the previous system (Psaty, Furberg, Ray, & Weiss, 2004, p. 2622). 
But the worry is that as speed has increased, the quality of the reviews has decreased. 
As I will discuss in a separate section below on iatrogenic injury and death (5.6), for 
many people this flood of new drugs comes at an enormous cost. 
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More than 250,000 side effects linked to prescription drugs, including 
injuries and deaths, are reported each year. And those ‘adverse-events’ 
reports by doctors and others are only filed voluntarily. Experts 
including Strom [Founding Chair of the Department of Biostatistics and 
Epidemiology, Perelman School of Medicine, University of 
Pennsylvania] believe the reports represent as few as 1% to 10% of all 
such events (Willman, 2000, ‘Lost Faith in the System’, para. 32).  
 
In response to the embarrassing revelations published by USA Today and the Los 
Angeles Times, the House Government Reform Committee held hearings (‘House 
Investigates’, 2001). The FDA drafted new conflict of interest disclosure policies (Lurie 
et al. 2006, p. 1922). But there is little evidence that this new guidance reduced conflicts 
of interest. 
 
An internal FDA report in 2002 found that ‘one-third of staff members surveyed did not 
feel comfortable expressing contrary scientific opinions’; ‘a third felt negative actions 
against applications were “stigmatized” within the agency’; and some drug reviewers 
stated, ‘that decisions should be based more on science and less on corporate wishes’ 
(Adams, 2002). 
 
A 2003 report from the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) found that 66% of reviewers in the FDA’s Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research (CDER) ‘lacked confidence in the FDA’s safety monitoring of 
marketed prescription drugs’ and ‘18% had felt pressure to approve a drug despite 
reservations about its quality, efficacy, or safety’ (HHS, 2003).  
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A Government Accountability Office (2006a) report found that the ‘FDA lacks clear 
and effective processes for making decisions about, and providing management 
oversight of, postmarket safety issues’.  
 
In 2006, the Union of Concerned Scientists sent a survey to 5,918 FDA scientists (997 
completed and returned the survey) and they found that: 
• 18.4% said that they ‘have been asked, for non-scientific reasons, to 
inappropriately exclude or alter technical information or their conclusions in a 
FDA scientific document’; 
• 40% fear retaliation for voicing safety concerns in public; 
• 61% knew of cases where ‘Department of Health and Human Services or FDA 
political appointees have inappropriately injected themselves into FDA 
determinations or actions’. 
• Only 47% think the ‘FDA routinely provides complete and accurate information 
to the public’. 
• 81% agreed that the ‘public would be better served if the independence and 
authority of FDA post-market safety systems were strengthened’. 
• 70% disagree with the statement that FDA has sufficient resources to perform 
effectively its mission of ‘protecting public health and helping to get accurate 
science-based information they need to use medicines and foods to improve their 
health’ (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2006).  
 
Strom (2006) highlights some of the effects of the sped-up drug approval process: 
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• 51% of drugs have label changes because of major safety issues discovered after 
marketing [US General Accounting Office, 1990];  
• 20% of drugs get new black box warnings7 after marketing [Lasser et al. 2002]; 
and  
• 3% to 4% of drugs are ultimately withdrawn for safety reasons [Bakke, 
Manocchia, de Abajo, Kaitin, & Lasagna, 1995]. 
 
The 2007 FDA Amendments Act capped the number of COI waivers the FDA could 
grant in a given year; but the 2012 FDA Safety and Innovation Act removed all caps 
which undermines any meaningful attempt to prevent COI on advisory committees 
(Wood & Mador, 2013).  
 
Downing et al. (2012) found that the FDA approves drugs faster than the European 
Medicines Agency. Downing et al. (2014) ‘found that the majority of pivotal trials in 
drug approvals involved fewer than 1,000 patients and lasted six months or less’ (which 
is ideal for measuring benefits but inadequate to measure harms with long latency 
periods). Downing et al. (2017) examined the ‘222 novel therapeutics approved by the 
FDA between 2001 and 2010’. They found that by 28 February 2017, 32% (71) had a 
major safety event that required a black box warning, a safety communication about the 
drug’s dangers, or withdrawal from the market. Lupkin (2017) points out that the FDA 
adverse events reporting system is voluntary so it undercounts the actual number of 
harms (para. 9). Caleb Alexander, co-director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Drug 
Safety and Effectiveness said:  
 
                                                
7 See definition in Glossary, p. xii. 
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‘All too often patients and clinicians mistakenly view FDA approval as 
[an] indication that a product is fully safe and effective. Nothing could be 
further form the truth. We learn tremendous amounts about a product 
only once it’s on the market and only after use among a broad population’ 
(in Lupkin, 2017, para. 18).  
  
Pham-Kanter (2014) studied the voting behaviour of 1,379 FDA advisory committee 
members over the period of 1997–2011. She found that advisory committee ‘members 
who served on advisory boards solely for the sponsor were significantly more likely to 
vote in favour of the sponsor (OR = 4.97, p= 0.005)’ (Pham-Kanter, 2014, p. 447). 
 
It does not appear to matter which party controls the White House, conflicts of interest 
at the FDA persist under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Walker 
(2014) in a study for the Wall Street Journal found that: 
 
In panels evaluating devices involved in cardiology, orthopedics and 
gynecology from 2012 through 2014 [years 4 to 6 of the Obama 
administration], a third of 122 members had received compensation — 
such as money, research grants or travel and food — from medical-
device companies, an examination of databases shows.... The FDA 
disclosed roughly 1% of these corporate connections (para. 4). 
 
In addition to the fees that the FDA collects from the companies that they are charged 
with regulating, Congress further opened the door to conflicts of interest through 
creating the non-profit Reagan-Udall Foundation in 2007 to support the work of the 
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FDA (Greenfieldboyce, 2012). While Reagan-Udall staff claimed that ‘core operating 
expenses would be accepted from the government, individual donors, or other 
nonprofits’ most pharmaceutical companies have set up non-profit foundations that 
enable them to engage in these sorts of donations. Indeed when the Reagan-Udall 
Foundation was struggling with funding during the early years, the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Foundation provided a $150,000 
grant (Greenfieldboyce, 2012). Furthermore there are interlocking boards of directors 
between the Reagan-Udall Foundation and companies the FDA is supposed to regulate. 
So for example, Garry Neil, is ‘an executive at Johnson & Johnson who is chairman of 
the PhRMA Foundation’s board of directors and also a member of Reagan-Udall’s 
board’ (Greenfieldboyce, 2012). While the dollar amounts flowing into the foundation 
at this point are still low ($4 million in 2015 according to the most recent financial 
statement from the RUF), the best available research on the funding effect shows that 
any conflicted contribution changes research outcomes.  
 
5.4.3 National Institutes of Health 
 
‘The NIH traces its beginnings to the Laboratory of Hygiene, founded in 1887 within a 
Navy hospital on Staten Island in New York’ (Willman, 2003). Initially, it led the 
federal response to cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and smallpox (Willman, 2003). ‘In 
1938 it was renamed the National Institute of Health and moved into its present 300-
acre headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland’ (Willman, 2003). Today NIH is the main 
institution through which the U.S. federal government conducts health research (NIH, 
2016b). NIH’s budget in 2016 was $32.3 billion (NIH, 2016b). ‘More than 80% of the 
NIH’s funding is awarded through almost 50,000 competitive grants to more than 
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300,000 researchers at more than 2,500 universities, medical schools, and other research 
institutions in every state and around the world’ (NIH, 2016b).  
 
In 2016, $216 million from the NIH budget was earmarked for autism research (NIH, 
2016a). By way of contrast, $7.8 billion in 2016 was earmarked for genetics research 
across all health categories (NIH, 2016a). The Director of the National Institute of 
Mental Health chairs the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee (IACC) that 
spearheads the federal response to ASD (IACC, n.d.).  
 
In December 2003, the Los Angeles Times published an investigation by David Willman 
into financial conflicts of interest at the NIH.  He discovered,  
 
In November 1995, then NIH Director Harold E. Varmus wrote to all 
institute and center directors, rescinding ‘immediately’ a policy that has 
barred them from accepting consulting fees and payments of stock from 
companies. The Varmus memo also ‘scuttled other restraints affecting all 
[NIH] employees, including a $25,000 annual limit on outside income, a 
prohibition on accepting company stock as payment and a limit of 500 
hours a year on outside activities’ (Willman, 2003, ‘Temptations 
Abound’, para. 21).  
 
Many ‘top scientists at NIH received substantial honoraria and stock options from 
biomedical firms that, in some cases, doubled their government salaries’ (Krimsky, 
2004, p. xi). Far from the disclosure and transparency that is often touted, most of these 
deals were kept secret. Willman found that: 
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NIH officials now allow more than 94% of the agency’s top-paid 
employees to keep their consulting income confidential.... A survey by 
the [Los Angeles] Times of 34 other federal agencies found that all had 
higher percentages of eligible employees filing reports on outside 
income.... The trend toward secrecy among NIH scientists goes beyond 
failure to report outside income. Many of them routinely sign 
confidentiality agreements with their corporate employers, putting their 
outside work under tight wraps (Willman, 2003, ‘Hidden From View’, 
para. 1–3).  
 
A subsequent editorial by the Los Angeles Times stated: ‘the NIH has become an arm of 
commerce, a place where objective science is being trampled in a stampede for market 
share. Its scientists brazenly collect paychecks and stock options from biomedical 
companies, and they do so with the blessing of their leaders. With the collusion of those 
leaders, they are moving swiftly to conceal the sources of their outside incomes from 
the public’ (‘Subverting U.S. Health’, 2003, para. 3). Congressional hearings prompted 
the Department of Health and Human Services to encourage disclosure but senior 
officials were still allowed to collect income from outside consulting (Krimsky, 2004, p. 
xi).  
 
The Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH) offers a way for 
corporations to give directly to NIH. In 2017, pharmaceutical giants Amgen, 
AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, and Pfizer each gave 
more than $5 million and they have all contributed for 15 years or longer; vaccine 
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producers GlaxoSmithKline, Merck Sharp & Dohme, and Sanofi each gave in the $2.5 
to $5 million range and have been donating every year for at least 16 years; other 
notable donors include alcoholic beverage giants Anheuser-Busch InBev, Carlsberg 
Breweries, and Heineken in the $1.5 to $2 million range (FNIH, 2017). In 2012, the 
National Football League gave what was supposed to be an unrestricted grant of $30 
million to FNIH for brain research (Farmer, 2017). But Congressional investigators 
learned that behind the scenes the NFL worked to prevent funding from going to a noted 
brain researcher, Robert Stern, who was critical of the NFL’s approach to brain injury 
(Farmer, 2017). Following the Congressional inquiry, the NIH allowed the contract to 
expire after spending $14 million of the promised $30 million (Farmer, 2017). Similar 
concerns were raised about the contributions of brewers to studies in connection with 
alcohol consumption (Rabin, 2018). The fear is that many of these grants are not in fact 
unrestricted and instead are just ‘the nose under the tent’ by which corporations come to 
influence scientific research and health policy. Because government has the ability to 
tax, it does not have to rely on such donations to fund scientific research (unlike non-
profits, academia, or even corporations). The fact that FNIH chooses to permit such 
funding schemes, in spite of the way that they interfere with scientific objectivity, raises 
troubling questions about the aims and purposes of the program.   
 
5.4.4 Environmental Protection Agency 
 
The creation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was one of the great 
victories of the environmental movement that began in the U.S. in the late 1950s. 
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969; amongst 
other things it established the President’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and 
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required environmental impact statements in connection with all actions of the federal 
government (Eccleston, 2008). In 1970, President Nixon created the Environmental 
Protection Agency to consolidate the various federal environmental tasks into a single 
cabinet level department (EPA, 1992). The stated mission of the EPA is ‘to protect 
human health and the environment’ and it does that through ‘writing and enforcing 
regulations based on laws passed by Congress’ (EPA, 2016). If mercury, endocrine 
disruptors, flame retardants, and pesticides are implicated in the autism epidemic as 
suggested by the epidemiological evidence presented in chapter 1, then it would 
represent an extraordinary regulatory failure by the EPA.  
 
In 2013, David Heath and Ronnie Greene at the Center for Public Integrity along with 
the PBS Newshour published an investigation into the EPA’s failure to regulate 
hexavalent chromium — a toxic chemical that is in the drinking water of an estimated 
70 million Americans (and brought to the public’s attention through the film Erin 
Brockovich). Heath and Greene (2013) argue that EPA scientists believe that there is 
clear evidence that hexavalent chromium is carcinogenic and were ready to announce 
their findings in 2011; but industry has managed to delay the report ever since (which 
also delays stricter drinking water standards that would be triggered by completing its 
risk assessment). Three of the five scientific advisory panel members who voted to 
delay the report had worked on behalf of the chromium industry in the court cases 
connected with the contamination in Hinkley, California (Heath & Greene, 2013, para. 
11). A fourth scientist also served as a consultant to the American Chemistry Council in 
connection with Hinkley chromium studies (Heath & Greene, 2013, para. 11).  
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COI on EPA advisory panels are extensive and troubling. Heath and Greene (2013) 
found that EPA does not even ask scientists if they have a COI:  
 
Instead, it turns that job over to private companies, which handle 
conflict-of-interest reviews in secret. All of the information the vendors 
collect, including financial disclosure forms is ‘considered private and 
non-disclosable to EPA or outside entities as required by law’.... What is 
more, the ethics guidelines are not binding on contractors, and the EPA 
handbook says the agency should not override decisions on conflicts of 
interest (‘EPA Farms Screening to Consultants’, para. 3).  
 
At the FDA, the burden of proof is on the makers of food and drugs to show that their 
products are safe (and as shown above, that system is riddled with COI that sometimes 
lead to the approval of unsafe products). But with chemicals including pesticides that 
are regulated by the EPA, the burden of proof is on the agency to prove that the 
chemical is harmful (Heath, 2013a). The Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) is 
the EPA’s toxic chemical assessment program (Heath & Greene, 2013). IRIS gives the 
veneer of regulation. But as a result of relentless industry interference that takes 
advantage of mechanisms for delay that are built into the assessment process, the EPA 
rarely completes an assessment which means there is almost no regulation of most 
chemicals in the U.S. (Heath & Greene, 2013). To briefly sketch the problem: ‘There 
are more than 80,000 chemicals available for commercial use; the EPA over the past 30 
years has assessed the health risks of only 570; these scientific assessments are 
necessary before any new regulation can be enacted’ (Heath, 2015). ‘700 new chemicals 
hit the market each year’; ‘a typical review takes six to eight years’; and ‘it took 27 
 164 
years for the agency to issue a partial assessment of dioxin’ (Heath & Greene, 2013). 
When EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson took office in 2009 she pledged to complete 50 
assessments a year. The EPA has never come close to that goal. It completed 14 toxic 
risk assessments in 2009, 14 in 2010, six in 2011, and just three in 2012 (Heath & 
Greene, 2013). Compare that with the FDA’s near perfect record of completing drug 
reviews on time over that same period and one starts to get a more complete picture of 
corporate influence on the regulatory process. To put it simply: pharmaceutical 
companies want fast approvals and chemical companies want slow or no regulations and 
both industries get exactly what they want under the current system.  
 
In toxic risk assessments, the EPA is expected to review all of the available evidence. 
At first that might seem reasonable but it creates all sorts of opportunities for 
corporations to cloud the pool of evidence through the use of ‘rented white coats’. 
CROs are not limited to testing drugs. There are also CROs that will perform all manner 
of toxicity studies on behalf of chemical companies. So for example, when it looked like 
the EPA was about to impose further limits on the use of hexavalent chromium, the 
American Chemistry Council announced that it had hired a CRO called ToxStrategies to 
conduct a $4 million study of the health effects of hexavalent chromium on animals 
(Heath & Greene, 2013). This bought the manufacturers more time, and, given 
ToxStrategies reputation for producing results favourable to industry, it likely bought 
helpful data too (Heath & Greene, 2013).  
 
In response to the Heath and Greene (2013) investigation, the EPA announced new rules 
to prevent COI including publicly posting the names of scientific advisory panel 
members prior to meetings (Heath, 2013a). The EPA noted that ‘the new steps do not 
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change existing standards for assessing conflicts, but instead, add sunshine to the 
process’ (Heath, 2013a).  
 
In 2014, for the sixth year in a row, the EPA failed to complete its assessment of arsenic, 
thereby allowing two arsenic containing pesticides to remain on the market (Heath, 
2014). In 2014, the EPA completed just one toxic risk assessment (Heath, 2015). In 
2015, ‘the EPA missed its own deadlines for completing risk assessments for atrazine, 
glyphosate, and imidacloprid’, three widely used toxic agrichemicals (Burd, 2015). As 
mentioned in chapter 1, the increased use of glyphosate is closely correlated with the 
increase in autism prevalence rates. Atrazine is an endocrine disruptor and endocrine 
disruptors have been implicated in the autism epidemic as well (Hertz-Picciotto, 2011).  
 
5.4.5 A different view of regulatory conflicts of interest 
 
Davis (2014) lists five main arguments that have been developed over the years by 
conservative legal scholars, free market social scientists, and various scientific interests 
in support of allowing COI and opposed to regulating or even disclosing such conflicts.8 
First, McComas et al. [2005], Ackerley [2007], and Sullivan [2011] argue that 
government has difficulty finding unconflicted experts because of the ‘shared pool 
dilemma’ — academia, government, and corporations all want access to the best 
researchers so they are all drawing from the same shared (finite) talent pool. Next, Lurie 
et al. [2006] and Ackerley [2009] claim that even if experts on advisory panels do have 
a conflict there is no evidence that these conflicts produce changes in voting patterns. 
Third, Philipson and Sun [2010], Woodcock [2011], and Epstein [2012] argue that COI 
                                                
8 All of the references in the next two paragraphs come from Davis (2014).  
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rules might delay patients’ access to (potentially lifesaving) treatments. Fourth, Herper 
[2012] portrays COI rules as driving up the cost of new drug development (to an 
average of $4 billion to as much as $11 billion per drug) which hinders economic 
competitiveness. Finally, Epstein [2012] and Eschenbach and Hall [2012] claim that 
COI rules are burdensome and that the FDA would be better served by more 
collaboration with conflicted experts rather than less.  
 
Davis (2014) shows that those who favour stronger rules to limit COI build their case 
around five counterarguments (p. 1618). First, there is overwhelming evidence that COI 
change voting patterns in ways that ultimately harm the public [Mansell, 2006; Biddle, 
2007; Lenzer & Epstein, 2012; Zuckerman, 2013]. Second, COI rules can work in 
industry’s favour if they prevent a competitor from using its position on an advisory 
committee to harm the interests of a rival firm [Silverman, 2007; Begley, 2012]. Third, 
industry’s estimates of new drug development costs are vastly overstated (closer to $55 
million per drug) [Light & Warburton, 2011]; pharmaceutical companies spend 19 times 
more money on marketing than they do on basic research (Light & Lexchin, 2012). 
Fourth, it is not entirely clear that the shared pool dilemma exists when, depending on 
the medical subfield, 30% to 50% of the academic researchers do not have a COI 
[Lenzer & Brownlee, 2008; Zinner et al., 2009; Mendelson et al., 2011]. Finally, 
rushing drugs to market that have not been adequately tested poses both financial and 
health risk to patients their families (Davis, 2014, p. 1618).  
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5.4.6 Capture of Elected Officials 
 
The capture of regulatory agencies is made possible by the capture of elected officials. 
The pharmaceutical/health products industry spent over $4 billion between 1998 and 
2018 to lobby elected officials and candidates, more than any other industry (Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2018, ‘Pharmaceuticals/Health Products’). The number of 
pharmaceutical company lobbyists increased from 729 in 1998 to 1,803 in 2008, before 
declining somewhat to 1,440 in 2018 (CRP, 2018, ‘Pharmaceuticals/Health Products’). 
In 2018, 919 (63.8%) of the lobbyists employed by the pharmaceutical industry had 
previously ‘worked in Congress or another branch of the federal government’ (CRP, 
2018, ‘Pharmaceuticals/Health Products’). The corporate conquest of the courts in the 
U.S. is also extensive, particularly in connection with toxic tort cases (Mirowski, 2011; 
Cranor, 2016). There is fairly good evidence that the pharmaceutical industry has 
captured traditional media as well. In non-election years, television news in the U.S. 
derives an estimated 70% of its revenue from advertisements for pharmaceutical 
products (Kennedy, 2014). 
 
5.5.0 Conflicts of interest amongst medical school students, doctors, and 
professional medical associations 
 
Conflicts of interest also shape the practices of medical schools (5.5.1), doctors (5.5.2), 
and professional medical associations (5.5.3) in ways that lead to bias (5.5.4) although 
there are some doctors who contest this claim (5.5.5).  
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5.5.1 Capture of Medical School Students 
 
Capture of the medical profession begins while students are still in medical school. 
Sierles et al. (2005) surveyed 1,143 third-year students at eight U.S. medical schools. 
‘Mean exposure for each student was 1 gift or sponsored activity per week. Of 
respondents, 762/818 (93.2%) were asked or required by a physician to attend at least 1 
sponsored lunch’ (Sierles et al., 2005, p. 1034). Third-year medical students had faith in 
their ability to resist bias, but less faith in their colleagues. ‘Regarding attitudes, 
556/808 (68.8%) believed gifts would not influence their practices and 464/804 (57.7%) 
believed gifts would not affect colleagues’ practices’ (Sierles et al., 2005, p. 1034). 
Perhaps most interesting, third-year medical students saw these conflicts of interest as 
their due. ‘Of the students [who responded to this particular question], 553/604 (80.3%) 
believed that they were entitled to gifts’ (p. 1034).  
 
Austad, Avorn, and Kesselheim (2011) conducted a systematic review of 32 studies on 
‘medical students’ exposure to the drug industry’. They found that ‘up to 90% of 
surveyed students in their clinical years had received educational materials such as 
textbooks or journal reprints from industry’ (Austad et al., 2011, p. 3). Medical students’ 
exposure to the drug industry was highest in the U.S. where two studies showed that 
‘100% of students had at least one interaction with industry’ (Austad et al., 2011, p. 3). 
‘Contact with the pharmaceutical industry increased over the course of medical school’ 
(Austad et al., 2011, p. 3). ‘Almost two-thirds of students reported that they were 
immune to bias’ but once again these same respondents were significantly less likely to 
believe the same about their medical school colleagues or doctors (Austad et al., 2011, p. 
3). ‘Students who interacted with PSRs [pharmaceutical sales representatives] were 
 169 
more likely than those who did not meet with PSRs to report positive perceptions of 
industry marketing (OR = 2.974) and were less likely to perceive this marketing as 
negative (OR= 0.408)’ (Austad et al., 2011, p. 3). Sierles et al. (2015) conducted a 
follow up study and discovered that exposures and attitudes had shifted, ‘students were 
significantly less frequently exposed to interactions (1.6/month versus 4.1/month), less 
likely to feel entitled to gifts (41.8% versus 80.3%), and more apt to feel gifts could 
influence them (44.3% versus 31.2%)’ (p. 1137).  
 
5.5.2 Capture of doctors 
 
While COI in universities, science and medical journals, and regulatory agencies are 
extraordinary, they pale in comparison to the financial conflicts of interest involving 
doctors.  
 
There is an extensive social science literature on gift giving, reciprocity, and influence 
going back five decades.  
 
Mauss [1967], argues that gifts create strong dispositions or obligations 
to reciprocate, especially if they involve extended relationships and more 
than mere economic transfers. Mather [2005] shows that physicians are 
subject to these obligations, and that through gift-giving pharmaceutical 
companies become accepted parts of physicians’ social landscape; and 
gifts to physicians have measurable effects, even though most physicians 
believe themselves immune from influence [Wazana, 2000] (Sismondo, 
2008b, p. 1911).  
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The Pew Charitable Trusts published a study in 2013 titled, ‘Persuading the Prescribers: 
Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its Influence on Physicians and Patients’. The 
data are extraordinary. In 2012, the pharmaceutical industry spent more than $27 billion 
on drug promotion; $24 billion (89%) of that total was spent on marketing to physicians 
while $3 billion (11%) was spent on advertising to consumers (including those 
ubiquitous television commercials in the U.S. that end with ‘Ask your doctor if [X drug] 
is right for you’); and $15 billion (62.5%) of the $24 billion spent on marketing to 
physicians is spent on what is called ‘detailing’ — the well-dressed pharmaceutical 
sales representatives who show up in doctors’ offices bearing gifts, free samples, and 
copies of the latest studies (Cegedim Strategic Data, [2012], in Pew, 2013, p. 1). 
 
Campbell et al. (2007) finds that 94% of physicians have financial relationships with the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industries. Rockoff (2014) finds that drug 
companies employed 102,000 sales representatives in 2005 but that the number of sales 
representatives shrank to 63,000 by 2014, mostly as a result of consolidation in the 
healthcare field whereby more doctors now work directly for hospitals or health 
maintenance organisations (para. 7).  
 
The pharmaceutical industry is heavily involved in continuing medical education. ‘In 
2011, the pharmaceutical and medical device industries provided 32 percent of all 
funding for continuing medical education courses in the United States — $752 million 
out of $2.35 billion’ (Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education, [2011], 
in Pew, 2013). Many of the same medical education and communications companies 
(MECCs) described above that shepherd a study through all phases of publication also 
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deliver the continuing medical education courses required for doctors. Via MECCs, 
pharmaceutical companies have turned CME into lavish commercials, in which studies 
designed, managed, and often ghostwritten by the MECCs are presented to doctors as 
cutting edge objective research.  
 
Elliott (2004) writes,  
 
Why is it so hard to bring about change? Partly because change is in 
nobody’s financial interest. In the case of medical education, the funding 
operation is seamless. Not only does pharma fund the MECCs who 
organize the CME, the academics who deliver the CME, and the offices 
that certify the CME, it also funds the professional societies that require 
the CME. Specialty groups like the American Psychiatric Association 
and the American Academy of Family Physicians are heavily dependent 
on industry funds. Pharma even helps write the accreditation guidelines. 
Nearly half of the membership of the task force which produced the 
original ACCME [Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical 
Education] standards governing industry support of CME came from 
industry itself (p. 21). 
 
The philosophy of science has long grappled with (and been unable to resolve) the fact 
that we are always part of the system we would like to measure so there never is a ‘true’, 
‘outside’, ‘objective’ position from which to measure ‘reality’. The capture of the 
medical profession by pharmaceutical companies is a capitalist variant on this problem 
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in that doctors are rarely outside of an ontological and epistemological reality created by 
pharmaceutical companies to serve their profit interests.  
 
5.5.3 Capture of Professional Medical Associations 
 
The capture of doctors also includes professional medical associations (PMAs) where 
corporate funding is pervasive. PMAs are extremely influential because they ‘inform 
members of new and established diagnostic treatment procedures’, ‘issue detailed 
practice guidelines’, and ‘define ethical norms for their members’ (Rothman et al., 2009, 
p. 1367).   
 
Only a handful of professional medical associations release detailed information about 
their finances. ‘As non-profits, they must disclose their tax returns but not their specific 
sources of funding’ (Ornstein & Weber, 2011). In response to a New York Times 
investigation (O’Connor, 2015), Coca-Cola agreed to reveal all of its corporate 
sponsorships covering the period 2010–2015. Over that five year period, Coca-Cola 
gave ‘the American Academy of Family Physicians $3.6 million, the American College 
of Cardiology $3.2 million, the American Academy of Pediatrics nearly $3 million, the 
American Cancer Society $1.9 million, Brigham and Women’s Hospital $1.2 million, 
and the American Diabetic Association $1.1 million’ (Belluz & Oh, 2015). In all, Coca-
Cola gave ‘$21.8 million to scientific research and $96.8 million to support health and 
well-being partnerships’ (Belluz & Oh, 2015). Many of the largest PMAs only bring in 
a fourth or less of their annual budget from membership dues; advertising and corporate 
sponsorship often make up the rest (Lexchin & Light, 2006). As the most extreme 
example, the Massachusetts Medical Society takes in nearly eight times more money 
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from advertising in the NEJM than they do in membership dues (Lexchin & Light, 
2006). The American Academy of Pediatrics has a Friends of Children Fund that 
enables them to take in corporate contributions. Infant formula makers Abbott Nutrition, 
Mead Johnson Nutrition, and Nestlé as well as vaccine makers Merck and Sanofi are 
among the biggest contributors (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2018).   
 
‘Panels that write clinical guidelines — the documents that govern the diagnosis and 
treatment of patients’ have also been found to be riddled with COI (Taylor & Giles, 
2005). An investigation by Nature found that 35% of the authors of clinical guidelines 
‘declared financial links to relevant drugs companies, with around 70% of panels being 
affected’ (Taylor & Giles, 2005). The researchers cautioned that ‘this is likely an 
underestimate as it relies on authors’ own declarations’ (Taylor & Giles, 2005, p. 1070).  
 
5.5.4 How financial conflicts of interest lead to bias and the inadequacies of 
disclosure as a remedy for conflicts of interest 
 
The information in this section will focus on how COI lead to bias amongst doctors. But 
the same dynamics likely apply to COI in other areas of science and medicine including 
medical school faculty, editors of academic journals, regulators, and politicians.  
 
In the case of clinical trials in connection with Vioxx, Seroxat, and Fen-Phen there 
appears to have been outright fraud on the part of doctors in hiding catastrophic side 
effects in order to boost sales and profits. But there are multiple mechanisms by which 
conflicts of interest lead to bias and often they are subtle or subconscious (Cain, 
Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005, p. 119). 
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For more than thirty years social scientists have been studying the problem of how 
conflicts of interest lead to bias.9 ‘Physicians typically report that they are not biased by 
financial arrangements with pharmaceutical companies, although a large body of 
research suggests that they are’ (Dana & Loewenstein, 2003, p. 254). Palmisano and 
Edelstein [1980] found that ‘medical students recognize gifts as more problematic for 
other professions than they are for medicine’. McKinney et al. [1990] found that ‘most 
physicians do not perceive themselves as biased, [however] they admit that conflicts of 
interest might compromise other physicians’ decisions’. Randall [1991] showed that 
many pharmaceutical companies ban ‘their own employees from accepting even small 
gifts’ lest it influence their behaviour. A survey of physicians by Steinman et al. [1991] 
found ‘61% reported that “promotions don’t influence my practice” while only 16% 
believed the same about other physician’s practices’. Orlowski and Wateska [1992] 
found that physicians who attended continuing medical education seminars sponsored 
by pharmaceutical companies were more likely to prescribe the sponsored drug; prior to 
attending the event 95% of those surveyed reported that the seminars would not 
influence their behaviour. Spingarn et al. [1996] tracked physicians who attended grand 
rounds (in-house master classes at a hospital) given by a representative from a 
pharmaceutical company. They found that physicians who attended were more likely to 
recommend the sponsored drug than physicians not in attendance — even though many 
of the physicians who attended could not recall the name of the sponsor [Spingarn et al., 
1996]. Patients too exhibit remarkably asymmetrical perceptions of bias. Gibbons et al. 
[1998] found that while gifts from pharmaceutical companies to doctors were generally 
seen as problematic, patients believed that other doctors were more likely to be 
                                                
9 The sources in this paragraph all come from Dana and Loewenstein, (2003), p. 254. 
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influenced than their own doctor. In every case listed above, perceptions of bias were 
self-serving and were contrary to the scientific evidence on how bias works.  
 
In response to high profile scandals and numerous studies that show how conflicts of 
interest lead to (often subconscious) bias, institutions tend to respond by implementing 
policies to limit the size of gifts and/or require disclosure. But there is no evidence that 
either of these strategies is effective in reducing bias (Dana & Loewenstein, 2003). 
McKinney et al. [1990] and Steinman et al. [2001] show that physicians think that 
accepting small gifts is more ethical than accepting large gifts. But Dana and 
Loewenstein (2003) argue that the size of the gift does not matter. They explain that 
regardless of the size of the gift, ‘judgments are subject to an unconscious and 
unintentional self-serving bias.... Furthermore, individuals are generally unaware of the 
bias, so they do not make efforts to correct for it or to avoid conflicts of interest in the 
first place’ (Dana & Loewenstein, 2003, p 252).  
 
Disclosure is not the panacea that many make it out to be and in many cases may 
actually increase bias. Part of the problem is that recipients of conflicted advice have no 
effective way of appropriately discounting information to take account of the potential 
for bias. Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber (1989) and Wilson and Brekke (1994) show 
that people are generally unable to unlearn, ignore, or suppress information in their 
decision making process even when they are told it is inaccurate. Psychological 
experiments demonstrate that disclosure can actually increase bias via ‘strategic 
exaggeration’ and ‘moral licensing’ (Cain et al., 2005). If an advisor believes that 
disclosure may cause their evidence to be discounted, they might be tempted to 
exaggerate claims in order to counteract that discounting (Cain et al., 2005, p. 115). 
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‘Although disclosure might warn an audience to cover its ears, it also may encourage 
advisors to yell even louder’ (Cain et al., 2005, p. 115). In their own experiments, Cain 
et al. (2005) build on the work of Crawford and Sobel [1982] to show that disclosure 
increases bias through what they call ‘moral licensing’. Cain et al. (2005) write, ‘Insofar 
as disclosure is perceived to level the strategic playing field, it may leave the advisor 
feeling less compelled to toe the ethical line and look out for the interests of those 
receiving their advice’ (p. 7).  
 
Elliott (2004) writes,  
 
It is time to admit that as a remedy for conflict of interest, disclosure has 
been an utter failure. Disclosure is an empty ritual designed to ease the 
consciences of academics unable to wean themselves from the industry 
payroll. Its only purpose is to serve as a warning signal, like a fire alarm 
in a burning building. Disclosure does nothing to fix the underlying 
problem of pharma funding, which is not secrecy but power. It does 
patients no good to be told that doctors, researchers, and regulators are 
all in pharma’s pocket if there is nothing they can do about it (p. 22).  
 
Disclosure as a remedy for bias persists precisely because it is ineffective. If disclosure 
reduced bias then pharmaceutical companies would not be getting a return on their $24 
billion a year investment in marketing to physicians and there would be no point in 
making such expenditures in the first place.  
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5.5.5 A different view of conflicts of interest involving doctors 
 
Rosenbaum (2015a, 2015b, 2015c), a national correspondent for the New England 
Journal of Medicine, is not especially concerned about doctors accepting funding and 
gifts from industry.  
 
In part one of a three part series regarding conflicts of interest published in the NEJM, 
Rosenbaum (2015a) explains that tragedies such as the death of Jesse Gelsinger (a 
healthy volunteer who died during a gene therapy trial directed by a medical school 
professor with a COI) and disasters such as Merck’s Vioxx along with record fines of 
GSK, Pfizer, Eli Lilly, Abbott Laboratories, and AstraZeneca, create a certain ‘affective 
impression’ that unfairly shapes the perception of all physician-industry interactions (pp. 
1861–1863).  
 
In part two, Rosenbaum (2015b) argues that the debate about COI has overshadowed 
other troublesome forms of bias including non-financial biases (listed as ‘fatigue, 
hunger, institutional norms, the diagnosis of the last patient we saw, or a memory of a 
patient who died’), self-serving bias (‘when we stand to gain from reaching a certain 
conclusion, we unwittingly assimilate evidence in a way that favors that conclusion’), 
‘bias blind spot’ (‘we’re far more likely to think that drug promotions influence our 
colleagues than that they affect our own behaviour’), and ‘anti-industry bias’ (pp. 1961–
1962). Regarding ‘anti-industry bias’, Rosenbaum (2015b) favourably quotes Epstein 
[2010] as writing: ‘The scientists who have no such connections could easily harbour 
strong beliefs that new and risky drugs should be kept off the market which, in turn, 
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could lead them to overstate the risks and understate the benefits of these new 
treatments’ (p. 1962). 
 
In part three, Rosenbaum (2015c) argues that the ‘conflict-of-interest movement’ has 
cast ‘industry interactions as a moral issue’ and that moral reasoning interferes with 
rational weighing of trade-offs. She continues by arguing that those who use moral 
reasoning are inclined to ‘invent harm’ (p. 2065) and that the debate over conflicts of 
interest is ‘disgust-driven spin’ and a ‘vicious gotcha cycle’ that has eroded the ‘public 
trust in medicine and science’ (p. 2067).  
 
What is odd about Rosenbaum’s argument is how thinly sourced it is. In part 1, she 
argues, ‘Finally, whatever the financial stake and however effectively it’s managed, the 
role of bias is impossible to prove...’ (Rosenbaum, 2015a, p. 1862). In part two 
Rosenbaum asks but leaves unanswered the question, ‘Does the money introduce a bias 
that undermines scientific integrity?’ (2015b, p. 1961). As I have shown in this chapter, 
there are numerous studies that show how funding shapes research outcomes. 
Rosenbaum (2015a, 2015b, 2015c) never uses the term ‘funding effect’ even though 
there is an entire field within science and technology studies dedicated to exploring this 
problem. For empirical data, Rosenbaum quotes Campbell et al. (2007), Bekelman et al. 
[2006], and Lurie (2006). However, Ioannidis and Gøtzsche are two of the most quoted 
experts in the world on the question of research bias but she makes no mention of them 
nor does she cite the work of the Cochrane Collaboration, Sismondo, Cosgrove, 
Lexchin, Lundh, or Michaels. If Rosenbaum had consulted their work she would have 
found that they have already provided, in abundance, the data she claims is unknowable. 
To be clear it does not appear that Rosenbaum is making an epistemological point about 
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the limits of all knowledge, proof, scientific validity, etc. Rather she is claiming that 
studies that counter her point do not exist when in fact they do.  
 
Rosenbaum unwittingly demonstrates that many debates about science are not scientific 
at all (insofar as the debate is not especially concerned with data, methods, or the results 
of empirical investigation). Instead they are debates about identity, power, and ideology.  
 
5.6 High levels of iatrogenic death and injury in our current system 
 
Conflicts of interest, fraud, and questionable scientific data result in high levels of 
iatrogenic injury and death. Gøtzsche (2013) writes,  
 
Our [prescription] drugs kill us on a horrific scale. This is unequivocal 
proof that we have created a system that is out of control. Good data are 
available, [Weingart et al., 2000; Starfield, 2002; and Lazarou et al. 
1998], and what I have made out of the various studies is that around 
100,000 people die each year in the United States because of the drugs 
they take even though they take them correctly. Another 100,000 die 
because of errors, such as too high a dose or use of a drug despite 
contraindications.... The European Commission has estimated that 
adverse reactions kill about 200,000 EU citizens annually (at a cost of 
€79 billion).... This means that in the United States and Europe: 
[prescription] drugs are the third leading cause of death after heart 
disease and cancer... In addition to all the deaths, millions of people 
experience serious, disabling drug injuries every year’ (pp. 259–260).  
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It is important to underscore here that Gøtzsche is not talking about those who commit 
suicide by overdosing on prescription drugs and he is also not talking about illegal drug 
use. These are fatalities from drugs that have been approved as safe and effective by the 
FDA and the European Medicines Agency.  
 
Makary and Daniel (2016) argue that ‘medical error is the third most common cause of 
death in the U.S.’ (p. 2). They conducted a meta-study of four existing studies [Health 
Grades, 2004; HHS, 2010; Classen et al., 2011; and Landrigan et al., 2010] on ‘annual 
deaths from medical error in the U.S.’ since 1999 (Makary & Daniel, 2016, p. 1). They 
‘calculated a mean rate of death from medical error of 251,454’ people a year in the U.S. 
(Makary & Daniel, 2016, p. 2). They argue that this is likely an underestimate because 
death certificates in the U.S. use International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes that 
do not include categories for human or systems errors and because the studies cited only 
measure inpatient deaths (Makary & Daniel, 2016, p. 1). Presumably the half of 
Gøtzsche’s (2013) prescription drug fatality estimate attributable to (usually hospital) 
error also shows up in Makary and Daniel’s (2016) estimate. By either measure there is 
a remarkable level of preventable death and injury from our current system of capitalist 
medicine.  
 
5.7 Science and medicine eschew the sorts of basic protections against corruption 
used by other institutions  
 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requires financial statements from 
publicly traded firms to be audited by independent accounting firms (USSEC, 2016, 
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§1110). No wise investor would put his or her money into a firm without this protection 
because the assumption is that the unaudited data would be fraudulent. Even then there 
are problems (e.g. the savings and loan crisis, Enron, the collapse of Arthur Andersen, 
and the global financial collapse, to name a few recent examples). Several leading 
figures in science and medicine (Angell, 2008; DeAngelis & Fontanarosa, 2008) have 
proposed having all clinical trials conducted by independent third parties, but these 
reforms have gone nowhere. In judicial systems around the world it is unthinkable to 
allow a judge, attorney, or juror to disclose a COI and then continue with the case 
(Krimsky, 2005). The legal system has decided that recusal is the only way to deal with 
COI. Yet in science and medicine, those who stand to gain financially from a discovery 
or invention publish their own account of the data and often that is the only information 
available. Angell (2008) writes, ‘It is self-evidently absurd to look to investor-owned 
companies for unbiased evaluations of their own products. Yet many academic 
investigators and their institutions pretend otherwise, and it is convenient and profitable 
for them to do so’ (p. 1071). The evidence presented above shows that the traditional 
safeguards in science and medicine — peer review and publication in respected 
scientific and medical journals, regulatory approval, and the endorsement of doctors and 
their professional associations — do not offer sufficient protection against bias, fraud, 
and the distorting influence of profit.  
 
5.8 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have shown that financial conflicts of interest are endemic in 
connection with university scientific research, corporate scientific practices, science and 
medical journals, regulatory agencies, politicians, medical school students, doctors, and 
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professional medical associations. These conflicts of interest distort every step of the 
scientific process from study design to research outcomes to marketing, postmarket 
surveillance, and clinical practice. Conflicts of interest lead to study results that are not 
replicable and high levels of iatrogenic injury and death from products that are not safe. 
Even those who are aware of the extent of the problem and its ramifications, continue as 
if these problems can somehow be managed through disclosure of COI in spite of the 
absence of any evidence to support this view. Scientists and doctors portray themselves 
as uniquely objective. However their unique epistemic position gives them 
extraordinary power and this power makes them unusually vulnerable to the distorting 
influence of profit. Science and medicine eschew the sorts of ethical safeguards against 
COI that are common in other industries and institutions. This lack of safeguards is by 
design because COI are profitable. The public depends on science and medicine to 
produce use values that reduce suffering and improve quality of life yet since 1980 these 
professions are increasingly dedicated to exchange values that produce profits.  
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Part II: 
The failure to regulate toxicants associated with autism 
 
Recapping the argument thus far 
 
In chapter 1, I presented what, at first glance, appears to be an unusual case — autism is 
an epidemic, there is fairly good data about factors that increase autism risk, and yet the 
federal government in the U.S. is not acting on that data. In chapter 2, I showed that 
science and medicine are shaped by their social, economic, and political contexts and 
argued that in any scientific debate one must study the data and its context (and the 
interrelationship between the two). In chapter 3, I showed that the histories of science 
and medicine do not resemble the idealised model of scientific progress presented by 
Kuhn (1962) and that instead, these professions can remain stuck in counterproductive 
paradigms for decades or longer as a result of social factors including power and profit. 
In chapter 4, I argued that autism resembles the dynamics of other toxic chemical 
disasters and long-term toxic chemical exposures such as lead, asbestos, and tobacco. In 
chapter 5, I showed that all facets of the scientific and medical process in the U.S. are 
now shaped by capitalism and that this has created a series of internal crises that have 
left these professions ill-equipped to respond to the autism epidemic.  
 
Introduction to Part II 
 
In chapters 6 through 9, I will provide evidence that the current crises in capitalist 
science and medicine are particularly acute in connection with those toxicants 
associated with increased risk of autism. Space does not permit me to review the 
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regulatory history of all of the toxicants listed in chapter 1. Instead, I focus on four 
classes of possible environmental triggers that may be contributing to the total allostatic 
load on children and that exemplify the need for greater regulation (plastics and flame 
retardants, herbicides and pesticides, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and 
vaccines). I will examine what research has been done, what research has been left 
undone, and how regulators have responded (or not) to scientific evidence. The 
regulatory patterns in connection with all of the toxicants discussed in chapters 6 
through 9 are very similar: regulatory agencies routinely allow products to enter the 
market without adequate safety testing; even when evidence of toxicity emerges it can 
take decades to get any regulatory action; and the producers of these products shape key 
aspects of the scientific and regulatory process to their benefit.  
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Chapter 6 
The failure to investigate possible environmental factors in general and  
the failure to regulate endocrine disruptors in particular in the U.S. 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter has four main sections. I begin by defining key terms in toxicology (6.1). 
Next, I document the failure of the U.S. Congress and U.S. public health agencies to 
effectively investigate toxicants associated with autism (6.2). Then, I review the failure 
to effectively regulate endocrine disrupting chemicals including phthalates, BPA, and 
flame retardants (6.3). Finally, I discuss lobbying and campaign contributions by 
chemical and related manufacturers (6.4).  
 
6.1 Definition of key terms 
 
To begin this section it is important to define a number of key terms in toxicology and 
epidemiology. A toxic substance is simply a poison; ‘any agent capable of producing a 
deleterious response in a biological system’ (Green, n.d.). A toxin is a ‘toxic substance 
produced by biological systems such as plants, animals, fungi, and bacteria’ (Green, 
n.d.). A toxicant is a ‘toxic substance produced by or a by-product of anthropogenic 
(human) activities’ (Green, n.d.). ‘Toxins’ is often used to refer to both toxins and 
toxicants (i.e. both natural and anthropogenic sources of poison) (Green, n.d.).  
 
In the environment, some toxicants are broken down quickly. Others persist for days, 
months, or years and may bioaccumulate if ‘they are stored in fat or attach to biological 
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molecules like proteins’ (Green, n.d.). ‘If a chemical can accumulate in an organism, 
then it can be passed on to the animal that eats it’; as a toxicant moves up the food chain, 
it can become more concentrated and more potent in a process called biomagnification 
[or bioamplification] (Green, n.d.). So large predatory fish (like tuna) often have higher 
mercury content than animals lower in the food chain.  
 
Toxins enter the human body through ingestion, inhalation, absorption through the skin, 
and injection (medical treatments) (Green, n.d.). The body has various ways to defend 
against toxic substances: saliva, stomach acid, properties of cells, and bodily organs all 
work to bind up, break down, prevent absorption, detoxify, sequester, store, and/or 
repair damage from toxins (Green, n.d.). But sometimes toxins overwhelm the body’s 
ability to protect and repair itself and this causes harms in many different ways (Green, 
n.d.). Mutagens ‘raise the frequency of mutations above the spontaneous rate’ (Porta, 
2014). Carcinogens ‘induce or otherwise participate in the causation of cancer’ (Porta, 
2014). Teratogens produce ‘abnormalities in the embryo or fetus by disturbing maternal 
homeostasis or acting directly on the fetus in utero’ (Porta, 2014). Immunotoxins 
produce an ‘adverse or inappropriate change in the structure or function of the immune 
system’ (Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, p. 3). Neurotoxins are ‘any substance 
that is toxic to neurons or to the nervous system’ (OED, n.d.). Endocrine disruptors 
interfere ‘with the normal functioning of the endocrine system and the physiological, 
developmental, and (especially) the reproductive processes regulated by it’ (OED, n.d.). 
Reproductive toxins are any substance that produces ‘adverse effects on sexual function 
and fertility in adults as well as developmental toxicity in offspring’ (United Nations, 
2011, p. 173).  
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Making matters significantly more complicated, Manikkam et al. (2012, 2013, 2014) 
show that various toxicants have transgenerational effects; in animal studies, certain 
toxic harms to a pregnant female (labelled generation F0) not only show up in her 
offspring (generation F1), but in the next three generations as well (labelled F2, F3, and 
F4). It is hard to overstate how profound a development this is. The standard cost 
benefit analysis (CBA) used by the EPA and other federal agencies generally only looks 
at the harms to generation F0; if in fact some of these toxicants harm four generations of 
offspring as well it means that many CBA calculations may understate actual harms by 
several fold. That casts doubt on 50 years worth of cost benefit analysis in connection 
with toxicants.    
 
Some of these mechanisms of action are understood better than others. For example, the 
term ‘endocrine disruptor’ was not coined until the 1991 Wingspread Statement (Bern et 
al., 1992) and does not yet appear in the Dictionary of Epidemiology (Porta, 2014). The 
chemicals discussed in this thesis usually have multiple mechanisms of action in the 
human body. So for example, BPA is classified as a carcinogen by Canadian and 
European regulators but it also may cause autism through endocrine disruption and/or 
other mechanisms. Historically, regulation has tended to focus on carcinogens. By 
accident or by design U.S. regulations have often failed to keep up with new 
developments in toxicology (Vogel, 2013). Regulation tends to be based on the 500 year 
old idea from Paracelsus that ‘the dose makes the poison’; so researchers seek to 
identify a no observed adverse effect level (NOAEL) and then a safety factor (NOAEL-
SF) is added (anywhere from 10x to 1000x) before setting a safe reference dose (RfD) 
(Vogel, 2013). But with some substances, such as lead, there appears to be no safe dose 
(Grandjean, 2010). Furthermore, with endocrine disruptors the relationship between an 
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exposure and an outcome can be nonlinear (what’s called ‘nonmonotonic’) — low, 
intermediate, and/or high doses may be toxic and the dose response curve may be U 
shaped, an inverted U, or neither (Porta, 2014). (To be clear, a U shaped dose response 
curve starts at a low dose, not at zero. For more on non-linear dose response curves see 
Vandenberg et al., 2012, cited in Porta, 2014.) Regulation based on the notion of ‘the 
dose makes the poison’ has yet to catch up with the profound implications of ‘no safe 
dose’ for some substances and ‘the timing makes the poison’ for other substances 
(Vogel, 2009 and 2013).  
 
Cranor (2013) points out an important aspect of causation that is not widely known — 
causal contributions do not necessarily need to be simultaneous. For example, animal 
studies have shown that mice exposed to one pesticide in utero do not develop 
Parkinson-like symptoms, but when they are exposed to a second pesticide as adults, 
they exhibit signs of Parkinson’s disease (Cranor, 2013, p. 112). Establishing or refuting 
such non-simultaneous or synergistic effects in humans is nearly impossible. 
Institutional Review Boards would never approve human experiments to test the theory 
and people are always exposed to a multitude of confounding variables. So even if such 
effects are happening, which seems plausible, U.S. regulatory agencies would be unable 
to detect them.  
 
6.2.0 Failure of the U.S. Congress and regulatory agencies to investigate toxicants 
associated with autism 
 
One might hypothesise that elected officials would have an interest in preventing toxic 
harms to their constituents and would be rewarded by constituents for taking action to 
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regulate and ban toxicants. But in order to ban toxicants, one would have to know which 
chemicals are toxic, and often that research is simply not done. The evidence I will 
present below shows that Congress and various regulatory agencies either refuse to fund 
the sort of research that would lead to a better understanding of the relationship between 
various chemicals in the environment and autism or they approve the research and find 
other ways to scuttle the project as it proceeds. In this section, I review the failure of the 
National Children’s Study (6.2.1), legislative changes to block research into 
environmental triggers in connection with the Combating Autism Act (6.2.2), and the 
CDC’s decision to eliminate unfavourable data at the Autism and Developmental 
Disabilities Monitoring Network (6.2.3).  
 
6.2.1 The failure of the National Children’s Study 
 
As the autism rate increased dramatically in the United States in the 1990s, many 
leading public health figures called for comprehensive research into possible 
environmental causes. In 1998, the President’s [Clinton] Task Force on Environmental 
Health and Safety Risks to Children recommended a National Children’s Study (NCS) 
and authorising legislation was included in the Children’s Health Act of 2000 
(Landrigan et al., 2006). The act called for a prospective cohort study that would track 
100,000 children from shortly after conception through age 21 (Landrigan et al., 2006). 
The act called for ‘a complete assessment of the physical, chemical, biological, and 
psychosocial environmental influences on children’s well-being’; data collection to 
evaluate ‘environmental influences and outcomes on diverse populations of children, 
which may include the consideration of prenatal exposures’; and consideration of 
‘health disparities among children, which may include the consideration of prenatal 
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exposures’ (H.R. 4365, 2000). In other words, Congress funded exactly the sort of 
comprehensive epidemiological study that would enable scientists to identify the 
possible environmental causes of autism.  
 
But the study never got off the ground. The NCS spent from 2001 to 2007 consulting 
with a range of experts and advisory committees on questions of study design. In 2007, 
Congress appropriated funding for a pilot called the Vanguard Study (Kaiser, 2014). In 
2009, the NIH began enrolling 5,000 mother-infant pairs in 40 academic centres across 
the United States (Kaiser, 2014). But the program was already troubled. The original 
director, Peter Scheidt was ousted in 2009 for ‘misleading Congress about the true cost 
of the study’ (Tozzi & Wayne, 2014). In 2012, the NIH dropped the 40 academic 
centres and turned the study subjects over to private contractors (Kaiser, 2014). In 2014, 
after spending fourteen years and more than $1.3 billion on the study that was still in the 
pilot phase, Francis Collins, director of the NIH, killed the study altogether (Collins, 
2014). Following the cancellation of the project, Collins and others made statements 
about continuing the research in some form using less expensive methods (Collins, 
2014), but such promises have not come to fruition. During the fourteen years that the 
NCS spent unsuccessfully trying to launch the study, the autism rate increased nearly 
five fold from 1 in 250 to 1 in 59 (CDC, 2018).  
 
It would be easy to blame bureaucratic incompetence for the failure of this project. But 
Francis Collins, who led the NIH from 2009 to 2016 (and was reappointed as head of 
NIH in 2017 by President Trump), previously led the Human Genome Project — so he 
had experience shepherding complex multibillion dollar projects to completion. 
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Furthermore, this is not the first time that government has shown a reluctance to explore 
the possible environmental causes of autism.   
 
6.2.2 Legislative Changes to Weaken the Combating Autism Act 
 
The Senate version (S. 843) of the Combating Autism Act of 2006 would have required 
the Centers of Excellence in Environmental Health and Autism to investigate, ‘a broad 
array of environmental factors that may have a possible role in autism spectrum 
disorders’ and allocated $45 million in funding for the purpose. But Representative Joe 
Barton (Republican, Texas) specifically objected to the language and funding in 
connection with environmental research in the Senate version of the bill; as chair of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee he kept it from coming to the floor for a vote 
(O’Keefe, 2006). Eventually a compromise was reached whereby the EPA could 
consider but was not required to research environmental factors associated with autism 
(O’Keefe, 2006). Given the history of regulatory capture at the EPA, even if the EPA 
was required by law to investigate environmental factors it would face extraordinary 
pressure to protect key industries; so to strip out the mandate weakened the bill 
considerably. After five years and a billion dollars in spending, the Combating Autism 
Act did not produce any major breakthroughs in diagnosis, causation, or treatments.  
 
6.2.3 Eliminating unfavourable data at the Autism and Developmental Disabilities 
Monitoring Network 
 
Autism advocacy groups maintain that it is extremely important to track cases of 
regressive autism as a separate category because it may give an indication of injury 
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from environmental factors, particularly vaccines. Those who have studied regressive 
autism note that there is a spike in cases of regressive autism at 1 year and 18 months 
which also coincides with the vaccine schedule (Wright, 2014, para. 6). As flawed as 
their system of counting is, the CDC, when it began the Autism and Developmental 
Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) network counted cases of regressive autism separately 
and found that between 13–30% of all cases of autism were characterised by regression 
and another 3–10% reported normal development followed by a plateau (Weisman, 
2014, ‘Elimination of Regression Reporting’, para. 1). Then in the reports in connection 
with the data from 2008 and 2010 (which are reported 4 years later, so the 2012 and 
2014 reports) the ‘entire section of the study reporting regression breakdown was 
eliminated’ (Weisman, 2014, ‘Elimination of Regression Reporting’, para. 1). It appears 
that the CDC simply stopped counting the data that did not fit their narrative. The 
CDC’s ‘will to ignorance’ (McGoey, 2007) in connection with autistic regression stands 
in stark contrast to the latest research in the field that shows that regression has 
previously been undercounted and ‘may be more the rule than the exception’ for 
children with ASD (Ozonoff et al., 2018, p. 788).  
 
6.3 Introduction to endocrine disrupting chemicals 
 
In chapter 1, I showed that a number of scholars have expressed concern and called for 
more research regarding possible links between endocrine disrupting chemicals and 
adverse neurodevelopmental outcomes including autism in children (Gilbert, 2008; 
Landrigan, Lambertini, & Birnbaum, 2012; Bennett et al., 2016). Many of the 
environmental triggers described in chapter 1, including mercury, phthalates, BPA, 
flame retardants, pesticides, SSRIs, and acetaminophen are endocrine disruptors. 
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Endocrine disruption is not their only mechanism of action (many are also neurotoxins 
for example) and it is not clear whether endocrine disruption is the mechanism of action 
associated with autism although a number of signs point in that direction. In this section, 
I will review the avenues of exposure to phthalates (6.3.1.0), the health effects of 
phthalates (6.3.1.1), and the regulatory history of phthalates (6.3.1.2). Next I will review 
the avenues of exposure and health impacts of BPA (6.3.2.0) and the regulatory history 
of BPA (6.3.2.1). Then I will introduce the topic of flame retardants (6.3.3.0) show that 
the tobacco industry lobbied for flammability standards for furniture to head off 
regulation of cigarettes (6.3.3.1), discuss the prevalence and toxicity of flame retardants 
(6.3.3.2), review the toxicity of PBDE and newer flame retardants (6.3.3.3), show that 
flame retardants are not actually very good at stopping fires (6.3.3.4), and document the 
limited progress in changing policies in connection with toxic flame retardants (6.3.3.5). 
Finally, I will discuss lobbying and campaign contributions by chemical and related 
manufacturing (6.4). The pattern with all of the chemicals presented in this chapter is 
similar: products in widespread use have not been sufficiently studied, when harms are 
identified they do not necessarily lead to regulatory action because companies can use a 
combination of science-for-hire, public relations firms, political donations, and lobbyists 
to prevent regulation of their products. 
 
6.3.1.0 Avenues of exposure to phthalates 
 
‘Phthalates are industrial chemicals that are added to plastics to impart flexibility and 
resilience and are often referred to as plasticizers’ (CDC, 2009, p. 258). They are in a 
wide range of industrial and consumer products including, ‘adhesives; automotive 
plastics; detergents; lubricating oils; some medical devices and pharmaceuticals; plastic 
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raincoats; solvents; vinyl tiles and flooring; and personal-care products, such as soap, 
shampoo, deodorants, lotions, fragrances, hair spray, and nail polish’ (CDC, 2009, p. 
258). They are also a key component in polyvinyl chloride (PVC) that is used in making 
‘toys, pipes, plastic bags, blood storage products, and intravenous medical tubing’ 
(CDC, 2009, p. 258). In PVC products, as much as 70% of the total product is made up 
of these plasticisers (ChemicalWatch, 2010). Phthalates are especially problematic 
because they do not permanently bind at a molecular level with the other chemicals to 
which they are added so over time they leach into the things they come in contact with 
(such as air, food, water, medicines, skin, and blood) (CDC, 2009, p. 258). Phthalates 
have become ubiquitous in the environment and in the bodies of animals and people 
(CDC, 2009, p. 258). Numerous studies, described below, show that some phthalates are 
harmful to animal and human health and some studies have found an association 
between phthalates and autism and/or autistic like traits.   
 
Children, women, workers in industries that use these chemicals, and those undergoing 
medical procedures who are exposed to phthalates in medical products are among those 
with the highest exposures (CDC, 2009, p. 258). Phthalates enter the body through 
inhalation, food, and skin contact (particularly with cosmetics and personal care 
products marketed to women) (CDC, 2009, p. 258). Infants are additionally exposed 
through dust and breast milk (CDC, 2009, p. 258). Hospital patients who need blood 
products or an IV have direct exposures of phthalates into their bloodstream (CDC, 
2009, p. 258). Tests of workers in industrial settings exposed to airborne phthalate 
emissions [Liss et al., 1985; Nielsen et al., 1985; Pan et al., 2006] show that ‘urinary 
metabolite and air phthalate concentrations are roughly correlated’ (CDC, 2009, p. 258). 
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The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) during 2003–2004 
found measurable levels of phthalate metabolites in the urine of the 2,636 participants; 
the body burden was higher in women than in men; but because the survey only 
enrolled people age six years and older, the burden on infants and young children was 
not measured (CDC, 2016b, ‘Phthalates’).   
 
6.3.1.1 Health effects of phthalates  
 
CDC (2009) presented a mixed picture of the human health effects of phthalates. They 
acknowledged that some phthalates have estrogenic properties [Coldham et al., 1997; 
Harris et al., 1997; Jobling et al., 1995] but then noted four studies showing that ‘in vivo 
studies did not support phthalates having estrogenic effects [Milligan et al., 1998; 
Okubo et al., 2003; Parks et al., 2000; Zacharewski et al., 1998]’ (CDC, 2009, p. 259). 
The CDC acknowledged phthalates’ reproductive toxicity in animals [citing Jarfelt et al., 
2005; Lovekamp-Swan and Davis, 2003; McKee et al., 2004; and NTP-CERHR 2000a, 
2000b, 2000c, 2006] (CDC, 2009, p. 258). While nearly 100% of the U.S. population 
have metabolites of phthalates in their urine, the CDC (2009) cautioned that, ‘finding a 
measurable amount of one or more phthalate metabolites in urine does not mean that the 
levels of the metabolites or the parent phthalate cause an adverse health effect’ (p. 259).  
As I showed in chapter 1, a number of studies that have come out since then have shown 
harms. Engel et al. (2010); Testa et al. (2012); Stein et al. (2013); Degroote et al. (2014); 
Ejaredar et al. (2015); and Kardas et al. (2016) showed an association between 
phthalates and autism or traits associated with autism. Other studies that explored a 
possible association between phthalates and autism were mixed (Miodovnik et al., 2011; 
Boas, Feldt-Rasmussen, & Main, 2012) or inconclusive (Philippat et al., 2015).  
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6.3.1.2 Regulation of phthalates 
 
The European Commission (1999) banned six phthalates (BBP, DBP, DEHP, DIDP, 
DINP, and DNOP) from toys and children’s products that are ‘intended to be placed in 
the mouth’. This followed earlier moves by Denmark, Austria, Greece, Finland, Sweden, 
Italy, France, and Germany to restrict some or all of these phthalates from children’s 
products (European Commission, 1999).  
 
The European Parliament (2006) passed Regulation 1907 concerning the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) and establishing a 
European Chemicals Agency in Helsinki. Unlike the EPA where the burden of proof is 
on the agency, REACH operates under a precautionary principle of ‘no data, no market’ 
that puts the burden of proof on the company to demonstrate that its product is safe 
(European Commission, 2016, para. 1). The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) 
administers the REACH regulations on behalf of the European Union. The ECHA 
reviewed the safety data on these six phthalates and recommended that ‘existing 
restrictions should be maintained’ (European Commission, 2014).  
 
In 2008, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (Westervelt, 
2015, para. 4). The legislation banned three phthalates (BBP, DBP, and DEHP) in 
children’s products, imposed an interim ban on three other phthalates (DIDP, DINP, and 
DNOP) in children’s toys and child care articles, and asked the U.S. Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (CPSC) to review the safety of phthalates (CPSC, 2014, p. 3). 
When the CPSC came back with its report in 2014, it recommended keeping the 
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permanent ban on BBP, DBP, and DEHP in children’s products; adding DINP to the 
permanent ban but allowing DIDP and DNOP back on the market; and took no action 
against other phthalates or phthalate alternatives other than to recommend more study 
(CPSC, 2014, pp. 7–9). The report also contained a curious disclosure: ‘Overall, food, 
beverages, and drugs via direct ingestion, and not children’s toys and their personal 
care products, constituted the highest phthalate exposures to all subpopulations’ 
(emphasis in original, CPSC, 2014 p. 3). Food, beverages, and drugs are under the 
jurisdiction of the FDA, so the CPSC simply suggested that the ‘U.S. agencies 
responsible for dealing with [phthalate] exposures from food and other products conduct 
the necessary risk assessments with a view to supporting risk management steps’ (CPSC, 
2014, p. 7). So on the one hand, Congress could claim that they took decisive action 
toward protecting children from these toxic harms, while on the other hand, the primary 
avenues of exposure (and their producers) were left undisturbed.   
 
Neither the U.S. Congress nor the European Parliament (nor the various regulatory 
agencies in both regions) have recommended banning phthalates as a class, preferring 
instead to ban or restrict individual low molecular weight phthalates while generally 
leaving high molecular weight phthalates on the market. But the problem remains that 
phthalates do not permanently bond to the chemicals they are mixed with (ATSDR, 
2008). So while high molecular weight phthalates may be less toxic, they still leach out 
of the product into the environment, food, and people’s bodies. The Lowell Center for 
Sustainable Production (2011) provides an overview of available alternatives to 
phthalates; yet many of them are not well studied and/or involve different health and 
environmental trade offs.  
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6.3.2.0 Avenues of exposures and health impacts of BPA 
 
Bisphenol A (BPA) is a chemical compound used in the manufacture of polycarbonate 
plastics, epoxy resins (used in canned food liners amongst other uses), and polyvinyl 
chloride (Stein, Schluter, Steer, Guo, & Ming, 2015, p. 272). Polycarbonate plastics 
account for 70% of global demand, followed by epoxy resins (Burridge, 2011). BPA is 
also found in thermal paper used in receipts (Björnsdotter, de Boer, & Ballesteros-
Gómez, 2017) and halogenated BPA is used as a flame retardant (Vandenberg, Maffini, 
Sonnenchein, Rubin, & Soto, 2009, p. 78). Six billion pounds of BPA are produced 
globally a year with demand increasing at 5% per annum (Burridge, 2011).  
 
The estrogenic properties of BPA have been known since the 1930s (Vogel, 2009, p. 
559). In 1993, it was discovered that BPA is an endocrine disruptor (Vogel, 2009, p. 
561). Cranor (2013) writes that, ‘some substances, such as DES [discussed below] or 
bisphenol A, can alter the expression of the genetic code without altering the genetic 
sequence itself’ (p. 114). 
 
Human exposure can come from contact with skin, ingestion, and/or inhalation (Stein et 
al., 2015). BPA is in the bodies of most Americans: 
 
More than 90% of the U.S. population has detectable levels of urinary BPA 
[Calafat et al. 2008]. BPA has also been detected in the urine and serum of 
pregnant women [Padmanabhan et al. 2008; Schonfelder et al. 2002; Wolff et al. 
2008; Ye et al. 2008] and serum, plasma, and placenta of newborn infants [Lee 
et al. 2008; Schonfelder et al. 2002] (Braun et al., 2009, p. 1945). 
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Endocrine disrupting chemicals such as BPA ‘may pose the greatest risk during prenatal 
and early childhood development’ and may also act as reproductive toxins that impair 
fertility (National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, ‘Endocrine Disruptors’, 
2018). Braun et al. (2009) found an association between prenatal BPA exposure and 
early childhood aggressive behaviour. Stein et al. (2015) in a study of 46 children on the 
autism spectrum compared against 52 neurotypical controls found a statistically 
significant association between BPA and autism (p. 272). In this subsection I will 
review the history of BPA and the failed attempts to regulate BPA in spite of a growing 
body of evidence showing cause for concern.  
 
6.3.2.1 Regulatory history of BPA 
 
A. P. Dianin first synthesised BPA in 1891 (Vandenberg et al., 2009, p. 77). British 
biochemist Edward Charles Dodds discovered in the 1930s that BPA has estrogenic 
properties which at the time were seen as desirable as a potential medical treatment for a 
range of disorders (Vogel, 2009, p. 559). Dodd’s research team later discovered an even 
more potent synthetic estrogenic substance, diethylstilbestrol (DES) (Vogel, 2009, p. 
559). In the 1940s, DES was commercialised and prescribed to women for a wide range 
of conditions from morning sickness to menopause and used to increase meat 
production in cattle (Vogel, 2009, p. 559). In 1971, DES was ‘banned for use in 
pregnant women after the first epidemiological studies reported rare vaginal cancers in 
young women exposed to DES while in their mothers’ wombs’; DES was banned in 
meat production 8 years later (Vogel, 2009, p. 559).  
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Chemists in the U.S. and Switzerland found use for BPA in epoxy resins (Vogel, 2009, 
p. 559). ‘Commercial production began in the early 1950s’ and uses proliferated in both 
industrial and consumer products (Vogel, 2009, p. 559). In 1957, scientists working at 
Bayer and General Electric discovered that BPA could be used to make polycarbonate 
plastic which ‘is strong enough to replace steel and clear enough to replace glass’ 
(Vogel, 2009, p. 559). The market for epoxy resins and polycarbonate plastics grew 
quickly and ‘reached half a billion pounds [about 227 million kilo] by the late 1970s’ 
(Vogel, 2009, pp. 559–560).   
 
In 1977, the National Cancer Institute launched what was supposed to be a 2-year 
animal study to try to determine whether BPA causes cancer (Vogel, 2009, p. 560). At 
the same time, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was conducting a study [Hart, 
1979] on the quality of the private labs used for government cancer research and they 
found widespread problems throughout the system (Vogel, 2009, p. 560). The worst lab 
in the study was Litton Biotechnics with violations including, ‘maintenance problems, 
poor quality-control measures, and poor pathology practices’ (Vogel, 2009, p. 560). 
Litton Biotechnics was the private contractor conducting the BPA carcinogenesis study 
(Vogel, 2009, p. 560). Yet the GAO report did not lead to changes in the BPA study and 
in 1982, the National Toxicology Program (NTP, which had since taken over the 
national Carcinogenesis Bioassay Program) released the final report (Vogel, 2009, p. 
560). The report found ‘no convincing evidence’ of carcinogenicity, with the exception 
of leukemia (NTP, [1982], p. ix in Vogel, 2009, p. 560). The study stated:  
 
That ‘bisphenol A is not carcinogenic’ should be qualified to reflect the 
facts that leukemia in male rats showed a significant positive trend, that 
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leukemia incidence in high-dose male rats was considered not significant 
only on the basis of the Bonferroni criteria, that leukemia incidence was 
also elevated in female rats and male mice, and that the significance of 
interstitial-cell tumors of the testes in rats was dismissed on the basis of 
historical control data (NTP, [1982], p. ix in Vogel, 2009, p. 560). 
 
When is it appropriate to use a Bonferroni adjustment? This may seem like venturing 
unnecessarily into the statistical weeds, but the inappropriate use of Bonferroni 
adjustments is a key point of contention in regulating toxic chemicals in general and in 
regulating toxicants in connection with autism in particular (see, e.g., Donzelli, 
Schivalocchi, & Battaggia, 2017). Bonferroni adjustments are used when multiple tests 
or comparisons are conducted for the same study and are used to reduce the possibility 
of Type I errors (false positives) (Nakagawa, 2004, p. 1044). They are calculated as 
follows: ‘The formula for the error rate across the study is 1 − (1 − α)n, where n is the 
number of tests performed. [α is the type 1 error rate, used to test the null hypothesis, 
usually set at .05.] However, the Bonferroni adjustment deflates the α applied to each.... 
The adjusted significance level is 1 − (1 − α)1/n’ and a quick way to estimate that is just 
α/n (Perneger, 1998, p. 1236). So if a Bonferroni correction was applied to a trial testing 
n = 10 hypotheses with an α = 0.05, then statistical significance would not be achieved 
until α < 0.005. One can instantly see the problem — in this example, a Bonferroni 
adjustment makes it 10 times more difficult to find a statistically significant association.  
 
Bonferroni adjustments are widely seen as controversial (Perneger, 1998; Moran, 2003; 
Nakagawa, 2004). ‘There is no formal consensus for when Bonferroni procedures 
should be used’ (Nakagawa, 2004, p. 1044). Perneger (1998), states that Bonferroni 
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adjustments ‘are, at best, unnecessary and, at worst, deleterious to sound statistical 
inference’ (p. 1236). Of particular concern, Bonferroni adjustments decrease Type I 
errors (‘false positives’) by increasing Type II errors (‘false negatives’) (Perneger, p. 
1236). While any errors are problematic, generally speaking, the makers of toxic 
chemicals have a vested interest in preventing Type I errors whereas environmental 
groups are more concerned with preventing Type II errors. So when Litton Biotechnics 
found a statistically significant association between BPA and leukemia, and then used a 
controversial statistical tool that increases Type II errors that rendered the result 
insignificant, it raised concerns. Of course there are also defenders of Bonferroni 
adjustments (Holm, 1979; Rice, 1989) and the courts in the U.S. have often been 
receptive to the use of Bonferroni adjustments precisely because they reduce Type I 
errors (Schachtman, 2014). Whether one sees this statistical technique as valid then 
depends on a host of earlier decisions one makes about theory and method.  
 
In spite of the problems with the Litton Biotechnics lab and problems with their BPA 
study, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) moved to set a regulatory 
safety standard for BPA in 1988 this was the study that they used (Vogel, 2009, p. 559). 
‘Considering BPA to be a noncarcinogen, the EPA used the lowest dose from the 
[Litton] carcinogenesis study as the “lowest observed adverse effect level” and divided 
this number by an uncertainty factor of 1000 to determine a reference dose of 50 µg/kg 
of body weight per day’ (Vogel, 2009, p. 559). This was also the reference dose adopted 
by the FDA and remains the current safety standard (Vogel, 2009, p. 559).   
 
The term ‘endocrine disruptors’ was coined in 1991 at a meeting of leading scientists 
put together by Theo Colborn and J.P. ‘Pete’ Myers, at the Wingspread Conference 
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Center in Wisconsin (Vogel, 2009, p. 561). But the idea had been developing for several 
decades. For example, Carson (1962) wrote at length about the impact of toxicants on 
the hormonal system. ‘In 1996, Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act 
(which amended the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act) and an 
amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act. Both amendments included language 
directing the EPA to establish a testing and screening program for endocrine disruptors’ 
(Vogel, 2009, p. 561). Twenty years later this is still a work in progress (and will be 
discussed in more detail below).    
 
In 2000, the EPA asked the NTP to ‘review the research on the health effects of low 
doses of estrogenic compounds, including DES and BPA’ (Vogel, 2009, p. 561). ‘The 
NTP’s [2001] Report of the Endocrine Disruptors Low Dose Peer Review... concluded 
that there was credible evidence for effects from BPA exposure at or below the safety 
standard’ (Vogel, 2009, p. 562). The NTP report largely concurred with the findings of 
a leading critic of BPA safety, Frederick vom Saal at the University of Missouri and 
noted that his findings on low dose effects had also been replicated by another 
laboratory (Vogel, 2009, p. 562). The NTP also called for a new testing paradigm to 
assess low dose effects (Vogel, 2009, p. 562).   
 
The American Plastics Council responded by hiring the Harvard Center for Risk 
Analysis (HCRA) to conduct a study of BPA safety on their behalf (Vogel, 2009, p. 
562). The HCRA is housed within Harvard’s T. H. Chan School of Public Health but as 
I showed in chapter 5 it receives funding from many of the largest producers of toxic 
chemicals in the world including the Dow Chemical Company which makes BPA 
(Vogel, 2009, p. 562). ‘The HCRA report on BPA, published in 2004, used a “weight of 
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the evidence” assessment framework developed at a 2001 meeting sponsored by the 
Annapolis Center for Science and Policy’ a corporate think tank ‘founded by the former 
vice president of the National Association of Manufacturers and funded by tobacco 
giant Phillip Morris and the ExxonMobil Foundation’ (Vogel, 2009, p. 562). The weight 
of the evidence framework is designed to favour the Good Laboratory Practice 
Guidelines that are standard in large corporate studies (Vogel, 2009, p. 562). Using this 
framework, the HRCA report concluded that two large multigenerational studies 
‘funded by the American Plastics Council and the Society of the Plastics Industry’ 
provided the most relevant and reliable data (Vogel, 2009, p. 562).  
 
vom Saal and Hughes (2005) responded with a literature review of their own.10 Their 
study showed that ‘by 2004 there were 115 published in vivo studies concerning low-
dose effects of BPA, and 94 of these report significant effects. In 31 publications with 
vertebrate and invertebrate animals, significant effects occurred below’ the EPA safe 
reference dose (vom Saal & Hughes, 2005, p. 96). Perhaps even more importantly, they 
demonstrated the extraordinary funding effect in BPA research. Of the 115 studies 
published between 1997 and 2004 more than 90% of government-funded studies 
reported significant effects from low doses of BPA whereas ‘No industry-funded studies 
(0 of 11, or 0%) report significant effects at these same doses’ (vom Saal & Hughes, 
2005, p. 96).  
 
In 2006, 38 experts on endocrine disruptors and BPA met for three days in Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina (vom Saal et al., 2007, p. 131). The meeting was sponsored by the 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the National Institute of Dental 
                                                
10 I am grateful to Vogel (2009) for first directing me to vom Saal and Hughes (2005) and vom 
Saal et al. (2007).  
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and Craniofacial Research, the EPA, and Commonweal, a foundation that works on 
environmental justice issues (vom Saal et al., 2007, p. 131). The meeting’s final product, 
the Chapel Hill Consensus Statement, concluded with ‘confidence’, on the basis of 
‘hundreds of in vitro and in vivo studies’, that BPA at concentrations found in the 
human body is associated with ‘organizational changes in the prostate, breast, testis, 
mammary glands, body size, brain structure and chemistry, and behavior of laboratory 
animals’ amongst other harms (vom Saal et al., 2007, p. 134).  
 
Shortly thereafter the Center for the Evaluation of Risks to Human Reproduction 
(CERHR) at the NTP, hired Sciences International to conduct a literature review on 
BPA toxicology (Vogel, 2009, p. 562). Sciences International is a three person firm in 
Alexandria, Virginia that has done extensive work for the tobacco industry, consults 
with 50 of the largest chemical companies in the world, and in 2006 listed two BPA 
manufacturers, BASF and DowDupont, among its clients (Cone, 2007, para. 13). An 
investigative report by the Los Angeles Times found that the CERHP routinely hires 
Sciences International to write the first draft of reports, and that Sciences International 
also helps select members and set the agendas for CERHR’s scientific review panels 
(Cone, 2007, para. 2). The final report found ‘some concern for effects on the brain, 
behavior and prostate gland in fetuses, infants and children at current human exposures 
to BPA’ (NTP-CERHR, 2008, p. vii). The study also found, ‘minimal concern for 
effects on the mammary gland and an earlier age for puberty for females in fetuses, 
infants, and children at current human exposures to bis-phenol A...’ and ‘negligible 
concern’ for all other health endpoints measured (emphases in the original, NTP-
CERHR, 2008, p. vii). In 2008, the federal government in Canada concluded that BPA 
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is toxic (Vogel, 2009, p. 559). In contrast, in 2009 the FDA and EPA both decided to 
take no action and announced plans to study BPA further (Vogel, 2009, p. 564).  
 
In 2012, the FDA declared that ‘baby bottles and children’s drinking cups could no 
longer contain BPA’ (Tavernise, 2012). But they did so at the request of the American 
Chemistry Council which wanted to ‘boost consumer confidence’ (Tavernise, 2012, 
para. 2). It is odd that an industry association can just give orders to a federal agency 
like that. Furthermore, it was solely an act of political theatre. Following earlier bans on 
BPA in baby bottles and ‘sippy cups’ in Minnesota, Chicago, and Connecticut, 
manufacturers had already removed BPA from those products (Tavernise, 2012). So the 
FDA action in this case did not affect any products and allowed manufacturers to 
continue to use BPA in containers of baby formula and all other products (Tavernise, 
2012, para. 12) while creating the impression that regulators were taking action to keep 
the public safe.  
 
Meanwhile, the EPA has spent 20 years trying to develop an Endocrine Disruptor 
Screening Program pursuant to their mandate from Congress set forth in the 1996 Food 
Quality Protection Act and the amendment to the Safety Drinking Water Act mentioned 
above (Vogel, 2009, p. 561). They began in 1998 by forming a stakeholders panel of 
representatives from industry, government, and the scientific community, but notably 
left off the panel the leaders who had drafted the Wingspread statement in 1991 
(Colborn, 2009, para. 4). By 2007, the EPA announced that they were finally ready to 
begin testing chemicals for endocrine disruption using a two tier system — an initial 
screen to identify the chemicals most likely to cause harm in vitro followed later by a 
second screen of these chemicals in vivo in animal studies if necessary (EPA, n.d., 
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‘Endocrine Disruption’). Already at this point, prominent researchers in endocrine 
disruption were warning that the EPA had selected the wrong screening tests (Ambrose, 
2007), and would likely miss the effects of known endocrine disruptors such as atrazine 
and chlorpyrifos because their measures were not sufficiently sensitive (Colborn, 2009, 
para. 6–7). As the EPA neared completion of their first round of screenings, the 
American Chemistry Council (2015) put out a statement applauding the design of the 
program. EPA (2017) released the first round of Tier 1 endocrine disruptor screenings 
and declared that no problems were found with any of the 52 chemicals tested.  
 
If the manufacturers of BPA are correct, then government is endlessly studying and 
needlessly raising alarms over a product that improves people’s lives (from extending 
the shelf life of food to strengthening plastic safety equipment). If vom Saal and others 
are correct, then government, for more than 60 years, has allowed a toxic chemical with 
devastating health consequences into the bodies of nearly all Americans, with particular 
consequences for infants and children that may include autism.  
 
Vogel (2013) argues that the battle over whether to ban BPA is asking the wrong 
question. If BPA is banned, another chemical will take its place and the decades-long 
regulatory fight will start all over again. Vogel (2013) argues that the more important 
fight is over the testing standards that will be used for measuring endocrine disruption. I 
will return to some of these themes in the next chapter.  
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6.3.3.0 Introduction to flame retardants 
 
According to Birnbaum and Staskal (2004) ‘There are more than 175 different types of 
flame retardants, which are generally divided into classes that include the halogenated 
organic (usually brominated or chlorinated), phosphorus-containing, nitrogen-
containing, and inorganic flame retardants’ (p. 9). There is little toxicity data for most of 
these chemicals but what data does exist is troubling (Birnbaum & Staskal, 2004, p. 9). 
For the purposes of this subsection I will focus on the handful of the most widely used 
flame retardants for which some data exists (PBDE, TBB, TBPH, and TPP). In this 
section I will show why regulation in connection with these chemicals has been slow 
and largely ineffective at improving public health. Indeed, regulation by the state of 
California helped to create the market for flame retardants in the first place and has 
caused it to grow over the last 40 years.   
 
6.3.3.1 Tobacco industry fends off regulation of cigarettes by lobbying for 
flammability standards in furniture  
 
The story of how flame retardants became ubiquitous in household furniture in the U.S. 
begins with efforts to regulate cigarettes (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). Hundreds of people 
die each year from fires that result from cigarette smoking — often after falling asleep 
while a cigarette is still smouldering (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). Starting in the 1920s, 
state and federal regulators tried to get tobacco companies to design ‘fire-safe’ 
cigarettes that would stop burning if left unattended (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). But 
tobacco companies believed that this would change the consumer experience of 
smoking and hurt sales of cigarettes (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). Over time, tobacco 
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companies figured out how to harness the regulatory apparatus of the state to protect 
cigarettes by mandating flame resistance standards for household furniture instead.  
 
California led the way. Slater (2012) reports that in 1975, the California Bureau of 
Home Furnishings:  
 
mandated that the foam inside upholstered furniture be able to withstand 
exposure to a small flame, like a candle or cigarette lighter, for 12 
seconds without igniting. Because foam is highly flammable, the 
bureau’s regulation, Technical Bulletin 117, can be met only by adding 
large quantities of chemical flame retardants — usually about 5 to 10 
percent of the weight of the foam — at the point of manufacture. The 
state’s size makes it impractical for furniture makers to keep separate 
inventories for different markets, so about 80 percent of the home 
furniture and most of the upholstered office furniture sold in the United 
States complies with California’s regulation (para. 5).  
 
As part of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement in 1998 between the attorneys 
general of 46 states and the four largest U.S. tobacco companies, 13 million internal 
tobacco company documents were made public (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). An 
investigation by the Chicago Tribune discovered that amongst the documents were 
details of the tobacco industry’s decades-long effort to shape regulations around flame 
retardants in furniture (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). Tobacco companies used the Tobacco 
Institute to funnel donations to fire fighting organisations to neutralise their support for 
safer cigarettes and get them to support flame retardants in furniture instead (Callahan 
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& Roe, 2012b). Peter Sparber, a former tobacco company executive, helped create The 
National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) which, as the name suggests, is 
made up of the top fire officials in every state (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). In 1992 the fire 
marshals lobbied for federal rules for flame retardant furniture and helped to delay rules 
around fire-safe cigarettes (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). 
 
In 1999, The Tobacco Institute was closed as part of the Tobacco Settlement Agreement 
(Callahan & Roe, 2012b). But by then the flame retardant industry had grown so large 
that it could fund nationwide lobbying efforts themselves (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). 
Producers of flame retardants used the same strategies as the tobacco industry, hired 
some of the same lobbyists, and funnelled money to fire marshals just as the tobacco 
industry had done (Callahan & Roe, 2012b). So for example, in 2007, Sparber and 
NASFM lobbied for federal regulations that would have required ‘hazardous materials’ 
warning labels on any couch that did not contain flame retardants, and sought to require 
any furniture store that sold couches without flame retardants to be declared ‘hazardous 
occupancies’ which is a ‘classification usually reserved for locations handling gasoline 
and other highly combustible materials’ (Callahan & Roe, 2012b).  
 
California’s Technical Bulletin 117, similar requirements in other states, and lobbying 
efforts to protect and expand such rules have been wildly successful at increasing the 
market for flame retardants. According to data from the Freedonia Group, worldwide 
demand for flame retardants has sharply increased over the last few decades from 526 
million pounds in 1983 to 3.4 billion pounds in 2009 to a projected 4.4 billion pounds in 
2014 (Callahan & Roe, 2012a). Three companies control 40% of the market for flame 
retardants: Chemtura Corp, Albermarle Corp., and ICL Industrial Products (Callahan & 
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Roe, 2012a). Chemtura, Albermarle, and ICL Industrial Products all fund the Bromine 
Science and Environmental Forum which uses Sparber as their lobbyist (Callahan & 
Roe, 2012b). These three firms are also the only members of an astroturf11 group called 
Citizens for Fire Safety that lobbies regulators to promote flame retardant standards for 
furniture (Callahan & Roe, 2012a). Citizens for Fire Safety collected $17 million 
between 2008 and 2010 (Callahan & Roe, 2012a). 
 
6.3.3.2 Prevalence and toxicity of flame retardants in people’s bodies 
 
Flame retardants are in almost all furniture sold in the United States. Congleton, Sharp, 
and Lunder (2014) found that: 
 
93 percent of couches purchased after 2005 contained significant levels 
of flame retardant chemicals compared to 76 percent of couches 
purchased prior to 2005. An analysis of baby products showed a similar 
pattern of flame retardant use [Stapleton 2011]. Eighty percent of 
samples collected from 101 baby products, including car seats, baby 
carriers and portable mattresses, contained fire retardants (p. 8).  
 
The increase in the use of these chemicals, primarily in furniture, has resulted in a sharp 
rise in flame retardant chemicals in people’s bodies, particularly women and children. 
Callahan and Roe (2012a) report that:  
 
                                                
11 See definition in Glossary, p. xii.  
 212 
Blood levels of certain widely used flame retardants doubled in adults 
every two to five years between 1970 and 2004. More recent studies 
show levels haven’t declined in the U.S. even though some of the 
chemicals have been pulled from the market. A typical American baby is 
born with the highest recorded concentrations of flame retardants among 
infants in the world (para. 13).  
 
As the foam breaks down over time, using a couch acts like a bellows that propels dust 
into the room (Slater, 2012, para. 15). People then inhale or swallow that flame-
retardant laced dust in the course of their normal activities. ‘Scientists believe that small 
children may have higher exposures to flame retardants because they spend more time 
on the floor, where dust contaminated with these chemicals accumulates’ (Congleton et. 
al, 2014). Stapleton, Eagle, Sjödin, and Webster (2012) confirmed ‘that the levels of 
PBDE flame retardants on toddlers’ hands predicted levels in their blood, supporting the 
role of hand-to-mouth contact as an exposure pathway’. Once inside the body, ‘flame 
retardants can pass from mother to child through the placenta and through breast milk’ 
(Slater, 2012, para. 15).  
 
6.3.3.3 PBDE and newer flame retardants 
 
Polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) are often used as flame retardants (CDC, 2009, 
p. 311) and there is concern about their health effects, particularly their impact on the 
hormonal system. Several studies show the ubiquity and toxic trespass of PBDEs into 
the human body. Lind et al. (2003) provide a helpful introduction to the literature: 
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PBDEs in breast milk were first reported in German samples by Krüger 
[1988] and later Swedish milk measurements were presented [Darnerud 
et al., 1998; Norén and Meironyté, 1998]. In the study of banked samples 
by Norén and co-workers, a strong increase in PBDE levels was 
observed from the beginning of the 1970s to 1997, but samples from 
1998 and later showed decreased levels [Meironyté-Guvenius, 2002]. A 
recent study on breast milk from the USA gives evidence for much 
higher levels (ca. 200 ng/g fat compared to Swedish levels of 3–4 ng/g 
fat) [Päpke et al., 2001], which may indicate national differences in 
exposure.... Comparatively high PBDE levels have also been found in the 
blood serum of immigrant women in the San Francisco Bay Area 
[Petreas et al., 2002] (p. 186). 
 
In chapter 1, I presented evidence that showed increasing levels of PBDE in human 
tissues (Sjodin et al., 2004). Gilbert (2008) expresses ‘high confidence’ that PBDEs 
cause learning and developmental disabilities. Messer (2010) reports that multiple 
animal and human studies have found that PBDE interferes with the thyroid and 
theorises a possible link between PDBE exposure and autism. Bennett et al. (2016) list 
PBDEs as a ‘prime example’ of a neurodevelopmentally toxic chemical that can 
contribute to ASD and other disorders.  
 
The Environmental Working Group has released four studies on PBDE levels in 
women’s bodies in the United States (Congleton, 2014, p. 10). EWG (2003) in a study 
of 20 first time mothers found that 100% had PBDEs in their breast milk; ‘the lowest 
level of PBDEs in the U.S. women tested, 9.5 ppb, was higher than the highest levels 
 214 
measured in Sweden, 7.7 ppb [Guvenius et al., 2003]’. EWG (2005) in a study of ten 
newborns found that all had PBDEs in their umbilical cord blood; 32 different types of 
PBDEs were detected. EWG (2008) found that ‘PBDE levels in American mothers were 
75 times higher than those found in European studies’. EWG (2009) tested the umbilical 
cord blood of 10 babies born to racial/ethnic minorities between 2007 and 2008 and 
‘found multiple PBDEs in every single sample’. Two PBDEs (pentaBDE and octaBDE) 
were to be voluntarily phased out of production in the U.S. by 2004; but other PBDEs 
continue to make up about 25% of all flame retardant production (CDC, 2009, p. 311).  
 
When safety problems emerge with one flame retardant, chemical companies can 
reformulate it by adding a new molecule and the burden of proof falls on the EPA once 
again to show that it is unsafe, thus starting the safety review process all over again. 
Firemaster 550 was introduced to market as a safer alternative to the PBDEs they were 
replacing (Hawthorne, 2012). Chemtura, maker of Firemaster 550, refuses to list the 
ingredients calling them a trade secret (Hawthorne, 2012). Independent tests confirmed 
that it contains TBPH, TBB, and TPP in addition to other chemicals (Tung, Ahmed, 
Peshdary, & Atlas, 2017). TBPH and TBB are structurally similar to the phthalate 
DEHP that is banned in both Europe and the U.S. (Hawthorne, 2012). In an animal 
study, Patisaul et al. (2013) found that Firemaster 550 is an endocrine disruptor. The 
Columbia Center for Children’s Environmental Health studied 25 mother-child pairs 
and found that 95%–100% had PBDEs, TBPH, and/or TBB on their hands; 100% of 
homes in the study had PBDEs, TBPH, and TBB in dust samples; and children had 
higher concentrations on their hands than their mothers (Cowell et al., 2017, p. 32).  
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6.3.3.4 Existing flame retardants do not necessarily stop fires 
 
The regulatory fight over flame retardants appears to pit two public goods against each 
other — the need to prevent fires versus the need to protect people from toxic chemicals 
(Slater, 2012, para. 31). Chemtura points to data that show that ‘deaths [in the U.S.] 
caused by furniture fires dropped from 1,400 in 1980 to 600 in 2004; a 57 percent 
reduction’ (Slater, 2012, para. 28). However, a number of factors changed over that 25 
year time period including updated sprinkler codes for apartment buildings and a 
decline in smoking. The evidence suggests that flame retardants currently on the market 
do not work nearly as well as advertised. It turns out that the ‘materials covering the 
foam’, not the foam itself are the key factor in reducing fires involving furniture 
(Congleton et al. 2014, p. 5). Many fire fighters are involved in the effort to limit the 
use of flame retardants in furniture because flame retardants make smoke more toxic 
(Callahan & Roe, 2012b, para. 17).  
 
Furniture makers complain that flame retardants hurt their interests because flame 
retardants make the foam more stiff and some customers worry about possible adverse 
health effects (Slater, 2012, para. 32). But the makers of flame retardants have been 
more successful at shaping regulations and the rules have persisted.  
 
6.3.3.5 Progress, but... 
 
There has been some progress in regulating flame retardant chemicals but that comes 
with many caveats. New York broke new ground by passing a fire-safe cigarette law in 
2003; by 2012 all 50 states and the District of Columbia had passed laws requiring self-
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extinguishing cigarettes (National Fire Protection Association, 2011). Passing fire-safe 
cigarette laws opens the door to changing flammability standards for furniture.  
 
Chemical manufacturers spent $23.2 million between 2007 and 2011 to defeat a series 
of proposed bills in California that would have re-written CA Technical Bulletin 117 
(Slater, 2012, para. 37). In 2013, California Governor Edmund Brown Jr. bypassed the 
legislature by directing ‘state agencies to revise flammability standards for upholstered 
furniture sold in the state’ (Office of Governor, 2013, para. 3). The 12 second open 
flame standard was replaced by a standard for smouldering fires like burning cigarettes 
(Office of Governor, 2013, para. 6). This enables manufacturers to only treat the fabric 
covers rather than the foam inside (Office of Governor, 2013, para. 6). The new 
regulation came into effect on January 1, 2015 (Office of Governor, 2013, para. 8). 
Because the market is so large in California and because California’s open flame 
standard started the nationwide trend towards flame retardants in furniture, this new 
regulation may cause a ripple effect nationwide.  
 
This was seen as an important victory for those concerned about the toxic effects of 
flame retardants. But it may be too soon to determine the health effects of this change. 
Since the pattern with many endocrine disruptors is that there can be harms even at very 
low doses, reducing the total quantity of the chemicals while simultaneously moving 
them from the inside of the furniture to the outside, may have offsetting effects. Explicit 
regulation of toxic substances in furniture would have set a higher health standard but 
such toxic reviews take so long that perhaps this was the best interim solution.  
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After decades of attempted reforms, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 was 
finally updated via The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act 
in 2016. The new law gives the EPA the power to order companies to conduct product 
safety reviews for products already on the market (Eilperin & Fears, 2016, para. 10). 
But at the same time, the law pre-empts more aggressive state based regulation of toxic 
chemicals; this is problematic because states including California, New York, and 
Massachusetts have been the pioneers in toxics regulations over the last forty years 
(Eilperin & Fears, 2016, para. 11).  
 
6.4 Lobbying and campaign contributions by chemical and related manufacturing 
 
Chemical and related manufacturing industries spend heavily on lobbying and campaign 
contributions. Producers of phthalates, BPA, and flame retardants would be a subset 
within this larger category. From 1999 through 2018, chemical and related 
manufacturers spent $887 million on lobbying (Center for Responsive Politics, 2018, 
‘Chemical and related manufacturing’). In 2018, they employed 321 lobbyists of which 
198 formerly worked in government or were elected officials (CRP, 2018, ‘Chemical 
and related manufacturing’). Companies also lobby individually. ExxonMobil is one of 
the largest producers of phthalates in the U.S. and it spent $254 million on lobbying 
from 1999 to 2018 to protect all of its business interests (lobbying in connection with 
phthalates would have been just a small fraction of that total) (CRP, 2018, 
‘ExxonMobil’). The $19.1 million that DowDupont spent on lobbying in 2016 dwarfs 
the lobbying expenditures of their biggest environmental opponent, the Environmental 
Working Group, which spent $567,452 on lobbying in 2016 (CRP, 2016, ‘DowDupont’; 
CRP, 2016, ‘Environmental Working Group’). Over the last 5 election cycles (2008 – 
 218 
2016) chemical industries reported $98.6 million in campaign contributions (CRP, 2018, 
‘Chemical and related manufacturing’). Supreme Court campaign finance rulings and 
new ‘dark money’ groups that do not reveal their donors make total campaign spending 
impossible to track (Mayer, 2016).   
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I defined key terms in toxicology and showed that the ancient notion of 
the ‘dose makes the poison’ is not always correct; depending on the toxicant, low, 
intermediate, and/or high doses may be toxic and the dose response curves may be non-
linear. Next, I showed that NIH Director Collins killed the National Children’s Study 
which was the best hope for identifying environmental triggers of autism, Congress 
stripped language from the Combating Autism Act of 2006 that would have required 
additional research into environmental triggers, and the CDC eliminated data on autistic 
regression from the Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network. Then, 
I showed that phthalates are ubiquitous in the marketplace and in the bodies of most 
Americans, that phthalates are endocrine disruptors, and that the U.S. Congress banned 
four phthalates in children’s toys without banning phthalates as a class. The primary 
avenues of exposure — food, beverages, and drugs, remain understudied and 
unregulated. Next, I showed that BPA is ubiquitous in the marketplace and in the bodies 
of most Americans, that BPA is an endocrine disruptor, that the funding effect is strong 
in the BPA literature, and that the FDA banned BPA only in baby bottles and sippy cups 
and only after manufacturers had already removed BPA from those products. Finally, I 
presented evidence that the massive increase in the use of flame retardants in furniture 
was the brainchild of the tobacco industry that wanted to head off regulations that would 
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have required self-extinguishing cigarettes. Five to ten per cent of the weight of the 
foam in most furniture in the U.S. is made up of flame retardants even though their 
effectiveness in preventing fires is questionable. Flame retardants are now ubiquitous in 
the bodies of Americans and many of them are endocrine disruptors. Even when 
dangerous flame retardants are removed from the market they are quickly replaced with 
slightly modified chemical compounds whose chemical properties and health effects are 
mostly unknown. The E.P.A.’s efforts to set up an endocrine disruptor screening 
program have failed to identify any health threats because they are using inadequate 
detection measures that are widely criticised in the field. The U.S. Congress passed 
chemical safety reform in 2016 that gave the EPA greater power to regulate toxic 
chemicals which is an important step forward; but the legislation also pre-empts more 
aggressive chemical safety standards in the states which is a big step backwards. In the 
next chapter I will review the failure to effectively regulate herbicides and pesticides.  
  
 220 
Chapter 7 
The failure to effectively regulate herbicides and pesticides 
 
7.0 Introduction to herbicides and pesticides 
 
In chapter 1, I showed that the herbicide Roundup and organophosphate, organochlorine, 
pyrethroid, and carbamate pesticides have been associated with autism. In this chapter I 
will provide a general history of attempts to regulate herbicides and pesticides (7.1) and 
discuss the downsides of the current regulatory framework (7.2). Then I will provide 
specific case histories of attempts to regulate Roundup (7.3), organophosphates (7.4), 
organochlorine pesticides (7.5), pyrethroids (7.6), and carbamates (7.7). I conclude by 
discussing similarities between the different chemicals listed in this chapter and in this 
thesis (7.8) and lobbying and campaign contributions by pesticide makers (7.9). The 
pattern across all of the chemicals discussed in this chapter is inadequate regulatory 
oversight that is the result of the extraordinary political power of chemical companies.  
 
7.1 General history of regulation of pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, and 
rodenticides 
 
Pesticides (insecticides), herbicides, fungicides, and rodenticides are often made by the 
same companies and are often regulated under the same statute. The term pesticides is 
often used as a shorthand to refer to all of these chemicals. For the sake of simplicity, in 
this chapter I will focus on pesticides and herbicides. But the issues raised apply to all 
four classes of agricultural chemicals.  
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Pesticides are ‘intentionally toxic’ and used on plants intended for human consumption 
which creates a complicated set of scientific and regulatory issues (Wargo, 1996, p. 6). 
Chemical pesticides have been in widespread use since the 1850s (Wargo, 1996, p. 6). 
By the 1900s the most commonly used pesticides were copper acetoarsenite (called 
Paris Green) and lead arsenate (an arsenate is a salt or ester of arsenic acid) (Wargo, 
1996, p. 67). In the absence of regulation, farmers voiced concerns about variability in 
pesticide quality and potency not about the toxicity of these products to human health 
(Wargo, 1996, p. 67). Congress passed the Insecticide Act in 1910 to require certain 
purity standards for pesticide formulations but the act did not include any protections 
for human health or the environment (Wargo, 1996, p. 67). Both the Insecticide Act and 
the Pure Food and Drugs Act were under the purview of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) which could set tolerance limits for the amount of pesticide 
residues allowed on food (Wargo, 1996, p. 67). Prior to 1933, detection methods were 
too primitive to measure lead residues effectively (Wargo, 1996, p. 68). From 1917 to 
1942 lead arsenate and calcium arsenate were the most popular pesticides used in the 
U.S. (Wargo, 1996, p. 67). In 1933, a new lead-detection method became available and 
‘the first lead tolerance was set at 0.025 grains per pound’ (a grain is 1/7,000th of a 
pound) (Wargo, 1996, p. 68).  
 
World War II provided the opportunity for the widespread testing of a range of different 
pesticides to protect military personnel from pests such as mosquitos in a range of 
different environments (Wargo, 1996, p. 70). In 1947, Congress passed the Federal 
Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act (FIFRA). It updated the purity and labelling 
standards from the Insecticide Act of 1910 to require ‘warning labels for certain highly 
toxic pesticides... [along with] instructions for use’ (Stroshane, 1999, p. 123). Under 
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FIFRA pesticides had to be registered with the USDA; if a pesticide was found to be 
particularly harmful to human health the USDA registered it as ‘under protest’ but it 
was still allowed on the market (Wargo, 1996, pp. 70–71). So the regulatory philosophy 
was labelling as risk management rather than restrictions on pesticides based on their 
impact on human health (Wargo, 1996, p. 71). Wargo (1996) notes: 
 
This approach may have done far more to protect the entitlements of the 
pesticide manufacturers rather than either public health or environmental 
quality. It sheltered manufacturers from uncoordinated state regulations, 
and may simply have served to provide the public with a false sense of 
security that pesticide risks were being well contained by USDA. The 
reality was that USDA registered pesticides whenever asked (p. 71).  
 
During the war, chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides such as DDT proved to be highly 
effective at killing mosquitos and a wide range of other insects; after the war they went 
into widespread commercial production for use in agriculture (Wargo, 1996, p. 71). By 
the early 1950s, there were concerns that DDT was killing other wildlife in addition to 
insects (Wargo, 1996, p. 72). In 1954, Congress passed the Miller Amendment to the 
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) (Wargo, 1996, p. 75). The Miller 
Amendment contained two conflicting principles. On the one hand, pesticide 
registration was only permitted so long as manufacturers could demonstrate that 
residues on food posed no risk to human health (Wargo, 1996, p. 75). On the other hand, 
regulators were instructed to ensure an ‘adequate, wholesome, and economical food 
supply’ (emphasis added) which introduced consideration of costs and benefits into the 
regulatory decision (Wargo, 1996, p. 75). The Miller Amendment did not give the FDA 
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authority to demand safety tests from manufacturers so the burden of proof and the cost 
of testing were still on the government (Wargo, 1996, p. 76). Furthermore, the USDA, 
was still in charge of evaluating the evidence of toxicity and protecting public health 
was not an institutional priority (Wargo, 1996, p. 76). ‘By 1966, the USDA pesticide 
registration division had licensed nearly sixty thousand separate products’ yet literally 
only had one toxicologist on staff to evaluate ‘the sufficiency of health and safety 
claims’ (Wargo, 1996, p. 76). Needless to say, the evaluations were likely cursory.  
 
Congress was also of two minds when it passed the Delaney Amendment to the FFDCA 
in 1958. On the one hand, pesticides registered prior to 1958 and ‘generally regarded as 
safe’ were grandfathered in and did not require further testing (Wargo, 1976, p. 76). On 
the other hand, Congressman James Delaney (Democrat from New York) inserted a 
provision that stated, ‘The secretary shall not approve for use in food any chemical 
additive found to induce cancer in man, or, after tests, found to induce cancer in animals’ 
(Wargo, 1996, p. 76). This would have seemed to have closed the door to a range of 
pesticides and food additives. The reality is that pesticide tolerances had rarely been 
geared toward protecting human health — instead manufacturers figured out the 
effective dosage to kill pests, the likely amount of residues that would end up in food 
based on that dose, and submitted that as the recommended tolerance which was almost 
always approved (Wargo, 1996, p. 107). Furthermore, the Delaney Amendment had a 
specific carve out for pesticides — a pesticide was only considered a food additive if its 
residues concentrate during processing (such as tomato paste) (Wargo, 1996, p. 110).  
 
The pharmaceutical industry wanted to continue to sell DES (diethylstilbestrol, 
discussed in chapter 6) to the cattle industry even though it was discovered to be 
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carcinogenic in the 1950s (Wargo, 1996, p. 110). So they lobbied for the ‘DES proviso’ 
a 1962 amendment to the FFDCA that permitted carcinogenic additives so long as the 
carcinogen was undetectable in the final food product (Wargo, 1996, p. 110). At the 
time, detection methods were fairly primitive. But detection methods continued to 
improve over the next two decades and DES was eventually banned altogether in 1979 
(Wargo, 1996, p. 110). Also, the FDA had wide latitude to estimate human exposures 
and calculate risk and ultimately settled on permitting residues so long as they pose ‘less 
than significant risk’ which was considerably different than the absolutist spirit of the 
Delaney Amendment (Wargo, 1996, p. 111).  
 
In 1970, President Nixon bypassed Congress by creating the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and gave it the authority to regulate pesticides (Nownes, 1991, p. 8). The 
FIFRA was updated in 1972 and became the Federal Environmental Pesticides Control 
Act (FEPCA) (Nownes, 1991, p. 8). Ostensibly, the EPA was given the power to ban 
pesticides that were considered unsafe but such a determination required a special 
review board and manufacturers were indemnified against financial losses from such 
decisions; if a pesticide was banned, the EPA had to buy out the remaining stocks of the 
pesticide using their own budget (Nownes, 1991, p. 8). In a similar vein, the EPA was 
required to review the safety data on pesticides registered prior to 1972, but Congress 
‘did not appropriate enough money for the EPA to do so’ (Nownes, 1991, p. 8).  
 
Two court cases further restricted the application of the Delaney Amendment. In 
Monsanto v. Kennedy [1979] the court ruled that ‘There is latitude inherent in the 
statutory scheme to avoid literal application of the statutory definition of “food additive” 
in those de minimis situations that, in the informed judgement of the Commissioner, 
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clearly present no public health or safety concerns’ (Wargo, 1996, p. 113). And the 
interpretation of de minimis was widened to include cost benefit calculations when the 
D.C. Circuit Court in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle [1979] declared, ‘unless Congress 
has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an implication of de minimis 
authority to provide exemption when the burdens of regulation yield a gain of trivial or 
no value’ (Wargo, 1996, p. 114).  
 
In 1988, Congress amended the pesticide registration provisions of FIFRA. To make the 
re-registration process faster (for the 60,000 pesticides approved under previous 
statutes), EPA was now to review 600 active ingredients in the space of 9 years rather 
than reviewing each pesticide individually (Willson, 1996). Also, the indemnity 
provision was modified so that the U.S. Treasury, rather than the E.P.A., would pay for 
any losses resulting from bans on dangerous pesticides (Nownes, 1991, p. 11).  
 
The FIFRA and the FFDCA were amended in 1996 by the Food Quality Protection Act 
(FQPA) (Thayer & Houlihan, 2004, p. 282). For the first time it required the EPA to 
separately assess risk based on the ‘unique diets and vulnerabilities of children’ (Thayer 
& Houlihan, 2004, p. 283).  But as I will show in the sections below on the failure to 
regulate pesticides and herbicides associated with autism, these provisions are perhaps 
not sufficient. 
 
Even when pesticides are banned or restricted for use in the U.S., manufacturers can 
continue to make them and sell them for export markets. So for example, DDT was 
banned by the EPA in 1972, but in 1996, the U.S. was still exporting one ton of DDT 
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per day (Wargo, 1996, p. 4). These pesticides can then return to the U.S. in the form of 
residues on imported food (Wargo, 1996, p. 4).  
 
Three international agreements have been developed in connection with pesticides. The 
Basel Convention, signed in 1989 and effective as of 1992, is an attempt to limit the 
movement of hazardous waste from developed to less developed countries (United 
Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], n.d.). The Rotterdam Convention, signed in 
1998 and effective as of 2004, requires signatory countries to give prior informed 
consent when trading any of 41 listed toxic chemicals (mostly pesticides) with other 
countries (UNEP, n.d.). And the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, signed in 2001 and effective as of 2004, eliminates or severely restricts 29 
chemicals that have been identified as causing long term harm to health and the 
environment (UNEP, n.d.). In 2012, the Secretariats of the three conventions merged 
under the auspices of the UNEP so that they could coordinate their mutual aims (UNEP, 
n.d.). The United States is not a signatory to any of these agreements.  
 
7.2 Downsides of the current regulatory framework 
 
Aerial and ground spraying of pesticides and herbicides is wildly inefficient: ‘about 98–
99.9% of the insecticides and more than 95% of the herbicides’ never reach their 
intended target (Miller & Spoolman, 2012, p. 145). Instead they contaminate soil, air, 
water, and the food we eat (Miller & Spoolman, 2012, p. 145). Over the long run, use of 
herbicides can lead to the development of herbicide resistant weeds (Waldman, 
Mulvany, Stecker, & Rosenblatt, 2017, para. 29). For most of the past 100 years, use of 
pesticides also led to the development of pesticide resistant insects (Shiva, 1988; Wargo, 
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1996; Metcalf & Horowitz, 2014). This has been an ideal business model for the makers 
of these agricultural chemicals — the more pesticides and herbicides applied, the faster 
resistance develops, the more new pesticides and herbicides one needs (Wargo, 1996). 
More recently there has been a collapse (as much as an 80% decline) in the populations 
of both beneficial and harmful insects (Stager, 2018). The cause(s) of this collapse are 
not well understood but pesticides are suspected (Stager, 2018). This presents a different 
set of problems as the disappearance of beneficial pollinators threatens the production of 
hundreds of different types of fruits and vegetables (Stager, 2018).  
 
7.3 Roundup 
 
Glyphosate-based herbicides (including Roundup) are the most used agricultural 
chemicals in human history (Main, 2016, para. 1; Lerner, 2016). Developed by 
Monsanto chemist John E. Franz, glyphosate was patented in 1974 and marketed along 
with a range of proprietary additional ingredients under the brand name Roundup (Franz, 
Mao, & Sikorski, 1997). At first it was not widely used because it killed plants 
indiscriminately, eliminating both weeds and crops. But that changed in the 1990s when 
Monsanto invented Roundup Ready™ corn and soybeans — seeds genetically 
engineered to survive being sprayed with their herbicide (Waldman et al., 2017). By 
spraying Roundup on fields planted with Roundup Ready™ seeds, ‘The weeds die, 
harvests expand, and expensive, laborious tillage is no longer necessary’ (Waldman et 
al., 2017, para. 2). Monsanto had figured out how to re-engineer the business of farming 
itself by substituting genetic engineering and toxicants for labour.  
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Use of glyphosate-based herbicides in the U.S. increased from an estimated 6 to 8 
million pounds (2.72 – 3.62 million kilo) in 1987, to 240 million pounds (108.8 million 
kilo) in 2014 (Myers et al., 2016, pp. 2–3). ‘Every year, farmers spray, on average, 
almost a pound [0.45 kilo] of glyphosate-based herbicides on every acre of cropland in 
the U.S. and nearly half a pound [0.23 kilo] on every acre of cropland worldwide’ 
(Waldman et al., 2017, para. 1). As sales of Roundup increased, Monsanto found ways 
to counter troublesome toxicity findings and persuade regulators to allow ever-greater 
Roundup residues on crops entering the food supply. Today the safe limit of glyphosate 
residues allowed on crops is 17 times higher than what was allowed in the 1970s (Main, 
2016, para. 9). 
 
7.3.1 Roundup adjuvants 
 
In the debate about Roundup in the popular press many people use Roundup and 
glyphosate synonymously. But this is incorrect. While glyphosate is one of the main 
ingredients in Roundup, most glyphosate-based herbicides including Roundup contain a 
range of additional ingredients and adjuvants that make them more toxic than 
glyphosate used by itself. Recall that in section 7.1 on the history of pesticide/herbicide 
regulation, the EPA, in an effort to clear a backlog of 60,000 agricultural chemical re-
registrations, decided to study the ‘active ingredients’ in these products individually 
rather than each pesticide, herbicide, fungicide, or rodenticide in its actual formulation 
with other ingredients. But in focusing on individual parts, the EPA may have missed 
synergistic effects and the toxicity of the product as a whole.  
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Martinez and Brown (1991) first drew attention to the fact that the surfactants used in 
Roundup increase the toxicity of the herbicide beyond glyphosate alone.12 Since then 
many additional studies have confirmed the dangers of these additional chemical 
adjuvants. Marc et al. (2002) showed that Roundup inhibited the cell division cycle in 
sea urchin embryos but that glyphosate by itself did not have an effect (p. 326). Marc, 
Mulner-Lorillon, and Bellé (2004) confirmed these findings for Roundup 3Plus and 
three other glyphosate-based herbicides (p. 245). Benachour and Seralini (2009) 
evaluated the toxicity of four different Roundup formulations (Express, Extra 360, 
Grand Travaux, and Grand Travaux Plus) in France at dilutions below standard 
agricultural usage, on umbilical, embryonic, and placental cells. They found that all 
Roundup formulations ‘cause total cell death within 24 hours’; but while glyphosate 
was toxic, the damage was not proportional to the amount of glyphosate but rather 
depended on the nature of the adjuvants (Benachour & Seralini, 2009, p. 97). The 
adjuvant POEA by itself changes human cell permeability and is additionally toxic in 
combination with glyphosate (Benachour & Seralini, 2009, p. 97). Pesticide and 
herbicide makers like Monsanto claim that the ingredients in a formulation are 
confidential business information (Lerner, 2016, ‘Naming the toxins’, para. 5) and the 
EPA does not force them to disclose the ingredients on the labels. Mesnage, Bernay, 
and Seralini (2013) reverse-engineered nine glyphosate-based herbicides including five 
types of Roundup. They successfully figured out the formulations of 6 of the 9 
herbicides and then tested the various ingredients alone and in various combinations. 
They found that each of the additives considered inert by the EPA were more toxic than 
glyphosate (by 1200-fold in the case of POE-15) and the combined formulations were 
more toxic than glyphosate alone (Mesnage et al., 2013, p. 125). Defarge et al. (2016) 
                                                
12 The structure and sources in this paragraph all come from Lerner (2016) although I reviewed 
each article individually and sometimes drew out additional information from them.  
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showed that POEA and another common glyphosate-based herbicide adjuvant called 
alkyl polyglucoside are endocrine disruptors at concentrations ‘800 times lower than the 
[standard] agricultural dilutions’ (p. 264). They also showed that glyphosate itself is an 
endocrine disruptor at ‘1/3 of the [recommended] agricultural dilution’ (Defarge et al., 
2016, p. 264). Reached for comment, the FDA said that they have no plans to test for 
these herbicide adjuvants in food; the EPA also has no plans to revisit its declaration 
that these chemicals are inert (Lerner, 2016).  
 
7.3.2 Attempts to regulate Roundup 
 
The Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) at the EPA faces the same dilemma as the FDA 
— by design, much of their funding comes from the industries they are charged with 
regulating. ‘Pesticide makers, called registrants, pay the office [OPP] to review their 
compounds for registration. In 2016, they provided $47 million which represented 28% 
of OPP’s budget. The OPP’s studies are based, by law, on data provided by pesticide 
registrants themselves’ (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 31).  
 
In the 1980s, the EPA used a system that graded the carcinogenic potential of pesticides 
on a scale of Group A (human carcinogen) to Group E (evidence of non-carcinogenicity) 
(EPA, n.d., ‘Evaluating Pesticides for Carcinogenic Potential’). In 1985, the EPA 
classified glyphosate as a possible human carcinogen (Group C) based on evidence of 
tumours in mice (International Agency for Research on Cancer [IARC], 2015, para. 7). 
In the study, funded by Monsanto, ‘4 of 100 mice that were fed large amounts of 
glyphosate developed rare kidney tumors... compared with zero of 98 mice given little 
or no glyphosate’ (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 32). Following the decision by the EPA, 
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Monsanto hired 10 scientists to reanalyse the kidney tissues from the healthy mice to 
look for evidence of tumours (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 32). One of these scientists 
reported that he found cellular changes in the kidneys of one of the mice in the control 
group — and this was enough to render insignificant the difference between the 
treatment and control group (i.e. the new  p-value > .05) (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 
33). The other nine scientists signed off on the report which was submitted to the EPA 
(Waldman et al., 2017, para. 33). The EPA toxicology branch went back and re-
examined the kidney tissues from the mice in the control group using new cross sections 
and concluded that the Monsanto scientists were in error and there were no tumours 
(Waldman et al., 2017, para. 34). In February 1986, EPA administrators overruled their 
own scientists and declared that glyphosate was of ‘uncertain carcinogenicity’ 
(Waldman et al., 2017, para. 35).  
 
Reports of Roundup’s toxicity continued to accumulate. Young, Ho, Glynn, and 
Edwards (2015) found that Roundup is an endocrine disruptor and confirmed that 
Roundup is more toxic than glyphosate alone. In March of 2015, the IARC (which is 
part of the World Health Organization) declared glyphosate as ‘probably carcinogenic 
to humans’ (Lerner, 2016, para. 6). But in November 2015, the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) decided that glyphosate was ‘unlikely to pose a carcinogenic hazard 
to humans’ (Lerner, 2016, para. 7). The IARC and EFSA used very different methods in 
their systematic reviews (Lerner, 2016, para. 7). The IARC looked at studies of 
glyphosate-based herbicides in their actual formulations whereas the ‘EFSA report 
included only studies looking at the effects of glyphosate alone’ (Lerner, 2016, para. 8). 
Furthermore, ‘the IARC considered only independent studies, while the EFSA report 
included data from unpublished industry-submitted studies, which were cited with 
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redacted footnotes’ (Lerner, 2016, para. 8). In 2017, the State of California listed 
glyphosate as ‘known to the state to cause cancer’ (Office of Environmental Health 
Hazard Assessment, 2017, para. 3).  
 
The same issues of corporate capture of academic scientists and ghost writing of 
academic journal articles described in chapter 5 also apply to Monsanto’s approach to 
promoting and defending Roundup. Monsanto e-mails turned over in discovery in 
connection with a lawsuit against the company in California show that Monsanto staff 
ghost wrote an article for Henry I. Miller, a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover 
Institution, that appeared in Forbes (Hakim, 2017, para. 3). Following revelations in the 
NY Times about the provenance of the article, Forbes withdrew it (Hakim, 2017, para. 
3). Miller is the former director of the Office of Biotechnology at the FDA so his name 
on the article carried a lot of weight. Other documents turned over in discovery show 
that Monsanto funded astroturf groups including the Genetic Literacy Project and 
corporate think tanks including the American Council on Science and Health that in turn 
attacked the EPA and the IARC on Monsanto’s behalf (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 16).  
 
Under the FQPA of 1996, the EPA must review each pesticide registration at least once 
every 15 years (Waldman, 2017, para. 3). The EPA convened a Scientific Advisory 
Panel meeting regarding glyphosate in the final month of the Obama Administration; 
the panel was deeply divided over the evidence of glyphosate’s toxicity with eight out 
of 15 panel members expressing ‘significant concerns’ (Waldman, 2017, para. 3). Now 
the decision as to whether to re-register glyphosate rests with the Trump administration 
which has consistently sided with chemical makers (Waldman et al. 2017, para. 4).   
 
 233 
7.3.3 Criticism and rejoinders regarding Roundup 
 
Monsanto’s website states that ‘glyphosate is about half as toxic as table salt and more 
than 10 times less toxic than caffeine’ (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 4). In an interview 
with Bloomberg Businessweek, Scott Partridge, Monsanto VP for Strategy said, 
‘There’s never been a more studied herbicide in the history of farming. In more than 
700 studies, not one has associated cancer with the use of glyphosate. And in the more 
than 160 countries that have registered glyphosate for use, not a single government 
agency has found glyphosate is a carcinogen’ (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 4). 
 
It is interesting to note that Monsanto’s talking points tend to refer to glyphosate rather 
than Roundup thereby trying to sidestep the issue of the toxicity of the whole product 
(glyphosate in combination with adjuvants and other ingredients). Furthermore, 
glyphosate has been found to be carcinogenic by a wide range of scientists and 
government agencies as described above, so it is not clear how Partridge could claim 
otherwise.  
 
The more complicated issue is that if one bans glyphosate-based herbicides, under the 
current regulatory system they might just be replaced by even more toxic alternatives. 
That is the fear of Andrew Kniss at the University of Wyoming who has done extensive 
work on the economics of agricultural chemical use (Waldman et al., 2017). Going 
completely organic reduces the cost of chemicals but Kniss ‘showed the yields from 
organic farms were roughly two-thirds of those from conventional farms for corn, wheat, 
soybeans, and barley, and less than half for grapes, tomatoes, bell peppers, and onions’ 
(Waldman et al., 2017, para. 24). ‘Kniss did another study that found planting 
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genetically modified sugar beets saved farmers $200 an acre, equal to about 15 percent 
of their revenue, compared with planting non-GMO seeds’ (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 
25). In the absence of glyphosate-based herbicides, farmers would switch to other 
chemicals (which might be more or less toxic) or have to hire more people to weed 
agricultural fields by hand (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 25). Kniss said, ‘Getting rid of 
glyphosate would have a major impact on farmers and their bottom lines. It’s not like 
there’s a risk-free scenario here’ (Waldman et al., 2017, para. 25). 
 
But perhaps this is a false dichotomy. Although many farmers think that the only choice 
is between Roundup and another toxic herbicide, agroecology techniques of crop 
rotation and planting fields with a range of different crops can be similarly effective 
(Shiva, 1988). ‘Researchers at Iowa State University... have shown that rotating diverse 
crops in three- and four-year cycles and controlling weeds with limited herbicide 
spraying produce similar yields and profits to conventional farming — with only 1 
percent of the water toxicity’ (Waldman et al. 2017, para. 29). This is driven more by 
necessity than idealism ‘because weeds are developing resistance to glyphosate[-based 
herbicides] at an accelerating rate’ (Waldman et al. 2017, para. 29).  
 
7.4 Organophosphates  
 
German scientist Willy Lange discovered the toxicity of organophosphate compounds in 
1932 (Petroianu, 2010, p. 776). German scientist Gerhard Schrader worked to develop 
organophosphates into pesticides ‘to protect food for the Nazi war effort’ (Lerner, 2017, 
para. 11). An accidental spill of a single drop in 1936 that left Schrader and his 
colleagues gasping for breath revealed the extraordinary effects of this class of 
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chemicals on the human nervous system (Lerner, 2017, para. 11). Schrader went on to 
lead a secret chemical weapons lab for the Nazis that turned organophosphates into 
nerve gas including tabun and sarin (Lerner, 2017, para. 11). After the war, German 
patents and government documents (including some of Schrader’s research) were turned 
over to U.S. companies who began to synthesise organophosphate pesticides such as 
parathion, malathion, and azinphosmethyl (Tucker, 2006). But they were slow to take 
off because the organochlorine pesticide DDT still dominated the market. Once the U.S. 
banned most uses of DDT in 1972, organophosphates came to dominate the pesticide 
market. The rise in the use of organophosphates results in higher levels of those 
pesticide residues in the bodies of Americans. ‘In the 2003–2004 National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), which recruits a representative sample of 
the U.S. adult population, 83% of pregnant women had detectable levels of urinary 
dimethylthiophosphate, an OP metabolite’ (Woodruff, Zota, & Schwartz, 2011). The 
most heavily used organophosphate pesticide is chlorpyrifos and in the next subsection I 
will explore its tangled regulatory history. 
 
7.4.1 Chlorpyrifos  
 
Chlorpyrifos is a type of organophosphate pesticide developed by Dow Chemicals in 
1965 (Lerner, 2017, para. 15). Manufactured by Dow and a number of smaller 
companies, popular brand names include Lorsban, Dursban, and Duraplex. Even though 
the word chlorpyrifos appears plural it is referred to in the singular — the word is a 
combination of chlor- (chlorine) + pyri- (pyridine) + -fos (which is an alteration of 
phosphorus) (‘chlorpyrifos’, n.d.).  
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The regulatory history of chlorpyrifos is similar to that described for each of these other 
agricultural chemicals — scientists have been aware for decades that the chemical posed 
a threat to human health; the EPA has studied it extensively and taken steps towards 
revoking its registration; and industry pressure, including efforts to shape the scientific 
record, has kept it on the market. Pesticide regulation also has a long history of going 
‘out of the frying pan into the fire’ as one toxic pesticide is replaced with newer 
pesticides of unknown toxicity that later prove to be as harmful or worse than their 
predecessors — lead arsenate was replaced by DDT (and other organochlorine 
pesticides) which was replaced by organophosphates including chlorpyrifos (Lerner, 
2017, para. 15).  
 
As chlorpyrifos use in U.S. agriculture skyrocketed in the 1980s, some elected officials 
became concerned about the potential health effects of its presence in the food supply. 
In 1988, Congress commissioned the National Research Council to conduct a study to 
examine the health effects on children and infants of pesticide residues in food (Lerner, 
2017, para. 16). Chaired by Philip Landrigan at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in 
New York, the report [Landrigan et al. 1993] noted that ‘organophosphates cause subtle 
and long-lasting neurobehavioral impairments’ in animals (Lerner, 2017, para. 16). 
Acute doses are also a problem — according to the EPA, by 1996 there were 7,000 
chlorpyrifos poisonings a year (Lerner, 2017, para. 17).  
 
Dow maintained that their product was safe and cited a wealth of internal scientific 
documents to make their case (Lerner, 2017, para. 20). As part of litigation against Dow, 
plaintiffs hired Robert Sapolsky at Stanford to conduct a systematic review of the 
studies produced by Dow (Lerner, 2017, para. 21). Sapolsky and a team of twelve 
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additional scientists concluded that all of the Dow studies were flawed and 89 percent 
‘had errors that broke the basic rules of science’; all of the errors worked in favour of 
Dow (Lerner, 2017, para. 22). Dow settled the lawsuit and later paid a $2 million fine 
from the NY Attorney General’s office for false advertising for claiming their product 
was safe (Lerner, 2017, para. 25).  
 
In the late 1990s, Beyond Pesticides and Californians for Pesticide Reform petitioned 
the EPA to ban chlorpyrifos and Dow threatened to sue the EPA if they did (Lerner, 
2017, para. 27). So the EPA negotiated a political compromise — Dow agreed to 
voluntarily withdraw chlorpyrifos for household use and the EPA agreed to allow 
continued use of chlorpyrifos in agriculture (Lerner, 2017, para. 27).  
 
As it turns out, the Columbia Center for Children’s Environmental Health was 
conducting a study of the health effects of residential use of chlorpyrifos that began 
before the withdrawal of the product and continued several years after (Lerner, 2017, 
para. 33). The decision to withdraw chlorpyrifos from the household market created a 
human experiment of a kind that would not likely pass research ethics review if it had 
been proposed on its own. Blood samples of women and children taken before the 
withdrawal of the product from the market showed 70% had chlorpyrifos in their bodies; 
five years after the ban, the levels were undetectable (Lerner, 2017, para. 35). Children 
born after the ban on average weighed half a pound (0.23 kilo) more and had higher IQ 
and better reflexes (Lerner, 2017, para. 36). What is more, the Columbia University 
study found neurological harms at levels 20 times below the EPA’s safety level (Lerner, 
2017, para. 40). Research teams at UC Berkeley and Mount Sinai Hospital (NY) 
reached similar conclusions about the detrimental health effects of chlorpyrifos on 
 238 
children (Lerner, 2017, para. 40). In response, Dow developed a series of white papers 
to challenge the unfavourable data and set up a website called chlorpyrifos.com to 
distribute the information on an on-going basis (Lerner, 2017, para. 41).  
 
Earthjustice, on behalf of a coalition of environmental and farmworker groups, sued the 
EPA in 2007, 2010, 2012, and 2014 to attempt to force it to ban the use of chlorpyrifos 
via what is called a writ of mandamus — an order to a government agency to fulfil their 
official duties (Lerner, 2017, para. 49). Dow contracted with the science-for-hire firm 
Exponent which promptly produced a study [Rees, Neil, Lamb, & Juberg, 2012] 
claiming that chlorpyrifos is safe (Lerner, 2017, para. 56). But the tide of evidence was 
trending decisively against chlorpyrifos — a systematic review [Muñoz-Quezadaa et al. 
2013] found that 26 out of 27 independent studies on chlorpyrifos showed evidence of 
harm (Lerner, 2017, para. 56). In 2014, the CHARGE Study (Shelton et al., 2014) 
showed an association between chlorpyrifos and autism. In December 2014, the EPA 
issued a draft of a risk assessment that concluded that chlorpyrifos increased 
‘developmental disorders, attention problems, working memory loss, and intelligence 
deficits in children who had been exposed to the pesticide prenatally’ — but the EPA 
still did not act to revoke the registration (Lerner, 2017, para. 52). In August 2015, the 
9th U.S. Circuit ordered the EPA to finalise its risk assessment on chlorpyrifos by 
October 31, 2015 (Lerner, 2017, para. 53). The EPA requested and were granted an 
extension (Lerner, 2017, para. 555). The EPA finalised its risk assessment on November 
10, 2016 — two days after the Presidential election that brought Donald Trump to 
power (Lerner, 2017, para. 5). The report concluded that chlorpyrifos causes 
neurological problems in children and that children are exposed to chlorpyrifos residues 
in food at levels 14,000% above the EPA safe dose (Lerner, 2017, para. 5).  
 239 
 
President Trump appointed Mike McKenna, a Dow lobbyist, to serve on his transition 
team; Myron Ebell who was a contractor for Dow oversaw staff hiring for the new EPA; 
and Scott Pruitt, a known foe of the EPA was appointed to lead the EPA (Lerner, 2017, 
para. 79). On March 29, Pruitt announced that he was overruling the findings of the risk 
assessment and would not ban chlorpyrifos (Biesecker & Rodriguez, 2017, para. 2). 
Pruitt did not provide any new evidence nor indicate what evidence had caused the 
agency to change course (Biesecker & Rodriquez, 2017, para. 16). Dow immediately 
issued a statement praising the decision (Biesecker & Rodriquez, 2017, para. 18).  
 
7.5 Organochlorine pesticides  
 
Organochlorine pesticides are made up of carbon, hydrogen, and chlorine (Ware & 
Whitacre, 2004, p. 2). They are also sometimes called ‘chlorinated hydrocarbons, 
chlorinated organics, chlorinated insecticides, and chlorinated synthetics’ (Ware & 
Whitacre, 2004, p. 2). The regulation of organochlorine pesticides would seem to be one 
of the great success stories of the modern regulatory state. The conventional narrative is 
that Rachel Carson (and a number of other authors at the time) drew the world’s 
attention to the dangers of the organochlorine pesticide DDT; the modern environmental 
movement was born; and President Kennedy’s Commission pushed to ban DDT, which 
was accomplished, along with the creation of the EPA, under President Nixon in the 
1970s. But the story is unfinished because a number of organochlorine pesticides that 
are chemically similar to DDT are still on the market, DDT is still produced for the 
export market and is still used on crops in the developing world that are exported to the 
U.S. market, and DDT persists in our bodies and in the environment in spite of the ban. 
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Woodruff, Zota, and Schwartz (2011) found that 100% of 268 pregnant women tested in 
the 2003–2004 National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES) had 
DDE in their bodies which is a breakdown product of DDT. 
 
From its invention in 1940 until it was banned in the U.S. in 1973, ‘4 billion pounds 
[1.81 billion kilo] of DDT were used throughout the world’ (Ware & Whitacre, 2004, p. 
2). Another organochlorine pesticide, Dicofol, was temporarily banned in 1986 because 
it is made with DDT and high levels of DDT residues remained in the final product; 
eventually the product was reformulated so that it contained less than 0.1% DDT and it 
was allowed back on the market (Sánchez, Hernando, Vaquero, García, & Navas, 2010, 
p. 231). As I showed in the first chapter, Roberts et al. (2007) for the California 
Department of Public Health found that living within 500 meters of a field sprayed with 
the organochlorine pesticides dicofol and endosulfan was associated with a 600% 
increased incidence of autism. Endosulfan was banned in 2010 (Cone, 2010a, para. 1). 
Dicofol was voluntarily withdrawn from the market in 2011 (Federal Register, 2011, p. 
77824). Use of another chlorinated pesticide, pentachloronitrobenzene, was restricted in 
2006, temporarily halted in 2010, and allowed back on the market in limited cases in 
2011 (Golf Course Superintendents Association of America, 2011).  
 
Organochlorine pesticides cross the placenta barrier and infants can be exposed to them 
via breast milk; ‘workers can be exposed to organochlorines in the manufacture, 
formulation, or application of these chemicals’; and contaminated drinking water and air 
are other routes of exposure (CDC, 2009, p. 75). When governments have banned or 
restricted organochlorine pesticides, blood levels of these chemicals in the population 
decline (Hagmar et al., [2006], and Kutz et al., [1991], in CDC, 2009, p. 75).  
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7.6 Pyrethroids  
 
Chrysanthemum flowers contain a natural insecticide called pyrethrins. Pyrethroids are 
a synthetic concentrated version of pyrethrins plus additional ingredients including 
adjuvants (CDC, 2009, p. 156). In agricultural settings, carbamates (discussed below) 
are increasingly being replaced with pyrethroids (CDC, 2009, p. 67). As of 2006, about 
3 million pounds (1.3 million kilos) of pyrethroids are used in agriculture each year 
(CDC, 2009, p. 156). After Dow withdrew chlorpyrifos for indoor use, many 
manufacturers switched to pyrethroids (Power & Sudakin, 2007; Williams et al., 2008) 
and now pyrethroid-based pesticides are ‘the most widely used agents for indoor pest 
control’ (Go, Garey, Wolf, & Pogo, 1999). In part because of their relatively short half-
life (21 to 28 days in the case of Permethrin, a popular pyrethroid) (Lee, Gan, Kim, 
Kabashima, & Crowley, 2003, p. 1) and natural analogue, pyrethroids have been seen as 
a safer alternative than many other pesticides. In October 2011, the EPA completed 
their cumulative risk assessment for pyrethroids and concluded that they ‘posed health 
risks below the agency’s level of concern’ (EPA, 2011). But there are reasons to think 
that the evidence of harms should be revisited and updated.   
 
Go et al. (1999) show that certain pyrethroids (sumithrin, fenvalerate) are endocrine 
disruptors (p. 173). Another pyrethroid, Resmethrin, was added by the State of 
California to the Proposition 65 list as a probable human carcinogen and other 
pyrethroids as of 2016 were undergoing review (Office of Environmental Health Hazard 
Assessment, 2016). Horton et al. (2011) found that exposure to the adjuvant piperonyl 
butoxide (PBO), added to pyrethroid insecticides intended for indoor use, was 
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associated with a 3.9 point decline on the Mental Development Index whereas airborne 
pyrethroid exposure did not show an effect (p. e699). The EPA re-registered PBO in 
2006 with only minor restrictions (EPA, 2006). Shelton et al. (2014) and Beyond 
Pesticides (n.d.) have drawn attention to the toxicity of pyrethroids but as of yet these 
concerns have not broken through into the mainstream media nor are there any signs of 
Congressional action to restrict or ban this class of chemicals.  
 
7.7 Carbamates 
 
Unlike other pesticides that work on the surface of the plant, aldicarb (a carbamate 
pesticide produced by Bayer CropScience) is drawn up through the roots of the plant 
and deposited into the fruit. Illegal use of aldicarb on watermelon fields in California in 
1985 caused the ‘largest case of pesticide food poisoning documented in North America’ 
— with more than 2,000 people affected — but it was allowed to remain on the market 
(Cone, 2010b, para. 12).  
 
In August 2010, Bayer CropScience announced that it was voluntarily withdrawing 
aldicarb (brand name Temik) from the world market; they gave themselves 5 years to 
stop producing it and 7 years to stop distributing it (Cone, 2010b, para. 2). The EPA had 
recently begun to measure the health risk for children separately from adults and found 
that infants were consuming eight times the EPA’s safe level and children one to five 
years old were ingesting aldicarb residues at three times above the safe level (Cone, 
2010b, para. 6).  
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The announcement highlighted the EPA’s general impotence to protect human health. 
By the time of Bayer’s announcement, ‘aldicarb has been under special review at the 
EPA for more than 25 years’ (Cone, 2010b, para. 16). ‘The EPA relies mostly on 
voluntary agreements, instead of bans, to avoid lawsuits from manufacturers’ (Cone, 
2010b, para. 21). The seven-year timetable to withdraw it from the market means that 
the EPA is knowingly allowing children to be exposed to this toxic chemical at levels 
exceeding their own safe thresholds for the better part of a decade. Furthermore, 
because the EPA is simply going along with the voluntarily withdrawal of the product 
rather than banning the entire class of carbamate pesticides, there is nothing to stop 
Bayer CropScience or other manufacturers from simply reformulating the product and 
bringing it back on the market and starting the decades-long review process again.  
 
7.8 Similarities between different chemicals listed in this chapter 
 
The question naturally arises: how could five different classes of chemicals (Roundup, 
organophosphates, organochlorines, pyrethroids, and carbamates) all possibly produce 
the same outcome — autism? It is important to remember that autism is a spectrum of 
related disorders so the diagnosis may reflect a variety of neurotoxic effects. 
Furthermore, the mode of action between these different chemicals may be similar. It is 
not exactly clear how DDT and other organochlorine pesticides work but they appear to 
interfere with ‘the delicate balance of sodium and potassium ions within the axons of 
the neuron in a way that prevents normal transmission of nerve impulses, in both insects 
and mammals’; so too pyrethroids are ‘axonic poisons’ and ‘apparently work by 
keeping open the sodium channels in neuronal membranes’; while organophosphates 
and carbamates both inhibit cholinesterase which is a key enzyme in the nervous system 
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(Ware & Whitacre, 2004, n.p.). Furthermore, while Shelton et al. (2014) attempted to 
study the marginal impact of increased exposures to particular pesticides, most 
Americans, including all of the study subjects, likely have all five of the agricultural 
chemicals described in this chapter in their bodies and the cumulative and synergistic 
effects are unknown.  
 
The connection between some of the pesticides and other chemicals listed in this thesis 
is also closer than one might think. Many of the chemicals that appear to be linked to 
autism are examples of bromination, chlorination, or fluorination (P. Klein, personal 
communication, 29 July, 2017). Many flame retardants are brominated compounds; 
many pesticides, vinyl chloride, and PCBs are examples of chlorination; and the 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor fluoxetine (brand name Prozac) is a fluorinated 
compound. Bromine, chlorine, and fluorine are all halogens, occupying column VIIA 
(17) of the periodic table of elements. Because fluorine, chlorine, and bromine are 
chemically similar to iodine (the next element in column VIIA), they can block iodine 
receptors in the thyroid and interfere with the normal production of thyroid hormones (P. 
Klein, personal communication, 29 July, 2017; Germinario, 2018).  
 
Clearly more research is needed. But that is precisely the point. Few large scale studies 
of environmental effects of pesticides are ever funded; even when such studies discover 
important new information it rarely is sufficient for a change in policy; and additional 
follow-on studies are sparse as well. The entire regulatory system in the U.S. follows a 
perverse logic that violates ethical norms, scientific reason, and common sense: testing 
these chemicals on humans would be unethical and would not pass human subjects 
review; but the burden of proof is on the regulatory body to show that a chemical is 
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unsafe; so in the absence of evidence (which usually does not exist because it would be 
unethical to collect) the chemical is presumed safe and allowed on the market; only 
when animal, in vitro, and human (epidemiological) studies show harms will the EPA 
(or FDA) consider withdrawing a chemical from the market; even then it will usually 
only be voluntary with no financial or criminal penalties; so, in effect, even though 
small scale testing would be unethical, regulatory agencies (under the rules created by 
Congress) engage in widescale testing, on the whole society, for decades, all while 
assuring the public that the product is safe. It seems that it was only a matter of time 
before such a lax regulatory environment created, in the words of Grandjean and 
Landrigan (2014) a ‘silent pandemic of neurodevelopmental toxicity’ (p. 330).  
 
To be clear, I am not calling for more human studies. If anything existing human studies 
conducted by pesticide manufacturers are horrific and may well violate the Nuremberg 
Code and the Declaration of Helsinki concerning ethical norms for human experiments 
(Shrader-Frechette, 2007; see also Cushman, 1998). A Congressional investigation into 
22 human experiments involving pesticides found ‘significant and widespread 
deficiencies’ (Committee on Government Reform, 2005). They write, ‘in violation of 
ethical standards, the experiments appear to have inflicted harm on human subjects, 
failed to obtain informed consent, dismissed adverse outcomes, and lacked scientific 
validity’ (Committee on Government Reform, 2005). If it would be unethical to conduct 
a human clinical trial it is also unethical to release the product to market; so only a 
precautionary approach, such as the EU’s Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) regulations, is consistent with international ethical 
norms of science and medicine.  
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7.9 Lobbying and campaign contributions by pesticide makers 
 
The main trade association representing the manufacturers of pesticides and other 
agricultural chemicals is called CropLife America (Sourcewatch, n.d.) and it spends 
about $2.5 million a year on lobbying (Center for Responsive Politics, 2016, ‘CropLife 
America’). Individual pesticide and herbicide producers also spend heavily on lobbying 
and campaign contributions. In 2016 Monsanto spent $4.6 million on lobbying (CRP, 
2016, ‘Monsanto’). But in some years, it spends considerably more — in 2008, 
Monsanto spent $8.8 million on lobbying. In the 2016 election cycle, Monsanto made 
$714,917 in campaign contributions; 37 out of 48 Monsanto lobbyists in 2015–2016 
have previously held government jobs; and 14 members of Congress (all Republicans) 
own Monsanto Co. shares (CRP, 2016, ‘Monsanto’). In September 2016, German 
chemical giant Bayer bought Monsanto for $66 billion (Roumeliotis & Burger, 2016). 
Even though Bayer now controls one quarter of all seeds and pesticides produced in the 
world (BBC, 2016), the Trump administration assured Bayer in January 2017 that it 
would not face an antitrust challenge (Philpott, 2017).  
 
7.10 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I argued that pesticides present a unique set of regulatory challenges 
because they are intentionally toxic. Early regulation focused on ensuring chemical 
purity rather than protecting public health. Later attempts to strengthen regulation were 
hampered by indemnity provisions that penalised the EPA for taking action, legislative 
language and judicial rulings that added in cost benefit calculations, and EPA 
procedures that review individual ingredients rather than the actual products. Herbicides 
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lead to herbicide-resistant weeds; some pesticides lead to pesticide-resistant insects; and 
more recently there has been a collapse in the populations of both harmful and 
beneficial insects which is not well understood but may be related to pesticides. 
Adjuvants make glyphosate-based herbicides much more toxic than glyphosate alone. 
But EPA reviews that focus on the ingredients separately and that ignore many widely-
used adjuvants enable glyphosate-based herbicides to escape stricter regulation (in the 
U.S.). Use of organophosphates including chlorpyrifos soared after DDT was banned, 
but evidence suggests that they produce neurological harms. Chlorpyrifos was studied 
extensively under President Obama but the risk assessment was not finalised until after 
the 2016 election and the Trump administration has refused to take action against the 
chemical. The banning of the organochlorine pesticides DDT and later endosulfan 
appear to be great victories for environmental regulation but several similar 
organochlorine pesticides remain on the market. Pyrethroids and carbamates for the 
most part have avoided regulatory action. The toxic effects are similar between these 
different chemicals and most of these chemical are in the bodies of most Americans so 
harms that are detected including autism may be the result of multiple, cumulative, or 
synergistic effects. Chemical makers spend heavily on lobbying and campaign 
contributions to keep in place a regulatory system that protects their profits and imposes 
few burdens or restrictions on their products. In the next chapter I will review the 
regulatory history of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors.  
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Chapter 8 
The failure to effectively regulate SSRIs 
 
8.0 Introduction  
 
In chapter 1, I showed that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are designed 
to cross the blood brain barrier and they also cross the placental barrier at a high rate 
(Hendrick et al., 2003; Rampono et al. 2009). Eight major studies (Croen et al. 2011; 
Eriksson et al. 2012; Rai et al., 2013; Sørensen et al. 2013; Gidaya et al. 2014; 
Harrington et al. 2014; El Marroun et al. 2014; Boukhris et al. 2016) have found a 
statistically significant association between SSRI use by women during pregnancy and 
subsequent autism in their children. Hviid, Melbey, and Pasternak (2013) found an 
association between SSRI use by women before conception and autism in their 
offspring but did not find an association between SSRI use during pregnancy and autism. 
Clements et al. (2015) found a statistically significant association between SSRI use 
during pregnancy and autism and then created a second model (that controlled for 
maternal major depression in spite of the lack of evidence supporting a link between 
depression in the absence of chemical interventions and autism) that rendered their 
results insignificant; the study was also characterised by financial conflicts of interest. 
Of all of the possible factors associated with autism in this thesis, the connection 
between SSRI use during pregnancy and autism is the clearest. And yet in the U.S. 
doctors are still prescribing these drugs to pregnant women and there are no black box 
warnings in connection with autism risk and no bans on their use during pregnancy.  
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In this chapter I will review the scientific history of SSRIs (8.1) and show that the 
serotonin theory of depression that is used to sell these drugs is not supported by the 
evidence. Next, I will review the regulatory history of SSRIs and show that drug makers 
used ethically dubious methods to gain approval for these drugs in spite of a lack of 
evidence of their effectiveness and safety (8.2). Then I will discuss the relationship and 
differences between medicalisation and iatrogenic injury (8.3). Finally I will review 
lobbying expenditures by SSRI manufacturers (8.4) and offer some criticisms of the 
existing literature on SSRIs and autism (8.5).  
 
8.1 The scientific history of SSRIs 
 
Whitaker (2010) notes that the modern psychopharmaceutical revolution began shortly 
after World War II. After the breakthroughs of sulfa drugs and penicillin during the war, 
scientists came to expect that other breakthroughs would soon follow (Whitaker, 2010, 
p. 46). Researchers at Rhône-Poulenc in France tested chemical dyes called 
phenothiazines against malaria, Frank Berger in Britain tested a disinfectant called 
phenylglycerol ether against respiratory disease, and chemists at Hoffmann-La Roche in 
Switzerland tested a former German rocket fuel called hydrazine against tuberculosis 
(Whitaker, 2010, pp. 48–54). In tests on animals and (after later refinements) in people, 
in addition to the antibiotic properties, these chemicals also produced changes in the 
central nervous system (Whitaker, 2010). The research at Rhône-Poulenc led to 
chlorpromazine, the first major tranquilizer (for mental disturbances like schizophrenia); 
Berger’s research led to meprobamate, the first minor tranquilliser (for treatment of 
anxiety in otherwise healthy people); and the research at Hoffmann-La Roche led to 
iproniazid, an ‘energizer’ that seemed to help patients with depression (Whitaker, 2010, 
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p. 54). These drugs proved wildly popular and favourable accounts in newspapers and 
magazines made these discoveries appear safer, more targeted, and more effective than 
they actually were (Whitaker, 2010, p. 58).  
 
Initially these drugs were viewed as tonics, things that could change mood or behaviour, 
but not as medicines per se (Whitaker, 2010, p. 54). Over the course of the 1950s, 
however, the discourse about these drugs changed as a result of what Whitaker calls an 
‘unholy alliance’ of the American Medical Association looking to increase the power 
and prestige of doctors, pharmaceutical companies looking to increase profits, and 
media outlets looking for stories of big breakthroughs (Whitaker, 2010, pp. 54–57). In 
an earlier era, the AMA was a gatekeeper, screening drugs for purity via their Council 
on Pharmacy and Chemistry (Whitaker, 2010, p. 55). In the 1950s, those efforts were 
abandoned and the AMA, pharmaceutical companies, and doctors started working 
together to market drugs to the public; one notable example was the television show, 
The March of Medicine, that touted the benefits of these new psychopharmaceuticals 
and other drugs (Whitaker, 2010, p. 57). A report for the New York Times coined the 
word ‘antidepressants’ in an article in 1959 (Whitaker, 2010, p. 60) and increasingly 
these drugs were described as medicines with the implication that they cured a known 
underlying condition.  
 
Yet, there was still no evidence to explain why they worked as they did. In animal 
studies in the 1950s, scientists were able to isolate several chemical messengers in the 
brain including acetylcholine (which was discussed above in connection with pesticides), 
serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine (Whitaker, 2010, p. 61). In 1955, David 
Brodie at NIMH found that if he gave reserpine, an herbal drug from India used to treat 
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psychosis, to rabbits, that it lowered their levels of serotonin and made them lethargic 
and apathetic (Whitaker, 2010, p. 62). Arvid Carlsson discovered that reserpine also 
depleted norepinephrine and dopamine (Whitaker, 2010, p. 62). These findings fit 
neatly with the emerging narrative that depression, schizophrenia, and other mental 
health problems were caused by chemical deficiencies or imbalances in the brain that 
could be corrected with these new medicines (Whitaker, 2010). 
 
But when scientists went looking for lower levels of serotonin in humans with 
depression, their studies produced conflicting findings.13 5-HIAA is the main metabolite 
of serotonin and it is used to estimate serotonin levels in the body. Bowers, Heninger, 
and Gerbode (1969), Papeschi and McClure (1971), and Bowers (1974) did not find an 
association between 5-HIAA levels and depression. Mendels and Frazer (1974) 
reviewed eight studies on the relationship between use of reserpine (which lowers 
serotonin) and depression in hypertension patients and did not find an association (p. 
447). Mendels, Stinnett, Burns, and Frazier (1975) found that large increases in 
serotonin as a result of administering high doses of L-tryptophan did not relieve 
depression.  
 
The (low) serotonin theory of depression was given a temporary reprieve as a result of 
two studies led by Åsberg. Åsberg, Thorén, Träskman, Bertilsson, and Ringberger 
(1976) found that 29% of 68 patients had low levels (defined as below 15 nanograms) 
of 5-HIAA in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Åsberg, Träskman, and Thorén (1976) found 
that patients with low 5-HIAA ‘attempted suicide significantly more often... and they 
used more violent means’ (p. 1193). But a closer examination of this data showed flaws 
                                                
13 I am indebted to Whitaker (2010) for pointing me to most of the sources in the literature 
review in this section.   
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in study design — what these studies reported as novel findings were in fact the regular 
distribution curves of 5-HIAA in the general population (Whitaker, 2010, p. 73). Maas 
et al. (1984) in a study for the National Institute of Mental Health found that ‘contrary 
to expectations, no relationships between CSF 5-HIAA and response to amitriptyline 
were found in the depressed patients...’ (p. 1167).  
 
When the SSRI, Prozac, first hit the market in 1988, pharmaceutical marketing 
executives needed a story to explain the mechanism of action so they went with the 
serotonin theory of depression in spite of the fact that the scientific evidence did not and 
still does not support it (Lacasse & Leo, 2005). Doctors liked these drugs because they 
were perceived to have fewer side effects than existing tricyclic antidepressants and 
consumers demanded these drugs in part, due to direct-to-consumer advertising of 
prescription pharmaceuticals — which is only allowed in two countries worldwide (U.S. 
and New Zealand) and which increased following a 1985 FDA decision that lifted a 
moratorium on TV advertisements for these drugs (Greene & Herzberg, 2010).   
 
This created the extraordinary situation whereby the scientific consensus is that 
depression is not a result of a serotonin deficiency even as this now discredited theory 
of the case is used to sell these pills to an eager public. Lacasse and Leo (2005) write, 
‘there is not a single peer reviewed article that can be accurately cited to directly 
support claims of serotonin deficiency in any mental disorder, while there are many 
articles that present counterevidence’ (p. 1213). Even as one leading scholar after 
another came forward to debunk the serotonin deficiency theory of depression 
[Valenstein, 1998; Horgan, 1999; Glenmullen, 2000; Delgado & Moreno, 2000; Kramer, 
2002, David Burns interviewed in Lacasse & Gomery, 2003; Healy, 2004, Kendler, 
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2005] drug makers, in direct-to-consumer advertising, continued to promote the idea 
(Lacasse & Leo, 2005).  
 
As sales of Prozac and other SSRIs continued to grow, the efficacy of these drugs was 
called into question. Kirsch, Moore, Scoboria, and Nicholls (2002) ‘examined the 
efficacy data submitted to the FDA for the six most widely prescribed SSRIs approved 
between 1987 and 1999’ (p. 2). They found that about ‘80% of the response to 
medication was duplicated in placebo control groups, and the mean difference between 
drug and placebo was approximately 2 points on the 17-item (50-point) and 21-item 
(62-point) Hamilton Depression Scale’ (Kirsch et al. 2002, p. 1). Overall they concluded 
that the ‘the pharmacological effects of antidepressants are clinically negligible’ (Kirsch 
et al., 2002). Those were conclusions based on the data submitted to the FDA — but as I 
showed in chapter 5, when contract research organisations generate unfavourable data, 
it often just disappears. So if one included the unpublished data, the differences between 
treatment and control (placebo) could possibly be smaller or non-existent. Indeed that is 
what happened when Kirsch et al. (2008) did a meta-analysis of all of the published and 
some of the unpublished data on four new antidepressants (GlaxoSmithKline had 
participated in a clinical trial registry program and so four previously unpublished 
studies were available) (Kirsch et al., 2008, p. 261). They found that ‘the differences 
between drug and placebo were not clinically significant in clinical trials involving 
either moderately or very severely depressed patients’ and were only statistically 
significant for ‘the upper end of the very severe’ patients (Kirsch et al., 2008, p. 260).  
 
So why do psychiatrists continue to write scripts for toxic drugs that do not outperform 
a placebo for the vast majority of patients? Consumer demand is likely a factor. 
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Conflicts of interest also may play a role. The best available evidence shows that 
psychiatrists receive more money from pharmaceutical companies than doctors in any 
other specialty (Harris, Carey, & Roberts, 2007; Insel, 2010). Direct payment to 
physicians for prescribing a particular drug is prohibited but drug companies can 
sidestep these rules by hiring doctors to give lectures, serve as consultants, participate in 
a study, or write practice guidelines (Harris, et al., 2007).  
 
8.2 Regulatory history of SSRIs 
 
The regulatory history of SSRIs is a case study in how business interests in medicine 
manipulate scientific data and capture regulatory institutions to generate profits at the 
expense of public health.  
 
Fluoxetine (brand name Prozac) was the first SSRI licensed for clinical use in the U.S. 
Its regulatory history was complicated by the fact that it did not work very well. 
Fluoxetine was developed by the Eli Lilly & Co. in the early 1970s; Wong, Horng, 
Bymaster, Hauser, and Molloy (1974) wrote the first peer reviewed journal article on it. 
In animal tests, fluoxetine did not seem to have an antidepressant effect and it increased 
aggression in rats (Healy, 2004, p. 30). Lilly explored using it as an antihypertensive but 
it did not seem to lower blood pressure (Healy, 2004, p. 31). Lilly also explored using it 
as a weight loss drug and, conversely, as a treatment for eating disorders (Healy, 2004, 
p. 31). Herbert Meltzer conducted the first tests of fluoxetine on humans and found that 
it had a negligible effect on depression and caused a side effect called akathisia (which 
is characterised by constant restlessness and need for motion) in many of his patients 
(Healy, 2004, p. 32). So Lilly started paring fluoxetine with benzodiazepines (minor 
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tranquillisers) in drugs trials — meaning that all of the effect in the treatment group may 
have come from the tranquillisers not fluoxetine (Healy, 2004, p. 32). Fluoxetine also 
failed in trials with patients hospitalised for depression and with atypical psychotic 
disorders (Healy, 2004, p. 32). 
 
Lilly shook up its clinical trial program and brought in Irwin Slater to direct it (Healy, 
2004, p. 32). Slater hired Louis Fabre to run a trial of fluoxetine with five mildly 
depressed patients; all responded favourably (Healy, 2004, p. 32). Fabre was later 
investigated by Upjohn in connection with a different clinical trial for pushing the 
ethical boundaries of patient recruitment (Abraham & Sheppard, [2000], p. 84 in Healy, 
2004, p. 32).  
 
Efforts to gain regulatory approval for fluoxetine in Europe experienced a setback in 
1984 when German regulators concluded, ‘Considering the benefit and the risk, we 
think this preparation totally unsuitable for treatment of depression’ (Healy 2004, p. 39). 
Lilly turned its attentions to the regulatory process in Sweden instead. There is an 
unusually detailed record of what happened behind the scenes because John Virapen, 
the managing director for Lilly in Sweden, became a whistle-blower and wrote a tell-all 
memoir about everything he did to get the drug approved (Gøtzsche, 2013, p. 203). 
Among the claims in Virapen (2010) — he flew doctors to the Caribbean for a week and 
plied them with ‘diving, surfing, sailing, pretty girls, and hot nights’ (p. 84). He also 
figured out who the independent expert was who had been hired to review the clinical 
trial data and, after some negotiation, paid him a $20,000 bribe (100,000 Swedish 
crowns) and arranged for a research grant for his institution (Virapen, 2010, p. 94). 
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Fluoxetine was later approved in Germany following ‘unorthodox lobbying methods’ as 
well (Healy, 2004, p. 248).  
 
A change in how drugs were approved at the FDA also helped Lilly to secure approval 
for fluoxetine in the U.S. (Healy, 2004, p. 35). In 1981, Paul Leber became head of the 
FDA’s neuropharmacology branch (Shorter, 2009, p. 179). He instituted a series of 
reforms in the approval process for new psychopharmaceuticals (Healy, 2004, p. 35). 
‘Leber’s reforms required that a new drug show evidence from two pivotal [understood 
to mean placebo controlled] studies that it worked and the majority of studies performed 
should go the same way’ (Healy, 2004, p. 35). Two of three placebo controlled studies 
of fluoxetine showed mixed results but some marginal benefits — including a study by 
Louis Fabre with just 11 patients who completed the four week trial — and that was 
enough to get it approved by the FDA in 1987 (Healy, 2004, p. 35).  
 
Lilly also revolutionised the way psychopharmaceuticals were sold. Up until this point, 
drugs had usually been named after their chemical ingredients (Healy, 2004, p. 32). 
Lilly hired Interbrand to come up with a name for fluoxetine and it came up with Prozac 
to imply professionalism (pro-) and targeting (-zac) (Healy, 2004, p. 33). Combined 
with direct-to-consumer marketing, by the time Prozac was launched in 1988 ‘patients 
were lining up asking for Prozac by name, an experience new to American psychiatrists’ 
(Healy, 2004, p. 38).  
 
Within four years of launch, Prozac became Lilly’s first billion dollar drug (Whitaker, 
2010, p. 321) and a wave of competing SSRIs soon followed. Lilly’s market 
capitalisation increased from $10 billion when Prozac first launched in 1987 to $90 
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billion in 2000, the last full year that Prozac was still under patent (Lilly also brought 
the antipsychotic, Zyprexa, to market during this period and it too became a billion 
dollar drug) (Whitaker, 2010, p. 321). Lilly senior executives gained $3.1 billion from 
cashing out stock options during this period as well (Whitaker, 2010, p. 321).  
 
8.3 Understanding the relationship and differences between medicalisation and 
iatrogenic injury  
 
This review of the political economy of SSRIs would be incomplete without a 
discussion of medicalisation which is a massive problem in psychiatry and is often 
discussed, incorrectly in my view, in connection with autism. Medicalisation is defined 
by Conrad (1992) as ‘a process by which nonmedical problems become defined and 
treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses or disorders’ (p. 209). There is 
a vast body of literature on medicalisation — particularly amongst critics of capitalist 
health care (e.g., Illich, 1976; Ehrenreich & English, 1979; Navarro, 1980).  
 
Medicalisation is especially problematic in psychiatry, where the number of mental 
disorders grows with each new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(Gøtzsche, 2013, p. 191). Financial conflicts of interest are rife amongst the authors of 
the DSM and the fear is that the pharmaceutical industry is using these definitions to 
prescribe ever greater numbers of pills to people who do not actually need them or 
benefit from them. Cosgrove, Krisky, Vijayaraghavan, and Schneider (2006) conducted 
a study of the authors of the DSM-IV and found that 57% of panel members had 
financial conflicts of interest; and that some panels had 100% conflicted members 
including the panel for mood disorders. Following criticism, the American Psychiatric 
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Association (APA) instituted a new policy that required financial conflicts of interest 
statements for panel members involved with drafting the DSM-5 (Cosgrove & Krimsky, 
2012). However, COI subsequently increased — 69% of the DSM-5 task force members 
reported having ties to the pharmaceutical industry — a 21% increase over the previous 
edition (Cosgrove & Krimsky, 2012).  
 
In many cases there is an additional step to medicalisation that is often overlooked — 
particularly in psychiatry, medicalisation often leads to treatment with toxic medical 
interventions which then cause iatrogenic injury (Gøtzsche, 2013). When medicalisation 
is discussed in the literature, authors sometimes are referring to medicalisation in the 
first sense as defined by Conrad (1992) (‘nonmedical problems come to be treated as 
medical problems’) but in other cases they are referring to the whole process of disease 
mongering followed by toxic treatments that cause material harms (including chronic 
illness, disability, and death).  
 
So is autism perhaps partially the result of medicalisation and, if so, is it the result of 
medicalisation in the first sense (an invented disorder) or in the second sense 
(misdiagnosis of some sort that then leads to toxic treatments that produce iatrogenic 
injury)?  
 
Frances (2010) and Gøtzsche (2013) think autism is an example of medicalisation in the 
first sense (not an actual increase in prevalence, rather, a changing of diagnostic criteria 
to label more people as autistic). Frances chaired the task force that wrote the DSM-IV 
but by the DSM-5 he had become a fierce critic of the entire process. Frances (2010) 
argues that the DSM-IV created ‘three false positive “epidemics”’ — ADHD, autism, 
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and childhood bipolar disorder. Gøtzsche (2013) quotes Frances favourably and seems 
to concur that autism is the result of medicalisation. If Frances (2010) and Gøtzsche 
(2013) are correct then all of the epidemiological evidence that I have cited so far in this 
thesis is likely wrong.  
 
Neither Frances nor Gøtzsche have conducted research nor published journal articles on 
autism. Frances (2010) and Gøtzsche (2013) also seem unaware of the fact that Byrd et 
al. (2002) and Hertz-Picciotto and Delwiche (2009) have already studied this matter at 
length and concluded that only a small fraction of the increase in autism prevalence was 
a result of changes in diagnostic criteria. Even though Frances (2010) and Gøtzsche 
(2013) are well-versed in the problem of medicalisation, they miss all of the ways that 
autism could be the result of iatrogenic injury.  
 
As I showed above, SSRIs do not outperform a placebo for the vast majority of people 
who are using them in the U.S. (Kirsch et al., 2008). But because doctors and a willing 
public bought the now discredited story of the serotonin imbalance theory of depression, 
SSRI use in the American population is at astonishing levels. Today 12.7% of 
Americans (8.6% of males and 16.5% of females) 12 and older are on antidepressants 
the vast majority of which are SSRIs (Pratt, Brody, & Gu, 2017); a quarter of all 
antidepressant users have been on them for a decade or longer (Pratt et al., 2017); 
antidepressants are the drug most prescribed to Americans age 18 to 44 — people of 
reproductive age (National Center for Health Statistics, 2016); and 6.5% of all women 
enrolled in private health insurance and 8.1% of women on public health insurance use 
these drugs during pregnancy (Dawson et al., 2016). The evidence from the eight 
studies I have cited shows that taking SSRIs before or during pregnancy significantly 
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increases the risk of autism in the offspring. So a strong case can be made that autism is 
not a false positive epidemic, as Frances (2010) asserts, but rather has a material basis 
as a result of iatrogenic injury resulting from the use of SSRIs by women who are 
pregnant or may soon become pregnant.  
 
8.4 Lobbying and campaign contributions 
 
The top four most prescribed SSRIs in the U.S. (and their manufacturers) are: Zoloft 
(Pfizer), Celexa (Forest Laboratories), Prozac (Eli Lilly), and Lexapro (Forest 
Laboratories) (Moore & Mattison, 2017, p. 275). Pfizer and Eli Lilly spend heavily on 
lobbying and their interests go well beyond SSRIs to cover the full range of 
pharmaceutical products that they produce. From 1999 through 2018, Pfizer spent 
$191.42 million on lobbying; in 2018, 49 out of 64 Pfizer lobbyists had previously held 
government jobs; and 34 members of Congress owned Pfizer shares (Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2018, ‘Pfizer’). From 1999 through 2018, Eli Lilly spent $141.65 
million on lobbying; in 2018, 49 out of 62 Eli Lilly & Co. lobbyists previously held 
government jobs; and 9 members of Congress owned shares in Eli Lilly (CRP, 2018, 
‘Eli Lilly’). For much of its history Forest Laboratories maintained a lower profile in 
Washington D.C. (it also had a much smaller portfolio of products than either Pfizer or 
Eli Lilly). From 2005 to 2014, Forest Laboratories spent a total of $2.4 million on 
lobbying (CRP, 2018, ‘Forest Laboratories’). In July 2014, Forest Laboratories was 
acquired by Actavis which later merged with Warner Chilcott to create the 
pharmaceutical giant Allergan which spends heavily on lobbying ($14 million from 
2015 through 2018) (CRP, 2018, ‘Allergan’). GlaxoSmithKline is the producer of 
another bestselling SSRI, Paxil, and a range of other pharmaceutical products; I write 
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about their lobbying expenditures in the next chapter. Many of these pharmaceutical 
companies also fund lobbying and campaign contributions through political action 
committees including the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. The 
critics of SSRIs are not well organised nor well funded and seem to consist of a handful 
of doctors, academics, and journalists who have no ongoing lobbying presence in 
Washington D.C.  
 
8.5 Criticisms and rejoinders 
 
There may be confounding factors that are clouding the data about a possible 
association between SSRI use during pregnancy and autism. Greater use of SSRIs 
during pregnancy might be an indicator of increased pharmacological use overall (such 
as analgesics) or greater compliance with all directives from doctors including obstetric 
interventions (such as Pitocin and anesthesia) and vaccines. Any study on SSRIs and 
autism that does not control for these additional factors could contain unacknowledged 
confounding factors in their results. Controlling for these additional factors would be 
relatively easy in the Scandinavian studies and with health maintenance organisations 
such as Kaiser Permanente because they have complete medical records in their 
databases. But in the current political climate, exploring the dangers of obstetric 
interventions or vaccines is seen as politically risky, so that might explain why 
researchers often fail to control for these factors.  
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8.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I showed that the early research that led to SSRIs was focused on the 
serotonin deficiency hypothesis and that the serotonin deficiency narrative was central 
to marketing campaigns even though scientific evidence in support of the theory never 
materialised. I showed that the first SSRI, Prozac, was approved in Sweden and then 
Germany following numerous breaches of scientific ethics including bribes and that 
approval in the U.S. was based on limited evidence including a study with just 11 
people that lasted one month. I pointed out that medicalisation has two different 
meanings — medicalisation can refer to pathologising aspects of everyday life or 
medicalisation can refer to pathologising aspects of everyday life and then treating said 
condition with toxic medical interventions that produce real and lasting harm. I argued 
that autism is often incorrectly understood as medicalisation in the first sense described 
here whereas it might properly be understood in the second sense — SSRIs are widely 
prescribed to those experiencing the normal ups and downs of life but by consuming 
SSRIs, women who are pregnant or about to become pregnant expose their future 
offspring to a teratogen that increases the risk of autism. The tragedy is made all the 
worse by the fact that for most people, SSRIs do not outperform a placebo. The FDA 
and CDC have done nothing in response to the growing evidence about the links 
between SSRIs and autism. Pharmaceutical companies are among the most prolific 
spenders on lobbying in Washington, D.C. and organised opposition to SSRIs is limited 
to a few doctors, academics, and journalists. In the next chapter I will explore the 
political economy of the regulation of vaccines.  
 
  
 263 
Chapter 9 
The political economy of the regulation of vaccines 
 
9.0 Introduction to the vaccines and autism debate 
 
One of the things that makes vaccines different from every other possible environmental 
trigger described thus far is the presence of thousands of parents who claim that they 
personally witnessed autistic regression — their child was healthy, the child was 
vaccinated pursuant to the U.S. schedule at a ‘well baby’ visit, and within hours, 
minutes, days, or weeks the child lost speech, motor coordination, eye contact, and/or 
developed a host of other symptoms associated with autism. With the other toxicants on 
the list, the possible damage is invisible — cells and systems are harmed during critical 
developmental periods in utero or slowly over time and this damage is only flagged later 
when the child misses key developmental milestones. With vaccines there are parents 
who say that they witnessed with their own eyes what happened to their previously 
healthy child. Recent scholarship suggests that autistic regression may be the rule rather 
than the exception (Ozonoff et al., 2018). The debate over vaccines is the most 
contentious facet of the autism debate and it is one of the most polarised debates in 
American society today. As a result, I devote more pages to the research in connection 
with vaccines than any other facet of the autism debate.  
 
The vaccines and autism debate is also one of the strangest debates I have ever seen in 
political economy so I want to foreground the discussion in this chapter by highlighting 
some of the internal contradictions and paradoxes that swirl around this topic:  
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1. All parties to the debate acknowledge that the current vaccine schedule could not 
exist in the absence of liability protection. Vaccines, according to their producers, 
cannot compete in the normal capitalist marketplace because class action lawsuits from 
those injured by their products would drive them out of business. Many state 
governments then require citizens to have this product injected into their bodies as a 
condition of entry to school, day care, and some jobs. So there is a paradox at the heart 
of this debate which is that this product is required in the name of public safety, even 
while its producers acknowledge that the product does not meet the usual product 
liability norms of the capitalist marketplace.  
 
2. We know that vaccines cause injury sometimes — there is an entire separate branch 
of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to compensate those injured by vaccines and the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth (2011), ruled that vaccines are 
‘unavoidably unsafe’. So the question is not do vaccines sometimes cause harm but 
rather, what is the rate of harm? However, the official government position is that to 
measure the likely rate of harm, via a comparison with an unvaccinated control group, 
would be unethical (see #5 below).  
 
3. We know that the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), because it is 
voluntary, undercounts the actual number of vaccine injuries. The former FDA 
commissioner David Kessler (1993) stated that adverse events in connection with 
pharmaceutical products are underreported by a factor of 100. So the question is not 
whether VAERS undercounts, but the degree of undercounting.  
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4. Many of the ingredients in vaccines — in particular ethylmercury and aluminium — 
are known neurotoxins (Grandjean & Landrigan, 2014). Defenders of the current 
paradigm argue that ‘the dose makes the poison’ (see Offit & Jew, 2003), but that idea 
has been challenged in recent years as toxicologists have discovered non-linear dose 
response curves and concluded that some substances, such as lead, have no safe dose 
(Grandjean & Landrigan, 2014, p. 331). The debate is not over whether ethylmercury 
and aluminium are neurotoxins, the debate is over their dose response curves which are 
not well understood.  
 
5. All parties to the debate admit that there are no studies with an unvaccinated control 
group that show that the national vaccine schedule is safe. Defenders of the status quo 
admit this as a point of pride, arguing that a proper double blind RCT would be 
unethical because they already know (based on experience) that vaccines are safe. But at 
the same time they argue that RCTs are the gold standard and should guide all other 
decisions in medicine. It creates an unusual spectacle whereby autism advocacy groups 
are demanding double blind RCTs while mainstream figures in science and medicine 
are violating their own preferred epistemology by blocking the sorts of studies that 
could resolve this debate.  
 
6. Even though the facts mentioned here are not in dispute, if one publicly points out 
these troubling contradictions and paradoxes in connection with the national vaccine 
program, one is risking one’s career and one will likely be ostracised by colleagues, 
friends, and family and labelled crazy and a conspiracy theorist (see: Martin, 2018). If 
one responds to the uncertainty created by undone science by refusing to vaccinate 
one’s children, most states then mandate that they cannot go to publicly funded day care 
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or school. Even more troubling, doctors ‘may report the parent to Child Protective 
Services’ for ‘medical negligence’ if the parent refuses to vaccinate his/her child 
(Rosenberg, 2012, p. 242).  
 
The debate regarding vaccines and autism is fraught. Yet, this is a conversation one 
must have if one is to understand the political economy of autism. This chapter has two 
main sections — the regulatory history of vaccines in the U.S. (9.1.0) and the scientific 
debate about vaccines and autism (9.2.0). Each section has numerous subsections that I 
will introduce at the start of each section. In this chapter I will attempt to show that 
capitalism shapes every aspect of the national vaccine schedule. Policies, procedures, 
bureaucratic infrastructure, and regulatory decisions are focused narrowly on the 
product and getting the product approved and into the marketplace without ever 
assessing the health of the whole system.  
 
9.1.0 Introduction to the political economy of vaccines 
 
In this section I will provide an overview of the size of the vaccine market (9.1.1); 
document the growth in the U.S. vaccine schedule (9.1.2); review the vaccine approval 
process (9.1.3); argue that clinical trials as part of the FDA licensure process are too 
short, too small, and use toxic placebos (9.1.4); discuss COI at the FDA’s Vaccines and 
Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC), the CDC’s Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), and the National Vaccine Advisory 
Committee (NVAC) (9.1.5); show that post-market surveillance of vaccine adverse 
events is inadequate (9.1.6); document the revolving door between CDC and vaccine 
 267 
makers (9.1.7); discuss the lobbying at the state level to make vaccines compulsory 
(9.1.8); and show COI in science and medical journals associated with vaccines (9.1.9). 
 
9.1.1 The size of the vaccine market   
 
Vaccine manufacturers reported $28.3 billion in global sales in 2015 (Transparency 
Market Research, 2016). The vaccine market is characterised by oligopoly as just four 
firms — GSK, Merck, Pfizer, and Sanofi — generated 86% of total global vaccine 
revenue in 2015 (EvaluatePharma, 2016). Several market research companies project 
robust growth in vaccine sales over the coming years: Markets to Markets projects the 
global vaccine market to reach $48 billion by 2021; Zion Market Research projects the 
vaccine market to reach $59.2 billion by 2020; and Mordor Intelligence projects a 
global vaccine market of $55 billion by 2021 (La Vigne, 2016). Just over one-third of 
global sales are projected to come from North America by 2024 ($28 billion out of 
$72.5 billion in vaccine sales in 2024) (Transparency Market Research, 2016). 
Paediatric vaccines currently account for 57.5% of the vaccine market but adult 
vaccines sales are expected to outpace paediatric vaccines sales in the coming years 
(Transparency Market Research, 2016).  
 
Johnson (2009) writing in the Wall Street Journal observes that the 1986 NCVIA and 
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program ‘is an important reason why the vaccine 
business has been transformed from a risky, low-profit venture in the 1970s to one of 
the pharmaceutical industry’s most attractive product lines today’ (para. 2). More 
recently, ‘Old vaccines have been reformulated with higher costs. New ones have 
entered the market at once-unthinkable prices. Together, since 1986, they have pushed 
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up the average cost to fully vaccinate a child with private insurance to the age of 18 to 
$2,192 from $100, according to data from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’ (Rosenthal, 2014, para. 4). ‘The federal government... buys half of all 
vaccines’ administered to children, and even with bulk discounts, its costs have 
increased 15-fold since 1986 (Rosenthal, 2014, para. 5). Just as there are billion dollar 
drugs, there are now billion dollar vaccines. So for example, Prevnar ‘is priced at $136 
[per shot], and most states require children to get four doses before entering day care or 
school’ (Rosenthal, 2014, para. 6). ‘Pfizer, the sole manufacturer, had revenues of 
nearly $4 billion from its Prevnar vaccine line last year, about double what it made from 
high-profit drugs like Lipitor and Viagra, which now face generic competitors’ 
(Rosenthal, 2014, para. 6). With liability protection, a guaranteed market of 4 million 
new children born into the U.S. each year, and guarantors in the form of the federal 
government footing half of the bill and insurance companies also picking up a large 
share, vaccines are a product unlike any other in the marketplace. The profits that one 
can earn from this unique product are largely dependent upon a pharmaceutical 
company’s ability to get additional vaccines added to the schedule. Yet as an indicator 
of just how vast the pharmaceutical industry is at this point, ‘even though the dollar 
figure is large and growing, vaccines still only account for 3 percent of the market share 
within the global pharmaceutical industry’ (La Vigne, 2016). 
 
9.1.2 The growth in the U.S. vaccine schedule 
 
In 1983, the official U.S. vaccine schedule could be explained in half a page and 
consisted of the following vaccines: DTP (diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis) (2 months), 
OPV (oral polio vaccine) (2 months), DTP (4 months), OPV (4 months), DTP (6 
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months), MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) (15 months), DTP (18 months), OPV (18 
months), DTP (4 years), OPV (4 years), and Td (tetanus and diphtheria without 
pertussis) (15 years) (CDC, 1983). So, counting each component of the conjugate 
vaccines separately, the schedule contained 24 doses total consisting of 7 injected 
vaccines and 4 oral vaccines. In 1985 the autism rate in the U.S. was calculated at 1 in 
2,500 (Autism Speaks, 2010). The current vaccine schedule (CDC, 2017) takes eight 
pages to explain and consists of the following:  
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Recommended Immunization Schedule for Children and Adolescents Aged 18 Years 
or Younger, United States (2017) 
Influenza (pregnancy) DTaP (18 months) 
Tdap (pregnancy)  Influenza (18 months) 
Hep B (birth) Hep A (18 months) 
Hep B (2 months) Influenza (30 months) 
rotavirus (2 months) Influenza (42 months) 
DTaP (2 months) DTaP (4 years) 
Hib (2 months) IPV (4 years) 
PCV (2 months) MMR (4 years) 
IPV (2 months) Varicella (4 years) 
rotavirus (4 months) Influenza (5 years) 
DTaP (4 months) Influenza (5 years) 
Hib (4 months) Influenza (6 years) 
PCV (4 months) Influenza (7 years) 
IPV (4 months) Influenza (8 years)  
Hep B (6 months) Influenza (9 years) 
rotavirus (6 months) HPV (11 years) 
DTaP (6 months) Tdap (12 years) 
Hib (6 months) Influenza (12 years)  
PCV (6 months) Meningococcal (12 years) 
IPV (6 months) Influenza (13 years)  
Influenza (6 months) Influenza (14 years), 
Influenza (7 months) Influenza (15 years)  
Hib (12 months) Influenza (16 years) 
PCV (12 months) Meningococcal (16 years) 
MMR (12 months) Influenza (17 years) 
Varicella (12 months) Influenza (18 years)  
Hep A ( 12 months)  
DTaP (diphtheria, tetanus, and acellular pertussis); Hib (haemophilus influenzae type b); 
HPV (human papillomavirus); IPV (inactivated poliovirus); MMR (measles, mumps, 
rubella); PCV (pneumococcal conjugate vaccine); Tdap (tetanus, diphtheria, and 
acellular pertussis) — which is different than DTaP. 
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As one can see the schedule is heavily front-loaded into the first two years of life with 
as many as seven injections at the six month paediatric ‘well baby’ visit. In total, 
counting each component of the conjugate vaccines separately, the current schedule has 
74 doses of 53 injected vaccines and three oral vaccines. Presently the autism rate is 
estimated at 1 in 36 (Zablotsky et al., 2017). This simply shows temporal association, 
but the association is troubling and that is one of the cases to answer here.  
 
9.1.3 The vaccine approval process in the U.S.  
 
Vaccine development goes through four clinical stages (Pickering & Orenstein, 2002). 
‘Phase 1 trials in humans include the smallest number of volunteers and are primarily 
designed to identify problems of acute safety’ (Pickering & Orenstein, 2002, p. 148). As 
I will show below (9.1.4) there are concerns that this phase may be too short and too 
small to detect iatrogenic events such as autism. Phase 2 looks at ‘dose range and 
immunogenicity’ and involves 100–1,000 human participants (Pickering & Orenstein, 
2002, p. 148). Phase 3 looks at ‘vaccine efficacy’ and involves 500 to 20,000 
participants (Pickering & Orenstein, 2002, p. 148). Phase 4 trials happen after the 
vaccine is already on the market and may involve 10,000 to 100,000 participants; 
postmarketing surveillance ostensibly includes millions of participations (Pickering & 
Orenstein, 2002, p. 148).  
 
The vaccine approval process in the U.S. is unusual because no less than 4 committees 
of political appointees sit above the FDA licensure process. The charter for each of 
these committees is focused first and foremost on the product, vaccines, rather than on 
health or wellness per se. The federal government uses a stakeholder model of decision 
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making where all of the relevant parties, including the vaccine maker, are usually at the 
table. The stakeholder model stands in contrast to Mertonian norms of science that 
emphasise disinterestedness and organised scepticism as well as the literature on the 
funding effect that shows that COI change research outcomes.  
 
The Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) 
consists of 15 members appointed by the FDA commissioner (FDA, 2017b). The charter 
states that the VRBPAC ‘advises the Commissioner or designee in discharging 
responsibilities as they relate to helping to ensure safe and effective vaccines and related 
biological products for human use...’  (FDA, 2017b). In 2017, Leonard Friedland, Vice 
President of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and David Greenberg, Associate Vice President 
of Sanofi Pasteur both sat on the VRBPAC (FDA, 2017a). The VRBPAC often offers 
their recommendations regarding a new vaccine before FDA staff have made a 
determination whether the vaccine is safe and effective (Pickering & Orenstein, 2002, p. 
149). Putting the political (stakeholder) process ahead of the scientific review process 
raises troubling questions about the objectivity of the FDA.  
 
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) also has a Committee on Infectious 
Diseases (COID) that studies new vaccines in the pipeline and makes recommendations 
on which vaccines should be added to the schedule. Since 2001, the APA’s COID 
vaccine schedule is ‘intentionally harmonized’ with the CDC’s ACIP schedule so that 
they are the same. Like the VRBPAC, the COID weighs in with their opinions before 
the FDA decides whether a vaccine is safe (Pickering & Orenstein, 2002, p. 150). The 
membership of COID is not publicly posted online, meetings are not public, and 
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minutes are not published. I wrote to the AAP in 2017 to request a list of COID 
members and the AAP never responded.  
 
The National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) at the Department of Health and 
Human Services ‘consists of 15 members appointed by the director of the national 
Vaccine Program in consultation with the National Academy of Sciences’ (Pickering & 
Orenstein, 2002, p. 149). The charter of the NVAC states that it is to ‘study and 
recommend ways to encourage the availability of an adequate supply of safe and 
effective vaccination products in the United States’ (NVAC, 2015). The assumption 
here, which is echoed in the charters of the other three advisory groups as well, is that 
vaccines are a permanent part of the health landscape. As of February 2016, both 
Timothy Cooke, CEO of NovaDigm (vaccine producer), and Philip Hosbach, Vice 
President of Sanofi Pasteur, are members of NVAC.  
 
The most important committee of all is the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP) at the CDC. Walton, Orenstein, & Pickering (2015) provide a history 
of ACIP. In 1938, the American Academy of Pediatrics — Committee on Immunization 
Procedures (now the Committee on Infectious Diseases) published an eight page 
pamphlet that came to be known as the Red Book that gave recommendations on the 
treatment of eighteen diseases (Walton et al., 2015, p. 406). Guidance was provided on 
six vaccines for children — diphtheria, pertussis, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, varicella, 
and smallpox (variola) (Walton et al., 2015, p. 406). In 1964, the Surgeon General of 
the U.S. Public Health Service created the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP) — prior to that vaccine policy was ad hoc or left to the states (Smith, 
2010, p. 68).  
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ACIP has become a virtual policy factory for adding vaccines to the national schedule. 
The ACIP contains 15 regular members and a quorum of 8 is enough to approve a 
recommendation (Smith, 2010, A73). ACIP also has 8 ex officio non-voting members 
made up of representatives from the various federal agencies that are involved with 
implementing vaccine policy and 31 non-voting liaison representatives from most of the 
major professional health associations in the country including the AAP, AMA, and 
America’s Health Insurance Plans (the trade association of the health insurance industry) 
(Smith, 2010, p. A69). ACIP meets three times a year; and 14 working groups meet at 
least once a month to prepare draft policy recommendations (Smith, 2010, p. A70).  
 
Four ACIP working groups are permanent: (1) Adult Immunization 
Schedule; (2) Influenza Vaccines; 3) General Recommendations on 
Immunization; and (4) Harmonized Schedule for Children and 
Adolescents, which works to ensure that vaccine schedules for children 
and adolescents are harmonized among ACIP, the American Academy of 
Pediatrics and the American Academy of Family Physicians, all of 
whom participate together in this working group (Smith, 2010, A72).  
 
The result of this extraordinary policy infrastructure is astonishing speed in adding new 
vaccines to the schedule. A few recent examples illustrate the point. The FDA approved 
the rotavirus vaccine, RotaTeq on 3 February 2006 and ACIP voted to add it to the 
schedule on 21 February 2006 (Smith, 2010, p. A73). Rotarix, also for the prevention of 
rotavirus, was approved by the FDA in April 2008 and added as an approved option to 
the routine infant immunisation schedule in June 2008 (Smith, 2010, p. A74). An earlier 
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rotavirus vaccine, Rotashield, was approved by ACIP and that recommendation was 
later withdrawn because it caused intussusception (an intestinal disorder) and fatalities 
in some children. So too with the HPV vaccine: Gardasil was approved by the FDA on 
8 June 2006 (FDA, 2009b); the ACIP working group had been working on HPV policy 
since 2004 and ACIP recommended ‘a routine 3-dose vaccination series for girls 11 and 
12 years of age’ three weeks later on 29 June 2006 (CDC, 2007).  
 
Officially, ACIP recommendations are not law; but in practice they are ‘generally 
regarded as national policy’ and adopted by most private health insurance companies 
and most states (Smith, 2010, p. A71). Furthermore, an ACIP recommendation gets a 
vaccine added to the federal Vaccines for Children Program that ‘pays for vaccine 
administration to almost 50% of American children under 6 years of age’ (Smith, 2010, 
p. A71). Most states then mandate that children must be immunised according to the 
national schedule in order to attend public day care or public schools. 
 
The eight to fifteen people who effectively decide what is injected into more than 90% 
of the population are not elected officials so they are not directly answerable to voters. 
In theory the CDC or HHS director could overrule ACIP but in practice that has only 
happened once (in 2003 when ACIP recommended a small pox vaccine for bioterrorism 
response teams and HHS overrode their decision) (Smith, 2010, p. A73). Also, it is 
striking how much more effective and efficient ACIP is compared with their 
counterparts in pesticide policy at the EPA for example — where it can take decades to 
develop a policy in connection with a single chemical substance. One key difference is 
that ACIP is recommending medical interventions that generate profits whereas the 
EPA is making recommendations that hurt corporate profits.  
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9.1.4 Vaccine licensure process at the FDA is characterised by studies that are 
short, small, and often use toxic placebos  
 
Vaccine safety studies used in the licensure process are conducted by the manufacturers 
which presents a clear conflict of interest. In this subsection I will present evidence that 
vaccine safety studies are too short and often use toxic placebos instead of saline in 
order to hide adverse reactions.  
 
If hypothetically, iatrogenic injury from vaccines had a long latency period — because 
of the toxicokinetics of the vaccine or the dynamics of autoimmune disease or the 
difficulties created by the fact that the target market are infants who are unable to 
narrate their own internal experience — many of the vaccine safety studies that have 
been approved by the FDA would not have been able to identify them because the trials 
were so short. For example, there are two hepatitis B vaccines licensed for use in the 
U.S. — one made by Merck and one made by GlaxoSmithKline. The evidence suggests 
neither of them has been adequately tested for safety in the target population. Holland 
(2012) notes that the package insert for Merck’s Recombivax HB states: ‘In three 
clinical studies, 434 doses of Recombivax HB, 5 mcg, were administered to 147 healthy 
infants and children (up to 10 years of age) who were monitored for 5 days after each 
dose’ (p. 70). Holland (2012) points out that ‘the insert does not state the ages of the 
children or the proportion of the 147 subjects who were infants. It makes no mention of 
newborns’ even though it is now given to almost all newborns (p. 70). By the same 
token, the package insert for GlaxoSmithKline’s (GSK) Engerix-B states: ‘In 36 clinical 
studies, a total of 13,495 doses of Engerix-B were administered to 5,071 healthy adults 
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and children who were initially seronegative for hepatitis B markers, and healthy 
neonates. All subjects were monitored for 4 days post-administration’ (Holland, 2012, p. 
70). There is no mention of how many neonates were in the study and the study results 
were not broken out separately for this population either (Holland, 2012, p. 70).  
 
But it is not just the hepatitis B vaccine. Relatively short safety studies are the norm in 
the licensing of vaccines. The package insert for the Hib (haemophilus influenzae type b) 
vaccine manufactured by Merck shows that it was licensed based on a trial that 
monitored adverse reactions for three days; the package insert of the Hib vaccine 
manufactured by GSK shows that it was licensed based on a trial that monitored adverse 
reactions for four days; and ‘the only stand-alone polio vaccine was licensed after a 
mere 48-hour follow-up period’ (Informed Consent Action Network, 2017b, p. 2).  
 
In addition to short safety studies, vaccines are almost always tested against toxic 
placebos rather than saline in order to hide adverse events. As I showed in chapter 5, 
Contract Research Organisations (CROs) have a number of ways that they can produce 
the outcomes desired by their pharmaceutical company clients. CROs are under 
enormous pressure to maximise the evidence of efficacy and minimise the evidence of 
harms. One way that many vaccine studies are manipulated is that instead of using a 
saline placebo as part of an RCT, another vaccine is used as the comparator instead. 
Alternatively, CROs put the toxic adjuvants (ethylmercury, aluminium) in the placebo 
and the only difference between the drug and placebo is the biological agent. None of 
this is prohibited by law. Beatrice Golomb (1995) then at the Department of Medicine at 
UCLA drew attention to problems with placebos in a letter to Nature:  
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The U.S. Food and Drug Administration sets no regulation on the 
constituents of placebos, and any guidelines are at best informal. 
Astonishingly, no systematic efforts are made to ensure the inertness of 
placebos: there is nothing validating the placebo standard against which 
other agents are measured. Further, the drug companies funding the trials 
control the placebo ingredients. The identity of the placebo and fillers 
used with the experimental drug are rarely stated in scientific studies (p. 
530).  
 
Fifteen years later, Golomb et al. (2010) showed that there are still no regulations 
concerning the contents of placebos in the U.S. In a review of all RCTs published in the 
four highest impact medical journals in 2008 and 2009, only 34% of studies of 
injectable treatments fully disclosed the contents of the placebo (Golomb et al., 2010, p. 
W-189). Jacobson, Ovsyannikova, and Poland (2009) reviewed four recent vaccine 
trials involving children and none of them used a saline placebo. ICAN (2018) reviewed 
the FDA applications for all of the vaccines currently on the national schedule and 
discovered that none of them used saline placebos (with the exception of Gardasil-9 
[HPV vaccine] where Merck ran a small subtrial using a saline placebo — but all of the 
study participants had previously received three doses of the original Gardasil vaccine 
and were in good health) (p. 6). 
 
9.1.5 Conflicts of interest at the VRBPAC and ACIP 
 
Getting a vaccine added to the schedule can be worth a billion dollars or more to a 
vaccine maker so the potential for conflicts of interest are extraordinary. The FDA’s 
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Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) and the 
CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) have been characterised 
by extraordinary conflicts of interest (Krimsky, 2004).    
 
Following a high profile debacle in connection with the approval of the Rotashield 
rotavirus vaccine, the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government 
Reform in August 1999 started an investigation into ‘conflicts of interest in federal 
vaccine policy making’ (Committee on Government Reform, 2000). The committee 
studied financial disclosure forms, examined minutes of meetings, and interviewed 
advisory committee members (Committee on Government Reform, 2000, p. 1). The 
majority staff report was released on June 15, 2000. It concluded that, ‘conflict of 
interest rules employed the FDA and the CDC have been weak, enforcement has been 
lax, and committee members with substantial ties to pharmaceutical companies have 
been given waivers to participate in committee proceedings’ (Committee on 
Government Reform, 2000, p. 1). Among other problems, the committee found that:  
• The CDC routinely grants waivers from conflict of interest rules to 
every member of its advisory committee [ACIP].  
• The Chairman of the CDC’s advisory committee [ACIP]... owned 600 
shares of stock in Merck, a pharmaceutical company with an active 
vaccine division.  
• Four out of eight CDC advisory committee members who voted to 
approve guidelines for the rotavirus vaccine in June 1998 had financial 
ties to pharmaceutical companies that were developing different 
versions of the vaccine. 
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• Three out of five FDA advisory committee members who voted to 
approve the rotavirus vaccine in December 1997 had financial ties to 
pharmaceutical companies that were developing different versions of 
the vaccine (Committee on Government Reform, 2000, p. 1).  
 
The actions of both ACIP and VRBPAC appear contrary to federal law that ‘requires 
that advisory committee members disclose their financial interests and recuse 
themselves from matters in which they have an interest’ (Committee on Government 
Reform, 2000, p. 2). Paul Offit, who will be cited often in this chapter, was named in 
the report as having voted in favour of Rotashield three times as part of his membership 
in ACIP in spite of the fact that he had a COI as a result of holding patents on a rival 
rotavirus vaccine; Offit is also the Maurice R. Hilleman Professor of Vaccinology at the 
University of Pennsylvania, a chair endowed by Merck; and Offit only recused himself 
for the vote as to whether to withdraw Rotashield from the market (Committee on 
Government Reform, 2000, p. 18). The VRBPAC and ACIP both approved Rotashield 
unanimously, in spite of concerns about safety expressed by several committee 
members, prior to the vaccine receiving FDA approval. On August 10, 2000, Dan 
Burton, chairman of the Committee on Government Reform wrote to the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services in connection with the report stating, ‘It 
has become clear over the course of this investigation that the VRBPAC and the ACIP 
are dominated by individuals with close working relationships with the vaccine 
producers’ (Krimsky, 2004, p. 97). The final report contained 17 proposed reforms 
including, ‘individuals who serve on advisory committees involving vaccines should 
have no financial ties to vaccine manufacturers’ (Committee on Government Reform, 
2000, p. 22). As of January 2018, a Vice President from Merck and an Associate Vice 
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President from Sanofi Pasteur were serving as voting members on the VRBPAC and the 
ACIP still does not disclose the names of the members of its working groups nor 
publish minutes from working group meetings.  
 
Financial conflicts of interest at the CDC go well beyond ACIP. While the CDC 
repeatedly claims on its website that it ‘does not accept commercial support’ the 
evidence proves otherwise (ICAN, 2017a, p. 26). As I showed in chapter 5, the CDC 
Foundation accepts millions of dollars in corporate donations every year (see also 
Lenzer, 2015). The moment the CDC accepts any outside funding it becomes a 
conflicted party subject to the funding effect and such funding raises doubts as to the 
scientific integrity of their work.  
 
9.1.6 Post-market surveillance of vaccine adverse events is inadequate  
 
The 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act established the Vaccine Adverse 
Event Reporting System (VAERS) administered by the Department of Health and 
Human Services to track injuries from vaccination (in ICAN, 2017a, p. 2). ‘In 2016, 
VAERS received 59,117 reports of adverse reactions following vaccination including 
432 deaths, 1,091 permanent disabilities, 4,132 hospitalizations, and 10,284 emergency 
room visits’ (ICAN, 2017a). As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, former 
FDA Commissioner David Kessler (1993) noted that only a small percentage of adverse 
events are ever reported. He cites Scott et al. [1987], in a study of physicians in Rhode 
Island, who found that ‘only about 1% of serious adverse events are reported to the 
FDA’ (Kessler, 1993, p. 2765). Because VAERS reports are voluntary, it is impossible 
to know the true number of adverse events in connection with vaccines every year.  
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The Department of Health and Human Services provided a nearly $1 million grant to 
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care (affiliated with Harvard Medical School) to measure 
vaccine adverse events in a large not-for-profit health services company (Lazarus & 
Klompas, 2011). In their final report, Lazarus and Klompas (2011) write,  
 
Preliminary data were collected from June 2006 through October 2009 
on 715,000 patients, and 1.4 million doses (of 45 different vaccines) 
were given to 376,452 individuals. Of these doses, 35,570 possible 
reactions (2.6 percent of vaccinations) were identified. This is an average 
of 890 possible events, an average of 1.3 events per clinician, per month 
(p. 6). 
 
These are alarming numbers — an adverse event rate of 2.6% is much higher than the ‘1 
in a million’ figure so often mentioned by the CDC and clinicians.  
 
The Harvard Pilgrim Health Care team also reported that it would be feasible to move 
from a voluntary to an automatic electronic system of reporting vaccine injury that 
would vastly improve the accuracy of the data submitted to VAERS (Lazarus & 
Klompas, 2011). However that system was never implemented because after the 
Harvard Pilgrim team presented their preliminary data, the CDC ceased all contact with 
the researchers (Lazarus & Klompas, 2011). ‘Unfortunately, there was never an 
opportunity to perform system performance assessments because the necessary CDC 
contacts were no longer available and the CDC consultants responsible for receiving 
data were no longer responsive to our multiple requests to proceed...’ (Lazarus & 
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Klompas, 2011, p. 6). Below I will also show that Harvard Pilgrim faced bankruptcy 
and other problems in 1999, but there is no evidence that these problems interfered with 
the HHS study led by Lazarus and Klompas.  
 
9.1.7 Revolving door between CDC and vaccine makers  
 
There is a revolving door between the CDC branch responsible for vaccine safety and 
the vaccine makers they are charged with regulating. Thomas Verstraeten was a senior 
research scientist at the CDC who led perhaps the most important study of vaccines and 
autism to date (Verstraeten et al., 2003). He was hired by vaccine maker 
GlaxoSmithKline on the morning he was scheduled to present his findings to the 
Institute of Medicine and moved to their offices in Belgium (Kirby, 2005). Julie 
Gerberding was director of the CDC and administrator of the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) from 2002 to 2009 during which time the 
CDC produced several reports that concluded there was no link between vaccines and 
autism. ‘A year after leaving as director of CDC in 2009, Dr. Julie Gerberding took a 
position as president of Merck Vaccines’ (DeLong, 2012, p. 70). SEC filings show that 
Gerberding sold over 38,000 shares of Merck stock in 2015 for just over $2.3 million 
dollars and that following the sale she still owned just under 32,000 shares of Merck 
stock valued at about $2 million (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015).  
 
Elias Zerhouni served as director of the National Institutes of Health from 2002 to 2008. 
After leaving government he became an advisor to Christopher Viehbacher, Chief 
Executive of the pharmaceutical giant Sanofi-Aventis (Herper, 2010, para. 2). In 2010, 
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Zerhouni was named to head the research labs at the Sanofi-Aventis in spite of the fact 
that he had little background in drug development (Herper, 2010, para. 4).  
 
The revolving door also happens at the state level where legislative mandates are key to 
expanding the market for vaccines. Eddy Bresnitz served as New Jersey’s deputy 
commissioner of health and state immunologist where he helped usher in a requirement 
that all children in the state must get annual flu vaccinations in order to attend preschool 
or day care in spite of the flu vaccine’s low efficacy rate (Capuzzo, 2007). Shortly 
thereafter he was hired as Medical Director at Merck where he oversees Global Adult 
Vaccines (Belkin, 2011, p. 163).  
 
9.1.8 Lobbying at the state level to make vaccines compulsory  
 
Even though vaccines are licensed and approved at the federal level, in the U.S. system, 
vaccine policy is ultimately at the discretion of the states. In spite of the potential for 
that to lead to widely varying policies, vaccination law is remarkably similar between 
states. Mello, Abiola, and Colgrove (2012) document the fact that ‘school entry 
mandates’ (state requirements that children cannot attend school unless they have been 
vaccinated according to state recommendations) are largely driven by pharmaceutical 
company campaigns that include everything from providing information, lobbying, 
drafting the legislation, mobilising physicians’ organisations, and conducting consumer 
marketing campaigns (p. 893). So for example, within a year of the approval of the HPV 
vaccine by the FDA and ACIP, ‘legislation relating to the vaccine was introduced in 41 
states and the District of Columbia, including bills in 24 states that would mandate HPV 
vaccination for 6th-grade girls’ (Mello et al., 2012, p. 893).  
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More recently, vaccine makers have pushed states to repeal religious and personal belief 
exemptions to vaccine mandates. Perhaps the most noteworthy example is California’s 
SB277 that eliminated ‘all personal and religious belief exemptions to the state’s 
childhood vaccine requirements for entry into public and private schools, as well as day 
care centers’ (Parpia, 2015, para. 1). An investigation by the Sacramento Bee revealed 
that ‘pharmaceutical companies and their trade groups gave more than $2 million to 
current members of the Legislature in 2013–2014’; the top recipient of this largesse was 
Senator Richard Pan who received $95,150 from drug makers and was the sponsor of 
SB277 (Miller, 2015, para. 5). Leading pharmaceutical companies spent another $3 
million during that session on ‘lobbying the Legislature, the governor, state pharmacists’ 
boards, and other agencies’ (Miller, 2015, para. 7).  
 
Peter Doshi, editor of BMJ notes that Every Child by Two (ECBT), the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, and the Immunization Action Coalition (IAC) also lobby for 
state vaccine mandates and removal of personal belief exemptions (Doshi, 2017, p. 1). 
Ostensibly these are non-profit organisations, but they all receive substantial funding 
from pharmaceutical companies that stand to profit from these recommendations (Doshi, 
2017, p. 1). These organisations are also funded by the CDC even though ‘U.S. federal 
law prohibits use of CDC award money for lobbying’ (Doshi, 2017, p. 2).  
 
9.1.9 COI in scientific journals associated with vaccines  
 
DeLong (2012) shows that COI are endemic to scientific publishing in connection with 
vaccine research. DeLong (2012) searched for the terms ‘vaccine’ and ‘safety’ during 
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the years 2006 to 2010 in the six medical journals with the highest impact factors 
(Archives of Internal Medicine, AIM, BMJ, JAMA, the Lancet, and the NEJM) and 
Pediatrics. Her search returned 39 articles that contained both terms — of those, ‘thirty-
one studies (79.5%) included at least one author who declared a COI with a vaccine 
manufacturer, and 24 studies (61.5%), included at least three authors with COIs’ 
(DeLong, 2012, p. 72).  
 
9.2.0 Introduction to the scientific debate on vaccine safety 
 
The conflict over the safety of individual vaccines and the vaccine schedule has become 
so fierce that many people refer to it as the ‘vaccine war(s)’ (see, e.g., Public 
Broadcasting Service, 2010; Wadman & You, 2017). The combatants in the vaccine 
wars are the medical, pharmaceutical, and public health establishment (with some 
exceptions) versus a range of vaccine safety and autism advocacy groups often made up 
of the parents of vaccine injured children. The sites of struggle include print media, film, 
TV, radio, the internet, social media, doctors offices, hospitals, playgroups, day care 
facilities, and schools to name a few. And the ammunition in the vaccine wars is a wide 
range of studies and testimonials that opposing sides use to make their case.  
 
Healthychildren.org (2017), a project of the American Academy of Pediatrics, has a 
webpage titled ‘Vaccine Safety: Examine the Evidence’ that provides brief descriptions 
and links to 43 studies, one court case, and one investigative journalism report. Since 
the 1970s, Institute of Medicine (IOM, now called the National Academy of Medicine) 
committees have issued 60 reports on vaccine safety. IOM (1991) reviewed the 
literature on 22 common adverse reactions to the DTP vaccine, IOM (1994) examined 
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the scientific literature on 54 commonly reported adverse events associated with seven 
of the vaccines on the schedule, and IOM [2012] reviewed the literature on 158 injuries 
associated with six vaccines on the schedule (ICAN, 2017a). In each case the IOM 
found a causal relationship between some vaccines and some adverse outcomes, but it 
did not find a causal association between any vaccine and autism (ICAN, 2017a). Paul 
Offit, Professor at the University of Pennsylvania and Chief of the Division of 
Infectious Diseases at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia has become the de facto 
face of the national vaccine schedule in the U.S in part through putting out books every 
few years on some aspect of the vaccine debate (Offit & Bell, 1999; Offit, 2005, 2007, 
2008, 2010). Science bloggers including Skeptical Raptor, Respectful Insolence, and 
Just the Vax link to a wide range of articles and studies that show that vaccines are safe.  
 
By contrast, the relatively new, anonymous website, Vaccine Safety Commission (n.d.), 
links to 50 studies that show a link between vaccines and a range of adverse outcomes 
including autism. Miller (2016a) reviews 400 critical vaccine safety studies, that he 
argues collectively make the case that vaccines are unsafe and cause autism amongst 
other iatrogenic injuries. Skyhorse Publishing has produced at least 16 books on the 
association between vaccines and autism including Conte and Lyons (2014); Habakus, 
Holland, and Rosenberg (2012); Kennedy (2014); and Lyons-Weiler (2016). SafeMinds, 
an autism advocacy group, contributed to 55 studies in their first 14 years of existence 
(SafeMinds, 2013). Ginger Taylor (2016) became an activist after her son regressed into 
autism after his 18 month shots. Her website, Adventures in Autism links to 142 studies 
on the links between vaccines and autism (Taylor, 2007). There are also websites that 
collect testimonials from parents who claim that vaccines caused autism and/or other 
disorders in their children. Vaxxed.com (n.d) has collected 6,736 vaccine injury 
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testimonials on video; Following Vaccinations (n.d) has collected 1,400 vaccine injury 
testimonials; and Vaccineinjury.info (n.d.) has 858 testimonials (as of 16 October 2017). 
It is not clear if there is any overlap between these testimonial sites.   
 
The sheer number of studies cited by various camps tells us little about the contents — 
other than to say that these factions live in separate universes, each of which is 
relatively stable; there are more than enough studies, performed by parties respected 
within these respective knowledge communities, to support each step in the logic 
claimed by each camp. These separate universes are a mirror image of each other — for 
every study cited by the mainstream camp, there is an opposite study cited by the 
sceptics camp on the same topic, sometimes even using the same data, and vice versa. 
The mainstream position that vaccines are safe and effective still dominates all of the 
leading journals, academic institutions, and government agencies. But vaccine safety 
and autism advocacy groups have closed the credibility gap somewhat over the last 
seventeen years. When the first study came out from an autism advocacy group, 
Bernard, Enayati, Redwood, Roger, and Binstock (2001), it was a medical hypothesis 
backed by a literature review. But vaccine safety and autism advocacy groups have 
become increasingly sophisticated and now fund their own animal (Hewitson et al., 
2010) and epidemiological studies (e.g. Mawson et al. 2017a and 2017b), and can point 
to research from elite institutions to back their claims (e.g. Leslie, Kobre, Richmand, 
Guloksuz, & Leckman, 2017, that shows an association between vaccines and a range of 
adverse mental health outcomes, includes four researchers from the Yale Child Studies 
Center). It is not possible to work through every study on vaccine safety and the safety 
of individual ingredients. Instead I will focus on eleven key facets of the conflict that 
illustrate the logic of the opposing camps and the differences between them. I will begin 
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this section by covering five key debates: What are the net benefits to society from 
widescale vaccination programs (9.2.1)? How important is herd immunity (9.2.2)? Is 
ethylmercury toxic at the doses contained in the vaccine schedule (9.2.3)? Is aluminium 
toxic at the doses contained in the vaccine schedule (9.2.4)? Are other ingredients in 
vaccines toxic at the doses contained in the vaccine schedule (9.2.5)? Then I will review 
studies showing no association between vaccines and autism (9.2.6), vaccinated vs. 
unvaccinated studies (9.2.7), studies on the safety of the hepatitis B vaccine (9.2.8), 
recent studies on the flu vaccine (9.2.9), allegations of fraud in vaccine safety research 
(9.2.10), and evidence that vaccines do not work very well in the first year of life 
(9.2.11).  
 
9.2.1 What are the net benefits to society from widescale vaccination campaigns? 
 
There are two radically different ways of seeing the net benefits to society from 
widescale vaccination programs. Public health officials often cite vaccination programs 
and the invention of antibiotics as two of the most important health breakthroughs in 
human history (Offit, 2010). Whitney, Zhou, Singleton, and Schuchat (2014) estimate 
that, ‘among children born during 1994–2013, vaccination will prevent an estimated 
322 million illnesses, 21 million hospitalizations, and 732,000 deaths over the course of 
their lifetimes, at a net savings of $295 billion in direct costs and $1.38 trillion in total 
society costs’ (p. 352). Zhou et al. (2014) in a study of the 2009 birth cohort estimated 
that every dollar spent on vaccination results in $3 in direct benefits and $10 in societal 
benefits (p. 577). However, Rozenbaum, Van Hoek, Hak, and Postma (2010) point out 
that cost benefit analyses of vaccine impact are often highly dependent on assumptions 
about indirect effects and produce widely ranging estimates (p. 2367).  
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Many of those who study the history of science and medicine take a different view. 
They argue that changes in the political economy of states, not mass vaccination 
campaigns, are responsible for the large gains in life expectancy over the last 100 years 
(Guyer, Freedman, Strobino, & Sondik, 2000; Wootton, 2006). Over the course of the 
20th century, life expectancy in the U.S. increased by 56% (Guyer et al., 2000, p. 1307). 
‘Between 1900 and 1998, the percentage of child deaths attributable to infectious 
diseases declined from 61.6% to 2%’ (Guyer et al., 2000, pp. 1307 and 1314). But when 
Guyer et al. (2000) looked at the data from 99 years worth of annual vital statistics for 
the U.S. they found that the evidence does not support the intuition that the increase in 
life expectancy and decline in child deaths stemmed from the introduction of antibiotics 
and vaccines. They write, ‘nearly 90% of the decline in infectious disease mortality 
among U.S. children occurred before 1940 when few antibiotics or vaccines were 
available’ (p. 1314). Later they underscore this point when they write,  
 
Vaccination, while first used in the 18th century, became more widely 
implemented in the middle part of the [20th] century. Vaccines against 
diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis became available during the late 1920s 
but only widely used in routine pediatric practice after World War II. 
Thus vaccination does not account for the impressive declines in 
mortality seen in the first half of the century (Guyer et al. 2000, p. 1315).  
 
That is not to say that vaccines had no part in the health gains over the last century — 
the declines in rates of infectious disease have been impressive following widespread 
national vaccination campaigns (Guyer et al. 2000, p. 1315). Breyer (1993) points out 
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that the last few percentage points of any remedy are the most expensive and most 
difficult to achieve. But the fact remains that the declines in fatalities from infectious 
disease are largely the result of political and economic factors including ‘improved 
socioeconomic conditions’, ‘water treatment, food safety, organized solid waste 
disposal, and public education about hygienic practices’, along with ‘improvements in 
housing and decreased crowding in U.S. cities’ (Guyer et al. 2000, p. 1315). In the 
debate over vaccines the two sides are often talking past each other with supporters of 
the current scheme citing estimates of morbidity (disease incidence) while critics point 
out that changes in political economy have made a greater contribution than vaccines to 
declines in mortality over the last hundred years.   
 
9.2.2 How important is herd immunity?  
 
A common refrain in articles and studies in defence of the current vaccine schedule is 
that ‘maintaining high immunization rates’ is essential to creating ‘herd immunity’ 
(Offit, 2010). Even though the term was coined almost 100 years ago, it was not widely 
used until recently (Fine, Eames, & Heymann, 2011, p. 911). Today, ‘herd immunity’ 
carries a variety of different meanings; the common thread that connects the different 
definitions is the idea that the more people who are vaccinated in a population, the 
lower the risk of infection among susceptible individuals (Fine et al., 2011, p. 911). 
Widescale vaccination programs are thus said to provide ‘indirect protection’ to those 
who are immunocompromised or otherwise unable to receive vaccines (Fine et al., 2011, 
p. 911). Herd immunity has become the ‘central rationale for compulsory vaccination’ 
(Holland & Zachary, 2014, p. 4).  
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Critics of the current vaccine schedule argue that herd immunity is a myth promoted by 
pharmaceutical companies to sell more vaccines. They point out that the ‘herd immunity 
threshold’ (also called the ‘vaccine critical level’) — the proportion of the population 
who need to be vaccinated to provide herd immunity — keeps rising (Solomon, 2014). 
In the 1960s the U.S. Public Health Service claimed that it could eradicate measles by 
1967 by vaccinating 55% of the population (Sencer, Dull, & Langmuir, 1967). Later the 
herd immunity threshold was revised upward to 70%, then 80%, 83%, 85%, and 90%, 
(Solomon, 2014). Now it is routine to see public health officials use 95% vaccination 
rates as essential for maintaining herd immunity (Offit, 2010). Fine et al. (2011) go one 
step further and recommend 100% immunisation rates which means that the size of the 
‘herd’ that is protected through passive immunity approaches zero.  
 
A second criticism is that the theory of herd immunity is based on observations of 
natural immunity even though vaccine induced immunity does not function in the same 
way. Natural exposure to and recovery from viruses such as measles provides lifetime 
immunity. Immunity from vaccines wanes over time — usually in about 2 to 10 years 
(Blaylock, 2009). So the argument is that models based on herd immunity from natural 
infections do not explain herd immunity thresholds from vaccine-induced immunity 
(Blaylock, 2009). At any given time over the last 50 years, upwards of 50% of the adult 
population did not have immunity to the various diseases for which they were 
vaccinated against as children (Blaylock, 2009). In a widely circulated article in The 
Hill, Dubeau (2016) asks, if most of the population does not have immunity to the 
various viruses that one vaccinates against (because the effectiveness has waned over 
time), then where are all the epidemics (that proponents of herd immunity claim would 
break out if the vaccination rate fell below 95%)?  
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Resolving this question as to the value of herd immunity potentially has important 
implications for autism. If herd immunity does not work as claimed, it changes all of the 
cost benefit analyses on which vaccine decisions are made and undermines the rationale 
for mandatory vaccination policies as well.  
 
9.2.3 Is ethylmercury toxic (at the doses contained in the vaccine schedule)? 
 
Morris Kharasch, a chemist at the University of Maryland, invented thimerosal (also 
spelled thiomersal) in 1927 and his patent was granted in 1928 (Kharasch, 1928). 
‘Thimerosal is 49% mercury by weight, in the form of ethylmercury attached to 
thiosalicylate’ (Hertz-Picciotto, 2011, p. 847) and it has been used as an antibacterial 
and preservative. Eli Lilly began marketing thimerosal under the trade name Merthiolate 
in the 1930s and it was added to a wide range of products including antiseptic ointments, 
nasal sprays, topical creams, and vaccines (Baker, 2008). Antibiotics were not yet in 
widespread use and an antibacterial agent that could be used in a range of products was 
in high demand (Subcommittee on Human Rights and Wellness, 2003, p. 10). Early 
safety studies were primitive by modern standards. Smithburn, Kempf, Zerfas, and 
Gilman (1930) administered high doses of thimerosal (up to 500 mg of thimerosal 
which = 248 mg ethylmercury) to 22 human patients during a meningitis outbreak. 
Thimerosal in this case was used as the treatment itself — not as an additive or 
preservative. The patients did not appear to display ‘anaphylactoid or shock symptoms’ 
so later commentaries declared ‘the toleration of such intravenous doses indicates a very 
low order of toxicity of Merthiolate for man’ (Powell & Jamieson, 1931, p. 306). Geier, 
Sykes, and Geier (2007) note that seven of the patients were only monitored for one day 
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and speculate that the short observation period may have been because these seven 
patients died of meningitis. Only one patient was observed for 62 days but that also may 
be too short to measure the long term effects of ethylmercury (Geier et al., 2007, p. 577).  
 
Powell and Jamieson (1931) divided 200 rabbits into 6 groups and injected them with 
different amounts of thimerosal — 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, and 40 mg per kilogram of body 
weight. Seven days later all of the rabbits injected with 15 mg/kg had survived and 29 
of the rabbits injected with 25 mg/kg survived and 12 died; so 15 parts per million 
became the no observed adverse effect level (NOAEL). No behavioural changes were 
included and the rabbits were only studied for seven days. As I will show below, more 
recent studies suggest that Powell and Jamieson (1931) dramatically underestimated the 
toxicity of thimerosal. Later, as the approval process at the FDA became more stringent, 
thimerosal was grandfathered in without further safety studies because it was ‘generally 
considered safe’ as a result of its widespread use (Kirby, 2005, p. 48).  
 
Geier et al. (2007) cite 62 studies published between 1935 and 1998 that show 
thimerosal is toxic to plants, animals, and people. Kennedy (2014) cites five studies that 
show that ethylmercury may be more toxic than methylmercury. Kennedy (2014) also 
points out that California’s Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 
(OEHHA) designated thimerosal a human reproductive toxin in 1990 (p. 83). In 2003, 
Bayer Corporation petitioned to reconsider this designation and in response the OEHHA 
(2004) reaffirmed its earlier ruling.  
 
The regulatory history of thimerosal fits with the pattern of almost every other chemical 
reviewed in this thesis — even when there is good epidemiological data on health risks, 
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it can take decades or longer to get effective regulatory action. Geier et al. (2007) 
provide a helpful literature review of attempts to regulate thimerosal (and I am grateful 
to them for alerting me to the sources in this paragraph). Concerns about the toxicity of 
thimerosal date back to Salle and Lazarus [1935] and a sizeable literature on health 
harms developed over the ensuing years (Geier et al., 2007, p. 578). The FDA became 
concerned about the safety of over the counter drugs containing mercury in 1974 and 
convened an advisory panel to conduct a formal review in 1975 (Geier et al., 2007, p. 
589). The Veteran’s Administration and NIH funded a study by van Horn et al. [1977] 
that concluded that thimerosal is toxic in ophthalmic drugs (Geier et al., 2007, p. 589). 
The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences funded a study by Fagan et al. 
[1977] that found that thimerosal is ‘highly toxic’ and that ‘equally effective and far less 
toxic broad-spectrum antifungal and antibacterial antiseptics are currently available’ (in 
Geier et al., 2007, p. 589). The FDA’s advisory panel issued its report in 1980 and 
declared that all 18 of the products containing mercury that it reviewed were either 
unsafe or ineffective (Geier et al., 2007, p. 589). The panel also noted that thimerosal 
causes an allergic reaction in anywhere from 10 to 26% of those studied (Geier et al., 
2007, p. 589). The FDA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rules or Notice of 
Proposed Rules to regulate or restrict mercury content in ‘1980, 1982, 1990, 1991, 1994, 
and 1995. No action was taken on any of these occasions’ (Geier et al., 2007, p. 590).  
 
The catalyst for the current debate about mercury in vaccines and autism was an 
amendment by Representative Pallone (Democrat, New Jersey, 6th District) to the Food 
and Drug Modernization Act in 1997 that required the FDA to produce a list of ‘drugs 
and foods that contain intentionally introduced mercury compounds’ and to provide a 
‘quantitative and qualitative analysis of the mercury compounds on the list’ (Offit & 
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Jew, 2003, p. 1394). This was more than a decade after the passage of the NCVIA of 
1986 and the vaccine schedule had already doubled by this time. At the time three 
vaccines on the schedule contained thimerosal — DTaP, Hib, and hepatitis B — and all 
of those vaccines required multiple doses. So American children were being ‘exposed to 
a cumulative dose of mercury as high as 187.5 µg by 6 months of age’ (Offit & Jew, 
2003, p. 1394). Over the years, federal agencies had set different limits for the 
maximum safe daily exposure of mercury — the EPA set the limit at 0.1 micrograms 
per kilogram of body weight; ‘the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR) calculated the safety limit at 0.3 micrograms per kilogram per day, and the 
FDA officials set the limit at 0.4 micrograms per kilogram per day’ (Kirby, 2005, p. 49). 
Prior to Representative Pallone’s amendment, no one at the CDC, EPA, ATSDR, or 
FDA had actually done the math to figure out how much mercury American children 
were receiving through the expanded vaccine schedule (Kirby, 2005, p. 49). Prompted 
by the FDA Modernization Act, the FDA finally did the calculations and discovered that 
‘most American children were being exposed to levels [of mercury] in excess of federal 
limits’ (Kirby, 2005, p. 49). ‘A two-month-old child weighing 5 kilograms could have 
been exposed to 62.5 micrograms of mercury in a single day. This would have been 125 
times more than the EPA limit for that child (0.5 micrograms per day), 42 times more 
than the ATSDR limit (1.5 micrograms per day), and 31 time more than the FDA limit 
(2.0 micrograms per day)’ (Kirby, 2005, p. 49). The various federal limits were set 
based on ingested mercury, but injected mercury is considerably more dangerous 
because it bypasses the entero-hepatic pathway that the body usually uses to filter and 
remove toxicants (Thomas & Margulis, 2016, p. 13).  
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Documents turned over in a lawsuit against the pharmaceutical industry revealed that 
Merck was aware of the increased mercury levels in the vaccine schedule, was 
concerned about the possible health effects, and failed to notify regulators about it 
(Kennedy, 2005 and 2014). A 27 March 1991 memo by renowned vaccine inventor and 
Merck scientist Maurice Hilleman, ‘warned Gordon Douglas, then-president of the 
company’s vaccine division, that six-month-old children administered the shots on 
schedule would suffer mercury exposures 87 times the daily Swedish safety standards’ 
(Kennedy, 2014, p. 89). ‘Hilleman recommended that thimerosal use be discontinued, 
“especially where use in infants and young children is anticipated”’ (Kennedy, 2014, p. 
90). ‘Hilleman also noted that the drug industry knew of non-toxic alternatives to 
thimerosal’ while also expressing concerns about cost (Kennedy, 2005, p. 7). Douglas, 
and by extension Merck, ignored Hilleman’s warning and between 1991 (when the 
memo was written) and 1999 (when thimerosal was eventually removed from some 
vaccines) ACIP added seven additional shots containing thimerosal to the national 
childhood vaccine schedule (Kennedy, 2005, p. 8).  
 
So how does anyone justify the continued use of mercury in vaccines more than 80 
years after safety concerns were first raised and more than four decades after the FDA 
expressed concerns about mercury in medications? Those who support the current 
schedule argue that it has been taken out of most childhood vaccines and that the 
toxicokinetics of ethylmercury are different than the toxicokinetics of methylmercury 
and therefore ethylmercury is safer than methylmercury (Offit & Jew 2003).  
 
There are reasons to be sceptical about these arguments. Yes, thimerosal has been 
removed from most vaccines on the U.S. schedule for children (and replaced with 
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increased aluminium) but thimerosal is still in three different brands of multidose flu 
vaccines (Fluvirin, Flulaval, Fluzone), one meningococcal vaccine, and three tetanus-
diphtheria vaccines (Thomas & Margulis, 2016, p. 14). The CDC and its defenders want 
to have it both ways — they want credit for proceeding from an abundance of caution in 
removing thimerosal from many vaccines on the childhood schedule but then 
inexplicably, they added it even earlier in the developmental window when the fetus is 
most vulnerable to toxicants. The toxicokinetics of ethylmercury (and the similarities 
and differences between methylmercury and ethylmercury) are not well understood 
(Clarkson & Magos, 2006; Clarkson, Vyas, & Ballatori, 2007). IOM (2001) estimates 
that ‘methylmercury has a whole-body half-life in the range of 70 to 80 days’ (p. 39). 
IOM (2001) does not venture a guess for the half-life of ethylmercury, saying simply 
that it is ‘not known’ (p. 39). Dórea, Farina, and Rocha (2013) argue that in vitro studies 
show remarkable similarities between ethylmercury and methylmercury but that in vivo 
studies suggest distinct toxicokinetics (p. 700) But then they go on to write, ‘a 
simultaneous exposure to both etHg and meHg might result in enhanced neurotoxic 
effects in developing mammals’ (Dórea et al., p. 700). Given that methylmercury 
(meHG) is already in the bodies of most Americans, simultaneous exposure (when 
ethylmercury is injected) is more than just a hypothetical scenario.  
 
Jafari, Rostampou, Fallah, and Hesami (2017) performed a meta analysis of 44 studies 
on ‘the association between mercury levels and autism spectrum disorders’ and found 
that the ‘mercury level in whole blood (Hedges’ [g] = 0.43; CI: 0.12, 0.74), red blood 
cells (Hedges’ [g] = 1.61; CI: 0.83, 2.38), and brain (0.61ng/g; CI: 0.02, 1.19) was 
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significantly higher in ASD patients than healthy subjects’ (p. 289).14 In section 9.2.9, I 
will discuss in more detail a study showing an association between the flu shot during 
pregnancy and ASD.  
 
9.2.4 Is aluminium toxic (at the doses contained in the vaccine schedule)? 
 
Nearly 100 years ago, scientists discovered that simply injecting killed viruses into 
people usually did not produce a robust immune response. So they started 
experimenting with adjuvants — substances that shock the body into producing a 
greater immune response. Ramon [1925] pioneered the use of adjuvants including 
‘starch, plant extracts, or fish oils combined with the diphtheria toxoid administered to 
horses’ (Garçon, Hem, & Friede, 2018, p. 61). Glenny, Pope, and Waddington [1926], 
in experiments for the Pasteur Institute observed that if they combined aluminium 
potassium sulphate (also known as alum) with diphtheria toxoid that it improved the 
immune response to the vaccine (Garçon et al., 2018, p. 61). Over time various 
aluminium compounds were added to many vaccines, ‘aluminum salts, in the form of 
aluminum oxyhydroxide or hydroxyphosphate, are the most widely used adjuvants in 
human vaccines’ (Garçon et al., 2018, p. 61). However, ‘there is still no consensus 
regarding the mechanisms by which aluminium-containing adjuvants potentiate the 
immune response’ (Garçon et al., 2018, p. 66). Aluminium adjuvants have been injected 
3 billion times into human bodies (Garçon et al., 2018, p. 66) and yet scientists are still 
not sure how they work.  
 
                                                
14 ‘A Hedges’ g is a measure of effect size... a g of 1 indicates the two groups differ by 1 
standard deviation, a g of 2 indicates they differ by 2 standard deviations’ (Glen, 2016). 
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The recent history of thimerosal and aluminium adjuvants are intertwined in important 
ways. Thimerosal was removed from many vaccines starting in 1999; manufacturing of 
many thimerosal containing vaccines stopped in 2001, but vaccines that were not past 
their expiration date were allowed to remain on the market until January 2003 (CDC, 
2015a). The removal of thimerosal from vaccines was an extremely important natural 
experiment that would reveal whether in fact ethylmercury was responsible for the 
autism epidemic. But the CDC took actions during this period that introduced 
confounding factors that muddied the waters (Miller, 2016b). In February 2000, ACIP 
added 4 doses of the pneumococcus vaccine to the childhood schedule and each dose 
contains 125 µg of aluminium (Miller, 2016b, p. 109). In 2002, ACIP added two doses 
of influenza vaccine to the schedule for all children 6 to 23 months of age even though 
the majority of doses contain thimerosal (Miller, 2016b, p. 109). In 2004, ACIP 
recommended adding the flu vaccine for pregnant women even though thimerosal has 
been shown to cross the placenta barrier and the blood brain barrier in the fetus is not 
yet developed at that stage (Miller, 2016b, p. 109). In 2005, ACIP added two doses of 
hepatitis A vaccine to the childhood schedule and each dose contains 250 µg of 
aluminium (Miller, 2016b, p. 109). In 2011, ACIP added DTaP to the schedule for 
pregnant women which contains 625 µg of aluminium (Miller, 2016b, p. 109) even 
though aluminium has been shown in animal studies to cross the placenta barrier and 
foetal blood brain barrier (Yumoto et al. 2001). In all during this period, ACIP added to 
the schedule as much 25 µg of thimerosal and 625 µg of aluminium for pregnant women 
along with up to 50 µg of thimerosal and 1,000 additional µg of aluminium for children 
in the first two years of life (Miller, 2016b, p. 109). Offit, Reiss, and others routinely 
claim that the ‘removal of thimerosal from the schedule’ proves that vaccines are safe 
which is disingenuous because thimerosal was not completely removed from the 
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children’s schedule, it was also added to the schedule for pregnant women, and the 
aluminium content increased for both pregnant women and young children and all of 
those are confounding factors. Regarding thimerosal, the actions of ACIP members 
during this period give lie to the notion that they are committed to proceeding out of an 
abundance of caution. Regarding aluminium, ACIP’s actions appear to be guided by the 
belief that such adjuvants are safe. However, I will show below that the evidence used 
to demonstrate the safety of injected aluminium is weak.   
 
Unlike metals such as copper or iron, ‘aluminium has no known beneficial 
physiological action in the human body’ (Morris, Puri, & Frye, 2017, p. 1347). The 
FDA, CDC, and vaccine spokespeople like Offit and Jew (2003) all tend to refer to 
aluminium adjuvants as ‘aluminium salts’ whereas critics point out that these are metals 
and often refer to ‘aluminium nanoparticles’. Proponents tend to express units of 
adjuvants in milligrams whereas critics tend to write the units in micrograms both of 
which appear to be discursive choices to minimise or maximise the perception of the 
quantity. The technical names of the three aluminium adjuvants used in vaccines are 
crystalline aluminium oxyhydroxide (AlOOH), aluminium phosphate (made up of both 
Al-OH and Al-OPO3), and potassium aluminium sulphate (alum) AlK(SO4) (Garçon et 
al., 2018, pp. 63–64). Proponents point out that ‘aluminium is the most abundant metal’ 
on the surface of the earth; they also argue that aluminium adjuvants have been used in 
vaccines for over 80 years and then conclude that therefore it is safe (Offit & Jew, 2003; 
Garçon et al., 2018). Critics argue that the 80 year history of aluminium adjuvants fits 
their narrative just as well if not better (it is unclear whether Sukhareva’s patients were 
exposed to aluminium adjuvants but Kanner’s and Asperger’s independent discoveries 
of autism occurred after the introduction of aluminium adjuvants in vaccines). The 
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scientific case in support of the safety of aluminium adjuvant is based mainly on 
experiments by Priest, Newton, Day, Talbot, and Warner (1995), and Flarend et al. 
(1997), and toxicokinetic models developed by Keith, Jones, and Chou (2002) for the 
ATSDR and Mitkus, King, Hess, Forshee, and Walderhaug (2011) for the FDA. Taking 
each of these studies in turn: 
 
Priest et al. (1995) injected 0.7 µg of the radioactive isotope 26Al into a healthy 41-year 
old Caucasian male (p. 287). Blood samples were taken regularly for 880 days, urine 
and faeces were collected for 14 days, and whole-body radioactivity was measured daily 
for the first 10 days and then less frequently over a period of 1,178 days (Priest et al., 
1995, p. 289). They found that 65% of the 26Al was excreted in the first 24 hours, that 
elimination continued but at a slower rate after that, and that 4% of the 26Al was still in 
the body after three years (Priest et al., 1995, p. 289). They speculated but were not able 
to confirm that the 4% of the 26Al that remained was deposited in the bone and that 
further depletion depended on bone turnover (Priest et al. 1995, p. 292). Two of the 
largest aluminium trade associations in the world funded the study — ‘the Aluminum 
Association, Washington D.C. and the International Primary Aluminium Institute, 
London’ (Priest et al., 1995, p. 292).  
 
Flarend et al. (1997) injected intramuscularly 850 µg of aluminium hydroxide adjuvant 
(labeled with radioactive 26Al), into each of two New Zealand White rabbits and 850 µg 
of aluminium phosphate adjuvant (also labeled with radioactive 26Al) into each of two 
other New Zealand White rabbits. Blood and urine were collected before the start of the 
experiment and regularly for 28 days after injection (Flarend et al., 1997). The rabbits 
were killed on day 28 and tissues samples were taken from the ‘brain, heart, left kidney, 
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liver, mesenteric lymph node, and spleen’; bone samples from the femur were taken but 
lost and the brain sample of one of the rabbits was lost as well (Flarend et al., 1997, p. 
1315).  
 
Over the course of 28 days, 6% of the aluminium hydroxide adjuvant and 22% of the 
aluminium phosphate was eliminated via urine (Flarend et al., 1997, p. 1316). The 
adjuvant that remained in the tissues was distributed as follows: ‘kidney > spleen > 
liver > heart > lymph node > brain’ (Flarend et al., 1997, p. 1317). In the discussion 
section, Flarend et al. (1997) declared that since the increase of aluminium in the blood 
of these rabbits was relatively small, the corresponding increase in plasma aluminium 
concentration in adult humans could be projected at 0.8% and that therefore aluminium 
adjuvants are safe (Flarend et al., 1997, p. 1318). This conclusion rests on two leaps of 
logic — that the conversion from rabbits to people is correct and that low levels in the 
blood cause no harms. No evidence is supplied to support either assertion. Furthermore, 
Flarend et al., (1997) performed no behavioral tests on the rabbits and they have no 
measure of what the long term effects of the aluminium deposits in the brain and other 
tissues would have been. It is also clear from the discussion section (and the small 
sample size and the fact they did not bother to fix problems like losing the brain tissue 
of 25% of their sample) that they saw this study as just a preliminary experiment and 
that other studies on aluminium adjuvant safety would surely follow. However, further 
studies of this type have not been done and public health officials have used Flarend et 
al. (1997) when they attempt to model the toxicity of aluminium in the vaccine schedule. 
Flarend et al. (1997) ‘was supported in part by the Showalter Trust’ (p. 1318); Robert E. 
Showalter was a former Vice-President and Board Member of Eli Lily and Company — 
one of the largest vaccine producers in the world. 
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Keith, Jones, and Chou (2002) at ATSDR built a model to estimate ‘infant body burdens 
during the first year of life for breast milk and formula diets and for a standard 
vaccination schedule’ (p. S13). They wanted to see whether infant body burdens 
exceeded the minimal risk level (MRL) of 2 mg Al/kg of body weight per day 
previously established by ATSDR (1999) for ingested aluminium (Keith et al., 2002). 
They rely on Priest et al. (1995) for the transfer rate from blood, the elimination rates, 
and retention functions and rely on Flarend et al. (1997) for the distribution pattern of 
aluminium in the body. They calculate that the body burden from aluminium in vaccines 
‘exceeds that from dietary sources’ but is below the MRL except on the day of birth as a 
result of the hepatitis B vaccine and at the two-month vaccinations; the four month and 
six month vaccinations also reach the MRL but do not exceed it (Keith et al., 2002, p. 
S15).  
 
The Keith et al. (2002) model was problematic for a number of reasons. The 1999 
ATSDR MRL was based on ingested aluminium which is not comparable to injected 
aluminium. The Priest et al. (1995) and Flarend et al. (1997) studies on which Keith et 
al. (2002) depends are both characterised by a financial conflict of interest and their 
sample sizes are too small to be statistically valid. Keith et al. (2002) takes no account 
of differences in the blood brain barrier or renal function between adults and infants. 
Even with an MRL that was arguably too high, the standard vaccine schedule exceeded 
it. Then ACIP added even more aluminium containing vaccines to the schedule pushing 
the exposure levels even further above the MRL. ATSDR (2008) lowered the MRL to 1 
mg Al/kg of body weight per day based on new animal studies on the dangers of 
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ingested aluminium. The federal government, rather than changing the vaccine schedule,  
decided to create a new toxicokinetic model to show that the vaccine schedule was safe.  
 
Mitkus et al. (2011) was written by five employees of the FDA, Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research and it updates the model from Keith et al. (2002) in light of 
ACIP increasing aluminum content in the schedule even as ATSDR was showing harms 
from ever-lower doses. As I showed in chapter 5, the FDA is a conflicted party because 
it relies on fees from companies they regulate and because they accept corporate 
donations through the Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA, Inc. Given the stakes, it is 
problematic, to say the least, that this paper was not written by an independent body. 
Mitkus et al. (2011) change a number of assumptions about aluminium disposition and 
toxicity and conclude that ‘the body burden of aluminum from vaccines and diet 
through an infant’s first year of life is significantly less than the corresponding safe 
body burden of aluminum modeled using the [ATSDR (2008)] regulatory minimum risk 
level’ (p. 9538). But that is not what their data show. Their data shows that the 
aluminium in the birth dose of hepatitis B vaccine and the vaccines in the 2 month visit 
exceed the MRL, the 4 month vaccines meets the MRL, and the 6 month vaccines 
nearly reach the MRL (Mitkus et al. 2011, p. 9541). They call these periods that exceed 
the MRL, ‘brief excursions’ without providing any discussion of the potential 
toxicological risks of those ‘excursions’ (Mitkus et al. 2011, p. 9541). Later in the paper 
they relax one of the assumptions (about the rate of release of aluminium from the 
injection site) and the ‘brief excursions’ then fall below the MRL and they thus declare 
the schedule safe (Mitkus et al., 2011, pp. 9541–9542).  
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Mitkus et al. (2011) acknowledge that there are reasons to question some of the 
assumptions in their model. The retention rate of aluminum that they use ‘is based on 
results for only one person’ — the adult male volunteer described above in Priest (1995) 
(Mitkus et al., 2011, p. 9542). They go on to say that ‘pharmacokinetic data in infants or 
in more than one adult’ would have been desirable and then quickly close the door to 
that possibility by writing, ‘an expansion of this study is unlikely’ (Mitkus et al., 2011, 
p. 9542). Then they acknowledge that their ‘estimate of the rate and extent of absorption 
of aluminum hydroxide and [aluminium] phosphate following intramuscular injection 
[that comes from Flarend et al., 1997], are based on data from only two rabbits for each 
of the two adjuvants tested’ — however they failed to acknowledge that all of the bone 
samples were lost as was the brain sample of one of the rabbits (Mitkus et al., 2011, p. 
9542). So by their own admission, the safety of the vaccine schedule, administered to 
more than 90% of all children in the U.S., comes down to a model based on estimates of 
the toxicokinetics of aluminium from one adult male human and three rabbits.  
 
Criticisms of Mitkus et al. (2011) have been withering. Masson, Crépeaux, Authier, 
Exley, and Gherardi (2017) point out that Mitkus et al. (2011) once again used an 
ingested MRL that is not comparable to injected aluminium toxicity, failed to 
distinguish between different types of aluminium adjuvants, misunderstood or 
misrepresented aluminium transport in the body, ignored animal studies that show that 
the ATSDR MRL is too high (by a factor of 17), and overestimated the rate of 
elimination of aluminium from the body, amongst other concerns. Masson et al. (2017) 
was funded by an interesting mix of institutions — ANSM (roughly the French 
equivalent of the FDA), the Ile-de-France Region of the PICRI Program (Institutions 
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and Citizens for Research and Innovation), and well known vaccine safety critics, the 
Children’s Medical Safety Research Institute (CMSRI).  
 
Critics of vaccine safety have created a large body of research on the toxicity of 
aluminium and the dangers of aluminium in vaccines.  
 
Christopher Exley, perhaps the world’s leading expert on aluminium toxicity, has 
authored 98 journal articles on the toxicity of aluminium beginning with toxicokinetics 
in animals, then studying the possible role of aluminium in Alzheimer’s Disease, and 
more recently looking at whether aluminium in vaccines might be a factor in causing 
autism. Christopher Shaw and Lucija Tomljenovic, both at the University of British 
Columbia, have produced more than 20 studies on aluminium toxicity and many of 
them have focused on the possible role of aluminium in ASD. The volume of critical 
literature is so large that it is not possible to cover it all in this section so I will highlight 
a few key studies. 
 
Miller (2016b) provides a brief historical literature review of critical aluminium studies 
including a case of industrial aluminium poisoning [Spofforth, 1921] and animal 
experiments that showed harm when aluminium hydroxide cream was applied to the 
brains of monkeys [Chusid, Pacella, Kopeloff, & Kopeloff, 1951; Driver, Ettlinger, 
Moffett, & St. John-Loe, 1968]. Baylor, Egan, and Richman (2002) note that ‘the 
British Ministry of Health recommended aluminium-free vaccines in 1957’ (p. S20).  
 
Bishop, Morley, Day, and Lucas (1997) randomly assigned 227 premature infants who 
required intravenous feeding to receive either standard feeding solution (that contained 
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25 µg of aluminium per decilitre) or a special feeding solution (that contained 2.2 µg of 
aluminium per decilitre); the neurodevelopment of the surviving infants (n = 182) was 
then assessed at 18 months of age (p. 1557). They found that the ‘aluminum exposure 
from the standard intravenous solutions was... associated with a mean loss of one point 
on the Bayley Mental Development Index per day of full intravenous feeding, after 
adjustment for potentially confounding factors’ (Bishop et al., 1997, p. 1561). Long-
term exposures were associated with even more severe outcomes. ‘In infants fed 
intravenously for 10 or more days, those receiving the standard solution had a major (10 
point) deficit in their Mental Development Index and were twice as likely to have a 
Mental Development Index below 85’ which is a key threshold that indicates the risk of 
later learning problems (Bishop et al., 1997, p. 1561).  
 
Zheng (2001) shows that, in animal studies, aluminium exposure increases the 
permeability of the blood-brain barrier. Tomljenovic and Shaw (2011a), ran a 
correlation analysis between rising amounts of aluminium in national vaccine schedules 
around the world and rising prevalence rates of autism. They found that  
 
(i) children from countries with the highest ASD prevalence appear to 
have the highest exposure to Al from vaccines; (ii) the increase in 
exposure to Al adjuvants significantly correlates with the increase in 
ASD prevalence in the United States observed over the last two decades 
(Pearson r=0.92, p<0.0001); and (iii) a significant correlation exists 
between the amounts of Al administered to preschool children and the 
current prevalence of ASD in seven Western countries, particularly at 3–
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4 months of age (Pearson r=0.89–0.94, p=0.0018–0.0248)’ (Tomljenovic 
and Shaw, 2011a, p. 1489).  
 
What is more, they argue that their results satisfy eight out of nine of Hill’s (1965) 
criteria for establishing causality. Tomljenovic and Shaw (2011a) was supported by the 
Katlyn Fox Foundation founded by a mother who lost her daughter to Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome following vaccination and the Dwoskin Family Foundation that funds 
vaccine safety research among other areas. Christopher Shaw is also the chair of the 
Scientific Advisory Board for the CMSRI that was founded by Claire Dwoskin.  
 
The Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety (GACVS) at the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in their meeting of 6–7 June 2012 felt compelled to respond to 
Tomljenovic and Shaw (2011a and 2011b). The GACVS called the two papers 
‘seriously flawed’; they pointed out that Tomljenovic and Shaw (2011a and 2011b) are 
ecological studies that are best used for generating hypotheses rather than drawing 
causal comparisons (WHO, 2012). Then GAVCS went one step further and held up 
Mitkus et al. (2011) as ‘a comprehensive risk assessment that further supports the 
clinical trial and epidemiological evidence of the safety of aluminium in vaccines’ 
(WHO, 2012). Given everything that is known about the limitations of Mitkus et al. 
(2011) to call it ‘comprehensive’ is not credible and raises troubling questions about the 
objectivity of the GACVS and WHO.  
  
Khan et al. (2013) injected intramuscularly three different mice strains with 18 µg of 
aluminium oxyhydroxide adjuvant — a dose designed (via allometric conversion) to 
match the aluminium dose given to children via the U.S. vaccine schedule. They found 
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that aluminium oxyhydroxide adjuvant was well tolerated in normal mice but that 
aluminium nanoparticles ended up in the brains of mice specifically bred with a weak 
blood brain barrier or high tissues levels of what is called CCL2 — a key protein in the 
immune system (Khan et al. 2013, p. 16). The authors concluded that ‘continuously 
escalating doses of this poorly biodegradable adjuvant in the population may become 
insidiously unsafe...’ (Khan et al., 2013, p. 1). The research was supported by funding 
from two French patients’ associations representing those suffering from muscle 
diseases (Khan et al., 2013, p. 16).   
 
Crépeaux et al. (2017) injected aluminium oxyhydroxide (known as Alhydrogel) 
adjuvant into mice at 200, 400 and 800 µg/kg of body weight. They found that 
Alhydrogel does not follow a linear dose response curve and that the group exposed to 
lower doses (200 µg/kg) exhibited more neurobehavioral changes and had higher levels 
of cerebral Al levels than groups exposed to higher doses (Crépeaux et al. 2017, p. 48). 
Further testing revealed that the 200 µg dose was composed exclusively of ‘small 
aluminium nanoparticles’ that they speculated may travel into the brain more easily. 
One of the important takeaways from their study is that the classic ‘the dose makes the 
poison’ rule of toxicology does not appear to apply to Alhydrogel — the most used 
adjuvant in vaccines today (Crépeaux et al. 2017, p. 48). 
 
Mold, Umar, King, and Exley (2017) examined the post-mortem brain tissue of four 
men and one woman who had received a diagnosis of autism during their lives. House, 
Esiri, Forster, Ince, and Exley (2012) had previously conducted a study of aluminium in 
the brain tissue of 60 donors; based on that study, Mold et al. (2017) established 
baselines of ≤1 µg/g dry weight as ‘pathologically benign’, ≥2.0 µg/g dry weight as 
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‘pathologically concerning’, and ≥3.0 µg/g dry weight as ‘pathologically significant’ (p. 
78). ‘The brains of all 5 donors had at least one tissue sample with a pathologically-
significant content of aluminium’ (Mold et al., 2017, p. 78). They commented, ‘We 
recorded some of the highest values for brain aluminium ever measured in healthy or 
diseased tissues in these male ASD donors including values of 17.10, 18.57, and 22.11 
µg/g dry weight’ (Mold et al., 2017, p. 81) with the only similar comparator being ‘a 42 
year old male with familial Alzheimer’s disease’ (Mirza, King, Troakes, & Exley, 2017). 
Mold et al. (2017) has been criticised for small sample size (n = 5), not having a control 
group, and the fact that it was funded by the CMSRI — a well-known vaccine safety 
advocacy group (Gorski, 2017).  
 
9.2.5 Are other vaccine ingredients toxic (at the doses contained in the vaccine 
schedule)?  
 
Thimerosal and the three types of aluminium adjuvants are just four out of hundreds of 
vaccine ingredients. The CDC (2015b) ‘Pink Book’ provides a complete list of what it 
calls ‘excipients and media’ gathered from vaccine product inserts developed as part of 
the FDA approval process. Many of these other ingredients including polysorbate 80, 
neomycin, monosodium glutamate, the use of human and animal cell cultures, and 
borax are also subject to fierce debate regarding safety. The presence of formaldehyde 
has divided vaccine safety groups with some raising concerns (Raines, 2015) and others 
arguing that ‘there is no clear evidence it is harmful and there are good theoretical and 
evidence-based reasons why it is not likely to cause harm other than local inflammation 
at the injection site’ (Vaccine Papers, 2015). The FDA (2014b) and CDC (2015b) 
maintain that these additional ingredients are safe at the doses contained in the schedule. 
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However, there is little research on long-term effects of many of these ingredients and 
there is almost no research on synergistic effects between these ingredients and between 
these ingredients and other chemicals (hormones, toxicants) already in the body.  
 
9.2.6 Studies showing no association between vaccines and autism 
 
In chapter 1, I showed that more than 20 scientific studies have looked at the association 
between vaccines and autism and concluded that there does not appear to be an 
association (Fombonne & Chakrabarti, 2001; Madsen et al., 2002; Mäkelä, Nuorti, & 
Peltola, 2002; Pichichero, Cernichiari, Lopreiato, & Treanor, 2002; Hviid, Stellfeld, 
Wohlfahrt, & Melbye, 2003; Madsen et al., 2003; Nelson & Bauman, 2003; Stehr-
Green, Tull, Stellfeld, Mortenson, & Simpson, 2003; Verstraeten et al. 2003; Wilson, 
Mills, Ross, McGowan, & Jadad, 2003; Andrews et al., 2004; Heron & Golding, 2004; 
Smeeth et al., 2004; Honda, Shimizu, & Rutter, 2005; Fombonne et al., 2006; Miles & 
Takahashi, 2007; Thompson et al., 2007; Baird et al., 2008; Hornig et al. 2008; 
Schechter & Grether, 2008; and Tozzi et al., 2009). Handley (n.d.) has created a website 
that provides detailed descriptions of the flaws in study design and the conflicts of 
interest of the authors in connection with most of these studies. Even though 
randomised double blind controlled trials are widely recognised as the gold standard in 
medicine, none of these studies has a proper control group of unvaccinated children. 
Supporters of the status quo openly acknowledge that this research remains undone. 
Gerber and Offit (2009) write ‘No studies have compared the incidence of autism in 
vaccinated, unvaccinated, or alternatively vaccine children...’ (p. 460). Then they go on 
to argue, ‘These studies would be difficult to perform because of the likely differences 
among these 3 groups in health care seeking behavior and the ethics of experimentally 
 313 
studying children who have not received vaccines’ (Gerber & Offit 2009, p. 460). Offit 
(2010) writes, ‘It would be, of course, an entirely unethical experiment. No investigator 
could prospectively study children who are denied a potentially lifesaving medical 
product. And no university’s or hospital’s institutional review board worth its salt would 
ever approve such a study’ (p. 162). Gerber and Offit are not outliers here, IOM (2013) 
also acknowledged that this research has not been done and argued that ‘it would be 
unethical to conduct such a study’. 
 
Regarding the practical claim that a vaccinated vs. unvaccinated study would be 
difficult to perform, the evidence suggests that this is untrue. In spite of widespread 
vaccine mandates in almost all 50 states there are still pockets of unvaccinated children 
including some religious groups (the Amish), clients of Homefirst Health Services in 
metropolitan Chicago, and homeschooled populations (although such comparisons 
would not be an RCT). Smith, Chu, and Barker (2004) even produced a study for the 
CDC, called ‘Children who have received no vaccines: who are they and where do they 
live?’ Furthermore, the challenge of limiting confounding variables is not impossible. 
Indeed, the Institute of Medicine (2013) concluded, ‘It is possible to make this 
comparison through analysis of patient information contained in large databases such as 
the VSD [Vaccine Safety Datalink]’ (p. 17) before going on to claim that a true RCT 
would be unethical.  
 
But the claim that a true RCT of the vaccine schedule (or even individual vaccines 
against a placebo, more on that below) would be unethical appears to be an example of 
begging the question, the fallacy in which the writer or speaker assumes the statement 
under examination to be true. There are valid reasons to question whether the vaccine 
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schedule is safe — additives like thimerosal in the flu shot were initially grandfathered 
in and not subject to rigorous modern safety testing, there is more aluminium in the 
schedule than ever before, the schedule is larger than at any point in history, the U.S. 
schedule contains more doses of more vaccines than any other country, the schedule 
contains genetically modified vaccines that did not exist when the NCVIA was passed 
— to name just a few examples. The logic of Gerber, Offit, and the IOM is that because 
the vaccine schedule is safe, it would be unethical to study whether it is safe. They 
simply assume away the question.  
 
Because vaccines are required for almost all U.S. children (in order to access day care 
and schools) the stakes are higher and because injection bypasses the body’s usual 
filtering mechanisms in the alimentary canal the potential risks are higher, making the 
need for proper RCTs greater than with any other pharmaceutical product. It is also not 
true that no vaccinated vs. unvaccinated studies exist which I explain in detail below.   
 
9.2.7 Vaccinated vs. unvaccinated studies 
 
In the absence of government funded double blind RCTs on the safety of the vaccine 
schedule (or even prospective or retrospective comparisons between vaccinated and 
unvaccinated groups), many vaccine safety and autism advocacy groups have funded 
their own surveys and studies. As I pointed out in chapter 1, this is an example of what 
Moore (2006) calls Activist-Initiated Participatory Science and in some cases these 
surveys and studies might be considered part of what Rose (2017) calls the ‘Autism 
Literary Underground’.  
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Are these studies valid? It is hard to know. The same issues of the funding effect apply 
in these cases as with the corporate and government funded studies — any COI no 
matter how small has been shown to change research outcomes. Most of these are 
conflicted studies so there is reason for scepticism. The situation is made considerably 
more complicated by the fact that mainstream public health institutions refuse to 
conduct vaccines safety studies with an unvaccinated control group — so there are no 
studies that contradict these findings. It makes for an untenable situation — on the one 
hand a number of studies by advocacy groups show startling results; on the other hand 
mainstream actors claim that these results are unlikely to be true and then refuse to 
conduct the sort of studies that would resolve the matter. But there are two studies that 
are not characterised by a financial conflict of interest (Gallagher & Goodman, 2008 
and 2010) and their results are in line with the findings of the other vaccinated vs. 
unvaccinated studies reviewed in this section.   
 
The NVKP (Nederlandse Vereniging Kritisch Prikken) (Dutch Association of Critical 
Diseases) is a volunteer organisation in Holland founded by ‘a group of people who had 
experience with negative consequences of vaccination’ (NVKP, 2006). In 2004, the 
NVKP conducted a survey of parents of 635 children that included both members of 
NVKP as well as non-members (NVKP, 2006). After filling out a questionnaire, the 
survey team followed up to request supplementary information and ask control 
questions (not specified) (NVKP, 2006). Partially vaccinated results were excluded as 
were incomplete questionnaires (NVKP, 2006). The final sample included 312 fully 
vaccinated children and 231 completely unvaccinated children (NVKP, 2006). The fully 
vaccinated had lower incidence of German measles, whooping cough, and heart rhythm 
disorder/heart murmur (NVKP, 2006). On every other measure — from allergies to 
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asthma to diabetes and febrile convulsions — the unvaccinated children were healthier 
(NVKP, 2006). Furthermore, there were 8 autism cases in the fully vaccinated 
population and none in the unvaccinated population (NVKP, 2006). Problems with this 
study include recall bias, selection bias, excluding the partially vaccinated results, 
source of funding bias, not peer reviewed, and not published in a medical journal.   
 
Generation Rescue (2007) contracted with the polling firm Survey USA to conduct a 
telephone survey to measure health outcomes between vaccinated and unvaccinated 
children. Generation Rescue noted that phone surveys are also used by the CDC to 
estimate prevalence of autism nationwide and that the CDC has previously defended 
telephone surveys as highly reliable (Generation Rescue, 2007). Survey USA collected 
data on 9,175 boys and 8,499 girls in five counties in California and four counties in 
Oregon (Generation Rescue, 2007). They found that ‘vaccinated boys were 155% more 
likely to have a neurological disorder (RR = 2.55), 224% more likely to have ADHD 
(RR = 3.24), and 61% more likely to have autism’ (RR = 1.61) (Generation Rescue, 
2007). One of the things that is intriguing about this survey is that there was negative 
correlation between vaccination status and autism in girls — unvaccinated girls in the 
survey had an autism rate of 3% while fully vaccinated girls in the survey had an autism 
rate of 1% (Generation Rescue, 2007). Gorski (2007) and others raised concerns about 
study design including possible reporting bias (as it was an automated phone poll, 
parents of neurotypical children may have hung up before completing the survey at a 
higher rate than parents of children on the spectrum). The study was never published in 
an academic journal and has since disappeared from the Generation Rescue website; old 
links to the study are broken and no explanation has been posted for its removal (I 
located cached versions of the study available through the Internet Archive).   
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More recently, Generation Rescue and the CMSRI funded two ambitious vaccinated vs. 
unvaccinated studies led by Anthony Mawson, a visiting professor of epidemiology at 
the Jackson State University School of Public Health (Mawson, Ray, Bhuiyan, & Jacob, 
2017a; and Mawson, Bhuiyan, Jacob, & Ray, 2017b). Mawson has a thirty year career 
in epidemiology and a long publishing track record including two publications in The 
Lancet (Jackson State University, n.d.) so he brings more credibility to the debate than 
some prior efforts by autism advocacy groups.  
 
Mawson and his co-authors acknowledged the financial conflict of interest and took 
pains to point out their editorial independence, stating, ‘The funders had no role or 
influence on the design and conduct of the research or the preparation of reports’ 
(Mawson et al., 2017a, p. 10). Mawson and his co-authors designed ‘a cross-sectional 
survey of homeschooling mothers on their vaccinated and unvaccinated biological 
children ages 6 to 12’ and they worked with the National Home Education Research 
Institute (NHERI), a homeschool think tank, to implement the study (Mawson et al., 
2017a, p. 3). They obtained results for 666 children of which 405 (61%) were 
vaccinated and 261 (39%) were unvaccinated (Mawson et al., 2017a, p. 1). The study 
controlled for race, gender, adverse environment (not defined), antibiotic use during 
pregnancy, preterm birth, and ultrasound during pregnancy (Mawson et al., 2017a, p. 8). 
As one would expect, they found that vaccinated children ‘were significantly less likely 
than the unvaccinated to have had chickenpox (7.9% vs. 25.3%; OR = 0.26; CI: 0.2, 0.4) 
and whooping cough (pertussis) (2.5% vs. 8.4%; OR = 0.3; CI: 0.1, 0.6), and less likely, 
but not significantly so, to have had rubella (0.3% vs. 1.9%; OR = 0.1; CI: 0.01, 1.1)’ 
(Mawson et al., 2017a, p. 4).  
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The results for chronic illness were a different story. ‘Vaccinated children were 
significantly more likely than the unvaccinated to have been diagnosed with the 
following: allergic rhinitis (10.4% vs. 0.4%; OR = 30.1; CI: 4.1, 219.3), other allergies 
(22.2% vs. 6.9%; OR = 3.9; CI: 2.3, 6.6), eczema/atopic dermatitis (9.5% vs. 3.6%; OR 
= 2.9; CI: 1.4, 6.1), a learning disability (5.7% vs. 1.2%; OR = 5.2; CI: 1.6, 17.4), 
ADHD (4.7% vs. 1.0%; OR = 4.2; CI: 1.2, 14.5), ASD (4.7% vs. 1.0%; OR = 4.2; CI: 
1.2, 14.5), any neurodevelopmental disorder (i.e., learning disability, ADHD or ASD) 
(10.5% vs. 3.1%; OR = 3.7; CI: 1.7, 7.9), and any chronic illness (44.0% vs. 25.0%; OR 
= 2.4; CI: 1.7, 3.3)’ (Mawson et al., 2017a, p.4).  
 
Mawson, Bhuiyan, Jacob, and Ray (2017b) conducted a separate analysis of the data on 
preterm children, vaccination status, and health outcomes. Preterm in this case is 
‘defined as birth occurring before 37 completed weeks of gestation’ (Mawson et al., 
2017b). The preterm population in the U.S. is large: ‘in 2012, 450,000 babies (11%) 
were born preterm in the United States, resulting in 35% of all infant deaths in that year’ 
(Mawson et al., 2017b, p. 1). Autism rates are higher in extremely preterm infants: 
Johnson et al. [2010] found that 8% of extremely preterm infants were later diagnosed 
with autism; Padilla et al. [2017] found 27.4% of their sample of 84 extremely preterm 
(<27 weeks of gestation) infants were later diagnosed with autism (Mawson et al., 
2017b, p. 2). The CDC’s vaccine schedule makes no exceptions for preterm births. 
‘Preterm infants receive the same doses of the recommended vaccines and on the same 
schedule as term infants’ — even though vaccine safety studies conducted by 
manufacturers specifically exclude preterm infants and clinical practice shows that 
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vaccine adverse events in this population are significantly higher than in the population 
of children born at full term (Mawson et al., 2017b, p. 2).  
 
Mawson et al. (2017b) found ‘no association... between preterm birth and 
neurodevelopmental disability [NDD defined as learning disability, ADHD, and/or ASD] 
in the absence of vaccination’ (Mawson et al., 2017b, p. 1). Preterm birth coupled with 
vaccination increased the odds of NDD by more than five-fold as compared to non-
preterm children who were vaccinated (48% vs. 8.9%; OR = 5.4; CI: 2.5, 11.9) 
(Mawson et al., 2017b, p. 5). Preterm birth coupled with vaccination increased the odds 
of NDD by more than twelve-fold compared to preterm birth without vaccination (48% 
vs. 0%; OR = 12.3; CI: 0.67, 224.2, p=.024; but ‘not technically significant because no 
child in the sample with an NDD was both preterm and unvaccinated’) (Mawson et al., 
2017b, p. 5). Preterm birth coupled with vaccination increased the risk of NDD by more 
than fourteen-fold ‘compared to children who were neither preterm nor vaccinated’ (48% 
vs. 3.3%; OR = 14.5; CI: 5.4, 38.7) (Mawson et al., 2017b, p. 5). If Mawson et al. 
(2017b) are correct, then the high rates of NDD amongst children born preterm may be 
due almost entirely to the effect of vaccination, rather than the early arrival. 
Acknowledged limitations of the study include small sample size, health outcomes were 
not validated by clinical records, and possibility of under-estimating morbidity in 
unvaccinated children because they are less likely to see a doctor (Mawson et al., 2017b, 
p. 6). It is also problematic to lump learning disabilities, ADHD, and ASD together and 
Mawson et al. (2017b) acknowledge that they did this because the sample sizes were so 
small (p. 3). They cite Surén et al. [2012] as showing a high degree of overlap between 
these three diagnoses and yet it would have been better to present the results separately 
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as well (Mawson et al., 2017b, p. 3). The Mawson et al. (2017a, 2017b) results highlight 
the need for immediate further study with larger sample sizes.  
 
The journey to publication for the two Mawson et al. articles was winding. The two 
articles were submitted to major journals without success. Eventually abstracts of the 
two studies were published online in Frontiers in Public Health, however following a 
behind the scenes lobbying effort, the studies disappeared from the website without 
explanation; they were not retracted, they just vanished (Handley, 2017). Then they 
were published in the obscure, Journal of Translational Science. Once again pressure 
behind the scenes resulted in the studies disappearing without explanation, and then, 
after a period of about two weeks, they suddenly reappeared (Handley, 2017).  
 
Paul Thomas is a pediatrician in Portland, Oregon who is an outspoken critic of the 
CDC’s vaccine schedule. In 2016 he co-authored, The Vaccine Friendly Plan with 
Jennifer Margulis. Based on his reading of the scientific data, Thomas developed an 
alternative schedule with no vaccines during pregnancy or at birth, no more than one 
aluminium containing vaccine at any one visit, and he delays administering the MMR 
vaccine until after age 3 (Thomas & Margulis, 2016, p. 339). Thomas vaccinates 
according to the wishes of the parents and so his patients fall into one of three groups — 
those who follow his alternative schedule, those who do not vaccinate at all, and those 
who follow the CDC schedule. Researchers (unnamed) reviewed ‘the health outcomes 
of 2,230 children over age two and under age seven who were patients at... Integrative 
Pediatrics [Thomas’s clinic] from June 2008 [which is when the clinic first opened] to 
February 2015’ to examine the relationship between vaccination status and health 
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outcomes (Thomas & Margulis, 2016, p. 326). The results are presented in the table 
below: 
 
Table 9.1: Clinical Data from Integrative Pediatrics 
Group Total Autism/ASD Rate 
Alternative schedule 1,098 0 0 
Unvaccinated 238 0 0 
CDC schedule 894 15 1/60 
Source: Thomas and Margulis (2016), p. 326.  
 
Given current estimates of 1 in 36 children with ASD, one would expect to see about 30 
cases in the group of children vaccinated according to the alternative schedule and about 
seven cases in the unvaccinated population — instead there were none; while the 1/60 
autism cases for children vaccinated according to the CDC schedule is just slightly 
lower than the national average (Thomas & Margulis, 2016, p. 327). Are these figures 
valid? Thomas has a financial conflict of interest so scepticism is warranted and these 
results have not been published in a peer reviewed journal. But if the figures are correct, 
it would mean that a big piece of the autism puzzle may have been found. Given the 
stakes, one would think public health officials and media outlets would take an 
immediate interest in following up to verify whether the data are correct. As of this 
writing (September 2018), there was no sign of follow up from the CDC or any other 
federal agency and none of the top 10 (by circulation) newspapers in the country have 
reviewed the book.  
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Gallagher and Goodman (2008 and 2010) are also vaccinated vs. unvaccinated studies 
and I will review them in the subsection below.  
 
9.2.8 Hepatitis B vaccine 
 
Given word limits it is not possible to go over every vaccine on the schedule. But I want 
to take a moment to focus on the birth dose of the hepatitis B vaccine because it is 
perhaps the most unusual addition to the national vaccine schedule and four studies 
have linked it with autism. In this subsection I will review medical knowledge about 
hepatitis B, the regulatory history of the hepatitis B vaccine, and recent studies that raise 
questions about the safety of the hepatitis B vaccine administered to newborns.   
 
According to the CDC (2015c):  
 
Hepatitis B is a liver infection caused by the Hepatitis B virus (HBV). 
Hepatitis B is transmitted when blood, semen, or another body fluid from 
a person infected with the Hepatitis B virus enters the body of someone 
who is not infected. This can happen through sexual contact; sharing 
needles, syringes, or other drug-injection equipment; or from mother to 
baby at birth.  
 
The CDC (2015c) notes that ‘Risk for chronic infection [with hepatitis B virus] is 
related to age at infection: approximately 90% of infected infants become chronically 
infected, compared with 2%–6% of adults’. So that would recommend earlier age of 
administration. But given its routes of transmission, the at-risk population for chronic 
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hepatitis B infection is drug addicts, prostitutes, prisoners, health workers, and men who 
have unprotected sex with many men (WHO, 2009, p. 413). Holland (2012) points out 
that, ‘while the ACIP [Mast et al., 2006] notes that transmission through saliva is 
possible, it suggests that nonsexual interpersonal contact must occur over an extended 
period, such as living with a chronic hepatitis B infected person in the same household’ 
(p. 68). The important takeaway is that children are not likely to be infected by casual 
contact (unlike measles for example).  
 
Conis (2011) and Holland (2012) document the regulatory history of the hepatitis B 
vaccine and I summarise their work below. Maurice Hilleman developed the first 
hepatitis B vaccine; it was produced by Merck Sharp & Dohme under the brand name 
Heptavax and approved by the FDA in 1981 (Schmeck, [1981], in Conis, 2011, p. 160). 
When ACIP first reviewed Heptavax in 1982, it noted that the U.S. is ‘an area of low 
HBV prevalence’ and that only 5% of the population is at risk over the course of their 
lifetimes (Holland, 2012, p. 68). So ‘ACIP recommended the vaccine only for “higher 
risk groups”: health-care workers, infants born to mothers infected with hepatitis B, and 
people likely to be in sexual or “needle stick” contact with those infected with hepatitis 
B’ (CDC, [1982], in Holland, 2012, p. 68). 
 
In 1986, the FDA approved a second hepatitis B vaccine, Recombivax HB, also from 
Merck Sharp & Dohme (Boffey, [1986] in Conis, 2011). Recombivax was the first 
genetically engineered vaccine and it is made by inserting a gene from the hepatitis B 
virus into yeast cells (Saccharomyces cerevisiae), causing those cells to produce 
hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg) which then was combined with an aluminum 
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adjuvant and thimerosal preservative to produce an immune response when injected 
(FDA, 1988).  
 
In 1988, ACIP called for screening all pregnant women in the U.S. to identify those who 
were positive for hepatitis B and recommended that children of mothers who test 
positive be vaccinated against hepatitis B (CDC, [1988], in Holland, 2012, p. 68). It 
estimated the population of pregnant women infected with hepatitis B at 16,500 and 
calculated that without vaccination, 3,500 infants would develop chronic hepatitis B 
infection (CDC, [1988], in Holland, 2012, p. 68).  
 
In 1989, a second genetically engineered hepatitis B vaccine was approved by the FDA 
— Engerix-B manufactured by SmithKlineBeecham (Associated Press, [1989], in Conis, 
2011). By 1990, CDC officials had noticed that the full three-dose course was rarely 
completed by high-risk populations (Holland, 2012). In 1991, ACIP reclassified 
hepatitis B as a ‘major health problem’ in the U.S. and ‘recommended hepatitis B 
vaccination for all infants regardless of the mother’s infection status’ (CDC, [1991], in 
Holland, 2012, p. 69). Overnight, the action of ACIP increased the market for hepatitis 
B vaccines for children from the 16,500 infants born to infected mothers to the four 
million children born in the U.S. each year times three doses. ‘By 1999, 42 states had 
mandated the hepatitis B vaccine for students, and over 25,000 reports of adverse events 
linked to the vaccine had been reported to VAERS [the Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System]’ (Conis, 2011, pp. 164–165).  
 
‘In January 1999, ACIP expanded its hepatitis B vaccination recommendation to include 
“all unvaccinated children aged 0–18 years and made hepatitis B vaccine available 
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through the Vaccines for Children program (VFC)”’ for families who could not afford 
the vaccine (CDC, [1999], in Holland, 2012, p. 72). This expanded the market to 76 
million children at three doses each for a total of 228 million doses, about half of which 
would be paid for by the federal government (Holland, 2012, p. 73). Amidst rising 
VAERS reports of injuries from the hepatitis B vaccine, the 106th Congress held 
hearings on the vaccine (Holland, 2012, p. 73). Michael Belkin, whose daughter died 15 
hours after receiving a hepatitis B vaccine, testified that in 1996, ‘there were 54 cases of 
hepatitis B in the 0–1 age group’ (Committee on Government Reform, [1999], in 
Holland, 2012, p. 75). But that ‘same year there were 1,080 reports of adverse events in 
the 0–1 age group and 47 deaths’ (Holland, 2012, p. 75). ‘Total VAERS hepatitis B 
[vaccine] reports for the 0–1 age group outnumbered reported cases of the disease 20 to 
1’ (Committee on Government Reform, [1999], in Holland, 2012, p. 76). As noted 
above, VAERS may undercount actual injuries by a factor of 100 (Kessler, 1993). 
 
Undeterred, in 2005, ACIP further expanded its hepatitis B recommendations by 
declaring that ‘all delivery hospitals should implement standing orders for 
administration of hepatitis B vaccination as part of routine medical care of all medically 
stable infants weighing greater than or equal to 2000 g at birth’ (CDC, [2005], in 
Holland, 2012, p. 73). This is an extremely aggressive medical intervention for a virus 
that is not transmitted through casual or airborne contact, a virus that by the CDC’s own 
admission has very low incidence in the U.S. population, a virus that 90–94% of healthy 
people are able to clear on their own if they do come in contact with it, and given that 
since 1988 hospitals have screened all pregnant mothers for HBV so that children of 
infected mothers could be vaccinated against the disease.  
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How long does the hepatitis B vaccine provide immunity? It is a crucial question 
because the vaccine is given to children just hours after birth but given the routes of 
transmission, exposure to HBV usually does not happen until adulthood if at all. ACIP 
estimated that 15–50% of children do not have immunity 5 to 15 years after vaccination 
with the full three dose series (CDC, [2005], in Holland, 2012, p. 74). There are reasons 
to believe that ACIP was overly optimistic in its assessment. Petersen et al. (2004) in a 
study of low risk children found that ‘Anti-HBs disappeared by 5 years of age in most 
children who were vaccinated with hepatitis B vaccine from birth’ (p. 650). Brands 
were not disclosed but 100% of children vaccinated with one hepatitis B vaccine and 
87.5% of children vaccinated with a second brand had no antibodies against hepatitis B 
at seven years of age (Petersen et al., 2004, p. 650). Wu, Lin, Wang (2013) in a survey 
of 8,733 senior high school students in Taiwan born after 1987 found that only 48.3% 
had antibodies to HBsAg (hepatitis B surface antigen). The study is limited by the fact 
that it did not make a distinction between those with HBsAG of ≥10 mIU/mL (which is 
generally considered protective against hepatitis B infection) and those with less than 10 
mIU/mL. Middleman et al. (2014) writing in Pediatrics acknowledges that ‘little is 
known about duration of protection after the infant primary series of hepatitis B (HB) 
vaccine in settings of low HB endemicity’ (p. e1500). They studied 420, 16- through 
19-year-olds who had received the full three shot series of hepatitis B vaccine as young 
children and found that only ‘24% had protective anti-HBs levels of ≥10 mIU/mL’ 
(Middleman et al., 2014, p. e1500). The authors were pleased by the fact that 92% of 
subjects achieved protective anti-HBs after receiving another booster dose (Middleman 
et al., 2014, p. e1500). But it is not clear how long that booster dose lasts and why it is 
an improvement over the 90+% of the population who are able to clear the virus 
naturally even in the absence of vaccination.  
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The epidemiological research on the safety of the hepatitis B vaccine is mixed but there 
are several studies that have generated cause for concern. Lewis et al. [2001], Marques 
et al. [2007], Demirjian and Levy [2009], and Price et al. [2010] did not find an 
association between hepatitis B vaccination and adverse events (Gallagher & Goodman, 
2010, p. 1665). By contrast, Fisher and Eklund [1999], Fisher et al. [2001], and 
Mikaeloff et al. [2009] found an association between hepatitis B vaccination and a range 
of serious health problems but did not look at autism (Gallagher & Goodman, 2008, pp. 
1665–1666).  
 
Gallagher and Goodman (2008) using data from the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey 1999–2000 found that boys who received all three doses of the 
hepatitis B vaccine (n = 46) were 8.63 times more likely (OR) to have a developmental 
disability than boys who did not receive all three doses (n = 7) (CI: 3.24, 22.98) (p. 
1002). The study has been criticised for small sample size and not sufficiently 
controlling for confounding factors (Left Brain/Right Brain, 2009). Gallagher and 
Goodman (2010) using data from the National Health Interview Survey 1997–2002 
found that boys: 
 
who received the first dose of hepatitis B vaccine during the first month of 
life had 3-fold greater odds for autism diagnosis (n = 30 with autism 
diagnosis and 7044 without autism diagnosis; OR = 3.002; 95% CI = 
1.109, 8.126), relative to boys either vaccinated later or not at all, adjusted 
for race, family structure, and maternal education (p. 1669).  
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In this study the authors obtained shot records for the children which addresses the 
problem of recall bias (Gallagher & Goodman, 2010, p. 1670). Perhaps most 
importantly, Gallagher and Goodman had no financial conflicts of interest (Gallagher & 
Goodman, 2010, p. 1665) — these studies were not funded by pharmaceutical 
companies, the CDC, nor autism advocacy groups.  
 
Given that the scientific case is so weak for requiring the birth dose of hepatitis B 
vaccine for all newborns, what motivated ACIP’s multiple decisions to expand its use 
(and why did AAP and NVAC go along with those decisions)? One possibility is 
cultural capture — the members appear to view vaccines as an unalloyed good so the 
more, the earlier, the better. But adding 228 million arguably unnecessary doses of a 
vaccine to the national schedule without a strong scientific justification raises the 
troubling possibility of financial capture — that profit interests may have been the 
motivating factor. Or perhaps it is a combination of both. In any event, one is hard 
pressed to make the case that ACIP’s decisions in connection with the hepatitis B 
vaccine are in children’s or the nation’s best interests.  
 
9.2.9 Troubling recent data on the benefits and safety of the flu vaccine 
 
As described in section 9.2.3 above, after thimerosal was removed from most vaccines 
in the early 2000s, it still remained in the some versions of the flu vaccine. Furthermore, 
as thimerosal was being phased out of most vaccines, the CDC added the flu vaccine to 
the schedule for children and pregnant women (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox, & Bridges, 
2004) which nullified the natural experiment of removing it from the other vaccines. 
ACIP’s actions in connection with the flu vaccine are troubling on many levels. Green 
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(1996) writes, ‘the single greatest area of risk and uncertainty in the pharmaceutical 
context is in the field of drugs for pregnant women’ (p. 340). Most clinical trials do not 
include pregnant women because of the risks involved so data on the safety of 
administering vaccines during pregnancy are usually lacking. In this subsection I will 
review studies that show that the flu vaccine is not very effective in adults or children 
and that administering the flu vaccine during pregnancy increases the risk of autism. 
Collectively these studies will once again raise questions about the degree of cultural 
and financial capture at ACIP (and by extension, the CDC, HHS, AAP, NVAC, etc.)  
 
The scientific case for recommending the flu vaccine for either adults or children is 
dubious. In 2014, Cochrane (formerly the Cochrane Collaboration) published a 
systematic review of the literature on the effectiveness of the influenza vaccine among 
adults (Demicheli et al., 2014). They noted that ‘over 200 viruses cause influenza and 
influenza like illness (ILI), producing the same symptoms (fever, headache, aches, pains, 
cough and runny noses)... At best, vaccines may only be effective against influenza A 
and B, which represent about 10% of all circulating viruses’ (Demicheli et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, they found that ‘vaccination shows no appreciable effect on working days 
lost or hospitalisation’ (Demicheli et al., 2014). In 2012, Cochrane conducted a 
systematic review of influenza vaccine in children. They noted that the CDC 
recommends the flu vaccine for children in the U.S. at 6 months of age, but their own 
findings showed, ‘in children under the age of two, the efficacy of inactivated vaccine 
was similar to placebo’ (Jefferson, Rivetti, Di Pietrantonj, Demicheli, & Ferroni, 2012). 
Furthermore, they found that ‘that reliable evidence on influenza vaccines is thin but 
there is evidence of widespread manipulation of conclusions and spurious notoriety of 
the studies’ (Jefferson et al., 2012).  
 330 
 
Zerbo et al. (2017) in a cohort study using in-house data from Kaiser Permanente 
(private health maintenance organisation) of 196,929 children, of whom 3,103 had 
autism spectrum disorder, found that maternal influenza infection (actually getting the 
flu) during pregnancy was not associated with increased autism risk (p. 1). But they 
found that maternal vaccination with the flu shot during the first trimester was 
associated with a 20% increased risk of autism ‘(adjusted hazard ratio = 1.20; CI: 1.04, 
1.39)’ (Zerbo et al. 2017, p. 1). Then they applied a Bonferroni adjustment and the 
result was no longer statistically significant and so they concluded, ‘These findings do 
not call for changes in vaccine policy or practice’ (Zerbo et al. 2017, p. 1). As I pointed 
out earlier in the chapter on phthalates, BPA, and flame retardants, Bonferroni 
adjustments are controversial (Perneger, 1998; Moran, 2003; Nakagawa, 2004) and 
‘there is no formal consensus for when Bonferroni procedures should be used’ 
(Nakagawa, 2004, p. 1044). The most cited paper in the medical literature, Perneger 
(1998), states that ‘Bonferroni adjustments are, at best, unnecessary and, at worst, 
deleterious to sound statistical inference’ (Perneger, 1998, p. 1236). JAMA Pediatrics 
published letters by Hooker (2017) and Donzelli, Schivalocchi, and Battaggia (2017) 
that argued that the use of a Bonferroni adjustment in Zerbo et al. (2017) was not 
supported by sound statistical reasoning.  
 
Zerbo et al. (2017) appears to demonstrate an extraordinary degree of cultural capture. 
Kaiser Permanente is an enclosed healthcare system — all doctors, specialists, hospitals, 
and pharmacy services are delivered through the Kaiser network. So the healthier their 
patients, the more money they make (because the patients are not using services). 
Patients with autism are expensive because they require lots of specialists and often 
 331 
have a host of co-morbid conditions including seizures (Tuchman & Rapin, 2002), gut 
issues (Erickson et al., 2005), sleep issues (Malow et al., 2012), anxiety (White, Oswald, 
Ollendick, & Scahill, 2009), and OCD (Russell, Mataix-Cols, Anson, & Murphy, 2005). 
Kaiser Permanente has everything to gain — from higher profits to greater market share 
to prestigious prizes in medicine — from figuring out the causes of autism. And yet 
even when their own data shows an association between the flu shot (that they 
recommend for all of their pregnant patients) and autism they dismiss it. They are 
betting the financial viability of the company and the health of millions of children and 
the nation itself on a Bonferroni adjustment being correct in this instance, even though 
that decision rests on dubious theoretical and empirical grounds. Zerbo et al. (2017) 
appear to have placed an ideological commitment to vaccination ahead of their 
commitment to sound scientific practices.  
 
9.2.10 Allegations of fraud in vaccine safety research 
 
In this subsection I will briefly review allegations of scientific misconduct against 
Andrew Wakefield who is a well known critic of vaccine safety as well as allegations of 
scientific misconduct against Thomas Verstraeten, Poul Thorsen, and William 
Thompson who conducted research on vaccines and autism for the CDC. 
 
Allegations of ethical misconduct against Andrew Wakefield are well known (see, e.g., 
Deer, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch, 2011) and often brought up 
in discussions of vaccine safety (Offit, 2010). However, the story is much more 
complex than is usually portrayed in the popular debate. Wakefield et al. (1998) 
published in The Lancet a case series of 11 children with autism that hypothesised that 
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the MMR vaccine may have led to ileal-lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia and non-specific 
colitis which led to their autism. Following the publication of the article, the Royal Free 
Hospital held a press conference in February 1998 in which Wakefield called for the 
MMR vaccine to be withdrawn and replaced with single virus vaccines. The Sunday 
Times, hired Brian Deer, a freelance journalist, to investigate Wakefield’s research. 
Wakefield’s study was eventually retracted by The Lancet (The Editors of The Lancet, 
2010), and he was struck from the UK medical registry (GMC, 2010) following the 
longest investigation in the history of the General Medical Council (Dyer, 2010, p.1). 
Godlee et al. (2011) in BMJ argued that Wakefield falsified data — but that was based 
on their understanding of Deer’s investigation — the GMC did not investigate whether 
Wakefield’s data were correct; he was struck for violating ethics rules (Triggle, 2010). 
Godlee et al. (2011) was itself problematic. It relied on the work of Deer — but Deer’s 
investigation was initially funded by The Sunday Times which is owned by Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corp and Murdoch’s son James sat on the board of GSK — one of the 
makers of the MMR vaccine (Sharav, 2016). Three months after publishing their 
condemnation of Wakefield, the BMJ had to issue an errata to disclose that it had a 
financial conflict of interest because it was backed by the two pharmaceutical 
companies that manufacture the MMR vaccine — Merck and GSK (BMJ, 2011). One of 
Wakefield’s co-authors, the Australian paediatric gastroenterologist John Walker-Smith 
was also struck from the register by the GMC. But, unlike Wakefield, Walker-Smith 
appealed the decision to the Court of Queen’s bench which concluded that the GMC’s 
conclusions were ‘based on inadequate and superficial reasoning’ and declared, ‘the 
finding of serious professional misconduct and the sanction of erasure are both quashed’ 
(Walker-Smith v. GMC, 2012). Many autism advocacy groups argue that the logic of the 
high court’s decision likely extends to Wakefield’s case as well (Elizabeth Birt Center 
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for Autism Law and Advocacy, n.d.) while supporters of the current vaccine schedule 
argue that it does not (Reiss, 2016b).  
 
What is less well known is that there are allegations of fraud against three researchers at 
the CDC or under contract with the CDC in connection with studies that concluded 
there is no link between vaccines and autism.  
 
In the 1990s as autism rates began to skyrocket in the United States, a group of parents 
came up with the hypothesis that thimerosal in vaccines might be the culprit (Kirby, 
2005). It was plausible enough to merit investigation — as described above, thimerosal 
is 49.6% ethylmercury, ethylmercury is a known neurotoxin, and the expansion of the 
vaccine schedule beginning in 1987 meant that children were being exposed to more 
ethylmercury in the vaccine schedule than ever before. Even more troubling, the 
cumulative levels of ethylmercury in the CDC’s schedule vastly exceeded the safe 
levels of methylmercury established by the ATSDR, EPA, and FDA (Kirby, 2005, p. 
49). The CDC decided to investigate this hypothesis and the task fell to one of its senior 
research scientists, Thomas Verstraeten. For his study, Verstraeten turned to the 
Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) which the CDC set up in 1991 and included health 
records from four health maintenance organisations (‘Group Health Cooperative of 
Puget Sound in Washington, Northwest Kaiser Permanente in Oregon, Northern 
California Kaiser, and Southern California Kaiser Permanente’) (Chen et al., 1997). 
Using the Freedom of Information Act, autism advocacy groups such as SafeMinds 
(2003 and 2004) discovered that Verstraeten produced five different generations of the 
analysis. There is no evidence that he initially planned five phases of research — rather, 
e-mails and other documents turned over to SafeMinds reveal that early drafts of the 
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analysis produced large statistically significant dose dependent associations between 
thimerosal exposures and neurodevelopmental disorders including autism and with each 
subsequent draft Verstraeten, after extensive consultation with colleagues, found 
various ways to re-organise the analysis to reduce the effect (SafeMinds, 2004, p. 2). 
Taking each phase in turn:15 
 
Generation Zero. (This was the earliest analysis but only discovered in a later document 
dump and it is the only analysis with a zero exposure group, hence the Generation Zero 
label). Verstraeten, Davies, Gu, and DeStefano, (1999) submitted an abstract, to the 
annual Epidemic Intelligence Service conference, on their initial work examining the 
relationship between thimerosal in vaccines and developmental neurological impairment. 
Their initial sample consisted of immunisation records from 400,000 infants born 
between 1991 and 1997 available through the VSD (Verstraeten et al., 1999). 
Importantly, their analysis included a zero exposure group (at one month of age) that 
they could compare against the highest ethylmercury exposure group (>25 µg) in 
examining ‘subsequent risk of degenerative and developmental neurologic disorders and 
renal disorders before age 6’ (Verstraeten et al., 1999). They write,  
 
The relative risk (RR) of developing a neurologic development disorder 
was 1.8 (95% confidence intervals [CI] = 1.1–2.8) when comparing the 
highest exposure group at 1 month of age (cumulative dose >25 µg) to the 
unexposed group. Within this group we also found an elevated risk for the 
following disorders: autism (RR 7.6, 95% CI=1.8–31.5), nonorganic sleep 
                                                
15 SafeMinds (2003, 2004) provides the outline of this critique of the Verstraeten et al. (2003) 
research project and I use Verstraeten et al. (1999) and Kirby (2005) to fill in critical details.  
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disorders (RR 5.0, 95% CI = 1.6–15.9), and speech disorders (RR 2.1, 95% 
CI = 1.1–4.0) (Verstraeten et al., 1999).  
 
The authenticity of this abstract is not disputed (Willingham, 2014). Those who 
question vaccine safety see this document as the only CDC funded vaccinated vs. 
unvaccinated study, a smoking gun, and evidence of a CDC cover up (SafeMinds, 2003, 
2004). Those who accept the status quo position see this document as an example of 
how ‘preliminary results change over time as data collection and analysis are completed’ 
(Willingham, 2014).  
 
Generation 1. In an e-mail dated 17 December 1999, Verstraeten wrote to Robert Davis 
and copied Frank DeStefano with the subject line, ‘It just won’t go away’; in the body 
of the e-mail he wrote that ‘all the harm is done in the first month’ (Kirby, 2005, p. 192). 
Just over two months later, Verstraeten had produced a new draft of the analysis — a 
thirty page report titled ‘Thimerosal VSD Study, Phase 1— update 2/29/00’ (Kirby, 
2005, p. 191). Verstraeten made a number of questionable judgement calls, such as 
excluding all children who did not receive 2 polio vaccines (which reduced the number 
of zero exposure patients), combining the zero exposure group with the <25 µg group, 
and introducing ‘stop dates’ that reduced the number of children in the sample with a 
diagnosis of autism (SafeMinds, 2004, p. 19). Even then, the relative risk of autism for 
the highest exposure group (>62.5 µg) was 2.48 (Kirby, 2005, p. 191). On 19 March 
2000, Verstraeten e-mailed DeStefano to explain that he had run a separate analysis on 
10 premature infants from Northern California Kaiser and found that the highest 
exposure group had a relative risk of developing autism of 5.0 (Kirby, 2005, p. 193) 
[which is in line with the Mawson et al. (2017b) finding of an OR of 5.4 for premature 
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infants]. Verstraeten wrote that the findings were ‘very extreme’ and said that ‘It 
warranted closer examination of these diagnoses’ (Kirby, 2005, p. 193).  
 
Generation 2. By June 2000, Verstraeten had produced another draft of the analysis, and 
now the relative risk of autism was 1.69 — still troubling but no longer statistically 
significant. CDC officials organised a gathering of leading epidemiologists at the 
Simpsonwood Conference Center in Georgia on 7–8 June 2000, to review Verstraeten’s 
latest findings (Kirby, 2005, p. 130; SafeMinds, 2003). As a result of the deliberations 
at Simpsonwood, Verstraeten and his team re-organised the study. Among the changes, 
Verstraeten added data from another HMO (Harvard Pilgrim which had previously filed 
for bankruptcy, used a different reporting system than the other two HMOs, and had 
been fined for record keeping failures) (Kirby, 2005, p. 148).  
 
Generation 3. By 1 July 2001, Verstraeten had produced a new analysis that he was 
scheduled to present to the Institute of Medicine; he opened his remarks by announcing 
that he had just been hired by vaccine maker GSK and would be relocating to work at 
their offices in Belgium (Kirby, 2005, p. 176). In spite of this clear conflict of interest, 
Verstraeten presented his findings as scheduled. In the new analysis, Verstraeten broke 
out each HMO separately and further subdivided the disability categories which shrank 
the statistical power of each of his findings (SafeMinds, 2003, p. 13).  
 
Generation 4. The final paper, Verstraeten et al. (2003) was published in Pediatrics; 
even though Verstraeten was now living in Belgium and working for GSK this was not 
disclosed in the journal article. Verstraeten et al. (2003) was highly influential in 
shaping IOM (2004) that concluded that there was no association between thimerosal 
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and autism and IOM (2004) was influential in shaping the Omnibus Autism Proceedings 
that denied the claims of 5,000 families. When autism advocacy groups later requested 
the VSD data used by Verstraeten et al. (2003) so that it could be re-analysed, the CDC 
claimed that the data had been lost; a contractor testified that he had been ordered to 
destroy data and the CDC announced that as of 2000 it would no longer monitor 
thimerosal exposures via the VSD (Kirby, 2005, p. 396).  
 
Poul Thorsen is a Danish doctor and researcher who has a long publishing track record 
of studies investigating the causes of autism. He was the data manager for Madsen et al. 
(2002) that found no evidence of an association between the MMR vaccine and autism 
and the data manager for Madsen et al. (2003) that found no evidence of an association 
between thimerosal containing vaccines and autism. In the 1990s, Denmark represented 
a potentially interesting natural experiment because it manufactures many of its 
vaccines via a state agency, and it removed thimerosal from vaccines in 1993. Poul 
Thorsen was a rising star in epidemiological research because he was adept at using big 
data to examine health questions (Grundvig, 2016, pp. 12–13). Thorsen figured out that 
he could use the Danish Health Registries — ‘more than 200 healthcare databases that 
store virtually all disease, disorders, and ailments of Danish citizens after 1968’ to 
perform a range of retrospective studies for government agencies including the CDC 
(Grundvig, 2016, pp. 12–13). Madsen et al. (2003) was instrumental in shaping the IOM 
(2004) decision that vaccines do not cause autism and the Omnibus Autism Proceedings 
decisions as well. But a closer look at the study revealed there were important flaws in 
study design. Kennedy (2016) observed: 
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In 1993, the same year Denmark removed thimerosal-containing 
vaccines from distribution, it coincidentally required, for the first time, 
that outpatient autism cases be reported on the government’s national 
disease registry. Prior to 1993, only inpatient cases were reported. These 
represented less than 10 percent of the total. Denmark’s new reporting 
protocols increased the reported autism incidence cases by nearly 1300 
percent. Dr. Thorsen and his pals took advantage of that artificial rise to 
suggest that real autism incidence had increased following thimerosal’s 
ban. The authors violated established peer-review scientific protocols by 
deleting the entire 2001-year class of seven-year-olds from the final 
published version. That deletion was flagrant research fraud. The 2001 
cohort was the first to be entirely free from thimerosal exposure in their 
vaccines (p. xiii).  
 
Similar flaws characterised Madsen et al. (2002) (Kennedy, 2016, p. xv). Grønborg et al. 
[2013] later reanalysed the data from that period and showed a decline in autism rates 
following the removal of thimerosal (Kennedy, 2016, p. xv). 
 
On 13 April 2011, Thorsen was indicted by a federal grand jury and ‘charged with 13 
counts of wire fraud and 9 counts of money laundering’ in connection with the theft of 
‘$1 million in CDC grant money earmarked for autism research’ (Crosby, 2011). As of 
2017, Thorsen was still on the [U.S.] Office of the Inspector General’s Most Wanted list 
(OIG, n.d.). Even after his indictment, the CDC’s Coleen Boyle stayed in contact with 
Thorsen; Diana Schendel at the CDC and Rosemary Higgins at NIH continued to 
publish with Thorsen (Clay, 2017, p. 3).  
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Reiss (2016a) makes a three-fold argument as to why accounts of Thorsen’s alleged 
crimes are overstated. 1.) ‘Thorsen was one of several authors, and not a lead one...’; 2.) 
‘there’s nothing to suggest any data manipulation....’; and 3.) ‘If Thorsen is accused of 
stealing from the CDC, how can he at the same time be an accomplice of the CDC in 
hiding data?’ (Reiss, 2016a). Responding to each argument in turn: 1.) Thorsen was the 
data manager for the project, that is not incidental; 2.) the data was manipulated by 
changes in how autism was recorded in Denmark and the deletion of key data that 
changed research outcomes (Kennedy, 2016); and 3.) data manipulation and stealing 
from the CDC are not mutually exclusive.  
 
William Thompson is one of the scientists at the CDC tasked with investigating a 
possible association between the MMR vaccine and autism following publication of 
Wakefield et al. (1998). Thompson is the third author on a key study, DeStefano, Bhasin, 
Thompson, Yeargin-Allsopp, and Boyle (2004) that said there is no association between 
the MMR vaccine and autism. Brian Hooker is the father of a child who regressed into 
autism two weeks after being vaccinated at 15-months of age (Barry, 2015). Hooker has 
become adept at using the Freedom of Information Act to request key government 
documents from the CDC about autism research (Barry, 2015). Hooker has sometimes 
found allies within the CDC who help him to ask the right questions and ask for the 
right documents (Barry, 2015). Hooker and Thompson spoke on the phone several times 
between 2002 and 2003 but then Hooker was blocked from further contact when he 
filed suit in the vaccine court as part of what became the Omnibus Autism Proceedings 
(Barry, 2015). Then in 2013, Thompson called Hooker (Barry, 2015). Thompson and 
Hooker spoke on the phone more than 30 times over the period November 2013 to 
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August 2014 (Barry, 2015). Hooker secretly recorded four of those phone conversations 
and transcripts of the calls are contained in the book, Vaccine Whistleblower (Barry, 
2015) and recordings of the calls are featured in the documentary film Vaxxed (Bigtree 
et al., 2016). Among the highlights of those calls, Thompson stated that ‘I’ve basically 
decided to stop lying’; that ‘thimerosal-containing vaccines should never be given to 
pregnant women’; and that the CDC was ‘sitting on’ a database of about 1,200 children 
with autism called the SEED study that had never been made public (Barry, 2015). 
Thompson has never denied the veracity of those recordings and in (2014) he issued a 
statement via his attorney saying,  
 
I regret that my co-authors [DeStefano, Bhasin, Yeargin-Allsopp, and 
Boyle] and I omitted statistically significant information in our 2004 
article published in the journal Pediatrics. The omitted data suggested 
that African American males who received the MMR vaccine before age 
36 months were at increased risk for autism. Decisions were made 
regarding which findings to report after the data were collected, and I 
believe that the final study protocol was not followed.  
 
Thompson also contacted U.S. Representative Bill Posey and turned over 100,000 pages 
of documents to him. Posey took to the House floor to enter Thompson’s testimony into 
the Congressional record including Thompson’s statement that,  
 
All the authors [DeStefano, Bhasin, Yeargin-Allsopp, and Boyle] and I 
met and decided sometime between August and September 2002 not to 
report any race effects for the paper. Sometime soon after the meeting, 
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where we decided to exclude reporting any race effects, the coauthors 
scheduled a meeting to destroy documents related to the study. The 
remaining four coauthors all met and brought a big garbage can into the 
meeting room and reviewed and went through all the hard copy 
documents that we had thought we should discard and put them in a huge 
garbage can (Congressional Record, 2015, p. H5602).  
 
Reportedly, Thompson was granted whistle-blower protection by President Obama in 
2015 (Howley, 2015) but thus far he has not been called to testify before Congress. 
Willingham (2015) writing in Forbes questions Thompson’s account of destruction of 
data arguing that electronic copies would have survived because CDC is a ‘multilevel 
bureaucracy with multiple levels of data backup, archiving, and storage’ (para. 9). As 
evidence to support that claim she cites the work of Frost (2014) writing on the Minitab 
blog who reviewed DeStefano et al. (2004) and concluded that it was ‘a careful 
observational study that assessed the role of potential confounders’ before 
acknowledging that it lacked an unvaccinated control group.  
 
It is standard practice at scientific journals for articles to be retracted if there is any 
evidence of fraud or scientific misconduct. To date, none of the studies co-authored by 
Verstraeten, Thorsen, or Thompson described above has been retracted (although 
Pediatrics in 2004 attached an errata to Verstraeten et al. [2003] to correct an error and 
simultaneously noted that ‘he is currently employed by GlaxoSmithKline’). 
Furthermore, it is standard practice in systematic reviews to exclude studies where there 
is evidence of bias. Yet at no point have the IOM (now the National Academy of 
Medicine) nor the wider scientific community taken steps to exclude Verstraeten et al. 
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(2003), Madsen et al. (2002 and 2003), and DeStefano et al. (2004) from meta analyses 
nor systematic reviews.  
 
9.2.11 Vaccines do not work very well in the first year of life 
 
Mainstream immunologists acknowledge that vaccines do not work very well in the first 
year of life. Vaccines (Plotkin, Orenstein, Offit, & Edwards, 2018) is a standard medical 
textbook. Chapter 2, Vaccine Immunology, is authored by Claire-Anne Siegrist (2018) 
who wears a number of different hats — ‘Professor of Vaccinology at the University of 
Geneva, Switzerland; attending physician for paediatric infectious diseases, vaccinology 
and immunology at the University Hospitals of Geneva; Director of the Pediatric 
Department of the University of Geneva; and Head of the WHO collaborating Center 
for Neonatal Vaccinology’ (WHO, 2010). Siegrist (2018) writes that ‘currently 
available vaccines have largely been developed empirically, with little or no 
understanding of how they activate the immune system’ (p. 16). Empirically, in this 
case means through trial and error and subsequent observation. 
 
Later in a section on ‘The challenges of neonatal and early life immunization’ Siegrist 
(2018) writes,  
 
Early life responses markedly differ from those elicited in mature hosts. 
The blunting of neonatal immune responses has been regarded for many 
years as resulting from ‘neonatal tolerance’, reflecting the antigen 
naïveté of the immune system and, subsequently, its immaturity. Recent 
work has prompted a change of perspective, leading to the recognition 
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that the neonatal and early life immune system is, in contrast, 
specifically adapted to the unique challenges of early postnatal life and 
develops over time through poorly defined but tightly regulated 
processes (p. 32). 
 
Offit (2010) characterises unvaccinated children as uniquely vulnerable, however 
Siegrist (2018) sees it the opposite way — that children come into the world uniquely 
well-suited to the surrounding environment.  
 
Siegrist (2018) presents a table (2-10) with seven reasons why vaccine responses in 
early life may be limited including the, ‘influence of maternal antibodies’ (p. 32). 
Infants receive immune protection from the mother through breast milk — so when a 
child is vaccinated, the immune response is often driven by the mother’s antibodies, not 
necessarily those produced by the infant. This realisation — that maternal antibodies 
interfere with immune response to vaccines in infants — led Moon et al. (2010) to 
suggest that ‘strategies to overcome this negative effect, such as delaying breast-feeding 
at the time of immunization, should be evaluated’ (p. 919). Moon and three of her co-
authors are at the CDC and another co-author was at NIH. Moon and her team were 
widely criticised for this proposal and the CDC later distanced itself from this 
recommendation (Johnson, 2017).  
 
Siegrist’s (2018) initial response to the failures of vaccines in the early years of life is to 
recommend upping the number of antigens before acknowledging that this strategy also 
fails as a result of ‘higher titers of maternal antibodies elicited by maternal 
immunization’ (p. 34). Both Siegrist and the CDC then appear to fall back on simply 
 344 
upping the number of vaccine doses in early years. Siegrist (2018) writes, ‘Maternal 
antibodies usually allow a certain degree of priming (i.e., of induction of memory B 
cells) through yet undefined mechanisms. As a rule, the blunting of infant antibody 
responses by maternal antibodies disappears after boosting’ (p. 34). It is interesting to 
note that neither of those assertions have citations in the text. But one can see how both 
the WHO and CDC have gotten themselves into a sort of arms race against maternal 
antibodies, recommending ever more potent vaccines and ever more doses to overcome 
the fact that vaccines during early life do not work very well. But given the data on the 
risks of mercury and aluminium and other adjuvants presented earlier in this chapter, 
one can also see how this arms race against maternal antibodies might also produce 
catastrophic iatrogenic outcomes for infants for whom the blood-brain barrier is not 
fully developed. Furthermore, it does not take a lot of imagination to come up with 
alternatives to this sort of arms race. Since vaccines do not work well during the first 
years of life, encouraging more breast feeding (maternal antibodies for free), providing 
more paid leave, and postponing vaccines until the child is older and more suited to an 
effective immune response would seem like promising science-based alternatives. 
However, none of those alternatives is profitable and the ideological commitment to 
vaccination is so strong that such alternatives are usually not even contemplated in the 
mainstream scientific community. 
 
9.3 Lobbying and campaign contributions by vaccine makers  
 
In the last chapter I wrote about lobbying expenditures by Pfizer ($191.42 million from 
1999 through 2018). The other three major vaccine makers — GSK, Merck, and Sanofi 
— also spend heavily on lobbying. From 1999 through 2018, GSK spent $92.84 million 
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on lobbying (CRP, 2018, ‘GSK’). From 1999 through 2018, Merck spent $119.83 
million on lobbying (CRP, 2018, ‘Merck’). From 1999 through 2018, Sanofi spent 
$109.78 million on lobbying (CRP, 2018, ‘Sanofi’). Combined, the four pharmaceutical 
companies that control 86% of the vaccine market spent a reported $513.87 million on 
lobbying over that twenty year period.  
 
Autism Speaks is the largest autism advocacy group in the U.S. but is no longer seeking 
a cure for autism and it does not support the vaccine autism hypothesis. From 2005 
when it started through 2018, Autism Speaks spent a total of $6.2 million on lobbying 
— primarily on issues of services and support for people with autism. The Coalition for 
Safe Minds spent $45,000 on lobbying in 2012 and again in 2013 but does not appear to 
have spent money on lobbying before or since. Neither Generation Rescue nor 
Children’s Health Defense appears to have a lobbying presence in Washington, D.C.  
 
9.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I showed that the vaccine market is large, profitable, and growing rapidly 
(9.1.1); documented that the U.S. vaccine schedule tripled following the passage of the 
NCVIA of 1986 (9.1.2); reviewed the vaccine approval process (9.1.3); argued that 
clinical trials as part of the FDA licensure process are too short and too small and use 
toxic placebos (9.1.4); provided evidence of COI at the FDA’s Vaccines and Related 
Biological product Advisory Committee (VRBPAC), the CDC’s Advisory Committee 
on Immunization Practices (ACIP), and the National Vaccine Advisory Committee 
(NVAC) (9.1.5); showed that post-market surveillance of vaccine adverse events is 
inadequate (9.1.6); highlighted the revolving door between CDC and vaccine makers 
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(9.1.7); discussed the lobbying at the state level to make vaccines compulsory (9.1.8); 
and showed COI in science and medical journals associated with vaccines (9.1.9). I also 
showed that there are two very different ways of looking at the net benefits to society 
from widescale vaccination programs (9.2.1), reviewed the debate over herd immunity 
(9.2.2), discussed the toxicity of ethylmercury (9.2.3) and aluminium (9.2.4); noted that 
little is known about the toxicity or interaction effects of other ingredients in the vaccine 
schedule (9.2.5); reviewed studies showing no association between vaccines and autism 
(9.2.6); uncovered a wealth of vaccinated vs. unvaccinated studies (9.2.7); discussed 
studies on the safety of the hepatitis B vaccine (9.2.8), reviewed recent studies on the flu 
vaccine (9.2.9); documented allegations of fraud in vaccine safety research (9.2.10); and 
noted that vaccines do not work very well in the first year of life (9.2.11). Finally I 
showed that the four largest vaccine makers spent heavily on lobbying ($513.8 million 
combined over the last 20 years) while the Coalition for Safe Minds (the only autism 
advocacy group opposed to vaccines that used a registered lobbyist during that period) 
spent $90,000 (9.3). Given the stakes, it is essential for government to be able to prove 
the safety of the U.S. vaccine schedule. Yet over the last three decades, as the schedule 
has tripled and moved earlier into key developmental windows, public health authorities 
have responded to legitimate questions and concerns with obfuscation, self-dealing 
behaviour, and legislative strategies based on coercion.  
  
 347 
Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
 
10.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will review the main findings of my research (10.1), discuss the 
implications of my findings (10.2), highlight the limitations of the research (10.3), and 
suggest some possibilities for future research (10.4).  
 
10.1 Main findings of my research  
 
In chapter 1, I presented evidence that autism prevalence rates are high and rising. One 
in 36 children in the U.S. are now diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum 
(Zablotsky et al., 2017); this is a 27,000% increase from the first autism prevalence 
estimate of less than 1 per 10,000 people in the population (Treffert, 1970). In 2015, 
ASD cost the U.S. an estimated $268 billion a year in direct costs and lost productivity; 
given current rates of increase, costs could reach $1 trillion a year within 10 years 
(Leigh & Du, 2015). In the U.S. on average, ‘the cost of supporting an individual with 
an ASD and intellectual disability during his or her lifespan was $2.4 million... The cost 
of supporting an individual with an ASD without intellectual disability was $1.4 million’ 
(Buescher et al., 2014, p. 721). Mothers often experience sharp declines in earnings as 
many become the principle care giver (Cidav et al., 2012).  
 
While the federal government through its various health agencies has devoted the bulk 
of research funding toward exploring theories of genetic causation, ‘there is no such 
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thing as a genetic epidemic’ (Kirby, 2005; Barclay, 2005; Hertz-Picciotto in Cone, 
2009). The most comprehensive study of twins and autism to date estimates that genetic 
heritability explains at most 38% of ASD cases and this is likely an overestimate 
(Hallmayer et al., 2011). The CDC also promotes the idea that the rise in autism 
prevalence may be the result of diagnostic expansion and substitution. Yet, several 
studies have concluded that diagnostic expansion and substitution, while a factor, 
represent a small fraction (somewhere around 26.9% to 31.3%) of the total increase 
(Byrd et al. 2002; Hertz-Picciotto & Delwiche, 2009; Nevison & Blaxill, 2017).  
 
There are many large, well-conducted studies that suggest that a range of toxicants may 
be driving the increased prevalence of autism. Possible environmental triggers include 
mercury from coal fired power plants (Palmer et al. 2006 and 2009), hazardous air 
pollutants (Windham et al., 2006), and emissions from motor vehicles (Hoyer et al., 
2004; Volk et al., 2011); phthalates (Ejaredar et al., 2015), BPA (Kardas et al., 2016), 
and flame retardants (Bennett et al., 2016); Roundup (Swanson et al., 2014); 
organophosphates, chlorpyrifos, pyrethroids, and carbamates (Shelton et. al., 2014); 
SSRIs (Croen et al., 2011; Eriksson et al., 2012; Rai et al., 2013; Sørensen et al., 2013; 
Gidaya et al., 2014; Harrington et al., 2014; El Marroun et al., 2014; Boukhris et al., 
2016), acetaminophen (Avella-Garcia et al., 2016; Liew, Ritz, Virk, & Olsen, 2016) and 
vaccines (Gallagher & Goodman, 2008 and 2010; Thomas & Margulis, 2016; Mawson 
et al., 2017a and 2017b). Other environmental factors that have been associated with 
autism are the age of parents at conception (Croen et al., 2002; Glasson, 2002; Bhasin & 
Schendel, 2007; and Durkin et al., 2008) as well as maternal obesity combined with 
maternal diabetes (Li et al., 2016). It is unclear whether those two additional 
environmental factors are also related to toxicants (e.g. different outcomes for older 
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parents could be the result of the natural aging process or the result of longer lifetime 
exposure to toxicants and rising obesity and diabetes rates could stem in part from 
environmental triggers). While noting that correlation is not causation, all of the 
possible environmental triggers have a plausible causal pathway by which they might 
cause autism. All of the toxicants in this list have higher odds ratios or relative risks for 
autism than other products that have been withdrawn from the market (Vioxx, Zicam) or 
discontinued (hormone replacement therapy) due to their side effects.  
 
In the midst of this crisis, the CDC does not use the word epidemic, the NIH devotes 
only a tiny fraction of research funding toward studying environmental factors, and no 
federal agency in the U.S. is engaged in trying to prevent autism via more proactive 
regulation of toxicants. The question then becomes, given rising prevalence rates and 
the extraordinary impacts of ASD on individuals, families, and communities, what 
explains why public health authorities, thus far, have failed to ban or restrict toxicants 
that have been shown to increase autism risk? 
 
This is an interesting historical moment for studying issues of science and medicine 
because by most accounts positivism is dead (its demise possibly hastened by Kuhn, 
1962) and yet it is not entirely clear what replaces it (e.g. poststructuralism does not 
offer a solid foundation for making science-based policy decisions). So it is important to 
be clear about the theoretical lenses I use to approach the material (chapter 2). My 
ontology and epistemology are shaped by Longino’s (1990) contextual empiricism — 
scientific knowledge is socially constructed and always subject to change but within the 
range of what is ‘known’ now, there are relatively better and worse choices available to 
policymakers. My methodology is influenced by the critical public health work of 
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Navarro (2008) and the descriptive political epidemiology of Pega et al. (2013). My 
research offers an elaboration on Lukes (1974) by showing: 1.) the battle of ideas in 
connection with autism; 2.) how the producers of toxicants are able to keep issues off 
the table; and 3.) how power also distorts the interests, preferences, and ideation of 
dominant (advantaged) groups (who seem to build defences to protect profitable turf 
rather than pursuing knowledge wherever it leads them). Finally, this thesis is an 
application of Wendell’s (1996) research on the social construction of disability — 
particularly the political economy factors that can create material changes in human 
bodies — while challenging the exclusively poststructural approaches to the social 
construction of disability as represented by Haraway (1991).   
 
Kuhn (1962) presents an idealised vision for how science changes its mind from 
immature science with competing paradigms to the emergence of a dominant paradigm 
which leads to a period of normal science followed by anomalies that produce crises 
that can lead to a paradigm shift (chapter 3). Wootton (2006) shows that the history of 
medicine does not resemble Kuhn’s model at all. Galenic medicine decreased one’s 
odds of survival. The 19th century saw some important breakthroughs that moved 
medicine toward a replicable empirical foundation but many of the early innovators 
(Horace Wells, Alexander Gordon, and Ignaz Semmelweis) were bullied, harassed, and 
ostracised by their peers and driven to an early grave. Medicine seemed to enjoy a 
golden age in the mid 20th century following the invention of antibiotics along with 
randomised controlled trials to confirm their effectiveness. The fact that in the 
developed world chronic conditions (including autism) have now surpassed illness from 
viruses and/or bacteria suggests that the golden age has passed and that a new uncertain 
future has emerged (Bethell et al., 2011).  
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The history of toxic chemical disasters and long term toxic chemical exposures possibly 
offers some important lessons for the autism epidemic (chapter 4). Toxic chemical 
disasters go through stages — from a private issue to a public issue to a political issue 
(Reich, 1991). Even after 30 years of rising prevalence rates, autism is still mostly a 
private issue and it is just beginning to become a public issue. Case studies in long term 
toxic chemical exposures such as asbestos, lead, and tobacco also reveal common 
patterns. Because many of these toxic industries use the same PR firms for product 
defence, they tend to follow a similar playbook that moves through stages including 
denial, insisting that harms only happen at high levels of exposure, and blaming other 
factors (such as genetic predisposition or lifestyle characteristics) (Sass & Rosenberg, 
2011). I also showed that victim blaming is common in the early stages, legal discovery 
is essential in unearthing key documents, and often some new technology is developed 
that enables earlier detection of harms at lower doses. 
 
In chapter 5, I argued that there is a popular perception shaped by the work of Merton 
(1942) that science and medicine are a separate walled garden, where dedicated men 
and women are bound by the ethical norms of CUDOS — communism/communalism, 
universalism, disinterestedness, and organised scepticism. It is unclear whether 
Merton’s norms ever actually existed or served some other ideological purpose (Mulkay, 
1976). Mirowski (2011) showed that the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 led to 
the privatisation of the scientific commons and the end of any sort of 
communism/communalism. Mirowski (2011) and others show that every step in the 
scientific process in the U.S. is now shaped by corporate influence including: 
universities (professors, departments, and the university itself); corporate scientific 
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research (that increasingly relies on trials conducted by contract research organisations 
in China and the third world); scientific journals (that often accept advertising and 
struggle with ghost, guest, and gift authorship); government (CDC, FDA, NIH, EPA, 
and elected officials); and medical school students, doctors, and professional medical 
associations. Extraordinary conflicts of interest across all aspects of the scientific 
endeavour have led to the replication crisis and high levels of iatrogenic injury.  
 
In chapter 6, I showed that on three separate occasions, Congress or U.S. federal 
agencies have acted to block research into possible environmental triggers of autism. I 
also looked at the regulatory history of phthalates, BPA, and flame retardants. Animal 
studies raised concerns about the toxicity of phthalates in 1947 and a large body of 
literature developed over the ensuing years. The European Commission banned six 
phthalates in 1999. In 2008, the U.S. Congress banned three phthalates (a fourth has 
since been added) in children’s products but left unaddressed the exposure to phthalates 
via food, beverages, and drugs (the highest phthalate exposures). Furthermore, Congress 
regulates phthalates individually instead of as a class which considerably slows and 
limits the regulatory process.  
 
The estrogenic properties of BPA have been known since the 1930s but initially it was 
viewed as a potentially helpful medical treatment. In the 1950s, BPA was incorporated 
into the manufacture of plastics. The National Cancer Institute launched a study on the 
carcinogenicity of BPA of 1977. In 1988, the EPA adopted a relatively high reference 
dose based on a study produced by a private contractor that had been cited for poor 
quality control measures and poor pathology practices and that remains the safety 
standard today. It was discovered that BPA is an endocrine disruptor in 1993. In 2012, 
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after nearly 100 studies had shown harms from BPA, the FDA “banned” BPA from 
baby bottles and ‘sippy cups’ — after manufacturers had already removed BPA from 
those products. The EPA spent more than 20 years trying to develop an Endocrine 
Disruptor Screening Program but they selected a crude measurement instrument. After 
the first round of tests finally got off the ground, the EPA announced in 2017 that none 
of the 52 chemicals tested showed any endocrine disrupting health effects in spite of a 
large body of scientific evidence showing that they do.  
 
Adding flame retardant chemicals to furniture was the brainchild of the tobacco industry 
as a way to head off regulations that might require them to produce fire safe cigarettes. 
Nearly 100% of Americans tested have flame retardant chemicals in their bodies, ‘blood 
levels of certain widely used flame retardants doubled in adults every two to five years 
between 1970 and 2004’, and ‘a typical American baby is born with the highest 
recorded concentrations of flame retardants among infants in the world’ (Callahan & 
Roe, 2012a, para. 13). Tests show that flame retardant chemicals do not stop fires better 
than untreated foams. In 2013, California finally changed the flammability standard but 
these chemicals are so ubiquitous in the environment that it remains to be seen when 
levels of flame retardant chemicals in the body will begin to decrease.  
 
Many of the pesticides and herbicides used in the U.S. were developed first as chemical 
weapons in World War I and II (chapter 7). The U.S. government promoted commercial 
applications of these chemicals and was slow to include public health considerations in 
evaluating their use. Glyphosate-based herbicides are the most widely used herbicides in 
the world, there is a growing scientific consensus that they are more toxic to humans 
than initially believed, and a number of studies (albeit in marginal scientific journals) 
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have made a link between the increased use of glyphosate-based herbicides and autism. 
Even as the International Agency for Research on Cancer (2015) has moved to label 
glyphosate-based herbicides as probable carcinogens and the State of California labeled 
them as known carcinogens, the FDA and EPA have refused to revisit their previous 
decisions that permitted their widespread use. The CHARGE study documented that 
organophosphates, chlorpyrifos, pyrethroids, and carbamates all increase the risk of 
autism. Dow previously agreed to withdraw chlorpyrifos from residential use but it is 
still permitted and widely used in agriculture. Congress and the various health and 
regulatory agencies have failed to take action against the remaining pesticides.  
 
SSRIs represent the clearest case of all of the toxicants listed in this thesis and are 
potentially the easiest to regulate (chapter 8). Eight studies have shown a statistically 
significant association between SSRI use in pregnant women and subsequent autism in 
their offspring. Two other studies found an association but these results were not 
statistically significant; closer examination of these two studies shows that the authors 
made scientifically questionable judgement calls that changed the results. To date the 
FDA has not issued black box warnings, the CDC has not intervened, and the American 
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists and the American Psychiatric Association, 
both of which have financial conflicts of interest, have not taken steps to limit 
prescriptions for SSRIs for women who are pregnant or want to become pregnant.  
 
In chapter 9, I showed that the debate regarding vaccines and autism is composed of a 
series of smaller debates about the safety of individual ingredients and the effects and 
risks of individual vaccines and the whole schedule. With a few notable exceptions, the 
science in connection with vaccine safety by all parties is characterised by financial 
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conflicts of interest. There are no studies that demonstrate the safety of the entire 
vaccine schedule. None of the studies that purport to demonstrate the safety of 
individual vaccines or individual vaccine ingredients includes a completely 
unvaccinated control group. The toxicokinetic model developed by the FDA to 
demonstrate the safety of aluminium as an adjuvant is based on prior studies of one 
adult male and three rabbits and is thus not statistically valid because the sample sizes 
are too small. The hepatitis B vaccine has been linked with autism in four studies and 
appears to be unnecessary for children except those born to mothers who are positive for 
the hepatitis B virus. The flu vaccine given to pregnant mothers offers few benefits and 
has been linked with autism in one study. The Wakefield case is more complicated than 
is usually reported and characterised by financial conflicts of interest on many sides. 
There is fairly good evidence that Verstraeten, Thompson, and Thorsen all violated 
sound scientific practices in key vaccine safety studies. Even defenders of the status quo 
admit that vaccines do not work very well in the first year of life. In spite of the 
enormous stakes and wide range of conflicting studies, mainstream research in this area 
slowed considerably following the Institute of Medicine (2004) recommendation to 
focus on other avenues of inquiry.  
 
The patterns across all of these different products are remarkably similar. There are 
early concerns about toxicity. Even as in vitro and in vivo evidence accumulates about 
potential risks, corporate power is able to shape regulation, shape the science, and delay 
regulatory action for decades. Only five chemicals have been banned under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) since it was enacted in 1976 and no chemicals have 
been banned under the TSCA since 1990 (although some have been voluntarily 
withdrawn by manufacturers) (GAO, 2006b). The failure of government to effectively 
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limit potential autism triggers suggests that the purpose of regulation is to protect the 
profits of the large corporations that write the rules rather than protecting public health 
(Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976).   
 
The products listed in this thesis are produced by some of the biggest companies in the 
world and they spend heavily to influence the political system and shape the regulatory 
environment to favour their interests. Companies lobby and make campaign 
contributions individually and also through various trade associations. The public tends 
to think of energy, plastics, flame retardants, pesticides, and pharmaceuticals as separate 
industries but they are closely intertwined. For example, Bayer makes BPA, pesticides, 
and pharmaceuticals and spent $112.86 million on lobbying the federal government 
between 1999 and 2018 to protect and promote its multiple business interests (CRP, 
2018, ‘Bayer AG’). There are also interlocking boards — Kenneth C. Frazier serves as 
Chairman of the board and CEO of Merck and also Director at ExxonMobil (Merck, 
n.d.); Gregory Boyce formerly was CEO of Peabody Energy Corporation, ‘the world’s 
largest private-sector coal company’ and served on Monsanto’s board (before the 
company was acquired by Bayer). From 1999 through 2018, chemical and related 
manufacturers spent $887.39 million on lobbying (Center for Responsive Politics, 2018, 
‘Chemical and related manufacturing’). The pesticide industry is characterised by 
oligopoly as just four firms (Syngenta-ChemChina, Bayer Cropscience Monsanto, 
DowDupont, and BASF) control 84% of the market (International Panel of Experts on 
Sustainable Food Systems, 2017, p. 23) and these firms lobby collectively through 
groups such as CropLife America and individually to promote their interests. 
Pharmaceutical companies spent more than $4 billion on lobbying members of 
Congress from 1999 through 2018 (CRP, 2018, ‘Pharmaceuticals/Health Products’). 
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Environmental groups have begun to spend more heavily on lobbying — $289 million 
over that same 20-year period (CRP, 2018, ‘Environment’) — with the bulk of that 
money focused on climate change legislation. However, the spending race is still wildly 
asymmetrical — in the U.S., corporations spend 34 times more money on lobbying than 
all public interest groups combined (Drutman, 2015). All of these actors also spend 
heavily on campaign contributions and new ‘dark money’ vehicles make total campaign 
spending impossible to track (Mayer, 2016).  
 
10.2 Implications of my findings 
 
There are a number of implications that emerge from my findings.  
 
1. In the U.S. today, medical science is social, medical science is political, medical 
science is capitalistic, but medical science is not very scientific at least not in the 
Mertonian sense of the word. The funding effect is a social phenomenon. The evidence 
shows that when a company provides free samples, free food, or makes a financial 
contribution of any kind, subtly, unconsciously, yet consistently the study results tend to 
favour the sponsor’s desired outcomes. Time and again the research presented in this 
thesis shows scientists making sure their results conformed with the expectations of 
their clients or peer group. In chapter 5, I quoted a CRO executive boasting that he 
could give clients whatever results they want. Science-for-hire firms and academic 
research centres that accept corporate sponsorship give their corporate clients the results 
that they need to fend off regulation and to win in court. Favourable scientific studies 
are a commodity that can be purchased on the open market; this is legal and the 
scientific community has done little to stop it. In chapter 9, I showed e-mails of Thomas 
 358 
Verstraeten repeatedly checking in with his supervisors asking them to guide him to 
their preferred outcomes. William Thompson wrote to CDC Director Julie Gerberding 
seven days before the IOM meeting in February 2004 so that she would have ample 
time to remove him from the program before he shared his damaging findings. 
According to William Thompson — Frank DeStefano, Tanya Bhasin, Marshalyn 
Yeargin-Allsopp, and Coleen Boyle met as a group to destroy documents. Far from the 
image of the lone scientist toiling in the lab or the heroic scientist announcing 
breakthrough results, autism research is characterised by a sort of bureaucratic 
echolocation as government and corporate scientists frequently check in to make sure 
that their results stay within the bounds of what is expected of them. A Nobel Prize 
likely awaits whoever figures out the causes of autism and yet Verstraeten et al. (2003), 
DeStefano et al. (2004), and Zerbo et al. (2017) used questionable scientific methods to 
make their statistically significant results go away — and they were rewarded for these 
actions by their peers. It is both necessary and helpful for scientists to collaborate with 
each other, challenge each other, and fix errors in their work. But what seems to be 
happening with autism research is markedly different from that. With autism research 
there is evidence of scientists going to great lengths to step outside the norms of 
accepted scientific practice (adding in corrupted data to dilute findings, destroying data, 
applying Bonferroni adjustments without justification) so that they can stay within 
accepted social norms and avoid being displeasing to funders and/or superiors.  
 
2. Because of their unique epistemic position, science and medicine are incredibly 
powerful but also uniquely vulnerable to the corrupting influence of profit. That has 
created a series of internal crises (including ghost authorship, the reproducibility crisis, 
and high levels of iatrogenic injury) that pose an existential threat to science itself. 
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Obstetrics, psychiatry, and paediatrics as professions are all characterised by 
widespread conflicts of interest and their failure thus far to engage in autism prevention 
research is troubling and appears to show these professionals putting class interests 
ahead of their duty of care.   
 
3. It is commonplace to believe that the U.S. has a regulatory system in place to protect 
public health and safety by limiting exposures to toxic chemicals. In reality the 
regulatory system is porous. Almost everything gets through the FDA on the first try 
and postmarket surveillance is generally inadequate. The EPA is toothless by design. 
The NIH has blurred the line between public good and private gain. The CDC actively 
works on behalf of industry. This is a reflection of the extraordinary degree of cultural 
and financial capture of government by corporations. This is also an indictment of a 
century of progressive reforms of the state that stemmed from the belief that the state 
could be harnessed to protect the public interest. Regulation is a reflection of political 
power not scientific reasoning nor public health considerations per se. Even when there 
is evidence of harms, it can take a century to get effective regulatory action.  
 
4. The patterns uncovered in this thesis serve as a stark reminder of the dangers of 
economic liberalism. In science and medicine, laissez faire has led to privatisation of the 
commons, skyrocketing costs, dwindling output of truly novel treatments, oligopoly, 
and catastrophic levels of iatrogenic injury. But the patterns uncovered in this thesis also 
serve as an unexpected defence of political liberalism. Toxic trespass appears to be at 
the centre of the autism epidemic. Individuals must regain the right to control what goes 
into their bodies as a check against corporate power. Labelling laws such as California’s 
Proposition 65 (the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986) are a 
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good start. Changes to toxic tort laws would give individuals greater access to redress 
for toxic trespass. And vaccine choice must be protected by state and federal law to 
guard against possible corruption in medicine. 
 
5. The U.S. is facing a political economy problem that is preventing a public health 
response to the autism epidemic. The political economy problem is the distorting 
influence of capitalism on science and medicine and the cultural and financial capture of 
government by corporations. Until the U.S. addresses the political economy problem it 
will likely be unable to address the public health problem.  
 
10.3 Limitations, paradoxes, and contradictions of the research 
 
Most of the studies I cite show correlation but causation is more difficult to demonstrate. 
Indeed, some of those at the forefront of autism research argue that we may never have 
definitive causation in connection with autism because there will always be too many 
confounding variables. But again, one can stop an epidemic even in the absence of 
establishing causation through natural experiments created by policy changes.  
 
The entire theory of the case from environmental epidemiologists and autism advocacy 
groups could be incorrect. Like the history of peptic ulcers, there could be some as yet 
unknown bacteria or virus or other factor like radiation, diet, or lifestyle that is causing 
autism. However, even if that is the case, current public health funding strategies 
focused largely on genetics are not well suited to find it.  
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As yet, there are no biomarkers for autism just as there are no biomarkers for any 
mental health condition. This makes any research in this area highly fraught and opens 
the door to the perception that rising autism rates may be a result of medicalisation. 
With autism, like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression, I contend that we 
have pretty good observation-based diagnostic measures but observation necessarily 
involves interpretation and so organised scepticism is always warranted. Furthermore, 
autism is not solely a brain issue — it also appears to involve the digestive system, the 
immune system, and the central nervous system — which adds extraordinary 
complexity to any discussion of causal factors.  
 
Others have noted that I am using scientific studies (Sismondo, Krimsky, Ioannidis, 
Gøtzsche, Angell, Lexchin, Cosgrove, etc.) to make the case that science is broken or at 
least strongly influenced by capitalism. But that suggests that some “good” science is 
still getting published so perhaps science really is self-correcting? It seems to me that in 
any institution or field of knowledge there are a range of different actors and some are 
more ethical than others. The authors that I think have done the best work often struggle 
on the sidelines of the field — marginalised by their peers precisely because of the fact 
that they have staked out positions that run counter to the dominant discourse. Many 
criticise their profession only after retiring (Angell) or because they feel that they have 
nothing to lose (Gøtzsche). Others operate in the social sciences (Sismondo, Mirowski, 
Krimsky) criticising corruption in science and medicine from the outside but have 
relatively little traction within the profession. Furthermore, no matter how insightful 
their research, their impact on policy is always in doubt.  
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Readers will also note that in the case of all of the potential environmental triggers 
except vaccines, the government funded studies are often the “good” studies, whereas 
with vaccine safety research I argue that the FDA, CDC, and NIH are conflicted parties 
and should be treated as such. How is that possible — can government really be 
differentially captured by agency and by issue? A closer look reveals interesting 
wrinkles. Critical research discounting the role of diagnostic expansion and substitution 
as well as highlighting the risks of hazardous air pollutants and pesticides comes from 
the UC Davis MIND Institute that was set up by parents of children on the autism 
spectrum and established with funds from the California legislature. Furthermore, it is 
one thing for public health officials to criticise phthalates made by oil companies and 
another matter to criticise vaccines which would implicate nearly every doctor and 
public health department in the country. Pharmaceutical companies spend more money 
on lobbying and campaign contributions than any other industry, so it would make sense 
that the degree of capture would be greatest in connection with the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals.   
 
Colleagues have asked if all or even most of the research is conflicted why should we 
trust some results and not others? A related issue is that if COI are disqualifying 
because of the funding effect, then there is almost no research left on which to base 
policy so how can one make decisions? A strong case can be made that paradigm shifts 
in general and the autism debate in particular are not about evidence per se. The 
available evidence can be used to construct a wide range of different (and conflicting) 
plausible narratives. How one sees the issue is also a question of interpretation and 
one’s interpretation is influenced by a host of factors including one’s class, metaphysics, 
ontology, and epistemology. If one believes that U.S. society is meritocratic, that 
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capitalism is self-regulating, and that science is generally self-correcting, one will be 
inclined to support the dominant narrative. If one believes that elite discourse tells us 
about power not truth, that capitalism tends to cause unnecessary harms, and that 
parents have a unique and superior epistemological position from which to make claims 
about what happened to their children, one will be inclined to construct a more critical 
narrative. Social science research shows that beliefs come first and logic and evidence 
are assembled after the fact to justify belief (Haidt, 2012). The important point here is 
that all of this recommends a political economy approach to understanding autism and 
other public health issues because it requires that one have a conversation about all of 
these levels of belief, influence, evidence, and knowledge. I think when we debate the 
evidence in its context this leads to better analysis than traditional positivist approaches.  
 
10.4 Possibilities for further research 
 
Historical epidemiology is often able to reconstruct the early days of an epidemic or 
disease. Olmsted and Blaxill (2010) figured out the family histories of Kanner’s early 
autism patients (and they make the case that many of these families had high levels of 
exposure to mercury). Sheffer (2018) has done extraordinary historical research on 
Asperger’s patients. To date, no one has attempted to reconstruct the medical history of 
Sukhareva’s first patients but such research could provide important insights into autism. 
The obstacles there are enormous — for example it is unclear what archival records 
from Moscow from the 1920s still exist, it is unclear if any of Sukhareva’s records exist, 
or if there are any surviving relatives of any of Sukhareva’s patients. But if Sukhareva’s 
patients really do mark the start of the modern autism epidemic it would be helpful to 
figure out the toxicological, viral, and bacterial context in Moscow prior to the first 
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cases and then attempt to identify the factors that changed that might have triggered this 
new disorder.    
 
A large number of lawsuits have been filed against Monsanto for alleged harms from its 
herbicide, Roundup. Three hundred and twenty of those lawsuits have been combined 
into a class action suit that is being heard in U.S. District Court (2019). The judge in 
that case, Vince Chhabria, has ruled that internal Monsanto documents, turned over in 
discovery can be unsealed and made available to the public (U.S. District Court, 2019). 
This creates a large body of new documents that researchers can use to better 
understand Monsanto’s own research into the toxicity of Roundup and potential harms.  
 
There is an urgent need for more cross-national comparisons between countries with 
different autism rates and different regulatory structures. For example one could 
compare the regulatory framework for 200 high volume toxic chemicals, serum levels 
of those toxicants in the bodies of citizens, and prevalence rates of neurodevelopmental 
disabilities including autism between different countries. While limiting confounding 
variables (diet, weather, genetics) is difficult, this is a challenge that faces many cross-
national comparisons and is not insurmountable.  
 
There are likely natural experiments as a result of policy changes or unforseen events 
around the world that could be studied to better understand the potential role of 
environmental triggers in the autism epidemic. For example a coal fired power plant or 
a chemical plant that shuts down for maintenance or that is damaged by a natural 
disaster might lead to lower emissions that result in changes in autism prevalence in the 
area. The E.U.’s more aggressive regulation of phthalates, pesticides, and other 
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chemicals as compared with the U.S. could also lead to interesting comparative studies 
of exposures and health outcomes.   
 
Autism is likely to be an issue of growing political and economic importance for the 
foreseeable future. In addition to the research projects mentioned above, the political 
economy of autism can and should become an entire subfield within the social sciences. 
In a post-positivist world, the social sciences are a vital and necessary part of the debate 
that involves the intersection of science, society, power, health, medicine, environment, 
politics, and economics.   
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